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
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ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82 (ACCS-82). VOLUME III. ANNEXE--ETC(U)  
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# ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS - 82)

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## VOLUME III ANNEXES

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <i>ADA114114</i>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)  <i>ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82 (ACCS-82)</i>		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED  <i>Final - 7810 thru 8002</i>
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) <i>Dwight L. Wilson, Brigadier General (Promotable), US Army, et. al.</i>		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS <i>Headquarters, Department of the Army ATTN: OCSA (DACS-CC) Washington, DC 20310</i>		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS  <i>T92398A (WOZUAA)</i>
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <i>Total Force; Command and Control; Policy; Planning; Mobilization; Active Army Support of Reserve Components; Installation Management; Army Readiness Regions, Readiness Groups, and Advisors; Army Readiness and Mobilization Re- gions; Organization, Mission, and Functions of Major Army Commands</i>		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <i>Four Volume Report: I - Executive Summary and main body of final report -- findings, conclusions, and recommendations (374 pgs); II - Detailed description of existing command and control organizational structure in COMUS and the can- didate alternative organizations (502 pgs); III - Annexes supporting Vol I -- background leading to the study, methodology, 19 supporting sub-studies, minutes of meetings of advisory groups, selected bibliography, glossary (546 pgs); IV - Detailed description of Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) concept (66 pgs). (See Continuation Page)</i>		

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Item 20, "Abstract," Continued

Study conducted in Office of Chief of Staff, Army, by 18-man study group led by BG (P) Dwight L. Wilson (names of other members listed in Executive Summary). Study objective was to make recommendations to the Chief of Staff, Army, to improve Total Army CONUS command and control capabilities to perform missions during peacetime, wartime, and throughout the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

Methodology included research of literature; data collection; interviews with staff members of all Services, within OSD, with key staff members and commanders (past and present) of CONUS major commands, and at 146 Active and Reserve Component headquarters from MACOM through battalion levels; documentation of organization, responsibilities, procedures, and resources for existing CONUS command and control structure from HQDA through brigade levels; development of candidate organizational structure alternatives; quantitative and qualitative analysis of the existing structure and alternatives; Army Staff and MACOM review of, and comment concerning, the study group's findings, conclusions, and recommendations; and, presentation of the final report to the Army's leadership.

Study report provides recommendations concerning 61 specific issues identified by the group as requiring resolution in order to accomplish the study objective (Vol I, Chap 7). Recommendations are organized in three general categories:

1 - Organizational: this includes layering, installation management, spans of control, peacetime functional alignment of MACOM and selected Reserve Component units, etc..

2 - Transition (from peacetime to wartime operations): this includes use of State Area Commands (STARCs), adequacy of communications and ADP support, adequacy of dedicated planning resources, requirements for mobilization exercises, etc..

3 - Other: this includes feasibility of providing "one-stop" installation support for Reserve Component units, potential use of recent retirees in selected Reserve Component units, adequacy of post-mobilization individual training programs, planning for total mobilization, etc..





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

17 APR 1980

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) -- Final Report  
(Volumes I - IV)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. Subject study has been reviewed at HQDA.
2. The recommendations of the study group, contained in Chapter 7 of Volume I, have been approved with the following modifications:
  - a. Organizational Issue 1. The Army Readiness and Mobilization Region concept, described in Volume IV, is the approved organizational alternative.
  - b. Organizational Issue 3. The activation of one additional CONUS headquarters is contingent upon the availability of resources; resource availability will be addressed during the staffing of the Army FY 82-86 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
  - c. Organizational Issue 17. Battalion-level advisory positions may be retained on a case-by-case basis if justified by a FORSCOM review conducted in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve.
  - d. Organizational Issue 20. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, is assigned the responsibility for developing the Army Mobilization and Planning System (AMPS). The Director for the Army Staff has the authority to approve the organizational requirements to support development of the AMPS.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Thomas U. Greer", is positioned above the typed name.

THOMAS U. GREER  
Major General, GS  
Director of Management

①

## FOREWORD

The views, opinions, findings and/or recommendations contained herein should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision unless so designated by other official documentation.

This volume contains backup information and detailed data to be considered in conjunction with Volume I, Study Report, Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82). The materials in these annexes are specific to the needs of the study and should not be extracted out of context.

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ANNEX A  
LETTER OF ESTABLISHMENT



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL AND THE ADJUTANT GENERAL CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

HQDA Ltr 10-78-5

DACS-DMA (M) (27 Sep 78)

S- 5 October 1978  
29 September 1978

Expires 29 September 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. PURPOSE. This letter provides initial planning guidance for the conduct of a study which will examine the US Army command and control organization in the Continental United States (CONUS). Specifically, the study will determine what improvements are required to: ensure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency; maintain responsive command and control of all Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces; and provide necessary support and assistance to all RC elements.

2. OBJECTIVE. The ACCS-82 objective is to determine the CONUS command and control necessary to:

- a. Provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war during mobilization.
- b. Reduce to a minimum reorganizational turmoil immediately following mobilization.
- c. Assure proper command and control of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units in peacetime and in war.
- d. Assure that appropriate attention is paid to readiness, training, and war planning in competition with the necessary day-to-day functions during peacetime.
- e. Continue to stimulate active Army interest in the readiness and training of National Guard and Reserve units.
- f. Utilize appropriately the National Guard and Reserve chains of command.
- g. Integrate National Guard and Reserve units ultimately into a total Army command and control system upon mobilization.

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82)

3. GENERAL.

a. The Study Chairman will be a General Officer who will conduct the study under the supervision of the Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army. A Study Advisory Group will be formed, and OSD/Army Secretariat membership will be solicited.

b. Background. The most recent reorganization of the Army in CONUS (Operation STEADFAST) was implemented in 1973. This reorganization was designed to improve readiness of AC and RC forces and align schools and combat development activities. This reorganization needs to be evaluated to determine whether the command and control structure will be effective during transition from peace to war.

(1) OSD has indicated that the RC command and control structure is excessively layered and duplicative. There have been repeated attempts, through the PPBS system, to change this command and control organization.

(2) The Army-sponsored Army Force Integration Study disclosed that some modifications to the current organization could be made, at little or no cost, which would improve our capability for transition to war.

(3) A major conclusion of MOBEX 76 was that CONUS organizational shortcomings existed with respect to command and control, before, during, and immediately following mobilization.

(4) The FORSCOM Command Relationship Study (CRS) recommended command and control improvements within the STEADFAST framework. Many of these recommendations were approved by HQDA; others will be evaluated further during MOBEX 78.

4. GUIDANCE.

a. ACCS-82 will:

(1) Determine the CONUS command, control and support structure needed to ensure effective continuity of command during the transition from peace to war.

(2) Seek to streamline the present organization by eliminating any excessive layering.

(3) Seek to reduce the size of the command and control structure.

(4) Provide budget level detail necessary to implement recommendations.

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82)

b. Other studies which could prove useful are:

(1) CONUS Reorganization-1973 (Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan).

(2) Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): Command Relationship Study, December 1977.

(3) Army Force Integration Study (AFIS) (Interim Report - Draft) September 1976.

c. The Study Group will:

(1) Recognize mission requirements of the individual States and requirements for peacetime management of RC forces.

(2) Concentrate on command structure and management functions in both peacetime and wartime environments, to include the transition from peacetime to wartime.

(3) Provide a plan for implementation which is evolutionary in nature in order to minimize turbulence, disruption, and readiness degradation within the Total Army Force.

(4) Consider long-term effects on RC training and readiness prior to mobilization.

(5) Consider impact of all on-going and programmed actions intended to enhance readiness of the RC to include Full Time Manning (FTM).

(6) Provide for full implementation of changes, with minimum turbulence, by FY 82.

d. Essential elements of analysis are at Inclosure 1.

#### 5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. The Study Chairman will:

(1) Provide a study plan, schedule for IPR's, and draft outline to the Director of Management by 8 December 1978.

(2) Submit a draft study to the ARSTAFF by 1 June 1979.

(3) Submit a plan, in budget level detail, for implementation of proposed recommendations by 1 August 1979.

b. The Chairman is authorized direct coordination with Army and other DOD agencies. Commands and HQDA Staff agencies will provide additional support and input to the study group at the request of the Study Chairman.

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82)

c. All addressees will provide a Point of Contact to DACS-DMA (LTC Isacco/AVN 225-5299) NLT 5 October 1978.

d. The Study Chairman will be selected by the Chief of Staff.

e. OCSA will be authorized 17 overstrength positions for the duration of the study effort. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel will coordinate the nomination and, subject to approval of the Study Chairman, assignment to the study group of sixteen officers/civilians (O4 to O6/GS-13 or GS-14). Selected personnel will be assigned on a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) basis for a period of approximately one year effective 15 October 1978. A list of personnel requirements is at Inclosure 2. The Study Chairman is authorized to modify the composition of the study group. Additional personnel may be temporarily assigned to the study group.

f. Deputy Director of the Army Staff for Executive Services will provide administrative support for ACCS-82 (clerical personnel, office space, equipment, and supplies). Funds for travel, per diem and overtime pay will be programmed by the study group and submitted to the Deputy Director of the Army Staff for Executive Services.

6. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Study Title: Army Command and Control Study - 82 (ACCS-82).

b. Study Schedule: See Milestone Schedule at Inclosure 3.

c. The final study report and implementation plan will consist of an executive summary, main report, and supporting documents as required, including budget level detail necessary to support proposed recommendations.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

4 Incls

1. Essential Elements of Analysis
2. Study Group Composition
3. Milestones
4. References

  
C. F. BRIGGS  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82)

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US ARMY HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND  
US ARMY RECRUITING COMMAND  
US ARMY MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
US ARMY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COMMAND  
US MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND

## Essential Elements of Analysis

1. Experience has indicated the following issues/questions have a direct impact on CONUS command and control structure and its ability to provide for a smooth transition from peace to war. Although some have been analyzed in varying degrees in previous studies, it is necessary to examine at least these issues/questions in detail.

### 2. Essential Elements of Analysis:

a. Can a single CONUS organization and chain of command be established for both peacetime and wartime use, considering force structure turbulence and experience with the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)?

b. What are the short-term, relatively inexpensive modifications that can be made in the CONUS command and control organization, to improve the transition to war? No responsibility fixed for long-term: Does the FORSCOM Command Relationship Study represent all those feasible, or are there others?

c. Is the current assignment of responsibility/authority with regard to mobilization planning and execution correct?

d. Is the present FORSCOM span of control efficient? Under current organization can FORSCOM effectively control execution of mobilization and subsequent deployment?

e. Should a "housekeeping command" (MACOM level) be established to command all installations (thereby allowing all non-installation units to assume "tenant status" regardless of parent MACOM)?

f. Is there a valid pre- and/or post-mobilization need for the following headquarters as they are presently configured?

(1) CONUSA Headquarters?

(2) Army Readiness Regions?

(3) Readiness Groups?

(4) Army Reserve Commands?

g. Can these echelons (f above) accomplish assigned post-mobilization missions in a partial, full or total mobilization?

h. Are USAR functional commands in lieu of ARCOMs (either CONUS-wide or within prescribed boundaries) feasible/desirable?

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i. Is adequate communication and ADP equipment available, or on-hand, in the CONUS organization, to support full mobilization and subsequent deployment?

j. Can the CONUS organization (current and/or recommended) support planning and execution requirements for intra-CONUS movement of both AC and RC forces?

k. Does the recommended peacetime CONUS organization require any shift or change of command relationships for major units or installations upon or during mobilization (partial or full)?

l. Does the recommended CONUS organization support accomplishment of GWP/MSCD/LSSF missions? Consider the requirements for interface with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other appropriate governmental agencies. Consider the joint interface requirements with ARRED/REDCOM and ARLANT/LANTCOM elements.

m. To what extent can the Gaining Command and COSCOM Roundout programs be applied to the CONUS command and control organization?

n. What role/function is, or should be, played by the State Area Command (STARC)?

o. Is it feasible to replace the CONUSA/ARR/AC corps headquarters with a single "dual hatted", corps headquarters that would command/manage all units within a geographical region? If so, how many are needed for CONUS command and control? Would this number meet operational requirements as well?

p. Can the recommended CONUS organization expand, manage and sustain total mobilization.

q. Does the recommended CONUS organization support DOD policy and the intent of Congress in regard to the management and maintenance of the Reserve Components?



STUDY GROUP COMPOSITION

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>RANK/RATING</u>	<u>BACKGROUND</u>	<u>NO.</u>
Study Chairman	0-7	General Officer	1
Study XO Analyst	0-6	ORSA/Mobilization	1
Analyst	0-6	National Guard	1
Analyst	0-6	Army Reserve	1
Analyst	0-5/0-6	Readiness Region	1
Analyst	0-5/0-6	MOB Reserve Components	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5 GS-13/GS-14	Force Structure (One with Medical back- ground)	2
Analyst	0-4/0-5 GS-13/GS-14	Program Budget	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5 GS-13/GS-14	Costing	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5	Engineer/Construction	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5 GS-13/GS-14	ORSA Tng/MOB	2
Analyst	0-4/0-5	Logistics/MOB	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5 GS-13/GS-14	Army HQ/Manpower	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5	Manpower	1
Analyst	0-4/0-5	Operations/MOB	1

MILESTONE SCHEDULE

<u>NLT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
5 Oct 78	POC's Identified
15 Oct 78	Formation of Study Group
Oct-Nov 78	Observe MOBEX-78
8 Dec 78	Submit study plan and draft outline to Director of Management
1 Jun 79	Draft Report to ARSTAFF
1 Aug 79	Completed Report to CSA
	Execution as appropriate

A-3-1

Incl 3

#### REFERENCES

1. CONUS Reorganization-1973 (Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan).
2. OSD Program/Budget Decision 129 (PBD-129), (Operations, Army Reserve), 17 November 1975.
3. OSD Draft Program/Budget Decision (Operations, Army Reserve), November 1976.
4. OSD Decision Package Set 059 (DPS-059), (Reserve and Guard Operations), 19 November 1977.
5. Army Force Integration Study (AFIS) (Interim Report - Draft) September 1976.
6. Army Mobilization Exercise 1975 (MOBEX 76) After Action Report, April 1977.
7. Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): Command Relationship Study, December 1977.
8. Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): FORSCOM RC Management Study, 12 April 1978.
9. OSD Amended Program Decision (FY 80-84).
10. GAO Review of Guard and Reserves -- Are They Structured for Optimal Readiness and Efficiency and Logical Interface with the Active Forces.

**ANNEX B**

**LETTER FROM OSD(M,RA&L) TO HQDA (VCSA)**



MANPOWER,  
RESERVE AFFAIRS  
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

24 AUG 1978

General Frederick J. Kroesen  
Vice Chief of Staff  
United States Army  
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Fritz:

As a result of our meeting on 15 August, I am approving the Army's request to apply the DPS 059 reductions to the total Army rather than solely to the Reserve Components Management Structure.

My action is based on recognition of the need for OSD and the Army to work together to achieve in a relatively short time a mutually acceptable mobilization command and control structure.

Our conversation revealed our mutual desire for a command and control structure that would:

- Provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war in a mobilization.

- Reduce to a minimum reorganizational turmoil immediately following mobilization.

- Assure proper command and control of Active, Guard, and Reserve units in peacetime and in war.

- Assure that appropriate attention is paid to readiness, training, and war planning in competition with the necessary day-to-day functions during peacetime.

- Continue to stimulate active Army interest in the readiness and training of Guard and Reserve units.

- Utilize appropriately the Guard and Reserve chains of command.

- Integrate Guard and Reserve units ultimately into a total Army command and control system.

I am not set on a particular mobilization command and control system and Reserve Component management structure to meet these mutual goals. The solution must meet the needs of the total Army.

I applaud your commitment to move steadily toward an improved mobilization command and control structure. You indicated that we could achieve a major improvement in about 2 years, building in an evolutionary manner on the STEADFAST organization. My staff will work closely with yours to assure that we will achieve a solution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a stylized 'J' followed by a series of loops and a final 'L' shape.

JOHN P. WHITE

ANNEX C  
STUDY PLAN

STUDY PLAN  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82  
(ACCS-82)

1. Introduction.

a. Background. The most recent reorganization of the Army in CONUS (Operation STEADFAST) was implemented in 1973. This reorganization was designed to improve readiness of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, align schools and combat development activities, and improve the quality and responsiveness of Army management. STEADFAST undoubtedly provides a quantity and quality of RC support not seen before. Despite this success, exercises such as PRIME RATE 75, POLE VAULT 76, MOBEX 76, and MOBEX 78 have shown that the emphasis on peacetime command, control, and assistance may not have improved the essential capability to mobilize and prepare units for deployment, i.e., the ability to transition to war. There have been no significant modifications to the STEADFAST organization since its implementation.

b. Summary of criticisms and problem areas. The current organization has come under increasing criticism for a variety of reasons.

(1) OSD considers the RC command and control arrangement to be excessively layered and duplicative.

(2) One of the major findings resulting from MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78 concerned the CONUS organizational shortcomings with respect to command and control before, during, and immediately following mobilization.

(3) Some headquarters in the current structure lack a post-mobilization mission.

(4) Insufficient integration of AC and RC personnel, units, and command structure.

(5) Lack of sufficient corps headquarters in the force structure to support wartime requirements.

(6) Excessive span of control for FORSCOM.

(7) Unclear and conflicting responsibilities for installation management during, and subsequent to, mobilization.

(8) Inadequate communications and automatic data-processing equipment to support command and control during mobilization.



(9) Excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peace to war.

c. This study group was established as a result of a 15 August 1978 agreement between OSD and DA and satisfies requirements set forth in HQDA Ltr 10-78-5, 29 Sep 78.

## 2. Purpose, Objective and Scope of the Study.

a. Purpose. The purpose of the study is to examine the US Army command and control organization in CONUS. Specifically, the study will determine what improvements are required to insure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency; maintain responsive command and control of all AC and RC forces; and provide necessary support and assistance to all RC elements.

b. Objective. The objective of this study is to improve the Total Army CONUS command and control structure to perform missions during peace, war, and the transition from peace to war. Initial considerations for the resulting structure are to:

- (1) Assure proper command and control of Army units.
- (2) Provide for orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.
- (3) Utilize appropriately the RC chain of command.
- (4) Continue to stimulate AC interest in the readiness and training of RC units.
- (5) Provide for mobilization and deployment planning.
- (6) Provide the command and control basis for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization.

### c. Scope of the study.

(1) The study group examine the CONUS command and control organizations of the Total Army from the DA-level down to, at least, the brigade level.

(2) The study group will recognize the realities of today's environment. Specifically, the study group will:

(a) Recognize mission requirements of the individual states and those missions necessary for peacetime management of the RC force. The peacetime roles of the Governors and Adjutants General with respect to the ARNG will be preserved.

(b) Concentrate on command structures and management functions in peacetime and wartime environments, to include the transition from peace to war.

(c) Provide a plan for implementation which will minimize turbulence, disruption, and readiness degradation within the Total Army Force.

(d) Consider long-term effects on RC training and readiness prior to mobilization.

(e) Consider impact of all on-going and programmed actions designed to enhance readiness of the RC, to include Full-Time Manning.

(f) Develop a plan to implement recommendations by FY-82.

(g) Insofar as practicable, consider the peacetime-only structure for reduction or elimination.

d. Constraints on the Study.

(1) The study will address only the CONUS command and control structure. This is interpreted to include those headquarters and or units outside of CONUS for which a CONUS MACOM has command authority (CONUS-based). The study will consider the design of the CONUS command and control structure as it is influenced by the needs of the overseas commander upon full mobilization.

(2) Proposed improvements to the current command and control structure must be evolutionary and accomplished in a manner that minimizes the adverse impact of turbulence.

(3) Army National Guard peacetime command and control is prescribed in the U.S. Constitution and Title 32 of the U.S. Code.

(4) Changes to designated management headquarters are subject to the provisions of AR 570-8, Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA) which implements DOD Dir 5100.73, Department of Defense Management Headquarters. This requires OSD approval of proposed revisions to DOD Management Headquarters and Support Activities and to Management Headquarters functions.

(5) Time available to complete the study.

e. Assumptions.

(1) The current MACOM design (STEADFAST) is sound and will be retained. The type and number of MACOM under HQDA is

accepted as the minimum necessary for effective CONUS command and control, and is not a subject for review by ACCS-82. However, MACOM headquarters and their subordinate structure will be reviewed for possible elimination of duplication and layering, streamlining, and improvement of the command and control capability to transition from peace to war. The result may include the transfer of functions between MACOM or the recommended addition of MACOM with dedicated, continuing pre and post-mobilization missions (e.g., installation management, RC command).

(2) The command and control structure must satisfy mobilization requirements of a short or no-notice conventional conflict in NATO Europe. The RC constitutes the major effort in mobilization and is, for the most part, targeted for NATO. A lesser contingency followed by a major NATO conflict is a more effective scenario for the purpose of force sizing. However, the "cold-start" major NATO conflict is considered more traumatic and demanding for the CONUS command and control structure and mobilization base.

f. Other considerations.

(1) Resource impacts of the study will be measured against FY 79 budget levels (Jan 1979 PBG). This does not mean that alternatives for consideration must meet FY 79 resource constraints. The best C2 system may be more or less costly than the present system. The study group should not be deterred from considering any alternative which offers a distinct improvement.

(2) Recruiting and declining manpower are recognized as a problem area. The study will not recommend actions which will obviously hinder recruiting or retention.

(3) The study accepts that all RC ADP support systems will not be compatible with AC systems by FY 82. This will be considered insofar as it impacts on CONUS command and control.

(4) The provisions of AR 5-10, Reduction and Realignment Actions are recognized. Ongoing realignment actions may affect ACCS-82 recommended alternatives. The study will also adhere to the requirements of AR 5-10 regarding reductions and (or) realignments resultant from approved recommendations.

3. Study Methodology.

a. Problem Definition. Available background material reflects serious shortcomings in the Army's CONUS command and control structure, particularly as it relates to accommodating the demands of mobilization and deployment. The study group will further develop this basic problem area into discrete issues that must be addressed in detail. The study group will then

develop the CONUS command and control structure which best provides for efficient management and appropriate readiness during peacetime and for effective transition from peace to war.

b. Research and Data Collection.

(1) Historical Research. The study group will examine related command and control studies, using the work that resulted in Operation STEADFAST in 1973, and CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102 Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), as the point of departure. This examination will include, but will not be limited to, the December 1977 FORSCOM Command Relationship Study; the April 1978 FORSCOM RC Management Study; the 1976 Interim Draft Report - Army Force Integration Study (AFIS); and the report of the 1978 OSD-sponsored task force that conducted a Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR). The rationale within OSD Decision Package Set 059 of 19 November 1977 (as amended) will also be addressed. The Army's after-action reports for mobilization exercises in 1976 and 1978 (MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78) will be examined to identify problem areas involving command and control. Reports of investigations by the General Accounting Office, the Army Audit Agency, and the Inspector General will be examined to identify shortfalls in the existing command and control organization. Additionally, the command and control structures of the other services (USN, USMC, USAF) will be examined. A listing of selected basic references is contained in paragraph 7.

(2) Selected commanders and key staff members, both past and present, of current organizations will be interviewed by the Study Group to obtain their insights concerning the structure and alternatives which have been considered. Appropriate HQDA staff elements, all CONUS MACOM, the three CONUSA, most ARR, and a comprehensive sampling of the MUSARCs and GOCOMs will be visited during this phase of data collection. Selected TAG, STARC Directors, and commanders of major ARNG units will also be interviewed. CINCUSAREUR will be interviewed as the major gaining-commander for CONUS-based units, if possible.

(3) A questionnaire will be developed to assist in collecting empirical data. This questionnaire will also solicit organization ideas from the respondents. The questionnaire will be given wide distribution to assure development of an adequate data base.

c. Base Case. The current command and control organization, i.e., the "Base Case", will be defined during the research and data collection effort. Evaluation of the Base Case will identify those deficiencies that must be resolved.

d. Development of Alternatives. The study group will develop alternatives for CONUS command and control to insure maximum wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency. The alternatives must keep turbulence to a minimum, provide for integration of AC and RC forces, and must not unreasonably alter resource requirements. Alternatives will be based on streamlining (not necessarily resources reduction) of the present Total Army CONUS command and control structure. Each alternative developed which meets the general objectives of the study will be analyzed and evaluated against a set of measures of effectiveness (MOE) and only feasible alternatives will be retained for later comparison. Once the feasible alternatives have been selected, the resource requirements will be determined in detail. Finally, resource shortfalls will be identified and related to the ability of the command and control alternative(s) to perform the mission (peacetime-transition-wartime) when implemented.

e. Comparison of Alternatives. Each alternative structure that is developed and retained for further study will be compared with the Base Case and all other retained alternatives. Comparisons will be based on quantitative and qualitative measures. The quantitative measures will be resource data (funding and manpower). Qualitative measures will be more difficult to identify because of the need to subjectively assess which functions are appropriate for each element in the structure, to predict how well the various elements will interact and to project how well the structure as a whole will be able to perform its mission.

f. Findings and Conclusions and Recommendations. The study group will develop findings and conclusions based on the study of the present structure (Base Case) and the comparison of feasible alternatives developed during the study. The manpower, equipment (particularly automatic data processing and communications equipment) and funding requirements developed during the comparison of alternatives will be stated in the conclusions of the study. Appropriate recommendations will be made based upon valid findings and conclusions.

g. Preparation of Study Report. A draft report will be prepared and staffed with appropriate DA staff agencies and MACOM. Comments received from the staffing action will be considered when preparing the final report. Report preparation actions will be accomplished in accordance with the milestones at Inclosure 1. The draft study report outline is at Inclosure 2.

h. Phasing and Milestones.

(1) The study will be conducted in five phases. Each phase is based on the primary study activity occurring during that period, although some activities will occur during more than one phase. The five phases and a summary of principal activities are:

(a) Developmental. (13 Nov - 15 Dec) Organization of study group development of study plan, and initiation of data collection and research on the Base Case.

(b) Base Case Definition. (16 Dec - 31 Jan)  
Establish, analyze, and evaluate current command and control structure (existing model) and begin development of alternative structures.

(c) Development of Alternatives. (1 Feb - 31 Mar)  
Develop and analyze alternative structures. Select feasible alternatives.

(d) Comparison of Alternatives. (1 Apr - 30 Apr)  
Evaluate and compare feasible alternatives; develop findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(e) Final Report and Implementation. (1 May - 31 July)  
Prepare and staff study group report; prepare plan to implement approved recommendations; and implement and manage approved recommendations.

(2) Major Milestones are:

(a) Study Plan to Director of Management - 8 Dec 78

(b) SAG Meetings - 8 Jan, 21 Mar and 21 May 79

(c) IPR - 27 Mar and 25 May 79

(d) Draft Report to Army staff and MACOM for review - 1 Jun 79

(e) Final Report for approval - 1 Aug 79.

(3) A detailed chart showing milestones and major activities in each phase is attached at Inclosure 1.

4. Control

a. Three Study Advisory Group (SAG) meetings and two In-Process Reviews (IPR) will be scheduled at key points during the study process. Each IPR will be preceded by a SAG meeting; the initial SAG meeting will be held in early January 1979. SAG and IPR schedule is shown on the attached milestone chart (Inclosure 1).

b. SAG membership will be 0-6 level and IPR membership will be directorate level, with representation as shown below.

	<u>IPR</u>	<u>SAG</u>
DAS or VCSA	X	
Management Directorate	X	X
ODCSOPS	X	X
ODCSPER	X	X
ODCSLOG	X	X

	<u>IPR</u>	<u>SAG</u>
OACSAC	X	X
OACSI	X	X
NGB	X	X
OCAR	X	X
OCE	X	X
OTSG	X	X
OTAG	X	X
OCA	X	X
FORSCOM	X	X
TRADOC	X	X
DARCOM	X	X
ACC	X	X
HSC	X	X
INSCOM	X	X
OSD (MRA&L)	*	X
ASA (M&RA)	X	X
ASA (IL&FM)	X	X
PAED	X	X
AAA	(Observer)	(Observer)

\*At selected meetings.

c. Implementation. The study group will develop an implementation plan, in budget level detail, for the recommended command and control reorganization. The plan will be evolutionary and will include a proposed reorganization schedule. It is envisioned that a residual element from the ACCS-82 Study Group, of a size to be determined, will be necessary to manage the implementation of the approved action, at least until HQDA directives are issued to the affected MACOM.


#### 5. Organization of Study Group

a. Developmental Organization. To accomplish the tasks of the developmental phase, four teams were organized. Their major functions were:

- (1) Team #1 - Study Plan Development
- (2) Team #2 - Research and Data Collection
- (3) Team #3 - Administration and Support Planning
- (4) Team #4 - Operations and Organization

#### b. Study Group Task Organization (effective 8 Dec 78).

(1) General. The study group will be organized in three functional teams as shown in the figure below. Team membership will be based on distribution of needed skills and backgrounds and will change as workloads vary during the conduct of the study.



#### (2) Organization and Analysis team will:

(a) Research and document the current Army CONUS command and control structure (Base Case).

(b) Research and document feasible alternative command and control structures.



- (c) Develop conceptual alternatives.
- (d) Select the alternatives to be evaluated in the study.
- (e) Assess the operational performance factors that characterize the Base Case and selected alternatives.
- (f) Analyze the Base Case and alternatives to derive manning and support parameters.
- (g) Establish the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) to evaluate the Base Case and alternative command and control structures.
- (h) Define the input requirements in terms of manpower, funding, equipment and operational performance factors needed to assess each MOE.
- (i) Compare (analyze and evaluate) the Base Case and alternatives in terms of quantitative and qualitative MOE previously established.
- (j) Evaluate the sensitivities of the comparison of alternatives to key assumptions and estimated performance factors.

(3) Resources Team will:

- (a) Develop funding and manpower resource estimates needed to evaluate the Base Case and alternatives.
- (b) Develop, in budget level detail, resources estimates for Base Case and the recommended alternative.
- (c) Prepare those portions of the study report and implementation plan dealing with resource requirements.

(4) Management Team will:

- (a) Develop and assess support factors (personnel, logistics, communications, automatic data processing equipment, etc.) needed to evaluate the Base Case and alternatives.
- (b) Develop recommendations and plans for management actions and support services needed to implement the recommended alternative.
- (c) Coordinate the scheduling, development and presentation of all briefings.
- (d) Provide documentation guidelines to other teams to support preparation of the study report.
- (e) Develop detailed outline of study report and coordinate the preparation and staffing of the report.

(f) Maintain master calendar of briefings, trips and Study Group activities.

(g) Coordinate all taskings and formal requests for information from ARSTAFF, agencies or MACOM.

c. A list of Study Group members is at Inclosure 3.

6. Study Group Budget.

a. The estimated funding requirement for Study Group travel is \$62,761.

b. This amount was developed based upon the following guidelines:

(1) Minimum number of travelers on any trip (average is 3).

(2) Minimum number of days to accomplish objectives (average is 3).

(3) Maximum use of multiple destination trips by consolidating visits to several locations.

(4) Maximum use of visits to ACCS-82 by staff representatives of appropriate outside agencies for briefings and discussions.

(5) Limiting repetitive visits to only FORSCOM, TRADOC, and CONUSA.

(6) Restricting travel to those essential missions which cannot be accomplished through other means of communication.

c. Actual travel costs will be held to the minimum through implementation of the following guidelines:

(1) Except where necessary to visit with Reserve Component units, travel will be scheduled to avoid weekend or holiday layovers, thereby reducing per diem costs for non-mission days.


(2) Maximum use of government transportation and facilities.

(3) Use of POV, rental cars, and variations will not be authorized unless clearly advantageous to mission accomplishment.

d. This travel budget will enable ACCS-82 to develop the on-site understanding of command and control requirements, limitations and problems necessary to formulate practical, effective and efficient proposals for implementation.

7. Selected References.

- a. CONUS Reorganization-1973 (Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan).
- b. OSD Program/Budget Decision 129 (PBD-129), (Operations, Army Reserve), 17 Nov 1975.
- c. OSD Draft Program/Budget Decision (Operations, Army Reserve), November 1976.
- d. OSD Decision Package Set 059 (DPS-059), (Reserve and Guard Operations), 19 November 1977.
- e. Army Force Integration Study (AFIS) (Interim Report - Draft) September 1976.
- f. Army Mobilization Exercise 1976 (MOBEX 76) After-Action Report, April 1977.
- g. Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): Command Relationship Study, December 1977.
- h. Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM): FORSCOM RC Management Study, 12 April 1978.
- i. OSD Amended Program Decisions (FY 80-84).
- j. GAO Review of Guard and Reserves -- Are They Structured for Optimal Readiness and Efficiency and Logical Interface with the Active Forces? Draft Report, December 1978.
- k. Army Mobilization Exercise 1978 (MOBEX 78) After-Action Report.
- l. Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) for CINUSAEUR OPLAN 4102.
- m. Report of the Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR), 1978.
- n. DoD Consolidated Guidance, 7 March 1978.



SAG - Δ

IPR - ⊗

ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82

(ACCS-82)

(REPORT OUTLINE)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Study Overview
- Findings
- Major Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Implementation Options (in Priority)
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INTRODUCTION

- Study Directive Factors
- Acknowledgements

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ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY -82

(ACCS-82)

Membership

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LTC JAMES E. THOMAS

MAJ WILLIAM H. ECHOLS

MAJ DARRELL W. WALKER

MR. WILBERT SCHWARTZAPFEL (GS-13)



ANNEX D  
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DACS-CC

Revised: 30 April 1979

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan

1. Introduction. This plan defines the basis, methodology and procedures that will be followed in evaluating the base case and alternative command and control structures. The Army's organization for command and control of the CONUS forces has come under criticism from OSD, GAO, and others. It is perceived in some cases as being unnecessarily layered, duplicative in some functions, poorly organized, inefficient and costly in operation. The approach being followed by the ACCS-82 study has been to further define the problem areas within the CONUS command and control structure, to a depth beyond that identified in the study directive and the associated Essential Elements of Analysis. These then lead to the development of alternative command and control structures for consideration and evaluation as options to correct the existing problems and improve the overall organization. The methodology sequence to evaluate these alternatives is as follows:

- a. Development of effectiveness criteria, and measures thereof.
- b. Scenario analysis.
- c. Assessment of effectiveness.
- d. Sensitivity analyses.
- e. Resource requirements.
- f. Additional issues.

The last two items listed above are not required in the sequence as shown but are derived from the analyses of the various alternatives.

DACS-CC

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan

2. Effectiveness Criteria. Specific objectives for the ACCS-82 Study as regards the desired characteristics for the CONUS command and control have been provided in the study tasker. These objectives are similarly suitable to become the criteria or factors to evaluate the effectiveness of any CONUS command and control organization, current or proposed. These effectiveness criteria are listed in Inclosure 1. The measures by which to assess the effectiveness criteria are defined in Inclosure 2. These are broken out in time periods of peacetime, the transition period, and wartime, where appropriate. Further exposition and expansion of these measures is provided in Inclosure 3 through a series of qualitative and quantitative considerations that apply. Through analysis of the data applicable to the considerations and factors listed in Inclosure 3, an assessment of the impact on each of the measures of Inclosure 2 can be made. These, in turn, will lead to an overall effectiveness assessment for the particular command and control organization being considered. This type of analysis is a form of Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA).

3. Scenario Analysis. The key assumption that defines a scenario to evaluate the command and control structure is the condition of a short or no-notice conventional conflict in NATO Europe. Appropriate planning documents will be used to analyze the peacetime planning and mobilization during the transition period for the base case and proposed alternatives. Their potential capability to accommodate to mobilization requirements beyond full mobilization leading to total mobilization will be analyzed along with their other wartime missions, e.g., CONUS Land Defense and Land Special Security Forces. The response of the command and control structure to the situation of a partial mobilization scenario will be an added analysis to distinguished between the different capabilities of the base case and the alternatives. For the base case and each alternative, the performance of the command and control organization will be analyzed in detail and specifically address each of the measurement stubs of the effectiveness criteria previously defined. This will provide input to the assessment of these effectiveness criteria as part of the overall evaluation of the alternatives.

4. Effectiveness Assessment. The basis to analyze each of the effectiveness criteria has been described. The following describes the technique to assess the worth of each criterion and, in turn, the overall effectiveness of the command and control structure. A modification of the Delphi technique is

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SUBJECT: ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan

proposed to accomplish this; a similar technique has been used in other studies. This technique as proposed is a procedure to develop an evaluation consensus from individual subjective assessments by a panel of personnel experienced in the area of organization for command and control. These individual assessments will be made having in hand a thorough analysis and the specifics of those qualitative and quantitative factors that apply to the base case and to each of the proposed alternatives.

a. Scoring Rules. The individual effectiveness measures under each of the criteria as defined in Inclosure 2 will be scored on a numerical basis in the range of zero to ten. The higher the score, the higher the worth in all cases. The scoring basis is:

<u>SCORE</u>	<u>ASSESSMENT (WORTH)</u>
10	Very Good
9	
8	Good
7	
6	Fair
5	
4	
3	Poor
2	
1	Very Poor
0	

These particular measures however, do not have equal importance. Therefore a relative weighting for each will be applied as they are aggregated to the next higher level of effectiveness measure; again weighted relatively as they are aggregated to the effectiveness criteria; and then again given relative weights to result in a single aggregated effectiveness score for each specific alternative. The relative weighting of the aggregated measures will remain the same for each alternative considered. Only the absolute score (zero to ten basis) for the measures will vary.

b. Group Scoring. For this "modified Delphi" approach the ACCS-82 Study Group will make up the sample population. Initially, each study group member will be asked to individually score the relative weighting of the effectiveness criteria and effectiveness measures and sub-measures as shown in the sample

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SUBJECT: ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan

scoring table, Inclosure 4. After this scoring, a team review of the results will be accomplished. Any individual scores which vary widely from the sample mean will be orally defended and the group given the opportunity to discuss the intent of "differing" scores. This process will expose the team to key points that may have been considered by only one or two members and to the logic of those who appear better informed. Paired comparisons will be analyzed leading towards establishing a level of indifference. The scoring will then be repeated; all team members will participate and be allowed to adjust their previous scores. This process will be repeated as necessary, to obtain scoring results that approach consensus. These relative weights will then remain fixed throughout the evaluation process and are independent of the base case or any command and control alternative. Separate from this relative weighting scoring, each individual of the scoring population will assess and score the individual worth of those effectiveness measures that are applicable to the base case and the alternatives as shown in Inclosure 4. These are the absolute scores on a zero to ten basis. A key requirement is that the base case be done first so that later assessment of the alternatives will be in proper relationship to the base case, even though each will be scored on an absolute basis. In order to accomplish this absolute scoring, the scenario analyses and supporting analyses for the effectiveness measures as defined in Inclosure 3 must be available for each alternative to be scored. A team review, oral defense of "outlier" scores, and an approach to consensus will be obtained as was done with "relative weighting." The absolute scores are then combined with the weighting factors to aggregate the effectiveness measures, then the effectiveness criteria, and then to one overall score for each command and control alternative. As a check on scoring results from the ACCS-82 Study Group, personnel from the Army Staff and FORSCOM will be invited to go through a similar evaluation process. Their evaluation scores will be retained separately.

5. Sensitivity Analyses. During the course of the ACCS-82 study the number of optional command and control alternatives has been narrowed down to where four are currently being considered. Within these alternatives are special features that might be unique to one or two of them. Where exceptional advantages accrue to some discrete feature, those advantages will be explored by applying them, in combination with others, to obtain an optimized command and control organization. Further sensitivity analyses will examine the impact of variations within the relative weighting factors. Several

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SUBJECT: ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan

alternative weighting schemes will be selected from the results of the "modified Delphi" approach. The specific selection of these will depend on the actual scoring results but will essentially be "off-mean" to explore the boundary conditions of the scoring system technique.

6. Resources Requirements. In conjunction with the assessment of the effectiveness of each alternative, the resources associated with each will be developed. These will be in terms of manpower, costs, and additional requirements for major items of equipment. These resources will be presented as incremental changes from the base case; in terms of annual operating requirements of manpower and dollars, and the one-time dollar costs of implementation for each alternative. For the base case, manpower and costs will be defined separately; these will provide a basis to retain the comparisons in proper perspective.

7. Additional Issues. There are further considerations that apply to any decision beyond the effectiveness assessments and resource requirements for a particular preferred alternative. Such considerations would involve political sensitivities within the Army, effects on career progression for both the AC and RC, and judgement of how any recommended changes will be perceived by OSD and Congress. One or several factors of any given alternative may be sensitive issues with the Army Staff, MACOM, USAR, or NGB; these could impede implementation, negate the intended effect, or even force the withdrawal of the proposed organizational change. Any proposed reduction of General Officer spaces will be adverse to the career progression for the RC and AC, where affected. Any major reorganization of, or loss of commands within, will disturb (usually adversely) the USAR. Increased support of the RC by the AC will impose an additional burden on the AC, while any decreased support will appear as degradation of AC interest in the RC. Where additional RC units are reorganized to report directly to an AC headquarters, the perception could be that this is leading to an AC takeover of the RC. Any physical relocations of headquarters will involve considerations of the environmental impact and broad political sensitivities. These sensitive factors as they apply to each alternative will be identified as part of the overall evaluation of the alternatives.

### EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA

1. MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND AN ORDERLY AND RAPID TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR.
2. AN EFFICIENT AND STREAMLINED AC AND RC STRUCTURE TO ASSURE PROPER COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY UNITS IN PEACE AND WAR
3. AC COMMITMENT TO TRAINING AND READINESS OF RC UNITS.
4. COMMAND AND CONTROL BASIS FOR EXPANSION TO MEET THE NEEDS OF TOTAL MOBILIZATION.
5. INTEGRATION OF AC AND RC AND APPROPRIATE USE OF THE RC CHAIN OF COMMAND.
6. MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF THE TOTAL ARMY.

## EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES

1. Mobilization and deployment planning and an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.

a. Peace.

- (1) Improve mobilization and deployment planning capability.
- (2) Improve domestic contingency planning/execution capability.
- (3) Improve installation planning capability.

b. Transition.

- (1) Provide required C&C structure.
- (2) Reduce organizational turbulence.
- (3) Provide for the expansion of the mobilization base.
- (4) Improve mobilization execution capability.

c. War.

- (1) Improve deployment capability.
- (2) Provide required deployable C&C structure.
- (3) Provide required CONUS C&C structure.
- (4) Provide for expansion of the mobilization base.

2. An efficient and streamlined AC and RC structure to assure proper command and control of Army units in peace and war.

a. Peace.

- (1) Reduce unnecessary layering
- (2) Reduce unnecessary duplication of functions.
- (3) Improve span of control.
- (4) Provide authority commensurate with responsibilities.



- (5) Command responsibilities more clearly defined.
- (6) Provide adequate C&C structure to manage AC and RC.
- b. War.
  - (1) Reduce unnecessary layering.
  - (2) Improve span of control.
- 3. AC commitment to training and readiness of RC units in peace.
  - a. Improve AC training assistance.
  - b. Improve association of RC and AC.
  - c. Improve training.
- 4. Command and control base for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization for war.
  - a. Provide required command and control structure for total mobilization.
  - b. Improve planning and execution capability for total mobilization.
- 5. Integration of AC and RC and appropriate use of the RC chain of command in peace.
  - a. Appropriate use of RC chain of command.
  - b. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC units in a command.
  - c. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC personnel in C&C Hq's.
- 6. Management capabilities of the Total Army in peace, the transition and war.
  - a. Improve personnel management capability during the continuum.
  - b. Improve logistical management capability during the continuum.

c. Improve financial management capability during the continuum.

d. Improve COMM/ADP support capability during the continuum.

## EFFECTIVENESS INFORMATION FACTORS

1. Mobilization and deployment planning and an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.

a. Peace.

(1) Improve mobilization and deployment planning capability.

- Identify planning authority and flow. DA to unit level.
- Identify staff assets to accomplish planning.
- Identify approval authority for plans at all command levels and installations.

(2) Improve domestic contingency planing/execution capability.

- Identify planning authority and flow.
- Identify staff assets to accomplish planning.
- Identify approval authority for plans at all command levels and installations.
- Identify execution authority capability.

(3) Improve installation planning capability.

b. Transition.

(1) Provide required C&C structure.

- Identify C&C structure to assist and command mobilizing units.
- Identify C&C structure to accomplish contingency missions on an area basis.

(2) Reduce organizational turbulence.

- Identify any OPCOM/guidance arrangements in effect which impact on organizational turbulence.

- Identify installations and major units (0-7 and higher) that change parent headquarters.
- (3) Provide for the expansion of the mobilization base.
  - Identify expansion capability (include C&C)
- (4) Improve mobilization execution capability.
  - Describe capability to decentralize execution below the MACOM level.
  - Describe the stability of the C&C structure below MACOM to include installations which control mobilization.

c. War.

- (1) Improve deployment capability.
  - Identify responsibility to control, coordinate and prepare for deployment.
- (2) Provide required deployable C&C structure.
  - Identify C&C units to fill requirements of full mobilization.
- (3) Provide required CONUS C&C structure.
  - Identify C&C units to fill requirements of/for:
    - ° Installations.
    - ° CONUS Defense (minus aerospace).
    - ° LSSF.
    - ° MSCD.
- (4) Provide for expansion of the mobilization base.
  - Identify C&C units with follow-on missions to fill requirements for Total Mobilization.

2. An efficient and streamlined AC and RC structure to assure proper command and control of Army units in peace and war.

a. Peace.

- (1) Reduce unnecessary layering.
  - Identify those HQ in the same C of C being commanded by officers of equal rank.
- (2) Reduce unnecessary duplication of functions.
  - Identify unnecessary functions.
  - Identify any function that may be better performed by another hq.
- (3) Improve span of control.
  - Identify any hq directly controlling an excessive number of units.
- (4) Provide authority commensurate with responsibility.
  - Identify instances in which authority not commensurate with responsibility.
- (5) Command responsibilities more clearly defined.
  - Identify instances in which command responsibilities not clearly defined.
- (6) Provide adequate C&C structure to manage AC and RC.
  - Describe the AC and RC management structure.

b. War.

- (1) Reduce unnecessary layering.
  - Identify those hq in the same C of C being commanded by officers of equal rank.

- (2) Improve span of control.
  - Identify any hq directly controlling an excessive/insufficient number of units.
- 3. AC commitment to training and readiness of RC units in peace.
  - a. Improve AC training assistance.
    - Identify assistance available.
  - b. Improve association of RC and AC.
    - Identify association features which enhances and complement the Total Army concept.
  - c. Improve training.
    - Identify features which should improve training.  
(Example - environment, opportunities, resources).
- 4. Command and control basis for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization for war.
  - a. Provide required command and control structure for total mobilization.
    - Identify C&C units in excess of full mob requirements.
  - b. Improve planning and execution capability for total mobilization.
    - Describe planning and execution capability for total mobilization.
- 5. Integration of AC and RC and appropriate use of the RC chain of command in peace.
  - a. Appropriate use of RC chain of command.
    - Describe how the RC chain of command is utilized.
  - b. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC units in a command.
    - Identify AC/RC units in same command.

c. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC personnel in C&C Hq's.

- Identify AC and RC personnel spaces in C&C units below DA level.

6. Management capabilities of the Total Army in peace, the transition and war.

a. Improve personnel management capability during the continuum.

- Identify personnel management strengths and problem areas.

b. Improve logistical management capability during the continuum.

- Identify log mgt strengths and problem areas.

c. Improve financial management capability during the continuum.

- Identify financial management strengths and problems areas.

d. Improve COMM/ADP support capability during the continuum.

- Identify COMM/ADP support strengths and problem areas.

SCORING TABLE

						NUMERICAL SCORE, (0-10)																					
EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA	RELATIVE WEIGHT	EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHT	EFFECTIVENESS SUB-MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHT	BASE CASE	ALT #1	ALT #2	ALT #3	ALT #4																	
1		A		(1)																							
				(2)																							
				(3)																							
		B		(1)																							
				(2)																							
				(3)																							
		C		(4)																							
				Σ=1.0																							
											Σ=1.0																
		2											A	(1)													
(2)																											
(3)																											
	B		(4)																								
			(5)																								
			(6)																								
	Σ=1.0																										
			Σ=1.0																								
					Σ=1.0																						
	3						A																				
		B																									
		C																									
		Σ=1.0																									
4				A																							
																				B							
		Σ=1.0																									
				5																A							
		C																									
	Σ=1.0																										
			6					A																			
																				B							
	C																										
Σ=1.0																											
					D																						
																				Σ=1.0							
Σ=1.0																											



ANNEX E  
HISTORY OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES

## HISTORY OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES: A CHRONOLOGY

The following is a chronological history, in summary form, of the major activities of ACCS-82.

27 Sep 78. Study directive Volume III, Annex A was published establishing ACCS-82.

17 Oct 78. BG Wilson met with GEN Kroesen and discussed US Army Command and Control in CONUS and received guidance for the study.

17 Oct 78. BG Wilson met individually with LTG Meyer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, LTG (Ret) Kalergis (principal author of STEADFAST) and MG Thurman, Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation, and discussed ACCS-82.

18 Oct 78 - 11 Dec 78. Study Group team members were selected and assigned in accordance with Inclosure 2 of the directive establishing the study. A list of study team members is included in the Executive Summary of the Study Report.

23 Oct 78. BG Wilson and one study group member visited HQ ARRL and received a comprehensive briefing on the Army Readiness Region and Readiness Groups.

24 Oct 78. BG Wilson met with MG Meloy, ADCSOPS, FORSCOM, and discussed ACCS-82.

3-5 Nov 78. Three team members visited three MOBEX 78 sites, conducting the final weekend of player participation.

8 Nov 78. The study group occupied office spaces in Wing 10, TEMPO A Building at Ft McNair.

13 Nov 78 - 15 Dec 78. Study group initiated its data collection effort.

15 Nov 78. BG Wilson, Cdr III Corps Artillery, was formally assigned Chairman of ACCS-82.

20-21 Nov 78. A two-day Organizational Effectiveness (OE) meeting was conducted by LTC Hinds, MAJ Smith and Mr. De Furia from the Organization Effectiveness Office, Management Directorate. The objectives of the meeting were:

- a. To enable the team members to become better acquainted.
- b. To clarify participants' concerns and expectations.
- c. To identify the objectives of the study.
- d. To formulate operating guidelines that could best support the study group mission.
- e. To determine the roles of team members.
- f. To provide an effective climate in which to work.
- g. To enhance the understanding of the ways in which to work.
- h. To develop a stronger feeling of support and interdependence among study group members with more emphasis on collaboration and less on competition.

22 Nov 78. An initial organization structure was developed by the study group. Four groups were formed with major responsibilities assigned as follows:

- a. Team #1. Study Plan. Responsible for preparing the study plan and study report outline.
- b. Team #2. Research and Data Collection. Responsible for data collection to include major references, previous studies and case histories.
- c. Team #3. Administration and Support Planning. Responsible for budget formulation, coordination of briefings, PIO, relocation planning and administrative support of the Study Group.
- d. Team #4. Operations and Organization. Responsible for planning for future operations, to include organization of study group to accomplish its total mission.

22 Nov 78. ACCS-82 received briefings by OCAR and NGB. These were the first in a series of 18 briefings to be received by ACCS-82 at the study group site from 22 Nov 78 through 4 Apr 79. The sources of the briefings are shown in Appendix 2 of Annex F, Volume III.

8 Dec 78. ACCS-82 presented a briefing of the study plan to the Director of Management, (DM). The study plan was accepted and additional guidance and information for the study was addressed by the DM.

8 Dec 78. In accordance with the study plan, the study group was reorganized into three functional teams. Team membership was based on distribution of needed skills and backgrounds. Team membership would change as workloads varied during the conduct of the study.

13 Dec 78. BG Wilson and five team members visited HQ 1st US Army and ARR III. This visit was the first in an extensive data gathering effort by ACCS-82 in which team members visited Active Army and Reserve Component headquarters throughout CONUS. These visits extended through 18 Mar 79. A summary and listing of headquarters visited is at Appendix 1, Annex F, Volume III.

19 Dec 78. An initial meeting of the ARSTAF and MACOM ACCS-82 points of contact (POC) was conducted to provide a briefing on the study plan and to develop mutual points of interest between study group members and POC.

8 Jan 79. The initial Study Advisory Group (SAG) meeting was conducted to obtain comments on the ACCS-82 study plan and on the constraints and assumptions developed for the study. Minutes for this meeting are at Appendix 1, Annex G, Volume III. Recommended changes were made in the study plan, to include a listing of the constraints and assumptions of the study.

8-17 Jan 79. Formal requests for information were transmitted to the MACOM and ARSTAF.

21 Mar 79. The second SAG meeting was conducted to review the principal issues, alternatives, and evaluation plan. Minutes for this meeting are at Appendix 2, Annex G, Volume III.

27 Mar 79. GEN Kroesen, VCSA, conducted the first In Process Review (IPR) of ACCS-82. Study group personnel described the purpose, objectives, management plan, key issues and alternatives to the command and control structure. Guidance was received regarding the alternatives and concepts for further analysis. Minutes of this meeting are at Appendix 4, Annex G, Volume III.

28 Mar 79. A second OE session was conducted with Mr. De Furia. The purpose was to utilize the data, collected from study group members on 14 Mar 79 by individual questionnaires, to clarify and plan improvement actions. On the basis of this action planning session, the study group was reorganized into a straight-line configuration with BG Wilson and his Deputy, COL Fitzgerald, directing the activities of each team member.

30 Mar 79. BG Wilson published, "ACCS-82 Action Guidelines." These provided the study group members a time-phased guide to achieve major ACCS-82 objectives.

9 Apr 79. ACCS-82 moved from TEMPO A, Ft McNair to the Pentagon.

1 Jun 79. The third SAG meeting was conducted to present the analysis and evaluation of the alternatives and the selection of the preferred alternative. Major findings and conclusions were briefed. Minutes of this meeting are at Appendix 3, Annex G, Volume III.

12 Jun 79. The second IPR was chaired by LTG Mc Giffert. Briefings were presented by ACCS-82 personnel which included development of the alternatives, analyses/evaluations and key issues. Tentative major findings, conclusions and recommendations were presented. The IPR members examined and discussed the results of the ACCS-82 presentations and LTG McGiffert directed that the draft ACCS-82 report be transmitted to the MACOM and ARSTAF for review. Minutes of this meeting are at Appendix 5, Annex G, Volume III.

22 Jun - 23 Jul 79. The draft study report was reviewed and comments were prepared by the MACOM and ARSTAF.

23 Jul - 23 Aug 79. Study Group considered the comments from the MACOM and ARSTAF and prepared the final report.

24 Aug 79. GEN Vessey (VCSA) conducted a SELCOM meeting in which ACCS-82 personnel presented a summary of the comments from the MACOM and ARSTAF and the resultant considerations by ACCS-82. Study recommendations were presented for approval.

25 Aug 79. Residual personnel from ACCS-82 designated to assist in the implementation of ACCS-82 recommendations.

ANNEX F  
SUPPORTING DATA

ANNEX F  
APPENDIX 1  
VISITS BY ARMY COMMAND  
AND CONTROL STUDY-82

Visits By Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82)

1. A summary of the CONUS visits made by ACCS-82 follows:

a. Active Army.

- (1) Eight of the ten MACOM headquarters (USACIDC and MDW were not visited).
- (2) All three of the CONUSA headquarters.
- (3) Both corps headquarters.
- (4) Four of the ten division headquarters.
- (5) Six major activities.
- (6) All nine of the ARR headquarters.
- (7) Twelve of the 28 RG headquarters.
- (8) Fifteen installation headquarters.
- (9) Three MOBEX 78 sites during the final weekend of player participation.

b. US Army Reserve (USAR).

- (1) Eleven of the 19 ARCOM headquarters.
- (2) Five of the 12 brigade headquarters.
- (3) Five of the 12 training divisions.
- (4) One of the two maneuver area commands.
- (5) Two USAR schools.
- (6) Eight commands having O-6 to O-8 commanders.
- (7) Regional LOGEX "Liberty Bell III".

c. Army National Guard (ARNG).

- (1) Fifteen of the 53 State-level headquarters.



- (2) Seven of the eight division headquarters.
- (3) Five of the 31 brigade headquarters.
- (4) Two group headquarters.
- (5) One COSCOM headquarters.
- (6) Two State-operated installations.

2. Specific commands and installations visited were:

a. Active Army.

(1) MACOM

- |             |            |
|-------------|------------|
| (a) TRADOC  | (e) MTMC   |
| (b) FORSCOM | (f) DARCOM |
| (c) HSC     | (g) USAREC |
| (d) USACC   | (h) REDCOM |

(2) CONUSA

- (a) First US Army
- (b) Fifth US Army
- (c) Sixth US Army

(3) Corps

- (a) III Corps
- (b) XVIII Abn Corps

(4) Divisions

- (a) 7th Inf Div
- (b) 9th Inf Div
- (c) 4th Inf Div (M)
- (d) 1st Inf Div (M)

(5) Major Activity

- (a) JFK Center
- (b) RCPAC
- (c) MEPCOM

- (d) USAINCS
- (e) Log Ctr
- (f) USAIC

(6) ARR

- (a) I
- (b) II
- (c) III
- (d) IV
- (e) V

- (f) VI
- (g) VII
- (h) VIII
- (i) IX

(7) RG

- (a) Ft Devens
- (b) Ft Dix
- (c) FIG
- (d) Ft Snelling
- (e) Ft Bragg
- (f) SF

- (g) STL
- (h) Ft Sheridan
- (i) Denver
- (j) Ft Knox
- (k) Ft Riley
- (l) LA

(8) Installations

- (a) Ft Devens
- (b) Ft Dix
- (c) Ft Hood
- (d) Ft Snelling
- (e) Ft McCoy
- (f) Ft Lewis
- (g) Ft Eustis
- (h) Ft Lee

- (i) Ft Ord
- (j) Ft Bragg
- (k) Ft Carson
- (l) Ft Knox
- (m) Camp Pickett
- (n) Ft Benning
- (o) Ft Stewart

(9) MOBEX 78 Player Sites

- (a) Ft Riley
- (b) Ft Bragg
- (c) Ft Benning

b. USAR

(1) ARCOM

- |           |          |
|-----------|----------|
| (a) 94th  | (g) 63d  |
| (b) 79th  | (h) 123d |
| (c) 90th  | (i) 102d |
| (d) 77th  | (j) 81st |
| (e) 88th  | (k) 86th |
| (f) 124th |          |

(2) Training Divisions

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| (a) 78th  | (d) 100th |
| (b) 91st  | (e) 84th  |
| (c) 108th |           |

(3) Brigades

- |               |                |
|---------------|----------------|
| (a) 157th Inf | (d) 143d Trans |
| (b) 221st MP  | (e) 205th Inf  |
| (c) 311th Spt |                |

(4) Maneuver Area Command

87th

(5) USAR Schools

(a) 6222d

(b) 5038th

(6) O-6 to O-8 Commanders

(a) 5501st MEDCOM

(e) 416th Engr Cmd

(b) 351st CA Cmd

(f) 30th Hosp Ctr

(c) 6211th USAR Garrison (g) 11th SF Gp

(d) 412th Engr Cmd

(h) 78th MTC

(7) Regional LOGEX "Liberty Bell III"

c. ARNG

(1) State Headquarters

(a) PA

(i) AZ

(b) DE

(j) IN

(c) TX

(k) AL

(d) MI

(l) FL

(e) CA

(m) KS

(f) WA

(n) MN

(g) NC

(o) GA

(h) MS

(2) Divisions

(a) 26th Inf

(e) 47th Inf

(b) 49th Armd

(f) 40th Inf (M)

(c) 50th Armd

(g) 38th Inf

(d) 42d Inf

(3) Brigades

- |                 |                  |
|-----------------|------------------|
| (a) 175th Med   | (d) 30th Inf (M) |
| (b) 30th Engr   | (e) 69th Inf (M) |
| (c) 32d Inf (M) |                  |

(4) Groups

- (a) 115th Area Spt
- (b) 168th Engr

(5) COSCOM

167th

(6) State-operated Installations

- (a) Cp Ripley
- (b) Cp Atterbury

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 2

BRIEFINGS PRESENTED TO

ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82

BRIEFINGS PRESENTED TO ACCS-82

Briefings were presented to ACCS-82 in Washington, DC by the following:

1. OCAR
2. NGB
3. Mr. John Brinkerhoff,  
OSD
4. COL John Claybrook,  
HQDA (DAMO-MOBEX 78)
5. FORSCOM
6. AF Reserve
7. ARNG (NGB)
8. TRADOC
9. DARCOM
10. USMC Reserve
11. USN Reserve
12. ACC
13. AC<sup>2</sup>MP
14. TIG
15. OCE
16. Surgeon General
17. MILPERCEN
18. AAA

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 3

INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES:

A FEASIBILITY STUDY



## Installation Management Alternatives:

### A Feasibility Study

1. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to examine installation management for CONUS mobilization installations (this includes active, semi-active and state operated stations. Specifically, the study will determine what improvements are required to insure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency.

2. Objective. The objective of this study is to improve the installation management structure to perform missions during peace, war, and the transition from peace to war. Considerations for the resulting structure are to:

a. Provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war at the installation level during mobilization.

b. Eliminate the need to change command of installations upon mobilization and deployment during and after the transition from peace to war.

c. Provide the basis for expanding the installation management structure to meet the needs of total mobilization.

3. History. The history of the Army's installation management and command from 1920 to the present has evolved through many systems. Under the National Defense Act of 1920, the Army was organized into nine corps areas. They were administrative rather than tactical and commanded the posts, camps and stations in their area except for "exempted" stations which belonged to Chiefs of Services. The corps were responsible for executing training programs, administration and installation management. The major reorganization of the Army in 1942 resulted, among other things, in the establishment of the Army Ground Forces (AGF), the Army Air Forces (AAF) and the Services of Supply (SOS). The Services of Supply were later renamed the Army Service Forces, (ASF). ASF became the Army's installation commanders for the duration of World War II. The nine corps areas and the Military District of Washington (MDW) were placed under ASF and reorganized into Service Commands. The Service Commands and MDW were the area installation commanders. All installations in CONUS were placed in four categories.

Class I - Directly under the Service Command; included all installations not involved with the AGF, the AAF or the technical services.

Class II - Installations housing AGF units.

Class III - Installations housing ASF units.

Class IV - ASF installations housing technical service activities.

ASF, through the Service Commands and the Installation Commanders, allocated the funds, personnel and materiel for the installation management function. A result was "landlord" - "tenant" friction between the ASF and the AGF and AAF, especially the latter, which was already pursuing the goal of becoming a separate service. In March 1948, the ASF was abolished and the installation management functions transferred to the Zone of the interior field armies. However, installations which belonged to the technical services were commanded by the technical service chiefs with the field armies providing installation management services. This arrangement did not work well, again due to "landlord" - "tenant" disputes. In 1955, the field armies were relieved of funding, personnel, and other resources for principal Class II mission and support activities. They were transferred to the Technical Services. Command responsibility for installations was still with the appropriate geographical Continental United States Army (CONUSA) commander. In 1973, the Army was reorganized to its current installation management system and for the first time since 1948 the CONUSA did not have management responsibility for installations. CONUSA installations are assigned to major command headquarters. The organizational concept (title STEADFAST) brought about a significant change in installation management and command. Installations are assigned to functionally oriented headquarters (Major Commands, i.e., FORSCOM, TRADOC, DARCOM etc.) reporting directly to HQDA rather than being managed by CONUSA having a geographical area of responsibility. STEADFAST provides that an installation commander will command all units, activities and personnel assigned with only minor exceptions. Where elements of both FORSCOM and TRADOC are assigned, the installation commanders report to, and are responsible to, both major commanders in their areas of responsibility for the missions and resources assigned. In addition, all installations support Reserve Component (RC) elements commanded by FORSCOM.

#### 4. Scope.

a. The installation management structure from DA down through the installations (inclusive) was examined.

b. Specifically, the study:

(1) Defines the base case installation management structure to include resources, strengths and weaknesses.

(2) Determines the feasibility of establishing an Installation Management Command (IMCOM) for pre/post mobilization.

(3) Determines the resources required to operate a separate IMCOM.

(4) Determines if there is an existing MACOM that should absorb the installation management function.

(5) Determines if only modifications to the current MACOM management of installations would establish objectives of para 2.

(6) Compares the costs of providing installation management in each alternative.

5. The following full spectrum of installation management alternatives are discussed in detail in paragraph 7.

a. IMCOM established as a separate MACOM.

b. Installation management incorporated into the Corps of Engineers (CE) Command Structure.

c. Installation management placed under a separate staff section at FORSCOM.

d. Minimum changes incorporated into current installation management system.

6. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. Description of existing structure.

(1) Within major Army commands, installation management structures are standardized by type. The organization

charts of the four "type" installations shown in Figures F-3-1-4 are a result of several installation management studies as well as the evolution of the Army organization.

(2) With the advent of STEADFAST, the command and management of installation activities became the concentrated responsibility of the installation commander under their parent MACOM.

(3) Most installations have similar functional support responsibilities that can be logically aligned into standard principal staff elements.

(4) No two installations operate exactly alike (nor can they).

(a) Installation commanders have a need for considerable flexibility to utilize available resources; therefore, higher commanders impose only the minimum possible organizational requirements on installations.

(b) The installation support management organization is established as a directorate type headquarters.

(c) Within installation type, MACOM commanders may establish substandardization as necessary to accomplish effective management.

(d) The sizes of internal elements are determined by workload analysis and allocation of available resources, and the names of individual elements reflect the elements' mission in terms commonly or traditionally known in the Army.

(e) Any regulation or other HQDA directive that prescribes that a functional element will be established as a "division," "branch," or "office" or that specifies numbers of installation elements is considered advisory rather than directive unless it also specifies that it is an exception to this policy.

(f) Directors' positions are designated as key management positions. The normal functional responsibilities of installation support directorates are described in Inclosure 1 (an extract from AR 5-3). It is not intended to provide a complete listing of functions and subfunctions but to list enough to describe the typical alignment.

Figure F-3-1




Figure F-3-2




Figure F-3-3



TYPE C INSTALLATION -  
SERVICE SCHOOL AND GARRISON

Figure F-3-4

## TYPE D INSTALLATION



(5) The chain of command to the installations is directly from the MACOM. Those MACOM that control installations are FORSCOM, TRADOC, DARCOM, ACC, INSCOM, HSC, MTMC, and MDW.

(6) DA does not directly involve itself in installation management other than providing the guidance in AR 5-3. There is no staff agency within the DA staff that has centralized responsibility for installation management.

(7) At the MACOM, responsibility for installation management is functionally across the staff. At MACOM with a DCSRM, that staff directorate is the primary coordinator for installation management of its subordinate installations.

(8) An analysis was made to determine the number of spaces currently involved with installation management to be used for comparison against the installation management spaces in the alternatives to be discussed. This was accomplished by analyzing the organization and functions manuals as well as the TDAs of those MACOM selected for participation in the various alternatives. 1053 spaces were considered to be performing solely installation management duties and subject to transfer in the various alternatives (see inclosure 3).

b. Characteristics of the present installation management system.

(1) MACOM are generally satisfied with the evolution of installation management following the STEADFAST initiatives.

(a) Changes in functional and command relationships, that made the installation commander the central figure in installation and area operations, strengthened the capability to do non-BASOPS tasks at the installation.

(b) Centralized management at the MACOM, decentralized operations and full operational authority for IM given installation commanders, enhanced the reorganization goals of improved readiness, schools, combat development activities and management.

(c) The installation commander has full authority to transfer funds between BASOPS and P2 mission requirements.

(d) The process which expanded the role of the installation commander elevates BASOPS to a high priority position among the commanders missions.

(e) There is a shortage of resources (funds and manpower) to cover all of the existing programs. With adjustments and fine tuning, the installation commander has the flexibility to make the IM system work.

(2) The major concern is not how the installation management system is functioning in peacetime but how it will function during the transition period and post mobilization. Major concerns in this area are:

(a) Installation stability and dependability is vital to a successful mobilization effort. Mobilization can affect the peacetime command alignment of installations. Present mobilization plans provide for Forts Hood, Bragg, Lewis, Ord, and Polk to house Army Training Centers which could cause installation command realignment from FORSCOM to TRADOC during wartime.

(b) FORSCOM commands the USAR and is responsible for related training and readiness. The majority of logistical and administrative support to USAR units is provided by FORSCOM and TRADOC installations.

(c) The extensive use of borrowed military manpower in support of installation management is a severe problem during deployment and post mobilization. During a mobilization situation, these STRAF troops, which are now used in large numbers to support installation management operations, are subject to immediate deployment. Related statistics at Table F-3-1 for principle FORSCOM installations indicate that in FY 1978 borrowed military manpower accounted for approximately 18 percent of the total work force used to operate FORSCOM installations. There is a wide range of such utilization between installations with those having a large troop concentration being the largest users. Table F-3-2 provides an indication of the magnitude of the problem at FORSCOM and TRADOC installations over the past five quarters.

(d) All installations have MTDAs which identify manpower requirements for mobilization and it can be assumed that present manpower authorization constraints will be removed at that time allowing the positions to be filled.



Table F-3-1

FORSCOM  
USE OF BORROWED MILITARY MANPOWER IN FY 1978 TO  
SUPPLEMENT USAG OPERATIONS

Installation	Rec Req			Auth Str			Borrowed Mil Mpr(m/y)	Total Auth & Borrowed	Borrowed Mil as % of Total
	Mil	Civ	Total	Mil	Civ	Total			
Ft Anador	1053	2456	3509	849	1847	2696	386	3082	12.5
Ft Bragg	1251	3387	4638	646	2107	2753	1253	4006	31.3
Ft Campbell	559	1965	2524	283	1460	1743	609	2352	25.9
Ft Carson	780	1906	2686	490	1279	1769	596	2365	25.2
Ft Devens	414	1327	1741	341	992	1333	101	1434	7.0
Ft Drum	96	493	589	96	406	502	-	502	-
Ft Hood	889	3163	4252	457	2047	2504	1361	3865	35.2
Ft S. Houston	503	1872	2375	478	1439	1917	16	1933	0.8
Ft Indiantown Gap	99	925	1024	93	864	957	-	957	-
Ft Lewis	794	2349	3143	459	1561	2020	871	2891	30.1
Ft McCoy	45	710	755	45	602	647	-	647	-
Ft McPherson	419	1308	1727	392	1063	1455	30	1485	2.0
Ft Meade	535	2033	2568	380	1546	1926	288	2214	13.0
Ft Ord	813	2104	2917	627	1407	2034	331	2365	14.0
Ft Polk	488	1831	2319	272	1492	1764	328	2092	15.7
Ft Richardson	1716	1926	3642	1548	1526	3074	600	3674	16.3
Ft Riley	546	1745	2289	314	1158	1472	539	2011	26.8
Ft Sheridan	307	1006	1313	295	805	1100	5	1105	0.5
Ft Stewart	562	2124	2686	407	1530	1937	406	2343	17.3
Presidio of SF	353	1530	1883	308	1189	1497	196	1693	11.4
Totals	12222	36358	48580	8780	26320	35100	7916	43016	18.4

## NOTES:

- Source of data.
  - Recognized Requirements and Authorized Strengths - From FY 78 TDAs
  - Borrowed Military Manpower - From FY 78 Manpower Utilization and Requirements Reports, RCS CSFOR 78.
- Authorized Strength does not include Temporary or Part Time manpower spaces.

Table F-3-2

BORROWED MILITARY MANPOWER  
TO SUPPLEMENT USAG OPERATIONS

COMMAND	FY 78				FY 79
	1st QTR	2d QTR	3d QTR	4th QTR	1st QTR
FORSCOM	7744	8833	9127	8453	7776
TRADOC	3049	5261	5047	5508	3727

NOTE: The above figures are as reported on the Manpower Utilization Report (RCS-CSGPO-78), but recent Manpower Baseline Studies of the MACOMs show these numbers may be conservative.

(3) The presence of a trained work force capable of sustaining expanded garrison operations is vital for the successful performance of an installation's mobilization mission. Adequate manpower authorizations in peacetime are highly unlikely. Rapid deployment of STRAF troop units at mobilization is a recognized necessity. One solution to this problem is an expanded role in which the USAR, both units and individuals (MOBDES), could become a prime source of manpower to operate installations at mobilization. Another source of providing needed manpower support to installations in peacetime is increased use of contracts which provide for rapid expansion at mobilization. Additionally, key personnel can be provided at mobilization by recall of pre-designated retired personnel.

#### 7. Discussion of Installation Management Alternative.

a. Alternative 1. Installation Management Command (IMCOM) established as a separate MACOM.

(1) Narrative Description. A new major command would be established with a mission of Installation Management. FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM installations would be included in the IMCOM. DARCOM, HSC, MTMC and MDW would be excluded from the IMCOM. The rationale for including or excluding a MACOM as a participant in the IMCOM is in Inclosure 2. This new command would directly command and support the installations currently subordinate to the included MACOM. It would also be in the budget and funding channel for these installations. The participating installations would act as host to all units and activities located on the installations. The installations would be responsible for providing all BASOPS support to these tenant units and activities. The IMCOM would stabilize command of installations currently scheduled to change command channels during post mobilization and free participating MACOM to concentrate on their principal missions. Added emphasis could be placed on installation management by establishing it as an OPMS specialty and designating the installation commander a command selection position.

(2) Command Relationships. Command and control of FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM installations would be transferred to the IMCOM. All other MACOM installations would remain under their current MACOM. The IMCOM installations would be host to all units and activities on the installations.

(3) Functions. All installation management functions at FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM would be transferred to the IMCOM.

(4) Stationing. A location would have to be found to station the 1304 personnel of the IMCOM Headquarters and their dependants. The most cost effective stationing procedure would be to use the IMCOM as backfill. Ft. Dix which is scheduled to lose its training center IAW recent DOD reduction/realignment announcements is one possibility. Another would be to backfill into Ft. Benjamin Harrison if neither MILPERCEN nor USAREC are relocated there. The stationing impact of transferring 452 spaces from TRADOC and 601 spaces from FORSCOM that go to the IMCOM would have to be addressed IAW AR 5-10, Reductions and Realignment Actions.

(5) Staffing Concept.

(a) Organizational Concept - Concept of Operations - This alternative would establish a separate MACOM under HQDA. All installations now subordinate to Participating MACOM would come under the direct command and control of the IMCOM. Budget and funding channels for these installations would be from HQDA through the IMCOM to the installations. The IMCOM installation would act as host to all units and activities located on the installation.

1 Type Staff - Directorate

2 Rationale for Staffing -

The procedure for establishing the proposed IMCOM was to analyze the organizations and functions in the area of IM along with the TDAs of the MACOM with installations to be included in the IMCOM. From this analysis, the IMCOM organization and functions and its required manning were determined (see Inclosure 3). The manpower required to staff such an organization would come from various sources. Two sources are spaces at FORSCOM and TRADOC Headquarters which are directly involved with installations management; these would be reallocated to IMCOM Headquarters.\*

\*NOTE: The spaces identified to be transferred from FORSCOM and TRADOC are considered to be the maximum that could be transferred and may not materialize. They were identified in the Organizations and Functions manuals and the TDAs as performing solely installation management duties when in fact they may be performing in a dual capacity and not be available for transfer. Inability to transfer spaces could increase the manpower requirements and corresponding cost.

Additional manning would have to be provided by an increase to the current force structure or reprogramming within the current force structure.

3 Display of headquarters organization -  
A description of organization and functions as well as wiring diagrams with manning is in Inclosure 3.

4 Manpower - Required to perform IM (see  
Inclosure 3)

a Military - 204 (all AC)

b Civilians - 1100 (all DAC)

c General Officers Summary - 1 LTG,  
2 MGs and 1 BG.

5 Resource Summary for IM  
Manpower

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
<u>a</u> IMCOM	+204	+1100
<u>b</u> FORSCOM	- 60	- 541
<u>c</u> TRADOC	- 54	- 398
<u>d</u> Net Manpower Impact (shortfall)	+ 90	+ 161 = +251

(6) Comparison with the Base Case.

(a) Advantages.

1 The IMCOM would assure that readiness, training and war planning would not have to compete with day-to-day operations of the installations.

2 It would place participating installations under one uniform management system .

3 It would provide installation stability during peacetime, the transition period and wartime.

4 The installation commander under the IMCOM would be an O-6 and would have to walk a tight rope between senior commanders.

5 There may be difficulty finding a qualified staff that is junior to the commander, especially if a command selection process could be established for installation commanders under this concept.

6 It would require additional manpower resources at the HQ level. 251 spaces would be required in addition to those reallocated from FORSCOM and TRADOC Headquarters to staff the IMCOM Headquarters.

7 It would require an addition to the force structure of 1 LTG, 2 MGs and 1 BG.

8 Such a command would have a span of command and control of approximately 50 installations.

9 Senior unit commander on Corps and Division installations would have reduced flexibility and not be able to balance installation resources to accomplish mission objectives.

10 Formation of an IMCOM would be a revolutionary change to the current organization and would create maximum turbulence to implement.

11 The IMCOM would have to be stationed as a major headquarters on an installation requiring the additional facilities and BASOPS-support generated by a MACOM of its size.

b. Alternative 2. Incorporation of Command and Control of FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM installations into the Corps of Engineers (CE) Command Structure.

(1) Narrative Description.

The Corps of Engineers would command and control all FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM installations. A separate directorate would be established at the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) for Installation Management. Other staff directorates throughout OCE would be augmented in order to accept the additional workload (see Inclosure 4). Management

would be decentralized to the Engineer Divisions on a regional basis throughout CONUS. A Deputy for Installation Management would be added to each Division Office Organization (see Inclosure 4). Also added to the Division Office Organization would be a staff section for Installation Services and Division staff augmentation to accept the added workload. This alternative would concentrate on using CE contracting expertise to the fullest extent possible.\* The installations would be under the command of an Installation Manager. The Installation Manager would report to the Division Engineer. All units and activities would be tenants on the installation. This alternative would stabilize command of installations during post mobilization and free participating MACOM to concentrate on their principal missions. Extensive use of contracts to perform BASOPS functions would reduce considerably the use of borrowed military manpower and provide a ready made system to meet BASOPS expansion requirements during mobilization.

(2) Command Relationships.

Command and control of FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM installations would be transferred to the Corps of Engineers. All other installations would remain under their current MACOM. All participating installations would be assigned to an Engineer Division on a regional basis and receive assistance from an Engineer District on an area basis. The District Area Office at the installation would become part of the installation Facilities Engineer Office. The Corps of Engineers would be host to all units and activities on the installation.

(3) Functions.

All installation management functions at FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM HQ would be transferred to the Corps of Engineers.

\*NOTE: OCE indicated in a recent decision briefing to the VCSA on "Alternative Strategies for Managing the Transition to Increased Installation and Regional Contracting" that their experience discloses that contracting BASOPS is expensive. Indications are that contracting will provide less services for more dollars. The Chief of Engineers has been directed to submit an initial plan to assume responsibility for RPMA CONUS-wide by 1 July 1979 for staffing with MACOM and the Army Staff. A cost analysis of contracting will be part of this plan.

(4) Stationing.

The stationing impact of the transfer to the IMCOM, 601 spaces from FORSCOM HQ and 452 spaces from TRADOC HQ would have to be addressed IAW AR 5-10.

(5) Staffing Concept.

(a) Organizational Concept - Concept of Operations - This alternative would establish an Installation Management Directorate at OCE. Management of the installations would be decentralized to the Engineer Division. Budget and funding channels would be from HQDA through OCE and the Engineer Division to the installations. The OCE installations would act as host to all units and activities on the installation.

1 Type Staff - Directorate

2 Rationale for Staffing -

The procedure for establishing installation management under the Corps of Engineers was to analyze the organizations and functions in the area of IM along with the TDAs of the MACOM HQ to be included. From this analysis it was determined that the IM functions formulated for the IMCOM established in alternative 1 (see Inclosure 3) would be identical to those required for installation management under the Corps of Engineers. The IMCOM manning was adjusted in order to staff OCE and the Engineer Divisions at the proper level to allow the divisions to accept the mission of installation management (see Inclosure 4). This was done by taking into consideration that space savings would be accrued by contracting BASOPS to the fullest extent possible and adjusting the staffing in areas where like functions were already being performed within OCE and the Engineer Divisions. The potential for space savings is confirmed in the OCE response to the ACCS-82 tasker message, dated 17 Jan 79.

3 Manpower - Required to perform IM

(see Inclosure 4)

a Military - 22 (all AC)

b Civilian - 827 (all DAC)

1 BG

c General Officers Summary - 1 MG and

4 Resource Summary

Manpower

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
<u>a</u> Corps of Engineers	+222	+327
<u>b</u> FORSCOM	- 60	-541
<u>c</u> TRADOC	- 54	-398
Net Manpower Impact	+108	-112 = -4

(6) Comparison with the Base Case.

(a) Advantages.

1 This management concept would assure that readiness, training and war planning would not have to compete with day-to-day operations of the installations.

2 It would place participating installations under one uniform system.

3 It would provide installation stability during peacetime, the transition period and wartime.

4 It would protect BASOPS financial resources from being reprogrammed into other operating activities.

5 It would provide potential to improve career opportunities in BASOPS (installation management).

6 The extensive use of contracts to perform BASOPS functions would reduce considerably the use of borrowed military manpower and provide a ready made system to meet BASOPS expansion requirements during mobilization.

(b) Disadvantages.

1 The Corps of Engineers may not be as responsive as current MACOM to the requirements of tenants on the installations.



2 It would complicate the planning, programming and priority processes for installation support.

3 It would complicate command relationships at the installation and would require expanded use of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

4 The Installation Manager under the Division Engineer would be an O-6 and would have to walk a tight rope between senior commanders.

5 There may be difficulty finding a qualified staff that is junior to the commander, especially if a command selection process could be established for installation managers under this concept.

6 Even though it could potentially reduce manpower resources by 4 spaces, OCE in a recent decision briefing "Alternative Strategies for Managing the Transition to Increased Installation and Regional Contracting" presented to the VCSA, disclosed that experience to date has shown BASOPS contracting to be expensive.

7 It would require an addition to the force structure of one (1) MG and one (1) BG.

8 Senior unit commanders on Corps and Division installations would have reduced flexibility and not be able to balance installation resources to accomplish mission objectives.

9 Formation of installation management under the Corps of Engineers would be a revolutionary change to the current organization and would create maximum turbulence to implement.

10 It would create stationing impact at both TRADOC and FORSCOM IAW AR 5-10 and would have to be evaluated accordingly.

11 OCE has little experience in BASOPS, other than the RPMA portion, creating considerable turbulence in installation management during the learning process.

12 There would be disruption in the Corps military construction programs and civil works programs

while installation management is being established under OCE.

13 Leased office space would have to be increased at every engineer Division with a minimum requirement of space for 67 additional personnel at South Pacific Division to a maximum requirement of space for 220 additional personnel at North Atlantic Division. OCE office space would have to be increased for 206 additional personnel. (See Inclosure 4).

c. Alternative 3. Command and Control of FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM Installations by FORSCOM under the staff supervision of a separate staff section at FORSCOM HQ.

(1) Narrative Description. The FORSCOM commander would command and control all assigned installations. Rationale for those installations transferred to FORSCOM control is the same as that establishing the IMCOM. A separate staff section would be established at FORSCOM HQ to manage and support those installations. This staff section would be headed by a Director of Installation management. The FORSCOM installations would act as host to all other MACOM units assigned on their installations. The transfer of the designated installations to FORSCOM would stabilize command of installations currently scheduled to change commands during mobilization.

(2) Command Relationships. All installations previously under the command and control of TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM would be transferred to the command and control of FORSCOM. The FORSCOM installations would act as host to all other units assigned to their installations.

(3) Functions. All installation management functions at TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM HQ would be transferred to FORSCOM HQ.

(4) Stationing. There would be no stationing changes caused by this alternative. There would be 452 spaces transferred from TRADOC HQ to FORSCOM HQ which would have to be addressed IAW AR 5-10.

(5) Staffing Concept.

(a) Organizational Concept - Concept of Operations - This alternative would establish a new staff

section at directorate level within FORSCOM HQ to manage and support all assigned installations. This staff section would be headed by a Director of Installation Management (DIM). The DIM would be the primary agent for the FORSCOM staff for all matters pertaining to installation management. The FORSCOM installations would act as host to all other units and activities assigned to their installations.

1 Type Staff - Directorate

2 Rationale for Staffing -

The procedure for determining the staffing of IM at FORSCOM was to analyze mission and functions to be performed and staff accordingly. Current FORSCOM and TRADOC IM personnel assests fall short of the required staffing, necessitating an increase in the force structure of 150 spaces (see Inclosure 5).

3 Display of Directorate Organization. A description of organization and functions as well as a wiring diagram with manning is in Inclosure 5.

4 Manpower - Required to perform IM (see Inclosure 5)

a Military 168 (all AC)

b Civilians 1035 (all DAC)

c General Officer Summary +1 MG, +1 BG

5 Resource Summary

Manpower

	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
<u>a</u> FORSCOM (IM Requirements)	+168	+1035
<u>b</u> FORSCOM (dedicate to IM)	- 60	- 541
<u>c</u> TRADOC	- 54	- 398
<u>d</u> Net Manpower Impact (shortfall)		

54      96 = 150

(6) Comparison with Base Case.

(a) Advantages.

1 The headquarters responsible for planning and executing mobilization, deployment and CONUS oriented contingency plans would command the primary support base in CONUS.

2 It would eliminate the need for command realignment of installations during mobilization.

3 It would facilitate rapid transition from peace to war.

4 It would centralize peacetime support for RC under MACOM having command jurisdiction.

5 It would permit centralized emphasis on development of peacetime contractual base at installations which could be expanded at mobilization.

6 It would provide maximum flexibility to realign resources to support mobilization requirements.

(b) Disadvantages.

1 The FORSCOM peacetime and mobilization span of control would be expanded.

2 Increased installation management problems at mobilization could detract from FORSCOM capability to perform combat readiness and deployment missions.

3 There is the possibility of conflict of interest with TRADOC and to a lesser extent ACC and INSCOM since, under this concept these MACOM units and activities are tenants on installations commanded by FORSCOM.

4 The realignment of installation command would result in a period of turbulence at FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC, INSCOM HQ and at all installations involved in changing command alignment.

5 It would require an additional 150 spaces at FORSCOM in addition to those reallocated from TRADOC to FORSCOM.

6 It would require an addition to the force structure of 1 MG and 1 BG.

d. Alternative 4. Minimum Changes Incorporated into Current Installation Management System.

(1) This alternative would retain the STEADFAST concept of a functionally aligned installation management system. There would be some changes in the post mobilization installation management and command structure. Five additional US Army Garrisons would be established and assigned post mobilization missions at five semi-active and state operated installations. Explicit guidance would be established to ensure the existing confusing and unclear post mobilization command procedures are corrected. These changes would be incorporated into the FORSCOM-RCMP. The USAR Garrisons would train on their mobilization station during peacetime. The USAR Garrisons would be tailored to their designated mobilization station. This includes the use of the ARNG TDA personnel at state operated mobilization stations. An additional change would be to designate a post mobilization command and control HQ at Fts. Hood, Bragg, Ord, Lewis and Polk. This would eliminate the need for these installations to change MACOM during mobilization. The Training Divisions presently designated to mobilize at these installations to establish training centers and take command of the installations at some specified time would continue with their training mission. Command of the installations would be assumed by a predesignated USAR or USA command and control headquarters. This would be an ARCOM for ACCS-82 Alternatives 1, 2 and 4 and the REDMOB in the ACCS-82 Alternative 3. Incumbents in various installation key staff positions could be reassigned to deploying units. The impact on the force would be reduced by assigning more MOBDES personnel in post mobilization garrison assignments. Retired personnel would be preassigned to mobilization assignments. Contracting of BASOPS would be increased, providing a ready made base for expansion. Finally, designated non-deploying units would be mobilized early to support the main effort.

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
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(2) Command Relationships.

All installations would remain under the command and control of their current MACOM. Five Corps and Division installations are now scheduled to become training centers during mobilization. This could result in a change of MACOM command channels. Assigning a FORSCOM command and control headquarters to take command of the installation during mobilization would ensure these installations remain under FORSCOM command and control.

(3) Functions.

All functions would continue to be performed as in the current system.

(4) Stationing.

There would be no stationing impact for this alternative.

(5) Staffing Concept.

Additional MOBDES and retired military would be used to augment the garrison staffs. The MTDA spaces that these individuals would be assigned against would be tailored to the needs of the installation. The basic organization, concept of operation and type of staff would remain as in the current system. AC and DAC manpower would not change under this concept.

(6) Comparison with the Base Case.

(a) Advantages.

1 It would provide installation stability during peacetime, the transition period and wartime without having to form a revolutionary new management system or increase manpower.

2 The installation commander would retain the flexibility to balance installation resources to accomplish mission objectives.

3 Reduces the impact of borrowed military manpower deployment by increased contracting in garrison functional areas.

4 It ensures unity of command at the installation.

5 Early mobilization of designated non-deploying and late deploying units would provide manpower to assist in garrison operations during the initial rapid expansion period.

(b) Disadvantages.

1 There would be competition between readiness, training and war planning and the day-to-day operations of the installations as long as the installation commander is responsible for both.

2 It does not protect BASOPS financial resources from being reprogrammed into other operating activities.

3 It provides no potential for improved career opportunities in BASOPS (installation management).

4 Early mobilization of non-deploying and late deploying units would increase demand on already over extended facility capability.

8. Conclusions.

a. The formation of a centralized installation management system within an IMCOM, OCE or FORSCOM would be a revolutionary approach to installation management. In addition, it would create considerable turbulence during its creation and require increased resources in every instance.

b. The current installation management system works in peacetime. However, there is a shortage of resources, both funds and manpower, to cover all of the existing programs. The commander is able to perform his missions through the use of borrowed military manpower (BMM) and the flexibility provided to him as the installation commander to transfer funds between BASOPS and P2 mission programs.



c. The major problems with the current installation management system occur during mobilization and deployment. When the corps and divisions deploy, the installations vacated are stripped of BMM. This leaves the garrison force depleted of its workforce at the very time that maximum turbulence caused by mobilization and deployment is taking place. In addition five of these installations will become training centers and possibly change command channels from FORSCOM to TRADOC during mobilization.

d. No two installations operate exactly alike (nor can they). The current decentralized approach to installation management and the flexibility given the installation commander by AR 5-3 and guidance provided by HQDA and the MACOM allows the installation commander to adjust his staff to accomplish his specific operational requirements.

e. None of the revolutionary changes to installation management will provide an improvement over the current structure unless the resources to fully fund and staff them are provided.

#### 9. Recommendations.

a. Retain the basic installation management system with installations under functional MACOM and management decentralized to the installation commanders.

b. Designate now the organization that will command installations that change command, missions and/or MACOM post mobilization.

c. Designate key positions at each installation that can be filled by MOBDES or retired military to provide expertise in all required installation services.

d. Contract more BASOPS now to provide for a ready expansion base for contracts during mobilization.

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## APPENDIX A

### INSTALLATION FUNCTIONS

A-1. This appendix lists functions and activities normally assigned within the cognizance of installation key managers. This listing is not complete, instead it is intended to be descriptive of basic alignment. It establishes neither requirements nor titles for elements within directorates. Any unlisted functions are to be assigned to the most logical directorate, based on similarity to those stated herein. Organizational elements within directorates should bear conventional titles or use conventional terms for functionally descriptive titles.

A-2. Normal functional responsibilities for directorates are as follows—

*a. Comptroller or Director, Resource Management.* This directorate encompasses the normal comptroller functions discussed in AR 5-2 and FM 101-5, excepting ADP management. Typical functions are: accounting policy; internal review; management analysis and engineering; command management improvement programs; statistical reporting; program review and analysis; statistical graphic services; budgeting and programing; finance, accounting, and disbursing of public funds; auditing and, optionally when as a resource management organization as approved by the MACOM commander, manpower management or force development; and other related functions such as reports control.

*b. Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities.* This directorate encompasses normal G-1/S-1 functions (FM 101-5). Typical functions in personnel and administrative activities are: military personnel and administration; civilian personnel administration, when not established as a separate staff office by the commander or MACOM; personnel security clearances, when not assigned to DSEC; education and career development; race relations/equal opportunity; headquarters administrative requirements and procedures; mail and messenger services; and when not designated a personal staff office, equal employment opportunity. If the EEOO and the CPO are positioned under the DPCA, both retain direct access to the commander. Typical functions in community activities are:

exchanges, clubs, and open messes; other non-appropriated funds activities; safety; recreational services; morale, welfare, and community services for personal development; drug and alcohol abuse prevention and control; dependent schools; adult education schools; military police activities.

*c. Directorate of Plans and Training.* This directorate encompasses normal G-3/S-3 functions. Typical functions are: plans; operations; training; force development; unit readiness objectives and levels; range operations; museum (may be under a school or other organization, depending on the nature of the museum); aviation; CBR activities; assigned training aids activities (Educational TV and Category I training film activities that are integral to schools remain on the school TDA if the TDA's are separate); and establishing unit priorities. The directorate may provide CRCs when separate element is not warranted.

*d. Directorate of Security.* This directorate encompasses normal G-2/S-2 functions. Typical functions are: security clearances; access to classified or restricted areas and activities; classified or restricted areas surveys and inspections; intelligence information; weather service; maps and aerial photograph policy. (This directorate does not include physical security of material and facilities which are normal military police activities under staff supervision of DPCA or DCAS.)

*e. Directorate of Industrial Operations.* Typical functions are: general supply; general maintenance; general support services not assigned elsewhere (includes food service operations not assigned to HQ Comdt); transportation services; administrative motor pools; logistical support plans; housing; purchasing and contracting (P&C) activities (includes the coordinating functions of P&C needs for installation, but not the P&C activities and responsibilities of the appointed P&C officer. The P&C officer is appointed by and responsible to the appropriate head of a procuring activity (HPA) for activities in accordance with Army Procurement Procedure (APP) and Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). P&C

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officer is placed under DIO for local supervision and administrative support but not for operational management).

*f. Directorate of Facilities Engineering.* Typical functions are: installation engineering projects and services; environmental affairs and environmental management program; master planning and construction program; execution, inspection, supervision, and acceptance of engineering contracts; real estate acquisition, management, and disposal; construction contract proposals and specifications; operation and maintenance of utilities; maintenance and/or repair of real property and facilities; minor construction; fire prevention and protection; supply and storage of items peculiar to facilities engineering, maintenance, and construction functions; maintenance of installed property; and natural resources management.

*g. Directorate of Communications-Electronics.* Typical functions include: supervision and operation of telecommunications center, radio opera-

tions (including MARS); radio frequency management; telephone facilities installation, operation, maintenance, and customer accounts; installation and maintenance of television outside cable; air traffic control.

*h. Directorate of Health Services.* The DHS performs installation staff functions associated with providing or arranging for health services essential to maintaining the health of uniformed service members and, within capability, other authorized beneficiaries located within the installation's designated geographical area of responsibility; appropriate health care training of troops; and health care aspects of emergency planning.

*i. Directorate of Dental Services.* The DDS performs installation staff functions associated with providing or arranging for dental services essential to maintaining dental health of uniformed service members and, within capability, other authorized beneficiaries located within the installation's designated geographical area of responsibility.

## MACOMS TO BE INCLUDED/EXCLUDED FROM IMCOM

### MACOMS TO BE INCLUDED

**FORSCOM & TRADOC** - Although FORSCOM and TRADOC have different missions their overall goals are the same. They both support the combat forces. Currently most installations have both FORSCOM and TRADOC troop units assigned.

**ACC** - The ACC response to an IMCOM was positive. If part of IMCOM, ACC could concentrate on providing commo to customers around the world. ACC installation garrison functions are not unlike the garrison functions of FORSCOM and TRADOC.

**INSCOM** - There appears to be no real basis for excluding INSCOM from an IMCOM on the grounds of special mission considerations. INSCOM installation garrisons perform much the same functions as FORSCOM and TRADOC installations.

### MACOMS TO BE EXCLUDED

**HSC** - The commonality of HSC installations is that they are the sole installation occupants and are self-managers. To superimpose a separate installation management organization on these facilities would be a clear waste of manpower and resources. HSC units are currently tenants on FORSCOM, TRADOC and ACC installation and would continue in the same manner on IMCOM installations.

**MTMC** - Military Ocean Terminals are unique installations in the Army. All plans for facility development would have to be coordinated through a command unfamiliar with the mission, operations, and priorities with possible negative impacts on mission.

**DARCOM** - Functions are typically so integrated with mission functions that any separation would be difficult and expensive. Such separation would result in major duplication of functions. These functions are industrially oriented and funded at DARCOM installations.

**MDW** - This command is unique among the major commands. It is located in a small consolidated geographic area and functions basically as a headquarters commandant organization in support of the National Capitol Region (NCR). The MDW Commander can best perform this mission by having complete control of all the assets within the NCR.

1-1 IMCOM - Mission

a. Command and support assigned installations and sub-installations.

b. Provide guidance to assigned installations/sub-installations in the areas of logistical and administrative support.

1-2. Commanding General - Commands all IMCOM installations and is the host for all FORSCOM, TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM units located on IMCOM installations.

1-3. Deputy Commanding General (East) - Provides direct supervision for the CG of all installations in the Eastern IMCOM sector.

1-4. Deputy Commanding General (West) - Provides direct supervision for the CG of all installations in the western IMCOM sector.

1-5. Office of the Chief of Staff.

a. Chief of Staff. Acts for the Commanding General within delegated authority and command guidance concerning operations and activities throughout IMCOM. Directs the operation of the HQ IMCOM General and Special Staff. Supervises the coordination and issuance of directives and instructions to ensure unity of action and compliance with the Commander's guidance. Coordinates the allocation and management of command resources, chairs the IMCOM Program Resources Advisory Committee (PRAC), and supervises the allocation and distribution of manpower and personnel resources. Personally oversees the IMCOM Equal Employment Opportunity Program and represents the command in matters pertaining to union negotiations.

b. Assistant Chief of Staff. Assists the Chief of Staff by providing administrative support for the Office of the Chief of Staff. Recommends administrative policies and procedures concerning staff management practices and staff action control within the headquarters. Acting for the Chief of Staff, assigns and coordinates tasking among headquarters elements and subordinate commands. Ensures proper coordination, reviews, edits, briefs (when required), dispatches staff papers of concern to the Command Group. Assigns and routes staff actions, assures completeness of staff actions, establishes suspenses, and institutes measures which implement established headquarters policy. Coordinates the social and business calendar for the Chief of Staff. Approves contingency fund use for the Command Group. Supervises the activities of the IMCOM Staff Duty Officer.

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c. Command Sergeant Major: As the senior noncommissioned officer of IMCOM, executes established policies and monitors standards of performance, training, and conduct of all enlisted personnel. Provides advice and recommendations directly to the CG, IMCOM, and his staff on matters pertaining to enlisted personnel. Participates in official ceremonies and performs other duties as directed by the Commanding General.

d. Secretary to the General Staff. Assists the Chief of Staff by providing administrative support for the offices of the Command Group. Receives, processes, controls, coordinates suspenses, and follows up on staff papers of concern to the Command Group. Arranges, and assists in the conduct of conferences, meetings, briefings and orientations hosted by the Command Group; assists and advises the staff concerning staff-hosted conferences. Schedules, arranges, and monitors briefings for personnel sponsored by or visiting the Command Group. Administers and approves travel funds for the Command Group. Administers contingency funds. Assists, monitors and advises the headquarters staff concerning official protocol, etiquette and courtesies for visiting US and foreign military and civilian dignitaries. Plans, prepares, organizes, and monitors itineraries, accommodations and other details related to visits by distinguished persons hosted by the Command Group. Plans, directs or assists in the conduct of promotion, award, retirement and honor guard ceremonies sponsored by the Command Group. Coordinates special mission transportation in support of headquarters personnel, visitors and tenant agencies.

e. Staff Action Control Office: Assists the Chief of Staff by monitoring and controlling action on all incoming official correspondence to HQ IMCOM. Processes, assigns suspense and follows up on responses by the Headquarters staff.

f. Historical Office: Prepares, executes, and supervises the IMCOM Historical Program. Prepares the annual Historical Review. Prepares historical studies and monographs in support of the IMCOM mission. Advises the commander and the Chief of Staff on all matters pertaining to the historical function. Provides staff supervision of the historical programs of subordinate commands. Provides historical services to the headquarters and command and other agencies.

g. Reserve Component Advisors' Office: The Army National Guard Advisor advises the Commanding General and IMCOM staff on all matters pertaining to ARNG. The United States Army Reserve Advisor advises the Commanding General and IMCOM staff on all matters pertaining to the USAR and administers the headquarters Mobilization Designee Program including assignments and active duty training in the headquarters.

2-1. Staff Office. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible for military and civilian personnel management; discipline, law and order; morale, welfare, educational support services support for IMCOM.

2-2. Functions.

a. Equal Employment Opportunity Office: Manages Equal Employment Opportunity Programs within IMCOM, including Spanish Speaking and Federal Women's Programs. EEOO acts as the principal advisor to the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff on EEO matters. Advises the IMCOM staff in the development of the EEO Plan of Action and monitors implementation throughout IMCOM.

b. Human Resources Division: Plans, develops, coordinates and manages programs designed to advance professionalism, improve discipline, morale and organizational effectiveness. Manages the IMCOM Safety Program, Equal Opportunity Program, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program, and Organizational Effectiveness (less training). Develops policy on services and entitlements, uniforms, leaves, standards of conduct, AWOL prevention and control, and staff supervision of IMCOM personnel control facilities. Has proponentcy for Range Safety Army Regulations.

c. Military Personnel Division: Supervises management of military personnel including personnel readiness of FORSCOM, TRADOC, INSCOM and ACC units on IMCOM installations. Coordinates the distribution of military personnel. Establishes priority of critical personnel fill for IMCOM installations and activities. Ensures optimum balancing of personnel fill, both quantitatively and qualitatively for IMCOM. Executes requisitions and programs the assignment of officer personnel for HQ IMCOM. Manages and directs IMCOM reenlistment programs and projects. Procures and manages Reserve Component Personnel on Special Active Duty at IMCOM installations. IMCOM manages Army Education Review Board (AERB), Army Enlisted Education Review Board (AEERB) positions. Coordinates and directs provisional staffing and TDY.

d. Personnel Systems Division: Develops and evaluates personnel policies and systems within IMCOM to include: Commander Involvement Program, Personnel Information Systems (PERSINS), Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), Women in the Army (WITA), Personnel Classification System, Enlisted Information System (EIS), Home-town Recruiter Assistance Program (HRAP). Develops, executes and coordinates IMCOM DCSPER program and budget activities.

e. Civilian Personnel Division: Advises the CG, CofS and DCSPER on all civilian personnel management matters. Supervises command civilian personnel management programs. Provides technical advice and guidance to Civilian Personnel Officers serving the command civilian workforce in all areas of civilian personnel management. Administers IMCOM program funds provided for executive development, intern training and long term training for executives. Serves as command Career Program Manager for the civilian personnel administration career program.

f. Morale Support Division: Exercises staff supervision of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs to include physical activities, community/skill development activities, library services (schools, academic, technical, and recreation services libraries), Army Community Services (ACS), and child care support services. Maintains custodianship of IMCOM (nonappropriated) Morale Support Fund (MSF). Directs administration of MSF. Provides command wide supervision of all IMCOM Nonappropriated tournaments, clinics, etc. Provides technical supervision in Army Emergency Relief Program of IMCOM installations. Operates HQ Technical Library. Acts as Command Career Program Manager for Librarian and Recreation Services Civilian Career Programs.

g. Education Division: Exercises staff supervision of the Army Continuing Education System (ACES) Program, to include Basic Skills Education Program, High School Completion Program, Foreign Language Program, Votech Program, Graduate and Undergraduate Tuition assistance and the Veteran's Educational Assistance Program (VEAP). Exercises staff supervision of IMCOM skill documentation program, apprenticeship program and industry recognition program, educational testing, educational counseling, consolidated education record. Exercises staff supervision of dependents' schools. Acts as Command Career Program Manager for ACES portion of Education and Training Civilian Career Program.

h. Office of the Adjutant General. The Adjutant General has staff responsibility for administrative services and provides administrative service support for HQ IMCOM and IMCOM installations. Exercises operational control over the Field Printing Plant and Publication stockage and distribution.

(1) Personal Affairs Branch: Exercises staff supervision of military awards program; officer evaluation system; Army bands; civil confinements; administrative aspects of OCS program; officer eliminations; warrant officer applications; Regular Army appointments; soldier voting commercial business solicitation; ID cards, tags and badges; check-cashing control;

private organizations on DA installations; credit unions; dependent welfare support; naturalization and citizenship of military personnel and dependents; passports; fund raising; consumer representations; retirement services; casualty administration and funeral support; IMCOM MOBDES sponsorship program; heraldry; salutes, honors and visits of courtesy; flags and ceremonies; and European orientation.

(2) Administrative Services Division: Exercises staff supervision of word processing, micrographics, printing, publications and forms management, records management, office copier cost control, Privacy and Freedom of Information Acts, postal operations, official mail control, and OCONUS TDY and nongovernmental meeting travel. Provides administrative support to the HQ to include processing and controlling all classified and unclassified incoming and outgoing official mail and distribution; publishing travel and permanent orders; reviewing, editing and publishing IMCOM publications and other printed material; exercising OPCON of HQ Field Printing Plant; preparing HQ IMCOM Staff Directory; conducting records management training; providing forms management services; assigning office symbols; monitoring the HQ alternate files; maintaining HQDA staff liaison files; and coordinating HQ officer and civilian school quota and training requirements and associated budgeting responsibilities. Acts as Command Career Program Manager for Records Management Civilian Career Program.

1. Staff Office. Provost Marshal is responsible for staff supervision of military police policy and law enforcement throughout IMCOM. Exercises technical staff supervision over the US Disciplinary Barracks.

(1) Functions.

a. Law Enforcement Management: Supervises IMCOM military police activities for training, equipping and employing Active Army military police units and personnel within IMCOM. Reviews and comments on contingency plans, and training doctrine applied to military police operations. Provides program and budget input for inclusion in fiscal year budget-manpower guidance. Reviews military police operational issues involving Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act. Coordinates command participation in National Crime Information Center Program. Reviews command and industrial-type functions (guard services). Implements and executes IMCOM portion of Army Correction Program. Provides staff supervision of Army confinement and correctional facilities within IMCOM. Conducts annual technical inspections of IMCOM Army confinement facilities. Monitors the handling of military prisoners within IMCOM. Collates and maintains prisoner population reports and monitors Correctional Reporting System portion of Military Police Management Information System.

(2) Crime Prevention: Establishes and supervises IMCOM Crime Prevention Program. Prepares IMCOM Law Enforcement and Discipline Report. Provides reports on installation crime trends to installation commanders. Implements and supervises IMCOM Physical Security Program. Prepares semiannual Physical Security Review Board Report. Implements and supervises DA Serious Incident Reporting Requirements. Implements directives for Security of Government Officials.

3-1. Staff Office. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Mobilization Planning and Security is responsible for the staff supervision of Army aviation support and EOD activities, mobilization planning and security.

3-2. Functions.

a. Operations Division: Implements emergency action procedures and maintains the capability to operate an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Takes action on compartmented special category (SPECAT) actions to include those involving IMCOM responsibilities IAW the Army Strategic Capabilities Plan. Responsible for required contingency plans.

b. Aviation Division: Provides staff supervision of aviation activities organic to IMCOM installations. Responsible for IMCOM aviation safety program and aviation standardization and training program. Provides staff supervision of aviation functions at USMA.

c. Security Division: Executes the security management function for HQ IMCOM Installation. Acts as point of contact for Signal Security (SIGSEC) matters. Provides command-wide policies pertaining to all aspects of ADP security. Implements and controls the headquarters Military Personnel Security Program and the Civilian Applicant and Employee Security Program. Establishes and implements policies and procedures for control and access to RESTRICTED DATA.

d. Mobilization Planning Division: Is the IMCOM staff agency responsible for all aspects of mobilization and mobilization planning. Provides planning guidance to HQ FORSCOM on installation capabilities to support mobilization. Coordinates mobilization planning activities with NGB and OCAR

4-1. Staff Office. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics is responsible for monitoring logistic management throughout IMCOM. Is responsible for ensuring that logistic support is provided to IMCOM installations, in the areas of materiel maintenance, supply, services, transportation and procurement in accordance with approved priorities.

4-2. Functions.

a. Management and Budget Division: Responsible for logistics management, plans, recommending assignment of logistic missions, and logistic portions of the IMCOM Program and Budget, except those pertaining to military construction and the Army Stock Fund. Manages the Commercial and Industrial-Type Functions Program and the Command Logistics Review Program. Manages the Interservice, Interdepartmental, Interagency and Intraservice Support Agreements Program. Coordinates the DCSLOG portion of the IMCOM Military Construction Program, Army (MCA).

b. Transportation and Services Division: Responsible for monitoring transportation and logistic services, to include programing, budgeting and evaluation of program execution at IMCOM installations. Monitors the shipment and storage of personal property function, movement of passengers (including USAF Admin Airlift Support) and material. Serves as IMCOM point of contact for: utilization of public highways for national defense and the Federal program for accidents/incidents involving shipment of hazardous materiel by commercial carriers; the Army Food Service Program, troop issue subsistence, laundry, and drycleaning operations; and the commissary resale operations. Exercises staff supervision of the IMCOM Administrative Transport functions and responsibilities. Conducts annual Administrative Transport Management Surveys. Coordinates mortuary affairs and post cemetery operations.

c. Procurement Division: Responsible for staff supervision of the procurement mission of the command. Monitors, coordinates, reviews and analyzes procurement actions of IMCOM installations, and activities attached or satellited for procurement support. Serves as Principal Assistant Responsible for Procurement. Represents IMCOM on OASA (I&L) Procurement Officer Program Consultant Board. Manages the DCSLOG portion of the Procurement Officer Program. Conducts procurement management reviews. Develops and supervises the command Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Program.

d. Materiel Operations and Policy Division:  
Responsible for IMCOM supply and maintenance policy, operations and materiel systems support (functional requirements, integration, testing, evaluation and implementation of command and multicommand maintenance and supply management information systems) to include programing, budgeting and evaluation of program execution. Evaluates and coordinates support provided by the wholesale logistics system (DARCOM, DLA and GSA). Coordinates the distribution and redistribution of selected items of equipment. Manages logistics readiness program, to include Materiel Assistance Designated Reports and the DARCOM responses. Manages the IMCOM Division Army Stock Fund program. Provides the Stock Fund support to other DA/DOD activities assigned by higher authority.

5-1. Staff Office: Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management is responsible for staff supervision of manpower and dollar resource management in IMCOM.

5-2. Functions.

a. Program Analysis Office: Develops, coordinates, and maintains the IMCOM Programing System in the Program Analysis and Resource Review (PARR). Performs programing reviews and analyses on all matters having resource implications. Performs independent studies related to planning, programing, budgeting, use, and management of resources. Monitors and analyzes DA planning, programing, and budgeting actions which affect IMCOM programing. Serves as IMCOM point of contact with DA and other MACOM on programing matters.

b. Budget Division: Directs and coordinates the development and supervises the execution of the IMCOM Budgets (OMA, FHMA, and RPA). Monitors the development of requirements and execution of programs from other fund sources to include minor MCA, Wildlife Conservation Special Fund, Quartermaster Foundation Trust Fund, and Nonappropriated Funds. Prepares the Command Operating Budget Estimate (COBE) and Budget Execution Review (BER). Coordinates, prepares, and maintains Budget Manpower Guidance (BMG) and installation contracts. As executive Secretary, is responsible for all Program Resource Advisory Committee (PRAC) and working PRAC meetings. Serves as the command point of contact with DA, other MACOM and installations/activities on budgetary matters. Coordinates and develops OMA requirements, administers funds for HQ operations, and develops the OMA related portion of the IMCOM Division, Army Stock Fund Budget. Reviews and analyzes the execution of approved operating budget for each installation assigned to IMCOM.

c. Resource Evaluation Division: Conducts studies on management practices and procedures, organizational structure and efficiency. Provides review and analysis related to missions, priorities and tasks of IMCOM including management of the IMCOM Management Information System. Conducts manpower and equipment surveys of all IMCOM installations. Proponent for DCSRM Information Systems. Responsible for IMCOM Management Information Control Program.

d. Force Management Division: Performs analyses and studies of manpower utilization and allocates military and civilian manpower in accordance with mission priorities. Studies and develops Army force management programs to support IMCOM systems. Conducts the IMCOM Review of manpower



Provides interface with HQDA and subordinate activities on manpower and authorization matters. Develops mobilization manpower requirements. Performs technical review of authorization documents for IMCOM and MOBTDA. Responsible for manpower portion of DA PBG and IMCOM.

e. Finance and Accounting Division: Formulates policy guidance and provides technical guidance and assistance relating to military and civilian pay, appropriated and nonappropriated funds, travel entitlements, allowances, disbursing operations and payment of commercial accounts. Insures quality of IMCOM finance and accounting functional areas. Provides guidance concerning propriety of .012 Contingency Fund expenditures. Reviews and takes final action for Commanding General IMCOM under delegated authority of the Secretary of the Army on all Reports of Survey over \$5,000. Receives, evaluates, and processes potential violations of RS 3679 and regulations governing control of funds. Performs accounting, reporting and cash control of the IMCOM Division of the Army Stock Fund and all IMCOM appropriated and nonappropriated funds. Performs billing for Foreign Military Sales Training cases. Maintains status of fund availability and authenticates Fund Authorization Documents (FAD) prior to distribution.

f. Resource and Economic Analysis Office: Implements the Army Program for Cost Analysis and the Army Program for Economic Analysis and Program Evaluation for Resource Management. Provides input for use in the preparation of cost and economic analysis studies. Validates cost estimates associated with various cost and economic analysis studies. Develops, publishes, and disseminates command resource factors for mission and base operations programs. Conducts trend and variance analyses of programs, activities, and installation cost, work force, workload data. Controls and releases cost and workforce data within the command.

g. Internal Review and Audit Compliance Office: Develops, executes, and supervises commandwide the internal review program. Maintains surveillance of internal review and audit activities of IMCOM subordinate commands. Conducts evaluations of internal controls. Determines compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. Evaluates effectiveness of procedures or systems. Reviews specific nonappropriated fund instrumentalities. Serves as IMCOM point of contact for all external audit activities including US General Accounting Office (GAO), Defense Audit Service (DAS), and US Army Audit Agency (AAA).

6-1. Staff Office. Inspector General is a member of the commander's personal staff and is responsible for inquiring into and reporting upon matters affecting the performance of mission and state of efficiency, discipline, and morale of the command.

6-2. Functions.

a. Operations and Administration Branch: Focal point for IMCOM staff, MACOM, DA coordination of IG matters. Prepares and coordinates IMCOM general inspection schedules. Processes and staffs findings from inspection reports, including those extracted from OTIG and other MACOM reports and monitors the corrective action. Analyzes and evaluates general and special inspection results, and prepares evaluation letters and follow-up correspondence relating to remedial actions taken on report findings. Administers the OIG budgeting program.

b. Assistance, Investigations, and Special Inspections Branch: Administers the IMCOM Inspector General Action Request (IGAR) System. Conducts the IMCOM program of special inspections. Conducts inquiries and investigations as directed. Serves as the coordinating and monitoring link between OTIG and inspectors general of subordinate commands reference IGAR and investigations.

c. General Inspection Branch: Conducts the IMCOM program of general inspections. Prepares formal reports of general inspections and resume reports for the Commanding General. Maintains coordination with the HQ IMCOM staff by exchanging information on matters of particular staff concern and interest, and evaluates effectiveness of IMCOM staff action at inspected activities.

7-1. Staff Office. Staff Judge Advocate is a member of the Commander's personal staff and is responsible for providing advice to the Commanding General, the headquarters staff and subordinate commanders on all legal matters. Provides legal assistance and supervises the Legal Assistance Program throughout the command.

7-2. Functions.

a. Administrative Law Branch: Provides legal opinions and advice regarding interpretation and application of laws, regulations and other directives concerning the environment, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, labor relations, civilian personnel law, race relations, equal employment opportunity (EEO), standards of conduct and conflicts of interest, reports of survey, military reservations, proposed IMCOM regulations and policies, commercial transactions, real and personal property transactions, civil disturbances and emergency assistance to civil authorities. Reviews proceedings of boards of officers and reports of investigation. Represents the command before Civil Service grievance and EEO hearings. Evaluates suggestions and IG findings on claims and administrative law matters and adequacy of actions taken. Supervises and assists legal advisors at subordinate commands regarding aspects of claims and administrative law.

b. Fiscal/Procurement Law Branch: Reviews financial interest and employment statements of designated persons assigned to Headquarters IMCOM and of designated field commanders. Furnishes legal advice and opinions to the commander, as Head of a Procuring Activity, on all aspects of Government procurement. Furnishes legal opinions and advice regarding fiscal law, including proposed major and minor construction projects, expenditure of appropriated and nonappropriated funds, over-obligated of appropriated funds, pay and allowances, administration of contingency funds, use of appropriated funds and property in support of nonappropriated fund activities, financial management improvement programs, fiscal management engineering studies, and proposed policy relating to financial planning and management of funds and facilities. Evaluates suggestions and IG findings on procurement and adequacy of actions taken. Supervises and assists legal advisors at subordinate commands regarding all aspects of fiscal and procurement law.

c. Criminal Law Branch: Provides opinions on military justice. Evaluates complaints submitted under Article 138, UCMJ. Executes staff responsibility for the administration of criminal law throughout IMCOM establishes jurisdictional structure regarding commanders' disciplinary powers and promulgates regulations and

supplements on military justice. Monitors courts-martial processing times and submits required reports to HQDA. Provides counsel for courts-martial. Refers cases to appropriate convening authorities. Advises the commander and chiefs of staff offices on internal disciplinary matters. Responds to OTJAG requirements and requests for studies. Evaluates POI and training materials on military justice subjects and training programs for legal/nonlegal personnel. Evaluates suggestions and IMCOM IG inspection findings on criminal law matters and adequacy of the action taken.

8-1. Staff Office. Chief of Public Affairs is a member of the commander's personal staff; provides the Commanding General public affairs advice, and is responsible for all public affairs matters, to include Command Information, Public Information and Community Relations.

8-2. Functions.

a. Administrative/Management Branch: Manages IMCOM public affairs personnel and budget resources. Manages the IMCOM Civilian Career Program for the Information and Editorial field. Makes recommendations on public affairs, training, organization and equipment matters for individuals and units. Develops public affairs portion of IMCOM plans and makes recommendations on subordinate plans.

b. Public Information Branch: Develops, implements and supervises public information policy, programs and activities throughout IMCOM. Acts as advisor to subordinate installations on public affairs policy and technical matters. Prepares and clears speeches. Reviews manuscripts. Conducts activities involving news media and analyzes presentation of military news in radio, television, magazines and newspapers. Keeps the DG, IMCOM, and staff informed on significant news events. Plans and executes comprehensive public information projects on continuing or major activities. Prepares and releases information concerning IMCOM activities to local, regional and national news media. Develops, implements and supervises community relations policy, programs and activities within IMCOM.

c. Command Information Branch: Provides information to members of the Army, dependents, retirees, ROTC personnel and Department of the Army civilians on matters affecting the Army community throughout IMCOM. Uses print and audiovisual media for news items and features. Conducts research, writes and produces radio and TV programs and arranges for IMCOM personnel to appear on local radio and TV shows. Provides radio/TV and print media policy guidance for the Command Information (CI) Program. Proponent for CI instructional materials to include

pamphlets and correspondence courses, and for manuals/handbooks for personnel assigned public affairs duties. Provides communications, interface and interchange of information affecting Reserve Components.

9-1. Staff Office. Surgeon is responsible for the staff supervision of all health matters and policies, to include the quality of health care in IMCOM. Provides guidance on effective preventive medicine and occupational health programs. Is the IMCOM medical liaison officer with other MACOM and with DA.

9-2. Functions. Coordinates and monitors medical support aspects of agreements between host installation and tenant units/activities and interservice agreements with other commands and activities. Accompanies the Inspector General team as required to provide medical expertise and evaluate the functions of the Director of Health Services. Provides advice on medical materiel and logistic support doctrine, policies and programs. Prepares and coordinates the medical portion of contingency and mobilization plans of the command. Coordinates and monitors Army Medical Department personnel authorizations.

10-1. Staff Office: Chaplain advises the Commanding General and exercises staff supervision on matters of religion, ethics, morals and morale within the command.

10-2. Functions. Manages chaplain resources, programs and training with the command. Represents the commander with religious leaders of other military services and the civilian community. Reviews TAADS documents and establishes projected Personnel Distribution (PD) and priorities for the total chaplain personnel requirements at IMCOM installations. Provides input to OCCH for Chaplain Professional Development. Manages Chaplain Appropriated Funds, Community Activities Funds (MSF), Chaplain Funds (NAF) and controls distribution of OCCH Specialized Services Funds for IMCOM installations. Conducts chaplain fund management review; assesses status and arranges for replacement of chapels and ecclesiastical equipment. Prepares review and analysis for the IMCOM Chaplain Ministries by Objectives and Results (MBOR) for OCCH. Plans and conducts professional development training for the total chaplain team; supervises IMCOM Chaplain MBOR program; develops, coordinates and monitors installation training of lay persons.

11-1. Staff Office. Engineer is responsible for staff supervision of all engineering matters throughout IMCOM installations.

11-2. Functions.

a. Construction Division: Develops and coordinates IMCOM Military Construction, Army (MCA) Program, and submits the IMCOM semiannual Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) construction reports. Supervises master planning for IMCOM installations to include Coastal Zone Management planning. Develops construction requirements associated with DA base realignment and special studies. Manages IMCOM real estate activities to include the Army's real property assigned to IMCOM installations. Supervises the IMCOM bachelor housing program of IMCOM.

b. Resource Analysis Group: Conducts special resource analysis studies. Develops and maintains management indicators and associated quality control standards for efficient use of Engineer resources. Conducts cost/economic analyses. Coordinates adjustments to resource requirements/allocations of budgetary program. Provides Engineer staff elements in-house computer support.

c. Engineer Resources Management Division: Develops administrative and management policies pertaining to Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA). Implements DA policies and develops command policies and procedures for financial management and leasing of military family housing. Provides staff supervision and professional consultant service to installations and IMCOM staff on RPMA matters involving industrial engineering, work management, budgeting, financial, supply, and equipment management. Promulgates and oversees application of Engineer Performance Standards; develops and monitors automated engineer and supply/equipment management information systems; interprets and supplements DA guidance for facilities management in the Installation and Facilities Objective Plan (IFOP); serves as executive secretary of the TRADOC Integrated Facilities Advisory Council (IFAC); manages engineer projects involving OMA and Minor Military Construction, Army (Minor MCA) funds; responds to GAO, AAA, and IG reports; and evaluates manpower change requests; prepares IMCOM resources programming/budget submissions; manages the statutory (MRPF Floor) and special (BMAR) target limitations; evaluates equipment requests for inclusion in applicable TDA; develops maintenance and services (M&S) equipment procurement requirements; and supervises DFAE warehouse supply system operations. Manages the Civilian Career Program for Engineers and Scientists (Const), the Facilities Engineer Apprentice Program (FEAP), and the career development of program registrants.

d. Facilities Engineering Division: Formulates, develops, and establishes policy, and exercises staff supervision of buildings, structures, surfaced areas, grounds, utilities, fire prevention and protection, and environmental functions and programs. Provides technical management and consultant services in the professional engineering fields in the construction, maintenance, repair, operation and disposition of IMCOM real estate, facilities and utilities plants and systems. Responsible for monitoring the management of the program for energy conservation and for engineering management of all utilities sales and purchase contracts. Provides technical direction and professional services for organization, training, operation and administration of fire prevention and protection activities and equipment, Entomology and pest control, Forestry, Agronomy, and fish and wildlife programs and activities. Staff responsibility for implementation of environmental management programs. Prepares environmental impact assessments and statements, and cultural resources surveys.

e. Housing Division: Implements DA policies and procedures and develops command policies and procedures for: family housing acquisition and construction; maintenance and repair to military housing; the operation, disposal, program management, housing referral services, leasing, assignment, utilization and termination of military controlled family housing facilities; coordinates the annual housing requirements survey and the determination of new housing construction requirements. Conducts regulatory on-site validation of installations' unfinanced maintenance and repair requirements. Provides technical assistance to and coordinates the family housing Energy Conservation Program. Manages the Congressionally directed test program for installing utility meters in family housing. Responsible for: assignment, utilization and termination of bachelor housing to include transient quarters and guesthouses; program management and initial issue, maintenance, repair and replacement of furniture for family, bachelor and guest housing. Reviews and analyzes performance of installations; housing activities through reports, including participation in Command Assistance visits. Develops performance standards for military housing program. Evaluates operational systems within functional areas of responsibility to determine and recommend improvements or functional changes.

12-1. Staff Office. Director of IMCOM Automation Management Information systems is responsible for staff supervision of the application of data processing throughout IMCOM.

12-2. Functions.

a. Plans and Programs Division: Develops the command long-range plan for the development, implementation, and improvement of data processing facilities and capabilities. Analyzes studies relating to improved ADP support capabilities, and determines feasibility and cost effectiveness of implementation. Develops Budget-Manpower Guidance for the management information and scientific systems program.

b. Automation Management Division: Monitors the commandwide application of ADP programs. Develops, implements, and supervises data processing installation management policies, programs and activities within IMCOM. Establishes quality control standards and reviews programs for management information and scientific engineering systems. Performs readiness and management reviews. Manages data processing equipment acquisition and reutilization. Responsible for executive software utility programs used on BASOPS computers.

c. Mission Systems Division: Designs and maintains automated systems in support of the headquarters and IMCOM installations. Provides ADP training for the operation of standard Army management information systems. Principal advisor for the interface of ADP and telecommunications within the command.

d. Support Systems Division: Designs and maintains automated systems in support of logistics, personnel, resource management, operations/security, the special staff and HQ IMCOM. Provides ADP training for the operation of standard Army management information systems.

e. Data Support Division: Provides automation data processing support to IMCOM. Provides data transcription support.



13-1. Staff Office. Communications-Electronics Officer advises the CG IMCOM and the HQ IMCOM Staff on C-E matters and exercises operational control for the CG of the US Army Communications Command (USACC) who provides communications support to IMCOM Headquarters and IMCOM installations.

13-2. Functions. Recommends C-E policies, objectives and responsibilities for telecommunications support throughout IMCOM. Assures adequate and responsive communications support under normal, mobilization or emergency conditions. Provides continuity and direction in support of current, mid-range and long-range communications requirements. Reviews and validates telecommunications requirements submitted for inclusion in the US Army Communications Command (USACC) Army Telecommunications Combat Theater and General Support (TACOGS) Five-Year Plan. Coordinates and validates requirements for telecommunications equipment and networks within IMCOM. Reviews, monitors, and evaluates integration, consolidation and automation of telecommunications facilities throughout IMCOM in support of intra-service and intra-service directives. Coordinates communications support during and following the development of ADP systems and facilities. Reviews telecommunications requirements submitted for inclusion in the Army Management Information System (AMIS) Master Plan. Manages the IMCOM Communications Economy and Discipline Program. Exercises staff supervision for the implementation of electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) policies and procedures, and provides assistance and advice on other C-E matters relating to electronic warfare. Coordinates and manages the IMCOM Address Indicating Group (AIG) Program. Exercises staff responsibility for the Electromagnetic Compatibility Program and staff proponentcy for operational communications security (COMSEC) matters. Prepares and reviews C-E portions of contingency and mobilization plans as they pertain to IMCOM installations and coordinates required communications-electronics support. Exercises supervision over the Army Civilian Career Program for Communications and performs Information Services Officer's (ISO) functions.

Table F-3-3-1

## SUMMARY OF IMCOM MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

	<u>Added for</u> <u>IMCOM</u>	<u>Withdrawn from</u> <u>FORSCOM</u>	<u>TRADOC</u>
Office of the CG	47	-	-
DCSPER	207	80	61
DCSOPS	55	3	17
DCSLOG	218	132	76
DCSRM (COMP)	320	170	134
IG	30	9	9
SJA	19	-	-
PA	31	2	2
Surgeon	10	7	3
Chaplain	10	6	4
Engineer	165	96	63
DMIS	174	86	80
C-E	18	10	3
TOTALS	1304	601	452

$601 + 452 = 1053$   
 IMCOM NET INCREASE = 251

Figure F-3-3-1

IMCOM Command and Control Diagram




Figure F-3-3-2

OFFICE OF THE  
COMMANDING GENERAL




Figure F-3-3-3




Figure F-3-3-4

OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF  
STAFF FOR  
OPERATIONS,  
SECURITY AND  
MOBILIZATION






Figure F-3-3-5

OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF  
STAFF FOR LOGISTICS




**OFFICE OF THE  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF  
STAFF FOR RESOURCE  
MANAGEMENT**






**OFFICE OF THE  
INSPECTOR GENERAL**

Figure F-3-3-7




OFFICE OF THE  
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

Figure F-3-3-8




OFFICE OF THE  
CHIEF OF PUBLIC  
AFFAIRS

Figure F-3-3-9




OFFICE OF THE  
SURGEON

Figure F-3-3-10




OFFICE OF THE  
CHAPLAIN

Figure F-3-3-11




OFFICE OF THE  
ENGINEER

Figure F-3-3-12




DIRECTOR  
MANAGEMENT  
INFORMATION  
SYSTEMS

Figure F-3-3-13



OFFICE OF THE  
COMMUNICATIONS -  
ELECTRONICS OFFICER

Figure F-3-3-14



F-3-3-33



Table F-3-4-1

## Additional Manpower Requirements at OCE

<u>Establish at OCE</u>	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
Director of Installation Management (0-8)	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Deputy Director of Installation Management (0-7)	3	3
Reserve Component Advisors Office	1	1
Morale Support Division	1	6
Education Division	0	3
Operations, Avn, Sec and Planning Div	1	2
Operations Br	2	3
Aviation Br	2	1
Security Br	2	2
Mobilization Planning Br	2	3
Logistics Div	1	2
Management + Budget Br	2	3
Transportation Br	2	8
Procurement Br	2	7
Material Operations + Policy Br	3	12
Engineer Div	1	2
Engr Resources Management Br	1	5
Housing Br	1	2
Construction Br	1	4
Facilities Engineer Br	1	7
Management Information System Div	0	2
Plans + Programs Br	1	3
Automation Management Br	0	3
Mission System Br	1	3
Support System Br	1	6
Data Support Br	1	11
<u>Other</u>		
Surgeon	1	1
Chaplain	2	1
Communication - Electronics Off	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Sub-Total	41	109

Table F-3-4-1 (Cont'd)

<u>Augmentation to OCE Staff</u>		
	<u>MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>
Historical Div	0	1
Office of Personnel		
Human Resources	1	1
Military Personnel	1	1
Personnel Systems	1	1
Civilian Personnel	0	4
Personal Affairs	0	1
Office of Administrative Services	1	3
Security and Law Enforcement	1	2
Resource Management Office	0	1
Budget + Program Div	1	4
Manpower + Force Management Div	1	7
Financial + Accounting Div	0	7
Resource Analysis + Evaluation Div	0	10
Audit + Internal Review Div	0	1
Engineer IG	2	1
Chief Council	1	1
Augmentation sub-Total	<u>10</u>	<u>46</u>
Newly established sub-Total	<u>41</u>	<u>109</u>
Total	51	135

Table F-3-4-2

## Additional Manpower Requirements at Division Engineers

AUGMENTATION OF ENGINEER DIVISIONS	TOTAL MIL CIV	% of increased workload									
		.15		.14		.30		.12		.06	
		South Western Div	South River Div	Missouri River Div	North Atlantic Div	North Atlantic Div	Ohio River Div	North Pacific Div	South Pacific Div	South Pacific Div	South Atlantic Div
COMPT (Resources Management)	3	12	1	0	2	1	2	0	2	0	2
Resource Management Office	0	23	0	4	0	3	0	7	0	1	0
Budget + Program Div	5	35	1	5	1	5	1	10	0	2	1
Manpower + Force Management Div	7	33	1	5	1	5	1	11	2	2	1
F & A Div	7	47	1	7	1	6	1	14	3	3	1
Resource Analysis & Evaluation Div	0	8	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0
Audit & Internal Review											
Personnel											
EEOO	7	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
Human Resources Div	5	8	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Military Personnel Div	7	7	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Personnel System Div	2	7	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
Civilian Personnel Div	0	20	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	1	0
Personal Affairs Br	8	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
Council (SJA)	7	13	1	2	1	2	1	4	1	0	1
Public Affairs	7	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Planning (Ops, Avn, Sec and Planning)	0	7	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
Historical Office	7	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Operations Br	7	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Aviation Br	3	9	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	1	1
Security Br	7	10	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1
Mobilization Br	4	4	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
Procurement & Supply	5	10	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	1
Management and Budget Br	0	29	0	5	0	4	0	8	0	2	0
Transportation and Services Br	0	25	0	4	0	3	0	7	0	2	0
Procurement Br	0	41	0	6	0	6	0	12	0	2	0
Material Operations & Policy Br	0	8	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
Engineer	0	22	0	3	0	3	0	6	0	2	0
Engineer Resource Management Br	0	14	0	2	0	2	0	4	0	1	0
Housing Br	0	29	0	4	0	4	0	8	0	2	0
Facilities Engineer Br	0	18	0	3	0	3	0	5	0	1	0
Construction/OPS (Construction)	0	7	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
Construction Br	0	8	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
ADP (Management Information Sys)	0	8	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
Plans and Programs Br	0	14	0	2	0	2	0	6	0	1	0
Automation Management Br	0	21	0	6	0	6	0	11	0	2	0
Mission Systems Br	0	40	0	6	0	6	0	4	0	2	0
Support Systems Br	0	14	0	2	0	2	0	4	0	1	0
Data Support Br	0	17	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1
Administrative Services	103	381	17	83	15	81	19	105	71	71	18
PM (Security and Law Enforcement)											
TOTALS											

Table F-3-4-2 (cont'd)

[illegible]

Figure F-3-4-1




Figure F-3-4-2

Director of Installation Management




Figure F-3-4-3

Division Engineer





Figure F-3-4-4  
OCE Command Relationship for  
Installation Management





1-1. Director of Installation Management (DIM). Serves as the primary agent for the FORSCOM Commander on all installation management matters. Provides guidance to all assigned installations and is the host for all TRADOC, ACC and INSCOM activities located on FORSCOM installations. Directs and gives guidance to the FORSCOM staff concerning Installation Management matters.

1-2. Deputy Director of Installation Management. Acts for the DIM within delegated authority and guidance concerning operations and activities on all FORSCOM installations. Supervises the offices under the DIM and insures coordination between the FORSCOM staff and the DIM staff. Maintain direct contact with the Installation Commander to insure the proper level of support by the FORSCOM staff.


1-3. Office of Financial Services. Serves as the DIM point of contact with the FORSCOM staff, other MACOMs and installations on budgetary matters. Monitors and analyzes planning, programing, and budgeting actions that pertain to installation management of FORSCOM installations. Monitors manpower utilization, management practices, procedures, organizational structure and efficiency for FORSCOM installations.

1-4. Office of Administrative, Operational and Security Services. Serves as the DIM point of contact with the FORSCOM staff, other MACOMs and installations on all administrative, operations and security matters. Monitors the personnel, security, mobilization planning programs, management information and communication programs that affect FORSCOM installations.

1-5. Office of Logistical and Engineering Services. Serves as the DIM point of contact with the FORSCOM staff, other MACOMs and installations on all logistical and engineering matters. Monitors all logistical support areas, procurement, construction facilities engineering and housing programs that affect FORSCOM installations.

Figure F-3-5-1

FORSCOM Organization for Director  
of Installation Management



F-3-5-2

Table F-3-5-1

Summary of IM at FORSCOM

IM spaces withdrawn from TRADOC	452
IM spaces retained in FORSCOM	<u>601</u>
Subtotal	1053

Additional Augmentation Requirements at FORSCOM

DIM	43
DCSPER	31
DCSLOG	4
DCSRM	7
IG	5
SJA	9
PA	14
Engineer	2
DMIS	4
C-E	<u>1</u>
(This is FORSCOM shortfall)	Subtotal 150
	TOTAL 1203

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 4

DESIRABILITY OF MACOM EXERCISING OPCON  
OR COMMAND OVER FUNCTIONAL RC UNITS

Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON

or

Command Over Functional RC Units

1. Problem - to determine the proper command and control relationship for selected RC units during peacetime, wartime, and the transition.
2. Facts bearing on the problem.
  - a. FORSCOM currently has command and control responsibility over all USAR units.
  - b. Command and control is exercised by CONUSA for FORSCOM.
  - c. HSC, TRADOC, DARCOM, USACC and MTMC provide command and control to TDA units upon mobilization. (See Incl 1).
  - d. CIDC and INSCOM provide command and control to a selected number of TOE deployable and non-deployable units upon mobilization (See Incl 2).
  - e. USACC commands selected TOE RC units after they deploy.
  - f. Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups are charged with providing training assistance to all USAR units.
  - g. All MACOMs are presently assisting or initiating some type of assistance relationship with the RC units that they will command upon mobilization.
  - h. The USA Military Traffic Management Command has a formal training supervisory relationship with FORSCOM for selected units.
  - i. The Gaining Command Program (GCP) provides for identifying a tentative wartime assignment for early deploying Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) units to the gaining USAREUR Corps or Communication Zone (COMMZ) Headquarters.

### 3. Discussion.

a. Since the STEADFAST reorganization most MACOMs have assisted FORSCOM in providing training and support to the Reserve Components. Most of the programs have been informal, ranging from mutual support/parallel training to a modified affiliation program. When these programs were established, the MACOMs were benefitting in some cases as much as the RC units, i.e., RC physicians were providing medical care in active military treatment facilities while receiving very little formalized military training.

b. These programs have been very beneficial to the AC and RC. However, they lack continuity, are cumbersome, loosely organized, responsibilities are not always clearly defined and the RC units are caught in the middle.

c. Recent exercises and evaluations have pointed out that the present structure does not provide the best means for an orderly and rapid transition to war.

#### d. Weakness of Existing Structure.

(1) The present structure does not provide the MACOMs with tasking authority.

(2) MACOMs are required to coordinate through too many levels of command in order to communicate with a specific unit.

(3) The units are not closely aligned with their wartime MACOM.

(4) FORSCOM does not have the special interest in the TDA units that the MACOMs have.

(5) Unclear and conflicting responsibilities for installation management during and subsequent to mobilization.

(6) Excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peace to war will occur.

(7) Prior to mobilization all MACOMs are not provided with information pertinent to readiness position (strength and training) of RC units.

(8) All MACOM are not providing input to pre-mobilization readiness of units assigned to them upon mobilization.

e. Alternatives. There are two feasible alternatives to the existing structure.

(1) Alternative A: The MACOMs exercise command and control of all RC units that report to the MACOM upon mobilization.

(2) Alternative B: The MACOMs exercise limited operational control for mobilization planning and training supervision over the RC units that report to the MACOMs upon mobilization (Definition of limited OPCON: Authorization for MACOMs to assign tasks, designate objectives and provide direction necessary to accomplish the training and mobilization planning mission).

f. Evaluation of Alternatives.

(1) Alternative A. To improve the command and control posture of the Reserve Components is not a simple task. Only in those areas where an enhancement of training of the total force can be recognized should changes be considered. MACOMs will receive upon mobilization a mix of National Guard and USAR deployable and non-deployable units. For these MACOMs to exercise command and control over these select units during peacetime would create additional management problems and further split the command relationship within the Reserve Components and create a duplicative management structure. The single manager concept with the CONUSAs dedicated to the RC management has proved successful with the exception of specialized training and mobilization planning for a select number of units. This present system provides for all of the administration and logistics required to manage the RC units and personnel. It would be a difficult task to reassign command functions from FORSCOM to MACOMs by reassigning FORSCOM assets. Each MACOM would require a significant increase in personnel, logistical and fiscal resources.

(2) Alternative B. The primary objective of the limited OPCON relationship is for the MACOMs to have a personal day to day relationship with the RC units that are assigned to them upon mobilization. A realistic MOU must be

written and approved that would explain the relationship (see Incl 3 for example). MACOMs should be able to exercise limited OPCON over the units with their existing staff and subordinate commands with, if any, a minor increase in personnel. Due to the different organizational structure and mission of each MACOM it is difficult at this time to determine the exact number of additional personnel required. The following additional personnel augmentation from the RC (statutory tours) should be adequate to assist the MACOMs in establishing the program. HSC 1, TRADOC 3, and INSCOM 2. The following are the advantages and disadvantages of Alternative B.

(a) Advantages.

1 During peacetime all of the selected RC units would be aligned with their wartime chain of command with the MACOM providing immediate attention to mobilization and insuring a rapid and orderly wartime transition.

2 Technical training matters for the RC units will be promoted by a direct technical channel.

3 Concentrates training towards accomplishment of the post-mobilization mission through direct interface with mobilization activity.

4 Promotes standardization of operations with the RC units assigned to the MACOMs.

5 Provides a direct channel of communications for updating of personnel, training, logistical and readiness matters.

6 Provides the RC force direct access to a broader special staff expertise.

7 Should not require a new headquarters or addition to Army end strength.

8 No structure changes required to manage RC units during IDT or AT.

9 Reduce FORSCOM responsibility for day to day operations in the limited OPCON area.

(b) Disadvantages.



1 Coordination of annual training scheduling may become somewhat more complex with more than one MACOM involved in communications.

2 CONUSA (if utilized as managers) would be responsive to two commands, FORSCOM for most units and to MACOMs for the OPCON units.

3 Limited OPCON is difficult to define therefore to be effective specific responsibilities must be agreed upon by FORSCOM and the other MACOMs.

4 Extensive time consuming coordination would be required to insure that each headquarters is kept informed of actions which could impact on both command and limited OPCON areas of responsibilities.

#### 4. Conclusions.

a. Alternative A is not practical for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 3f(1).

b. Alternative B presents the best course of action because the advantages, which will create a closer relationship between the MACOMs and RC units far outweigh the aforementioned disadvantages.

c. In addition to the command and control problem that is being addressed there is a problem associated with mobilization planning for a select number of late deploying units. (In one MACOM's situation early deploying units are also considered). Most MACOMs require these units to temporarily augment the CONUS base until the MACOM mobilization expansion plans are activated and all of the personnel positions are filled. One MACOM (DARCOM) will address this matter with FORSCOM and DA DCSOPS. This situation will require DA to consider altering the "Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL).

#### 5. Recommendations. Recommend Alternative B be approved and that action be taken to have:

a. DA issue guidance placing the units listed at Inclosure 1 and 2 limited OPCON to the proper MACOMs.

b. FORSCOM and the MACOMs listed prepare a recommended MOU in the format as shown in Inclosure 3 that spells out in detail the limited OPCON relationship.

c. The MACOMs listed be authorized to requisition additional staffing. The staffing should be from Reserve Component statutory tours (section 265) personnel with the following breakdown:

USA Health Services Command	1
USA Training and Doctrine Command	3
USA Intelligence Command	2

d. MACOMs with a requirement for temporary use of late deploying units to support the CONUS base, coordinate with DA and FORSCOM ASAP.

6. The limited OPCON relationship should be an expansion of the Gaining Command Program (GCP) aluded to in paragraph 2i above, and should compliment FORSCOM's Support Unit Improvement Program (SUIP) and Wartime Mission Utilization Program (WARMUP).

7. References.

US Army Forces Command  
Command and Control of USAR Schools Study  
Ft. McPherson: 19 March 1979.

US Army Forces Command  
FORSCOM Regulation 3502:  
Reserve Component (US Army) Training  
Appendix O, Ft. McPherson: 1 February 1979.

US Army Forces Command  
USAR Training Division/Separate Training Brigade Command and Control Study, Ft. McPherson: 24 March 1979.

US Army Health Services Command  
Army Command and Control Study-82 (U)  
HSC Response to ACCS-82 Tasking  
Ft. Sam Houston: 23 February 1979 (CONFIDENTIAL).

US Army, Training and Doctrinal Command  
Army Command and Control Study-82  
Message, Ft. Monroe: 161525Z April 1979.

HQDA Letter 525-79-4  
(DAMO-ODM) Subject: Gaining Command Program (GCP)  
2 April 1979.

NON DEPLOYING  
RC UNITS  
OPCON (POTENTIAL)  
TO OTHER MACOMS

HSC

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Unit</u>
US Army Hosp <u>(100B)</u>	US Army Hosp (Aug) <u>(300B)</u>	US Army Hosp (Aug) <u>(1000B)</u>	US Army Den Svc Det <u>(65-Man)</u>
135	3271	4005	1204
147		4010	3346
1207		5502	
2289	US Army		US Army
3343	Hosp (Aug) <u>(300B)</u>	US Army Den Svc Det <u>(16-Man)</u>	Den Svc Det <u>(82-Man)</u>
US Army Hosp <u>(300B)</u>	3273		6355
5503	3344	1205	
		1206	US Army
US Army Hosp <u>(500B)</u>	US Army Hosp (Aug) <u>(500B)</u>	3342	Den Svc
5010	6250	5505	Det <u>(123-Man)</u>
		US Army Den Svc Det <u>(21-Man)</u>	3299
US Army Hosp <u>(750B)</u>	US Army Hosp (Aug) <u>(750B)</u>	5504	US Army <u>Med TC</u>
6252	1208	5507	3457
		6254	
US Army Hosp <u>(1000B)</u>	US Army Hosp (Aug) <u>(750B)</u>	US Army Den Svc Det <u>(31-Man)</u>	
2290	3270	3295	
	6251	2287	
US Army Hosp <u>(1000B)</u>		2288	
2291	US Army		US Army
3297	Hosp (Aug) <u>(1000B)</u>		Den Svc
5501			Det <u>(48-Man)</u>
6253	1125	3298	
	3274	4005	
	3345	5606	

INCL 1

F-4-1-1

# TRADOC

## Training Divisions

70th            91st  
76th            95th  
78th            98th  
80th            100th  
84th            104th  
85th            108th

## Reception Stations

3398th        3358th  
4074th        2053rd  
5089th        6218th  
3396th        6219th  
1018th        4073rd  
5091st

## USAR Schools

4151 USAR Sch - TX  
4152 USAR Sch - LA  
4153 USAR Sch - NM  
4154 USAR Sch - AR  
4155 USAR Sch - OK  
4156 USAR Sch - OK  
4157 USAR Sch - LA  
4158 USAR Sch - LA  
4159 USAR Sch - TX  
4160 USAR Sch - IN  
4161 USAR Sch - TX  
4162 USAR Sch - TX  
4164 USAR Sch - TX  
4166 USAR Sch - TX  
4960 USAR Sch - HI  
5030 USAR Sch - IN  
5032 USAR Sch - MI  
5033 USAR Sch - MI  
5034 USAR Sch - IL  
5035 USAR Sch - IL  
5038 USAR Sch - MO  
5039 USAR Sch - MO  
5040 USAR Sch - IA  
5041 USAR Sch - IA  
5042 USAR Sch - MN  
5043 USAR Sch - SD  
5045 USAR Sch - WI  
5046 USAR Sch - CO  
5047 USAR Sch - KS  
5048 USAR Sch - KS  
5049 USAR Sch - NE  
6220 USAR Sch - CA  
6222 USAR Sch - CA  
6224 USAR Sch - AZ  
6227 USAR Sch - CA  
6228 USAR Sch - ID  
6229 USAR Sch - WA

6232 USAR Sch - VT  
6236 USAR Sch - WA  
6237 USAR Sch - CA  
6241 USAR Sch - WA  
1031 USAR Sch - CT  
1033 USAR Sch - ME  
1034 USAR Sch - NH  
1035 USAR Sch - VT  
1036 USAR Sch - PA  
1037 USAR Sch - MA  
1049 USAR Sch - MA  
1150 USAR Sch - NT  
1151 USAR Sch - NY  
1154 USAR Sch - NY  
1155 USAR Sch - NJ  
1157 USAR Sch - NY  
1159 USAR Sch - NY  
1163 USAR Sch - NY  
2059 USAR Sch - PA  
2070 USAR Sch - VA  
2071 USAR Sch - MD  
2072 USAR Sch - PA  
2073 USAR Sch - PA  
2074 USAR Sch - KY  
2075 USAR Sch - OH  
2076 USAR Sch - DE  
2077 USAR Sch - OH  
2078 USAR Sch - OH  
2079 USAR Sch - VA  
2085 USAR Sch - KY  
2087 USAR Sch - OH  
2090 USAR Sch - PA  
2091 USAR Sch - PA  
2093 USAR Sch - WV  
2979 USAR Sch - VT  
3283 USAR Sch - GA  
3285 USAR Sch - NC

3286 USAR Sch - NC  
3287 USAR Sch - SC  
3288 USAR Sch - SC  
3289 USAR Sch - SC  
3290 USAR Sch - TN  
3291 USAR Sch - TN  
3292 USAR Sch - TN  
3294 USAR Sch - GA  
3385 USAR Sch - AL  
3387 USAR Sch - FL  
3388 USAR Sch - FL  
3390 USAR Sch - MS  
3391 USAR Sch - FL  
3392 USAR Sch - AL

## Tng Brigades

8830th MP BDE (AIT)  
5th AR BDE (AIT)

USACC

936th AV DET ATC  
88th AV DET ATC  
223rd AV DET ATC  
49th AV DET ATC  
150th AV DET ATC  
11th AV DET ATC  
47th AV DET ATC  
426th AV DET ATC  
28th AV DET ATC  
670th AV DET ATC  
253rd AV HQC  
29th AB HHD BN  
232nd AV DET ATC  
145th AV PIT ATC  
2361st DET SIG CTR  
2362nd DET SIG CTR  
6201st RAD COM STA  
6202nd RAD COM STA  
6203rd RAD COM STA  
6204th RAD COM STA  
6205th RAD COM STA  
6206th RAD COM STA  
6207th RAD COM STA

MTMC

1188 MILITARY OCEAN TERM UNIT (81st ARCOM)	1172 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (94th ARCOM)
1175 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (79th ARCOM)	1192 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (122nd ARCOM)
1176 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (97th ARCOM)	1395 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (124th ARCOM)
1182 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (120th ARCOM)	1173 US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (94th ARCOM)
1169 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (94th ARCOM)	1185 US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (79th ARCOM)
1181 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (121st ARCOM)	1190 US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (122nd ARCOM)
1184 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT A (121st ARCOM)	1394 US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (63d ARCOM)
1191 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION (122nd ARCOM)	1397 US ARMY TRANSIT CONTROL UNIT (124th ARCOM)
1170 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (94th ARCOM)	US ARMY PASSENGER LIAISON UNIT (120th ARCOM)
1174 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (77th ARCOM)	1179 DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT UNIT (77th ARCOM)
1186 US ARMY TRANSPORTATION TERMINAL UNIT B (81st ARCOM)	

DARCOM

4-Aviation Classification and Repair Activities  
(A select number of these units may deploy)

A - Groton - CT

B - Gulfport - MS

C - Springfield - MO

D - Fresno - CA

DEPLOYABLE AND NON DEPLOYABLE  
RC UNITS  
OPCON (POTENTIAL)  
TO OTHER MACOMS

CIDC

TOE

307th MP Det (CI)  
315th MP Det (CI)  
316th MP Det (CI)  
321st MP Det (CI)  
322nd MP Det (CI)  
323rd MP Det (CI)  
347th MP Det (CI)  
348th MP Det (CI)  
366th MP Det (CI)  
375th MP Det (CI)  
378th MP Det (CI)  
380th MP Det (CI)  
383rd MP Det (CI)  
399th MP Det (CI)  
425th MP Det (CI)  
430th MP Det (CI)  
493rd MP Det (CI)  
733rd MP Det (CI)  
ARNG 121st MP Det (CI)  
170th MP Det (CI)  
1156th MP Det (CI)  
417th MP Det (CI)

Incl 2

F-4-2-1



INSCOM

TOE Deployable

MI DET (STRAT)

308th MI DET  
400th MI DET  
401st MI DET  
402th MI DET  
403d MI DET  
404th MI DET  
405th MI DET  
407th MI DET  
408th MI DET  
409th MI DET  
411th MI DET  
415th MI DET  
416th MI DET  
417th MI DET  
419th MI DET  
420th MI DET  
421st MI DET  
423d MI DET  
424th MI DET  
425th MI DET  
428th MI DET  
432d MI DET  
433d MI DET  
434th MI DET  
439th MI DET  
440th MI DET  
442d MI DET  
443d MI DET  
445th MI DET  
446th MI DET  
448th MI DET  
449th MI DET  
450th MI DET  
453d MI DET  
454th MI DET  
458th MI DET  
462d MI DET  
465th MI DET  
466th MI DET  
467th MI DET  
468th MI DET  
469th MI DET

470th MI DET  
471st MI DET  
474th MI DET  
476th MI DET  
477th MI DET  
478th MI DET  
479th MI DET  
480th MI DET  
481st MI DET  
484th MI DET  
486th MI DET  
487th MI DET  
488th MI DET  
490th MI DET  
698th MI DET  
837th MI DET

MI (CI)

20 th CI DET  
226th CI DET  
228th CI DET  
283d CI DET  
337th CI DET  
349th CI DET  
372d CI DET  
826th MI Bn FID Army  
99 th ASCO  
197th AS DET  
142d MI CO  
342d ASCO

**Example of OPCON Agreement  
for  
Training and Employment  
of  
Designated RC Units**

1. **Purpose.** This directive provides guidance for MACOMs exercising limited OPCON for mobilization planning and training supervision for designated Reserve Component (RC) units.

2. **Applicability.** This directive is applicable to designated TDA and TOE RC units. When this directive conflicts with the guidance of other regulations, circulars, and pamphlets, the provisions of this directive apply.

3. **Explanation of Terms.**

a. **Designated Units.** This term applies to all RC units designated for assignment to MACOMs under mobilization. Most of these units are organized by TDA and assigned to the USAR troop program. (See Incl 1 and 2 of basic document for MACOM unit breakdown).

b. **MTMC.** The Military Traffic Management Command is a jointly staffed industrially funded major Army command through which the Secretary of the Army executes his responsibility as Department of Defense (DOD) Single Manager for military traffic, land transportation and common user ocean terminals.

c. **HSC.** The Health Services Command provides health services for the Army in the Continental United States (CONUS), Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and, as directed by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA), for other departments, agencies, and organizations. Provide medical professional education and training for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and, as required or directed, of other Army personnel, members of other Services of federal agencies, and authorized foreign national personnel within policies established by HQDA.

d. **TRADOC.** The Training and Doctrines Command develops and manages training programs and supervises the training of individuals of the Army and authorized foreign nationals. Conducts all combat developments not assigned by HQDA to other commands and agencies and, as the Army's principal combat developer, guide, coordinate, and integrate the total combat development effort of the Army. Command organizations and

INCL 3

installations as assigned by HQDA and, through assigned installations, provide administrative, logistical, and other support services to elements and agencies of DA, DOD, and satellites of TRADOC installations.

e. DARCOM. The Material Development and Readiness Command acts as the primary materiel developer with responsibilities for research, development, configuration management, developmental test and evaluation, integrated logistics support planning and execution, acquisition or procurement production, new materiel systems for the US Army and other DOD agencies as assigned. Develop and provide materiel maintenance and related logistic services to DA and other agencies as directed, or in accordance with letters of agreement. Provides worldwide technical and professional guidance and assistance for readiness planning and logistic support for Army materiel in coordination with US Army Logistics Center in its area of responsibility.

f. CIDC. The Criminal Investigations Command provides services to all US Army elements and, as directed by the Chief of Staff, Army or higher authority conducts sensitive or special interest investigations and to provide or conduct protective service operation for DOD and DA.

g. INSCOM. The Intelligence and Security Command conducts intelligence, counter-intelligence and electronic weapons operations in support of the Army at echelon above corps. Conduct Signals Intelligence, command the Army component of the Central Security Service. Analyze, produce and disseminate all source counter-intelligence and provide advice, assistance and technical operational support to ensure maximum exploitation of national intelligence assets.

h. USACC. Army communications command engineer, install, operate and maintain: the Army's communications systems at all echelons above the corps level including Army posts, camps and stations; the Army's air traffic control systems (both tactical and non-tactical) and the Army's assigned portion of the Defense Communications System (DCS).

i. Limited OPCON - Authorization for MACOMs to assign tasks, designate objectives and provide direction necessary to accomplish the training and mobilization planning mission.

4. General. Designated Reserve Component units will conduct progressive military and functional training. Their objectives are to attain and maintain the highest levels of individual and unit proficiency that are achievable in a premobilization status in order to produce units qualified to perform operational missions assigned by MACOMs with the absolute minimum of postmobilization training.

5. Inactive Duty Training (IDT).

a. During IDT, units will emphasize mission-related training which can be accomplished at home station. Classroom instruction, command post exercises, SQT training, mutual support programs, and civilian sponsored unit programs are examples of training that can be conducted during IDT to improve individual and unit readiness.

b. Paragraph 3-4 of FORSCOM Reg 350-2 outlines general guidance for IDT. This guidance is amplified/modified as follows: TDA designated units are exempted from the field environment and overnight bivouac requirements of para 3-4a, except when necessary to provide additional site support requirements.

c. CPX requirements indicated in paragraph 3-1c of FORSCOM Reg 350-2 do not apply to designated units. For these units, the following applies:

(1) Units which have attained a C-1 or C-2 training rating will conduct or participate in one mission oriented CPX annually.

(2) C-3 and C-4 units will concentrate on training which will improve their training rating and are exempted from CPX requirements until they progress to a C-2 rating.

6. Annual Training (AT).

a. Training conducted at AT should include training which cannot be conducted efficiently at home station. Designated units should train in an operational site environment so as to acquire experience in actual operations.

b. CONUSA provide training schedule site and dates in coordination with MACOMs.

7. Field Training/Bivouacs. TDA designated units are not required to perform training in a field environment during IDT or AT because their missions do not require operation in such an environment; however, if only field conditions exist at a required training site, training will be conducted under those conditions.

8. Weapons Qualification. TDA designated units are not authorized weapons; however, individual weapon qualification/familiarization requirements for these units may be established by the CONUSA concerned, IAW guidance contained in basic regulation.

9. Familiarization Tours of Mobilization Sites. Designated units will conduct familiarization tours of mobilization sites. Units will normally conduct such tours during IDT. For those units unable to conduct such surveys during IDT, MACOMs will attempt to conduct these tours during the unit's scheduled AT. Unit personnel to accomplish this requirement will be selected by the unit commander. All familiarization tour/site surveys will be coordinated by MACOMs and arrangements made with cognizant installations in advance. These tours/surveys will be scheduled so that each unit will conduct surveys at least once every three years.

10. Individual School Training. Officer and enlisted personnel are encouraged to apply for appropriate career, functional, or MOS awarding courses. US Army Schools (DA Pam 351-4), correspondence courses (DA Pam 351-20), or nonresident USAR school courses are available. Personnel enrolled in correspondence courses that have combination resident and nonresident phases must request quotas for resident phases of training through channels, to the respective CONUSA headquarters. Class dates for all resident courses are listed in TRADOC Pam 350-series. Officers should enroll in those courses which fulfill the military education requirements for promotion as outlined in AR 135-155.

11. Essential Functions of MACOM Operations. Training in essential functions such as MIS, documentation and contract administration, should be accomplished during both IDT and AT. Separation of personnel from a unit during IDT/AT should not be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the required training in these functions.

a. MIS Training.

(1) Mutual support agreements should be established, where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, to provide MIS training during IDT/AT.

(2) Two-week resident courses can be established at the US Army Administration Center, Ft Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Specific instructions are provided in e below.

(3) Enrollment in MIS oriented correspondence courses provided by the US Army Administration Center is encouraged.

b. Documentation Training. (MTMC/DARCOM)

(1) Enrollment in correspondence courses provided by the US Army Transportation School, Ft Eustis, Virginia, is encouraged.

(2) Use of USAR schools with documentation instruction should be considered for IDT or AT.

(3) Mutual support agreements should be established where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, which can provide OJT in the use of MIL STAMP procedures during IDT/AT.

(4) Two-week resident courses can be established at the US Army Transportation School. Specific instructions are provided in para e below.

c. Contract Administration Training (MTMC/DARCOM).

(1) Mutual support agreements should be established, where possible, with Active Component installations/activities, regardless of service, which can provide OJT in contract administration procedures.

(2) Attendance at the School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, which provide resident courses in contract administration is encouraged. Quotas for attendance are allocated by the US Army Logistics Management Center through the Commander, US Army Material Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM). applications should be forwarded through channels to Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFPR-MPT-S.

7. Field Training/Bivouacs. TDA designated units are not required to perform training in a field environment during IDT or AT because their missions do not require operation in such an environment; however, if only field conditions exist at a required training site, training will be conducted under those conditions.

8. Weapons Qualification. TDA designated units are not authorized weapons; however, individual weapon qualification/familiarization requirements for these units may be established by the CONUSA concerned, IAW guidance contained in basic regulation.

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d. Special resident instruction. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and other MACOM service schools can provide two week courses for RC personnel. Requests for courses to be presented will be forwarded through channels to Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-RCO, at least six months prior to the desired start date. A minimum of 20 students per course is required. Since one unit may not be able to provide the minimum student load CONUSA will consolidate command wide requirements.

12. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) TOE units.

a. The purpose of the ARTEPs for designated units is to establish standardization and uniformity among the Reserve units' training programs. The ARTEPs provide a basis for development of training objectives by specifying minimum standards of performance for critical missions and tasks. It also provides the unit commander a means of evaluating the effectiveness of past training of all echelons of his unit, as well as assessing future training needs.

b. Unit evaluation, using the ARTEPs, will be in accordance with paragraphs 2-7 through 2-10 of FORSCOM Reg 350-2.

c. MACOM personnel will conduct the external ARTEP evaluations, and provide qualified evaluators including the Site Chief Evaluator.

13. Coordination.

a. Direct technical communications channels between MACOM and the designated units is authorized. Communications that are directive in nature will be channeled through Commander, FORSCOM, the appropriate CONUSA and RC chain of command.

b. CONUSA are authorized to coordinate directly with MACOM concerning AT scheduling and evaluation of the designated Reserve Component units, and the use of MACOM installations during IDT/AT.

14. The command relationships outlined in this draft Memorandum of Understanding will accommodate the philosophy of the Gaining Command Program (CCP), FORSCOM's support unit improvement program (SUIP) and wartime mission utilization program (WARMUP).

d. Special resident instruction. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and other MACOM service schools can provide two week courses for RC personnel. Requests for courses to be presented will be forwarded through channels to Cdr, FORSCOM, ATTN: AFOP-RCO, at least six months prior to the desired start date. A minimum of 20 students per course is required. Since one unit may not be able to provide the minimum student load CONUSA will consolidate command wide requirements.

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c. MACOM personnel will conduct the external ARTEP evaluations, and provide qualified evaluators including the Site Chief Evaluator.

## 13. Coordination.

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b. CONUSA are authorized to coordinate directly with MACOM concerning AT scheduling and evaluation of the designated Reserve Component units, and the use of MACOM installations during IDT/AT.

14. The command relationships outlined in this draft Memorandum of Understanding will accommodate the philosophy of the Gaining Command Program (CCP), FORSCOM's support unit improvement program (SUIP) and wartime mission utilization Program (WARMUP).

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 5

US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

## US Army Reserve Command

1. Problem. To determine desirability/feasibility of establishing a US Army Reserve Command (USARCOM) as a separate major command (MACOM).

2. Assumptions.

a. An USARCOM may be a practical alternative to the current CONUS command and control structure.

b. The USARCOM would enhance management of the US Army Reserves.

3. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Army Command and Control Study Team-82 (ACCS-82) must evaluate the concept of the USARCOM.

b. The USARCOM could either be a separate major command (MACOM) (Incl 1) or be placed subordinate to FORSCOM (Incl 2).

c. Following the 27 March 1979 In-Progress Review (IPR), the USARCOM was dropped as a separate staff action, but ACCS-82 was directed to continue analyzing the alternative with the latitude to reinstate the USARCOM as a working alternative if merited.

d. The establishment of a separate USARCOM would be a revolutionary change from current doctrine.

4 Discussion.

a. The Army Command and Control Study Team-82 (ACCS-82), in analyzing alternatives to the present CONUS command and control structure, developed an alternative which included the USARCOM as a MACOM (see Incl 1).

b. The alternative eliminated the present CONUSA, the Army Readiness Regions (ARR), and the Reserve Component (RC) assistance structure at HQ, Forces Command. The Readiness Groups were retained and placed subordinate to the Active Component (AC) corps, which were increased to three. The AC corps would command most AC units, and would assume the training evaluation and support coordination functions formerly performed by the ARR.

c. Another variation of a USARCOM was included in the initial group of alternatives which was presented at the 21 March 1979 Study Advisory Group (SAG) (see Incl 2). That alternative was designed similarly to the one described above with major different features being:

(1) The USARCOM was placed subordinate to Forces Command and commanded by a USAR MG with an AC BG deputy commander.

(2) Corps were not changed.

(3) Other MUSARC's staff spaces devoted to the command and control of non-functional command type units assigned were eliminated. MUSARC were retained as GOCOM under the USAR divisions.

d. As briefed at the 27 March 1979 IPR, the USARCOM alternative contains the following significant points concerning the RC structure:

(1) The Chief, Army Reserve, will:

(a) Become the commander of the USARCOM.

(b) Continue to serve as the senior USAR staff advisor to CSA.

(2) The USARCOM will:

(a) Assume former ARR, CONUSA, and FORSCOM USAR command related functions except training evaluation and AC training support coordination. <sup>1</sup>

(b) Command a to-be-determined number of USAR corps <sup>2</sup> which will assume command of all USAR units and perform those RC management functions as delegated by the USARCOM.

(3) 12-15 USAR division HHCs <sup>2</sup> will be organized subordinate to the USAR Corps to:

---

1 Spaces from 1 ARCOM used in the USARCOM Hq.

2 Formed from remaining 18 ARCOMs.

- (a) Command subordinate units.
- (b) Command selected installations upon mobilization.
- (c) Organize, fill and train new divisions to meet mobilization requirements.

e. Advantages concerning the USARCOM:

- (1) Will establish a USAR structure similar to the US Air Force Reserve.
- (2) Reduces FORSCOM peacetime span of control.
- (3) Provides additional corps and division bases.
- (4) Establishes a USAR chain of command from DA to unit level.
- (5) USAR structure is more similar to ARNG.
- (6) Reduces layering in that the CONUSA, ARR and the FORSCOM dedicated staff is eliminated.
- (7) Provides increased visibility of USAR successes and problems to the highest levels of the Army and DOD because of the USAR chain of command.
- (8) Results in a savings of 387 spaces.

f. Disadvantages concerning the USARCOM:

- (1) Degrades command and control for domestic contingencies.
- (2) Degrades wartime command and control efficiency in CONUS.
- (3) Creates broad span of control for USAR commander.
- (4) Reduces AC/RC integration.
- (5) Separates one component of the Army force rather than integrate, thus weakening the Total Army concept.

(6) Increases FORSCOM wartime span of control.

(7) Eliminates AC headquarters dedicated to support of RC, with possible degradation of RC training and readiness.

(8) Degrades ability to make the transition from peace to war.

(9) Staffing of full-time headquarters requires additional statutory tours and full-time manning. Positions may be difficult to fill with qualified personnel.

(10) Potential exists to hamper or nullify gains inherent with SUIP, WARMUP, and other AC-RC training association programs.

(11) Significant amount of reorganizational turbulence over an extended period of time.

(12) Manpower costs increase almost \$2 million.

g. At the 21 March 1979 SAG, ACCS-82 was advised that FORSCOM would not support establishment of a USARCOM.

h. Additional alternative development.

(1) The USARCOM and subordinate structure as further developed by ACCS-82 contained the USARCOM Headquarters and three USAR Corps HHC with 15 subordinate USAR division HHC. Full-time personnel spaces in the current Army Reserve Commands, along with those from the AC Headquarters and staffs, were absorbed in the USARCOM and subordinate structure. A summary of manpower spaces is attached (Incl 3).

(2) The RC corps will be staffed on a full-time basis to provide an appropriate, efficient chain of command between the USARCOM RC divisions and MUSARCs. Management from the Department of the Army level would be an impractical situation because of such a wide span of control, which would include 12 training divisions, 15 division HHC, two maneuver area commands, 28 general officer commands, and three separate brigades. The corps HHC will be activated at ALO 3.

(3) Other features concerning changes in the AC structure are:

(a) The RG are augmented to assume some of the functions previously performed by the CONUSA and the ARR.

(b) The three AC corps are augmented to assume management of the RG: those AC management related functions formerly performed by the CONUSA and ARR; those CONUS defense/emergency situation related functions performed by the CONUSA; and the RC training evaluation and support functions formerly performed by the ARR.

(4) Staffing guides are not established for single MACOM, but rather for like-type headquarters or units. Several options were reviewed to determine an efficient level of staffing in the USARCOM.

(5) An analysis of the present RC-dedicated structure is:

(a) The authorized strength of CONUSA headquarters compared to authorized strength of RC units is:

ARMY	SPACES	RC STR	% RC	SPACES	RATIO
1st	619	321,200	49	1:519	(.0019)
5th	512	228,100	35	1:445	(.0022)
6th	447	109,800	16	1:246	(.0041)
TOTAL	1578	659,100			

Numerical ratio (total): 1:418 (.0024)

Weighted ratio (total): 1:449 (.0022)

(b) The authorized strength of CONUSA headquarters with a proportional allocation of the RC management strength (274 spaces) of FORSCOM included with the CONUSA changes ratios as follows:

ARMY	SPACES	RC STR	% RC	SPACES	RATIO
1st	753	321,200	49	1:427	(.0023)
5th	608	228,100	35	1:375	(.0027)
6th	491	109,800	16	1:224	(.0045)
TOTAL	1852	659,100			

Numerical ratio: 1:356 (.0028)

Weighted ratio: 1:376 (.0027)



(c) Above ratios are based on RC support being provided by four headquarters: three CONUSA and FORSCOM.

(d) If the weighted ratio were applied to the staffing, 94 spaces could be saved (1825 down to 1758) from those presently dedicated to RC management and support.

(6) Staffing in the USAR Division HHC is based essentially on that which formerly was in the ARCOM staff, except in those headquarters which assume additional USAR management responsibilities in areas formerly served by ARCOM. Full time staffing is increased according to the percentage increase in assigned USAR strength. No economy of spaces will be realized as 15 divisions assume the responsibilities of the former 19 ARCOM because in all cases time and distance factors and the increased workload make a reduction of personnel detrimental to mission accomplishment.

(a) Present basis of authorization for augmentees for an ARCOM is 11 (DA Pam 570-554).

(b) Present basis of authorization for technicians for an ARCOM is 17 (DA Pam 570-560).

(c) Except for AC augmentees, no other AC personnel will be assigned to the USAR divisions.

(d) Organized at ALO 2, average strength 167.

(7) Staffing of the USAR Corps HHC will be 100% of authorized level which at ALO 3 is 262 (less FAS section). Composition of staff will be 60% AC and 40% RC, with all elements of the full-time staff being integrated. Because the corps could be deployed, only AC and full-time USAR personnel will be assigned. The corps commander will be a RC MG with an AC BG as deputy. The corps will decrease the span of control for the USARCOM, will provide guidance to subordinate units, and perform those RC management functions as delegated by the USARCOM.

(8) The USARCOM will be full-time, staffed similarly to the current CONUSA, the only headquarters devoted to RC management. Functions presently assigned to the CONUSA have previously been justified through manpower studies, surveys, and staffing guides. Those functions, less evaluation and AC support are transferred to the USARCOM. Essentially that

same guidance was applied in preparing the manning level of the USARCOM.

(a) Manpower requirement is reduced with centralization and consolidation of efforts at the USARCOM.

(b) Percentages of manpower (AC, RC, and civilian) in the existing RC-dedicated headquarters were applied to establish manning of the USARCOM.

(c) USARCOM military manning will be 60% AC; 40% RC; with the OCAR being dual hatted as the commander. The deputy will be an AC MG.

(d) USARCOM staff will total 1100 personnel.

(e) The USARCOM has a 1:599 (.0017) staffing to supported troops ratio in comparison to the 1:356 (.0028) ratio under the current structure.

#### 5. Conclusions:

a. Establishment of an USARCOM has several advantages as outlined in paragraph 4e above. Others of lesser significance could be defined to support such an organization.

b. The number of disadvantages inherent in establishing another major command are more numerous and significant than the advantages.

c. To establish a separate USARCOM with all responsibilities inherent to a major command equates to a full-time USAR headquarters. Staffing would be full-time, with both AC and RC personnel, to provide the necessary expertise in current doctrine and management programs of the Army, and comparable management level as presently exists.

d. As reflected in the Manpower Space Summary (Incl 3), the net change is a 387 space savings. When those spaces are analyzed, the USARCOM alternative dollar costs are:

AC:	+\$1,580,056
RC:	+ 8,658,617 (Full-time)
	- 2,056,240 (AT/IDT)
CIV:	- 6,268,672
TOTAL:	+\$1,913,761

Because of reallocation of grades and the additional full-time RC personnel, this alternative on dollars alone, is almost a \$2 million increase over the current structure.

e. A reorganization with the degree of change of RC assistance as described in this report would result in reorganizational turbulence for several years following implementation.

(1) Twelve existing AC headquarters would be phased out.

(2) Battalion or battalion equivalent advisors would be reassigned.

(3) RC management staff at FORSCOM headquarters would be reassigned or positions abolished.


(4) Gains made with STEADFAST would probably decline during the reorganizational turbulence.

f. Assuming a scenario which would require deployment of the AC corps, FORSCOM would have to assume the CONUS C<sup>2</sup> functions. That headquarters is not staffed to effectively manage the mission; neither does this alternative provide to FORSCOM the necessary C<sup>2</sup> resources required to assume the CONUS missions now delegated to the CONUSA.

g. A reorganization with the turbulence inherent in establishing the USARCOM and the resulting degradation of the CONUS AC C<sup>2</sup> structure would be detrimental to the readiness of the entire Army. Potential gains which might be made in the RC would be more than offset by the overall losses and do not justify the implementation of such a command structure.


6. Recommendation: A separate US Army Reserve Command should not be established.

3 Incl  
as



Incl 1

F-5-1-1



Incl 2

F-5-2-1

Incl 3

# MANPOWER SPACE SUMMARY

ACTIONS:	AC			FULL TIME			PAID DRILL			CIV		
	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT	OFF	WO	ENL	WO	TOT	DAC	ART	
<u>DECREASES</u>												
Inactivate CONUSA	-416	-6	-277	-699	-45					-792		
Inactivate ARR	-212	-14	-113	-339	-15					-97		
Inactivate ARCOM	-151		-64	-215				-1314	-95	-1720	-3129	-334
Inactivate FORSCOM	-115									-22	-159	
RC Mgmt	-10		-2	-12								
PIRC Reduction	-81		-80	-161				-1314	-95	-1720	-1070	-334
Elim Bn Adv	-870	-20	-536	-1426	-60							
SUB-TOTAL												
<u>INCREASES</u>												
Organize USARCOM	+179	+3	-108	+290	+120	+2	+72			+437	+179	
Organize 3 RC I	+201	+9	+261	+471	+135	+6	+174					
Corps HHC								+945	+30	+1530	+2550	+22
Organize 15 RC	+115		+50	+165								+334
Div HHC												
Total 2505 Spaces												
Organize AC I	+112	+5	+145	+262								
Corps HHC												
Augment 3	+192	+6	+120	+318								
AC Corps												
Augment RGs	+28		+56	+84				+945	+30	+1530	+2505	+513
SUB-TOTAL	+827	+23	+740	+1590	+255	+8	+246					
NET	-43	+3	+204	+164	+195	+8	+246	-369	-65	-190	-624	-555
			AC MIL	-1426	RC F-T		RC PDS	CIV				
			-1426	-60	-3129		-1404	-6019				
Net Decreases			+1590	+509	+2505		+1028	+5652				
Net Increases			+164	+449	-624		-376	-387				
Net Change												

1. Less FAS Section

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 6

ANALYSIS OF ARMY FORCE MOBILIZATION

PLANNING AND EXECUTION

Analysis of Army Force Mobilization  
Planning/Execution

1. Introduction.

A. Purpose. The purpose of this analysis is to display and clarify current responsibilities for planning and executing Army force mobilization, identify deficiencies in the planning/execution process and recommend improvements.

B. Objective. The objective of this analysis is to improve the Army Force Mobilization planning process either through organizational changes in the Army CONUS C<sup>2</sup> structure (ACCS-82 Alternatives) or changes in the mobilization planning process.

C. Scope and Definitions.

1. This analysis addresses Army Force Mobilization planning/execution activities within HQDA, HQ FORSCOM the CONUSA, and at Army installations.

2. The following definitions are extracted from CSR 10-5. Other terms are defined in Inclosure 1.

FORCE MOBILIZATION - The process by which part or all of the units and individuals of the Army Reserve Components are brought on active duty. Planning for force mobilization is based on approved time-phased requirements of contingency plans and applies to assembling, transporting to mobilization station, providing operational and training criteria for mobilization stationing, equipping, and training those units and individuals needed to meet force mobilization requirements.

PERSONNEL MOBILIZATION - The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing civilian and Reserve Component personnel resources into active military service.



D. Organization of this Report.

a. Section II addresses the major authorities and responsibilities for Army Force Mobilization assigned to HQDA, HQ FORSCOM, CONUSA and Army installation by existing regulations, SOPs and approved guidance documents and plans.

b. Section III addresses the Army Force Mobilization Planning process as it is currently defined. It displays the planning flow and guidance links within the process and major planning interfaces.

c. Section IV presents the problems and/or deficiencies in the planning/execution process which have been identified during MOBEX 78 and during the conduct of ACCS-82.

d. Section V addresses the need for a comprehensive Army Mobilization Planning System.

e. Section VI presents conclusions and recommendations for improving the Army's mobilization capability through improved planning.

II. Assigned Authority and Responsibility.

A. Pre Planning.

1. HQDA.

a. Primary ARSTAFF responsibility for Force Mobilization is assigned to DCSOPS by CSR 10-5. CSR 10-20 (Organization and Functions, ODCSOPS - Draft) further assigns this responsibility to the Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Division in the Operation and Readiness Directorate.

b. CSR 500-5 prescribes guidance and responsibilities for force mobilization planning in the "current time frame" (generally the current year and next budget year). ARSTAFF responsibility for preparation of the Army Capabilities Plan (ACP) Volume II, Force Mobilization Planning Guidance is assigned as shown in Table F-6-1. Other ARSTAFF responsibilities for Force Mobilization Planning and related actions as prescribed by CSR 500-5 are shown in Inclosure 2 to this report.

c. CSR 500-5 also establishes the DA Force Mobilization Review and Evaluation Committee (FMREC) chaired by the Chief, Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Division, ODCSOPS. The FMREC reviews and monitors all force mobilization planning activities; recommends corrective actions through normal staff channels to the CSA; and reviews requirements for, and monitors data systems associated with force mobilization planning. All ARSTAFF agencies and MACOMs involved in mobilization planning provide members of the FMREC at the Division Chief (O-6 or equivalent) level. ODCSOPS is currently preparing a new AR to create a US Army Mobilization and Deployment Committee (MODC) which will replace the FMREC.

Table F-6-1  
Force Mobilization Planning Guidance (FMFG), Volume II  
of the ACP

<u>Annex</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Responsible Staff Agency</u>
A	Reference/Terminology	ODCSOPS
B	Personnel and Individual Training*	ODCSPER
C	Logistics	ODCSLOG
	Appendix I - Transportation	ODCSLOG
	Appendix II - Installations	OCE
D	Unit Training	ODCSOPS
E	Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis (DMTB)	ODCSOPS
F	Post M-Day Deployment Troop Lists (PMDL)	ODCSOPS
G	Non-Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis (NDMTB)	ODCSOPS

\*Individual training was reassigned to ODCSOPS in Oct 78.

d. The responsibilities assigned to ODCSOPS by CSR 500-5 establish that agency as the primary HQDA agency for coordinating guidance, directing, and monitoring the mobilization planning activities of headquarters subordinate to DA.

e. Primary agency level responsibility for Force Mobilization within other ARSTAFF agencies has been assigned by appropriate CSRs as shown below.

<u>ARSTAFF Agency</u>	<u>Agency Level Responsibility assigned to:</u>
ODCSPER	Dir., Plans, Programs, and Budget (Plans Division)
ODCSLOG	Dir., Plans, Readiness and Systems
ODCSRDA	Dir., Material Plans and Programs, Plans, Policy and Test Div (under Industrial Activities function)
OACSI	Dir., Intelligence Systems
OACSAC	Dir., Policy, Plans and Evaluation
OTSG	Dir., Health Care Operations (Plans and Operations Division)
OCE	Ass't Chief of Engineers (Installations Planning Division)
OCAR	Operations and Logistics Division
NGB	Dir., Army National Guard (Organization and Training Division)

f. AR 135-300, Chapter 3 assigns responsibilities to ARSTAFF agencies for mobilization execution. These will be discussed in more detail later in the report but many of these execution responsibilities require extensive pre-planning.

g. CSR 10-5 assigns primary ARSTAFF responsibility for Personnel Mobilization (see definition in I.C.2, above) to DCSPER.

h. AR 135-300 assigns to US Army MILPERCEN responsibility for developing plans and publishing procedures for the rapid integration of RC personnel into the AC personnel system.

## 2. HQ FORSCOM.

a. Force mobilization planning responsibilities are assigned to CG FORSCOM by AR 10-42. The following specific functions are extracted from paragraph 4: (\*\*\*\* indicates omitted subparagraphs not related to mobilization).

\*\*\*\*

(5) Acts as the DA executive and coordinating authority for the following listed functions, within guidance and direction of HQDA:

\*\*\*\*

(c) Prepares and executes plans for mobilization of Army Reserve component units within CONUS, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, Alaska, and Hawaii...in accordance with Vol II of the Army Capabilities Plan.

\*\*\*\*

(8) Operates the CONUS troop staging facilities.

\*\*\*\*

(14) Maintains the DA master files of standard unit movement data and standard unit reporting procedure for Army units to support the planning and operations requirements of the Army Capabilities Plan and Joint Operations Planning System.

(15) Maintains the DA master data file of standard equipment characteristics (dimensions, weight, and cube) for Army TOE equipment.

\*\*\*\*

(23) Collects, processes, and transmits data reported under the Joint Reporting Structure on all organizations assigned to FORSCOM and TRADOC.

b. AR 10-42, paragraph 5b, gives CG FORSCOM authority to task other Army commands and agencies in furtherance of the responsibilities as DA executive and coordinating authority (para 2a Item (5) above).

c. The ACP Vol II and AR 135-300 (paragraph 3-2) assigns responsibility to CG FORSCOM to insure proper mobilization planning by CONUSA, USAR and ARNG units and supporting/coordinating installations and mobilization stations. The DA DCSOPS transmittal of the ACP Vol II also cites the FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP), along with the ACP Vol II as the basis for Army Force Mobilization Planning guidance.

d. Within HQs FORSCOM, the distribution of mobilization planning functions (FORSCOM Regulation 10-5) is generally analogous to that within HQDA. The Mobilization Planning Division, under the DCSOPS, is the centralized staff coordinating authority for all aspects of mobilization. This division has responsibility for the FORSCOM RCMP and MTBSP.

e. Other FORSCOM staff functions upon which mobilization planning is based reside in other divisions of ODCSOPS or in other staff agencies. Of particular interest are:

(1) Deployment Planning is in the DCSOPS Plans Division.

(2) USAR Troop Basis and Stationing are in the DCSOPS Force Structure and Stationing Division.

(3) Mobilization TDA processing is in the DCSOPS Documents Division.

(4) Movement Planning and COMPASS are in the DCSLOG Transportation Services Division.

(5) Personnel aspects of mobilization are assigned to the DCSPER Plans, Mobilization, Information Systems Office.

3. CONUSA.

a. FORSCOM Reg 10-42 assigns the CONUSA commander the mission to prepare and execute plans for mobilization of Reserve Component units in accordance with the FORSCOM Mobilization Plan.

b. The FORSCOM RCMP tasks the CONUSA to publish appropriate coordinating instructions, direct preparation of mobilization plans in accordance with the RCMP, and to direct and supervise preparation of appropriate mobilization plans of major subordinate commands. Annex A of the RCMP states that the CONUSA has review/approval authority over RC (USAR and ARNG) mobilization plans and will review/concur with installation (mobilization station) mobilization plans.

c. The FORSCOM RCMP, FORSCOM Reg 10-42 and AR 135-300 assign a number of mobilization execution missions/tasks to the CONUSA which require pre-planning on the part of the CONUSA. These will be further described later under execution planning.

d. FORSCOM Reg 10-42 assigns the Army Readiness Region a mission to provide mobilization planning advice and assistance to RC units, but specifically states that the ARR is not in the review chain for mobilization planning (this follows the RC chain of command to the CONUSA). All three CONUSA have, however, delegated varying levels of review and approval authority to the ARR.

3. Installations.

a. AR 135-300 assigns installation commanders (mobilization stations only) responsibility for preparation, coordination and execution of a mobilization plan which outlines support to be provided to mobilized units reporting to their installations.

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b. The FORSCOM RCMP requires FORSCOM and TRADOC installations designated as mobilization stations to prepare and submit plans through the CONUSA to HQs FORSCOM. FORSCOM/TRADOC installation mobilization plans are prepared in accordance with Annex H of the RCMP.

c. The ACP, VOL II requires other MACOM to direct their installations which have mobilization responsibility to prepare implementing force mobilization plans. MACOM mobilization plans will provide appropriate mobilization mission and planning guidance to subordinate installations in consonance with the ACP Vol II and the FORSCOM RCMP. USACC and DARCOM mob sta forward plans through the CONUSA to their parent MACOM for approval. HSC plans are not submitted through the CONUSA.

d. The RCMP requires separate mobilization plans for sub-installations. Parent installations are responsible for sub-installation plans. This includes inactive/semi-active or state operated installations which become sub-installations upon mobilization.

e. Planning responsibility for state operated installations which become separate/principle installations upon mobilization is assigned to federal installations designated by Annex H of the FORSCOM RCMP.

f. Installation commanders are responsible for separate Emergency Expansion Capability Plans IAW AR 210-23 (Master Planning for Army Installations - Emergency Expansion Capability). For state owned installations these plans are the responsibility of designated mobilization support installations.

g. Commanders of Coordinating/Supporting installations are assigned additional mobilization execution responsibilities which may be covered by installation mobilization plans. These responsibilities are described further under execution planning.

**B. Execution Planning and Execution.**

**1. HQDA.**



a. CSR 500-5 assigns responsibility to ODCSOPS for preparing, coordinating and publishing the DA Mobilization SOP. This responsibility is further assigned to the Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Division (DAMO-ODM).

b. The DA Mobilization SOP and AR 135-300 further assign responsibilities for execution planning and execution. No separate distinct organization will be formed to execute mobilization. All staff agencies are assigned responsibilities for specific required actions. The current DA Mob SOP has not been revised to reflect changes in responsibility resulting from the Oct 78 ARSTAFF reorganization.

c. The letter of promulgation for the DA Mob SOP requires each staff element and staff agency to insure that Emergency Action Statements (DD Form 855) and all items/actions are correlated and that such other procedures as may be required are prescribed.

d. The current DA Mob SOP assigns an active role to the FMREC in supervising HQDA mobilization execution and issue resolution. The FMREC is to be replaced by a new US Army Mobilization and Deployment Committee (MODC) which will not play a role in mobilization execution since most issues arising during execution must be resolved directly between the responsible staff agencies.

e. Annex H of the DA Mob SOP establishes Crisis Management Team Composition for augmentation of the AOC during mobilization. The AOC becomes the focal point for controlling crisis actions. Actions are passed to the responsible staff agency which must take action, coordinate and resolve issues through established ARSTAFF processes compressed in time.

f. Authority to initiate Army force mobilization is derived from DOD Directive 1235.10, Mobilization of the Ready Reserve and AR 10-5, Organization and Functions: Department of the Army. The authority, responsibility and relationships of Army agencies are further defined in Chapter 2 of AR 135-300. Figure F-6-1 (extracted from AR 135-300) displays these relationships graphically.



#### 4. HQ FORSCOM.

a. CG FORSCOM recommends USAR units to be mobilized. This is normally done during pre-planning in the RCMP.

b. If attack on the CONUS is not imminent CG FORSCOM is not in the direct chain for alert and order to active duty (chain is DA to area commanders/CONUSA). In times of extreme national emergency, declared by Congress or the President, the CG FORSCOM is designated by the Sec A-my as competent authority to order RC units to active duty. This authority may be delegated to the CONUSA by AR 135-300.

c. The FORSCOM RCMP assigns tasks and responsibilities for mobilization execution. Execution is decentralized to CONUSA (CG CONUSA is designated as a Deputy CG, FORSCOM) and installation commanders. HQs FORSCOM generally directs execution on an exception basis.

d. Depending on the nature of the contingency HQs FORSCOM recommends units to be mobilized, or revises the MTBSP as the situation dictates.

#### 5. CONUSA.

a. During mobilization CONUSA commanders act as Deputy CG, FORSCOM. The responsibilities assigned to the CONUSA by AR 135-300 and the FORSCOM RCMP make the CONUSA a focal point for C&C and management of mobilization execution during the early phases (alert through closure at mobilization station).

b. The CONUSA in its geographic area:

- (1) Alerts USAR units.
- (2) Orders the STARC to active duty.
- (3) Issues Orders for active duty to all RC units being mobilized.
- (4) Commands STARC and mobilized RC units.

(5) Re-assigns to ARCOM non-organic GOCOM subordinate units and transfers non-deploying units to their gaining CONUS MACOM.

(6) Acts as FORSCOM executive agent for training of mobilized RC units at mobilization stations.

(7) Directs and supervises RC unit personnel management and preparation for accession of RC personnel into AC.

(8) Monitors and supervises readiness reporting.

c. The CONUSA Commander (In CONUSA Mob Plans) designates the ARR Commander as his representative and employs ARR and RG assets to perform training functions [3b(6), above] as specified in the CONUSA Mob Plans.

#### 6. Installation.

a. Mobilization station commanders are responsible for execution of installation mobilization plans for receiving, housing, training, equipping and supporting mobilized units IAW AR 135-300, the RCMP, and parent MACOM mobilization plans.

b. FORSCOM Reg 10-42 states that FORSCOM installation commanders will command all FORSCOM units and activities assigned or mobilized at the installation. The RCMP indicates that the CONUSA "transfer units attached to installations from CONUSA to respective installations upon closure of the units at designated Mobilization Stations." (This appears to conflict with para 3-5h of AR 135-300 which states that the CONUSA commands mobilizing FORSCOM units until they arrive at POE.)

c. The TRADOC Post-Mobilization Individual Training and Support Plan (TRADOC PMITSP) states that C&C of mobilizing units passes to the TRADOC installation upon arrival at mob station. The installation commander is responsible to FORSCOM for matters pertaining to deploying units.

d. The ACP, Vol II, Annex C states that installation commanders will report to DARCOM all RICC I items uncovered by units deploying to POMCUS and DARCOM will direct redistribution. Assets other than RICC I remain under control of the installation commander (page II-c-14 of ACP Vol II). Installation commanders are authorized to request from DARCOM diversion of uncovered POMCUS (RICC-1) assets for early deploying units on a case by case basis. Installation commanders must plan for the expedited movement of uncovered POMCUS based on pre-designated shipping instructions.

e. The installation commanders' authority to cross level personnel and non-POMCUS equipment currently is based on peacetime procedures and authorities established by personnel and logistic management regulations. No guidance or changes in authority have been promulgated for mobilization.

f. Installations assigned responsibility, under AR 5-9, as coordinating/supporting installations for mobilization support have additional execution planning responsibilities assigned by AR 135-300. These include:

(1) Assisting and supporting mobilized units.

(2) Assisting in coordination among supporting installations, mobilization stations, ARCOM, GOCOM and STARC.

(3) Assuming custody of vacated USAR centers and excess property.

(4) Providing procedures and forms for requesting support after alert.

(5) Assisting ARCOM and STARC in preparing for or executing mobilization.

(6) Provide packing and crating services at home station.

The FORSCOM/TRADOC supplement to AR 5-9 states that the TAG/USPFO continues to support ARNG units until they close on mobilization stations. Coordinating installations designated by Map 1 in AR 5-9 function as mobilization support installations for RC units.

### III. The Army Force Mobilization Planning Process .

#### A. General.

1. The Army Planning System provides two basic planning cycles for mobilization planning:

a. Short range planning based on the Army's current capabilities is performed under guidance of the Force Mobilization Planning Guidance of the ACP, Vol. II. This short range planning cycle is the subject of this analysis.

b. Mid-range planning is performed under the Army POM process. Major resource shortfalls/imbances identified during the short range planning cycle are addressed in MACOM PARR submissions to HQDA. Resource requirements are consolidated and prioritized in the overall POM process. Annex D of the Army POM addresses broad mobilization issues and focuses on programing resources required to meet identified mobilization requirements.

2. The overall process of mobilization as defined in JCS Pub. 1 (see Inclosure 1) includes assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and material for active military service. Force mobilization (see paragraph IC.2, above) is that portion of mobilization which brings Reserve Component units and individuals to active duty.

#### b. Army Force Mobilization Planning.

1. FORSCOM prepares and executes plans for mobilizing reserve units and serves as the DA executive and coordinating authority for this portion of force mobilization. Figure F-6-2 is a general flow chart for planning the mobilization of RC units. Table F-6-2 is a tabular display of the planning guidance linkage between the major Army planning documents used in the process.

a. The OSD Consolidated Guidance, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), general war plans,

Figure F-6-2  
MOBILIZATION PLANNING FLOW




Table F-6-2  
Planning Guidance Linkage-Mobilization of RC units

<u>PLAN</u>	<u>INPUT/ Guidance from</u>	<u>OUTPUT/ Guidance to</u>
ACP, VOL II	Consolidated guidance ACP, VOL I JSCP OPLAN/TPFDL (JOPS)	RCMP MACOM MOB Plans NGB Coordinating Instr.
FORSCOM RCMP	JSCP; ACP VOL II OPLAN/TPFDL NGB Recommendations AR 135-300	MACOM MOB Plans TOA Movement flow plans CONUSA MOB Plans MOB STA, CI SI Plans
Other MACOM	ACP VOL I+II RCMP OPLANS AR 135-300	Sub CMD+Agency MOB Plans MOB STA Plans
CONUSA	RCMP AR 135-300	State/STARC MOB Plans ARNG Unit Plans MOSARC MOB Plans
INSTALLATIONS	RCMP AR 135-300 AR 220-10 AR 55-10 OTHER	Installation Staff Planning and Requirements Definition.



contingency OPLANS and the ACP, Vol I are the sources of guidance and requirements for Army mobilization planning. ACP, Vol II, is the basic guidance to major Army commanders on force mobilization planning. Responsibility for preparation of the ACP, Vol II, is described in Section I, above. The Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis (DMTB), The Non-Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis (NDMTB) and the Post Mobilization Deployment Troop List (PMBL) are published as annexes to the ACP, Vol II.

b. The FORSCOM RCMP encompasses the guidance in the ACP, Vol II, and provides additional general mobilization guidance and instructions to MACOM, all FORSCOM subordinate commanders, ARNG Commanders, and related supporting commanders. The Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan is Annex O of the RCMP and is published separately.

c. Other MACOMs develop mobilization plans for both force mobilization and for expanded material, supply and individual replacement support of deployed forces and the mobilized Army. These MACOM plans are based on the same sources of guidance as is the RCMP. Additionally those MACOM which have subordinate mobilization stations must satisfy the requirements of the RCMP itself.

d. The RCMP/MTBSP also becomes an input to the Transportation Operating Agencies for intra-CONUS movement flow planning.

e. The RCMP, supplemented by NGB coordinating instructions becomes the planning guidance for state Adjutants General and STARC mob planning.

f. The CONUSA, in coordination with the state AG, supplements the RCMP with CONUSA mobilization plans and coordinating instructions. The RCMP, as supplemented by CONUSA and STARC instructions, becomes the basis for mobilization planning by major USAR and ARNG units. AR 135-300 also contains basic procedural and planning guidance for the CONUSA and RC unit planning.

g. The RCMP/MTBSP along with the TRADOC Post-Mobilization Individual Training and Support Plan (PMITSP) and the Army Medical Department-Health Services Command Base Mobilization Plan (AMEDD-HSC BMP) provide mobilization missions for installations. These missions are the basis for development of installation mobilization expansion plans.

2. An important part of force mobilization planning process is a feedback system for requirements for General Support Forces (GSF) and mobilization base support needed to support the RCMP and other mobilization and deployment plans. This feedback process generally originates at the installation, unit or agency level where detailed mobilization planning identifies shortfalls in personnel, facilities, communications, ADP or other supporting services/capabilities needed to execute mobilization plans. The documentation, submission and validation of these requirements is governed by procedures and regulations which are not formally part of the force mobilization planning process. For example, additional personnel requirements are reflected in Mobilization-TDA and submitted IAW AR 310-49. Facility requirements generated by installation capability plans are processed under AR 210-23 (Master Planning for Army Installations Emergency Expansion Capability). Communications requirements must be submitted as Mobilization TELERS (Telecommunications Requirements) IAW AR 105-22. These feedback loops are closed when the requirements are satisfied by allocation of peacetime or post M-Day assets or are otherwise disposed of by changes in planning guidance, plans or planning constraints. The diversity of channels through which these feedback requirements flow makes it difficult to insure that all requirements are satisfied or otherwise disposed of in the next planning cycle.

3. The other aspect of Force Mobilization not fully addressed by RC unit mobilization as discussed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above is the mobilization of individual RC personnel.

a. CONUSA, unit and installation functions pertaining to accession of RC unit personnel are incorporated in the planning process described in paragraph III B.3. HQDA and its operating agencies, MILPERCEN and RCPAC, also play

a major supporting part in unit mobilization. Planning for this role has been incorporated in:

(1) ODCSPER Emergency Action Procedures developed IAW the DA Mobilization SOP.

(2) AR 135-300 and other appropriate Army regulations.

(3) Planning and development of administrative procedures and systems for mobilization (e.g., MOBPERS and SIDPERS-WARTIME, SIDPERS-USAR, etc.).

b. Planning for the mobilization of non-unit RC personnel in the IRR and standby reserve is primarily a responsibility DA, DCSPER, MILPERCEN and RCPAC in coordination with DA, DCSOPS and TRADOC for training aspects. FORSCOM plays no role in this process except to generate personnel requirements. DCSPER and MILPERCEN planning processes are incorporated in other overall functions of Personnel Mobilization and the Overseas Replacement System. These will not be discussed further here.

#### C. Planning Interfaces.

##### 1. General.

a. As used here the term planning interface means an explicitly defined requirement for coordination and exchange of information between two or more planning activities/or processes. In this sense, defining a planning interface requires the explicit definition of the planning activity or process on either side of the interface. It is possible to discuss the interface between Force Mobilization Planning as described above and the TAADS, or JOPS but it is difficult or impossible to define the interface with "logistics planning," or with "CONUS contingency planning" if those planning activities are not explicitly and systematically defined.

2. Nearly all military planning activities aimed at wartime military missions or tasks may, directly or indirectly be affected by or affect Force Mobilization Planning. It is not possible here to enumerate all of the

- Telecommunications Requirements Planning (AR 105-22).
- The Army Automation Planning, Programing and Evaluated System (TB 18-101-Draft).
- The Total Army Equipment Distribution Plan (TAEDP).
- Deployment Management System (DEPMAS).
- Master Planning for Army Installations (AR 210-23).

c. A full development of the MPS as proposed by FORSCOM would undoubtedly identify a number of additional planning or execution interfaces which must be explicitly defined and understood if the MPS is to be disciplined at the DA level.

#### IV. Problems and Deficiencies in the Force Mobilization Planning Process.

##### A. General.

1. Most problems and deficiencies in the Army's capability to execute full mobilization in the required time generally arise from three basic sources:

- o Lack of clearly defined wartime requirements.
- o Lack of, or constrained resources to satisfy known wartime requirements.
- o Lack of, or incomplete, prior planning.

Many of the problems cited as planning problems in MOBEX 78, in fact, derive from problems in one of the first two sources above. These two problem areas (i.e., requirements definition and resource constraints) will not be discussed here except for requirements generated in, an resources required for mobilization planning, itself. It must be recognized, however, that problems in overall requirements

required interfaces. The purpose here is to cite examples of some of the more important interfaces and present some planning interface concepts which will be helpful in discussing planning problems and deficiencies in the next section of this analysis.

### 3. The Nature of Planning Interfaces.

a. Planning interfaces are defined where separately planned actions have:

- o A supported - supporting relationship.
- o Mutually supporting objectives.
- o Potential for mutual interface.

b. Planning interfaces are implemented through coordination or exchange of planning documents and through an orderly and deliberate sharing of planning data (frequently automated).

c. Planning interfaces between two distinct planning processes usually require multiple exchanges of information at different points in time (planning cycles) and by different organizational elements or echelons.

### 4. Major Force Mobilization Planning Interfaces.

a. In initiating development of its Mobilization Planning Systems (MPS), FORSCOM has identified a number of major planning and reporting systems with which the MPS must interface. These are the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), the Force Accounting System (FAS), the Total Army Analysis (TAA), the Joint Reporting System (JRS), and the Joint Operational Planning System. The FORSCOM paper describing the MPS (at Inclosure 3 to this analysis) describes the nature of these interfaces.

b. Other planning interfaces implicit in the MPS discussion or in previous sections of this analysis are with:

definition and resource constraints generate the need for many assumptions and trade-offs in mobilization planning which greatly complicate the planning process.

2. This analysis addresses mobilization planning problems and deficiencies identified from two sources:

a. GAO Draft Report, dated November 30, 1978 "The Army and Air Force Selected Reserve Components--Better Readiness and Deployability through Organizational Changes." (Chapter 7) (Note: Final report title is, "Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively?", dated 25 April 1979.)

b. MOBEX 78 Analysis Report (U), 25 April 1979. (Part VI-Functional Recapitulation of Conclusions and Recommendations).

B. Deficiencies Cited by GAO.

1. GAO cited four major deficiencies in Army mobilization planning. Each will be discussed in succeeding paragraphs below. The cited deficiencies are:

a. FORSCOM's span of mobilization planning responsibilities is overextended, inhibiting its ability to manage and evaluate the mobilization planning for subordinate management levels.

b. FORSCOM's Mobilization Planning Division is inadequately staffed.

c. Many of the requirements necessary to plan and support mobilization have not been identified.

d. Installation mobilization plans are outdated, incomplete or non-existent.

2. FORSCOM Span of Mobilization Planning Responsibility.

a. Any analysis of the FORSCOM span of planning responsibility faces two basic problems:

(1) The FORSCOM responsibilities for mobilization planning are not clearly defined and have been interpreted in various ways within HQs FORSCOM and within HQDA.

(2) Mobilization planning is, of necessity, a very complex process because it affects or is affected by almost all Army CONUS missions, functions and activities and requires extensive coordination with other DOD and civilian agencies.

b. The FORSCOM responsibilities and roles in mobilization planning were described in Section II and III above. There are many aspects of mobilization with which FORSCOM is not involved or is only peripherally involved. Use of the term "DA Executive Agent" in describing the FORSCOM-DA relationship leads to a misunderstanding of the breadth of FORSCOM planning responsibility. FORSCOM is the DA Executive agent for preparing and executing plans for mobilization of Army RC units. Documents which cite a FORSCOM role as DA Executive Agent for Mobilization create confusion concerning the FORSCOM role. (The GAO report, itself, fails to clarify the limited FORSCOM role.) The FORSCOM role in planning mobilization of RC units is relatively well defined. Its planning process, while complex and incompletely executed, is relatively well developed under the RCMP. The definition of other areas of mobilization planning, however, lacks an adequate taxonomy for assigning clear responsibilities to other MACOM and HQDA.

c. The GAO report implies that over-centralization of the planning process contributes to the over-extension of FORSCOM responsibility.

(1) This impression is partly created by confusion concerning the FORSCOM role, discussed above.

(2) A central problem in planning RC unit mobilization is stationing. The MTBSP drives CONUSA and installation planning and the planning of other MACOM which support unit mobilization. The nature of the stationing problem is such that it must be solved in a centralized manner.

(3) FORSCOM commands all RC units mobilized until those units are transferred to gaining commands. FORSCOM must, therefore, play a prime role in planning mobilization of RC units.

(4) The mobilization planning process as described in Section III above is not a centralized process. The CONUSA and installation are also major planning nodes, although guidance for that process is focused in the RCMP.

(5) The overextension of HQ FORSCOM in RC unit mob planning will be largely resolved as the CONUSA and mobilization stations accomplish their planning responsibilities and by clearly defining responsibility for other aspects of mobilization planning for which HQDA and other MACOM are responsible.

### 3. FORSCOM's Mobilization Planning Division (MPD) Staffing.

a. While mobilization planning responsibility within HQs, FORSCOM is focused in the MPD of ODCSOPS, mobilization planning functions are also defined in other staff sections. The DCSPER has a Plans, Mobilization and Information Systems Office. The DCSPER, DCSLOG and MISO provide full time personnel to MPD to perform mob planning functions. The Study Coordination Office under the CofS played a key role in initiating the MPS.

b. Staffing of any single staff element of a headquarters is not the key to providing manpower for mobilization planning. Command emphasis is the key. A commander may provide dedicated manpower spaces to mob planning or he may require that all staff elements handling actions impacting mobilization address mobilization aspects directly. At all planning levels a combination of these two types of emphasis is needed. Only the commander can determine the proper balance. The CG FORSCOM has recently required all staff elements to become more involved in mobilization planning.

c. FORSCOM has estimated that the current level of effort in mob planning is 17 full time man-years throughout the headquarters and that 5 additional man-years are required. With the present command emphasis the current



level of full time effort should be more than adequate once the initial start-up effort for the MPS has been completed and when the CONUSA and installation planning are well in hand.

#### 4. Mobilization Support Requirements.

a. The GAO report cited 15 problem cases of unidentified support requirements in MOBEX 76, ten of which were still deficient at the time of the GAO study (summer 1978). All ten of these deficiencies related to installation support requirements. A general review of MOBEX 78 reports and the ACCS-82 field visits in Jan-Mar 79 indicate that many of these deficiencies still exist.

b. As described in Section III, above, the generation of support requirements occurs primarily at installation and unit level during detailed mobilization planning. It is at this level where the most critical shortage of planning personnel exists. This will be further discussed in paragraph 5, below.

c. Prior to MOBEX 78 there was extreme turbulence in the mobilization requirements, guidance and MTBSP. At the installation level, major changes in identity of mobilizing units, station loading, mobilization and deployment dates, etc., tend to invalidate previous plans completely and force the installation to start each cycle from scratch.

d. The installation is placed in a position where, after it has identified a resource shortfall and documented and submitted a requirement into the appropriate channel, it must proceed with its mobilization planning under the assumption that the requirement will be honored and satisfied. It seldom gets feedback to validate or invalidate that assumption.

e. The lack of capstone DA systems to close the requirements feedback with the mobilization planning guidance (discussed in Section III, paragraph B2, above) frequently results in the installation trying to develop requirements in the next planning cycle without knowledge of the status of previously submitted requirements.

## 5. Installation Level Mobilization Plans.

a. GAO cited four contributing factors resulting in major deficiencies in mobilization planning:

(1) Mobilization support requirements necessary for proper planning (discussed earlier) had not been identified.

(2) Emphasis on mobilization planning was lacking.

(3) There was a lack of mobilization planning personnel.

(4) A "closed-loop" management system to assure development of effective installation plans was lacking (also discussed earlier).

b. Command emphasis at installations varies with involvement in major mobilization exercises. Almost all mob planning done in the past 3 years has been in preparation for MOBEX 76 and 78.

c. Even where command emphasis is high, there is a lack of balance between total staff involvement and dedicated planning positions. With few exceptions there are no planning positions dedicated to mobilization planning at the 53 mobilization stations.

d. The lack of dedicated mobilization planners greatly inhibits the development and retention of mobilization planning expertise at the installation level and continuity from one planning cycle to the next.

e. While the GAO report emphasized the planning problems at Ft Ord, which is also responsible for the mobilization plans of Camp Roberts and Ft Erwin, this situation is not unique. It is, rather, representative of the installation planning status.

f. While the lack of mobilization planners is most critical at the installation level, the FORSCOM effort to decentralize the review and approval process

for installation (and STARC) plans could also be inhibited by manpower shortages at the CONUSA level.

g. All three CONUSA have planning elements with some spaces dedicated to mobilization. Again the balance between total staff involvement and dedicated spaces must be judged by the commander. ARR and RG personnel have developed expertise in mobilization during exercises. First Army has directed the dedication of ARR and RG personnel to planning assistance and review of RC unit and mob station plans. The other CONUSA have also tasked ARR with planning assistance and review tasks.

h. Even with increased command emphasis some additional manpower spaces at the installation level and possibly within the CONUSA will be required. Most mobilization stations require a minimum of one planning space dedicated to mobilization. Those installations which must also develop plans for sub-posts and inactive or semi-active posts may require at least two spaces.

C. Deficiencies cited in the MOBEX 78 Report.

1. Part VI of the MOBEX 78 Analysis Report is a functional recapitulation of conclusions and recommendations (C&R). One functional Category is Mobilization Plans. This category includes 58 sets of C&R. Many of these cite specific planning deficiencies which are "sins of omission" and for which the responsible agency/command and the applicable planning document or process are identified. These deficiencies are symptomatic of larger problems in shortage of planning assets, lack of command emphasis, lack of feedback systems or interfaces, etc. which are emphasized through this analysis. The "symtomatic" deficiencies will not be discussed further here.

2. Some of the mob plans C&R address directly root causes of planning problems and a number of the C&R collectively illustrate other primary problem areas. These include the need for:

a. Permanent mobilization planning elements at all levels, particularly at DA and MACOM.

b. A DA developed and disciplined mobilization planning system.

c. Greater involvement of functional MACOM (HSC, ACC, DARCOM, etc.) in developing Force Mobilization Guidance.

d. A systematic means of identifying and addressing time phased GSF and mobilization support requirements.

e. A better planning review process particularly for installations and MACOM plans.

3. A cursory review of the C&R under the other functional categories in the MOBEX 78 report also reveals many mobilization problems which are symptomatic of planning deficiencies. These cannot be discussed in detail here but the broad range of problems points to a need for an expanded and more systematic definition of general mobilization planning responsibilities which are not covered by the term Force Mobilization (Force Mobilization is a term defined only in CSR 10-5 and is generally not applicable, recognized or used below HQDA). Such an effort is necessary to adequately define and implement planning interfaces (as described earlier) and to provide a basis for extending planning processes to the requirements of total mobilization.

#### V. Army Mobilization Planning System.

A. Statement of Need. The need for a DA developed and disciplined mobilization planning system (paragraph C.2.b, above) is of sufficient magnitude to deserve special treatment.

1. Full development of an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) would encompass all of the other needs listed in paragraph IV. C2 above.

2. The need for such an overall system has been raised in MOBEX 78 issues, in ACCS-82 discussion with HQDA agencies and MACOM, and by CG FORSCOM.

3. Two initiatives have been surfaced informally which attempt to develop a framework for a broader, more elaborate planning system. These are:

a. The MPS proposed by FORSCOM and discussed earlier (see Inclosure 3).

b. A concept for an Army Command and Control Information System (ACCIS) briefed to HQDA staff officers by the MOBEX 78 Planning Group on 25 April 1979. Inclosure 4 to this report contains the vugraphs used to brief ACCIS.

4. Both of these proposals call for HQDA action to provide a broader, more thorough definition of mobilization planning and management responsibility and the development of planning systems which do not currently exist. The MPS emphasizes Force Mobilization Planning and focuses on the mobilization of RC units. The ACCIS concept addresses a Force Readiness system capping the many Army management systems into which GSF and mobilization base support requirements flow. Such a concept provides a basis for closing the feed-back loop discussed earlier.

5. Both concepts call for a significant increase in the use of automation in the planning and management systems. This will require a level of rigor which has not existed in the past definitions of mobilization planning systems and the information exchange across planning interfaces.

6. One part of the ACCIS concept has been proposed separately by DA DCSOPS (DAMO-FD). It is the Army Mobilization Base Requirements Model (MOBREM) Study. As described in the draft CSM (at Inclosure 1) this study will directly address potential solutions to the requirements feed-back problems discussed in Section III, paragraph B2, above. The MOBREM Study will develop a methodology and model for determining force structure and manpower requirements for the mobilization base and appears to be intended for mid-range (POM years) planning. It is not clear that this effort would close the loop for successive near term (yearly) mobilization planning cycles.

7. The proposed initiatives, above, if pursued and developed, would be significant steps towards an Army

mobilization planning system. These initiatives as they currently stand, however, are tentative, have no clear HQDA sponsor, and represent a piecemeal approach. The MPS is near-term (current year) planning which focuses on RC unit mobilization. The ACCIS is a broad mid-range planning approach and the MOBREM-M proposal addresses only manpower and force structure.

8. It is unlikely that an adequate mobilization base can be developed and sustained over a period of years without a major improvement in mobilization planning. An Army mobilization planning system is needed which will:

- a. Define and assign broadened mobilization planning responsibilities.
- b. Incorporate the FORSCOM MPS and its methodology.
- c. Formalize consistent planning approaches for all areas of mobilization (i.e., RC units, personnel base, logistics base, etc.).
- d. Integrate current year and budget year planning with mid-term planning (POM) for mobilization.
- e. Integrate mobilization planning with all appropriate Army planning systems.
- f. Optimize the use of automated planning aids and automated system interfaces through a structured management of planning information.

B. HQDA Organization for Developing a Mobilization Planning System.

1. HQDA development of comprehensive and coordinated near-term and mid-term mobilization planning systems for all aspects of mobilization will be a complex, time-consuming and expensive effort. It would exceed the expertise and available resources of any single ARSTAFF agency. Such an effort would affect the vital interests of all ARSTAFF agencies and CONUS MACOM. The complexity of the systems is such that the effort could not be successfully undertaken or managed by any ad hoc or part time organization (e.g., the FMREC/MODC).

2. If significant progress is to be achieved in the next two years, a dedicated organization within HQDA should be established to develop, integrate and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). Such an organization should be chartered for up to 24 months, and should be headed by a General Officer (O-8) with Director status.

3. Most of the analysis and development effort for creating the mobilization planning system would have to be done with contractor assistance or by direct taskings to ARSTAFF, MACOM or analysis agencies (e.g., CAA, Engineer Study Center, USAMSSA, etc.). The manpower required in the organization would, therefore, be driven by the required expertise, rather than the magnitude of the work. The required staffing should include a combination of personnel with experience and knowledge of organization, missions and functions of MACOM and field operating agencies, experience in various functional areas and administrative capabilities. The following is an estimate of the required personnel based on areas of expertise.

Area of Expertise

<u>Organizational</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
FORSCOM	1
TRADOC	1
DARCOM	1
RCPAC/MILPERCEN	1
ACC	1
HSC	1
MTMC	1
NGB	1
OCAR	1

<u>Functional</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Force Development	1
Supply and Maintenance	1
JOPS	1
PPBS	1
Transportation Systems	1
Facilities Engineering	1
Stationing	1
Personnel	1
Comm/ADP	1
Training Base	1
Industrial Base	1
ADP Systems Development	2
ORSA	3
Management/Admin (by position)	
Director	1
Exec	1
Admin NCO	1
Clerical	3
	<u>31</u>
TOTAL	

4. If all individuals assigned to the organization were selected based on a background in at least two of the organization or functional areas, above, it would be possible to provide the required expertise within a total strength of eighteen personnel. This should provide sufficient manpower if the organization has adequate tasking authority.

5. Five alternatives have been addressed for placement of such an organization within the Army Staff:

a. As an Office of the Special Assistant for Army Mobilization Planning Systems directly under the CSA (OSAAMPS).

b. As a directorate in OCSA under the supervision of the DAS (DAMPS).

c. As a new directorate or office under the DCSOPS (DAMO-DAMPS).

d. Within DAMO-OD reorganized as an Operations, Readiness and Mobilization Directorate, (DAMO-ORM).



e. Within DAMO-FD reorganized as a Force Management and Mobilization Directorate (DAMO-FMM).

6. Inclosure 6 of this analysis contains advantages and disadvantages of the five alternatives in paragraph 5, above. Establishment of a office of the Special Assistant for Army Mob Planning Systems (OSAAMPS) under the CSA is the favored alternative. A comprehensive AMPS would have a wide impact on ARSTAFF and MACOM planning; would require intensive effort to develop and implement and would have a significant future impact on the prioritization and justification of mobilization base resource requirements. For these reasons the following advantages favoring the OSAAMPS alternative outweigh other considerations:

- o Provides maximum management emphasis (clout) through more regular involvement of the CSA or VCSA.

- o Provides direct tasking authority to the ARSTAFF.

- o Emphasizes temporary (2 year) status of the OSAAMPS.

- o Isolates office from pressure of day to day ARSTAFF actions.

- o Enhances overall ARSTAFF/MACOM involvement and cooperation.

7. Establishment of the DAMPS under the DAS provides similar advantages except that it appears to be a more permanent office (disadvantage) and it would more directly involve the DAS (additional advantage). The DAMPS is the second most favored alternative.

8. Manpower for the organization would have to be provided through a combination of TDA authorized spaces, HQDA overstrength spaces and personnel assigned to ARSTAFF/MACOM spaces but detailed for 24 months for duty with the OSAAMPS. Such an arrangement would be easier and more acceptable under the OSAAMPS alternative than under the other alternatives.

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations.

A. HQS FORSCOM Mobilization Planning.

Conclusions: The FORSCOM span of responsibility for mobilization planning is not too broad. Its planning for RC unit mobilization is a well developed process which will be further improved by the FORSCOM MPS.

a. Use of the term "DA Executive Agent" in regard to FORSCOM responsibilities confuses the role of FORSCOM in mobilization planning.

b. Lack of a clear definition of roles and responsibilities of ARSTAFF agencies and other MACOM in common mobilization terminology adds ambiguity to the bounds of FORSCOM responsibility.

Recommendation: That HQDA develop and publish a standardized terminology and taxonomy of overall mobilization planning responsibilities.

a. This terminology and taxonomy or responsibilities should be incorporated in all appropriate CSR 10 -( ) and AR 10 - ( ) series Organization and functions documents.

b. The mobilization terminology and taxonomy should be defined by and used in the Army Mobilization Planning System (see Recommendation D, below).

c. MACOM should be assigned mobilization planning and execution missions, but the term "DA Executive Agent" should be eliminated or used only for specific and clearly defined responsibilities.

B. Installation Mobilization Planning.

Conclusion: Installation Mobilization Planning is critically inadequate. Major improvements require:

(1) Additional dedicated planners.

(2) Improved intermediate (CONUSA) review of installation plans.

(3) Closing the loop between support requirements and planning guidance.

Recommendations:

(1) That at least 51 planning manpower spaces (1 per mob station) be provided to mobilization stations from available ACCS-82 manpower savings or through restoration of manpower cut by DPS059.

(2) That FORSCOM and TRADOC standardize the review and approval process for installation mobilization plans (ACCS-82 must address same in alternatives).

(3) That HQDA support the development of the FORSCOM MPS and develop a system for capturing aggregated mobilization base requirements and developing planning constraints (ACP Vol II) based on mob base resources or shortfalls. (See Recommendation D below).

#### C. HQDA Mobilization Planning Process.

Conclusion: A DA (Army) Mobilization Planning System does not formally exist.

(1) Current formal mobilization planning processes emphasize RC unit mobilization and fail to emphasize training base, manpower accession, logistic base and the staging base for deploying and sustaining forces.

(2) Current planning processes provide no vehicle for identifying conflicts or deficiencies in planning guidance, or resource shortfalls created by competing requirements from diverse planning actions, except through mobilization exercises.

(3) There is no adequate interface between near term mob planning (current and budget year) and mid-term planning (POM years).

(4) Mobilization planning responsibilities within HQDA are inadequately defined.

(5) There is little reaction or replanning capacity to meet major changes in requirements immediately prior to or following M-Day.

Recommendation: That HQDA undertake and expedite the development, implementation and disciplining of an Army Mobilization Planning System which will:

(1) Define and assign clear and broadened mobilization planning responsibilities to both ARSTAFF agencies and MACOM.

(2) Incorporate the FORSCOM MPS.

(3) Formalize consistent planning processes for all areas of mobilization (i.e., RC units, personnel bases, logistics base, staging base, etc.).

(4) Integrate near term and mid-term planning.

(5) Optimize and extend the use of automated planning aids and automated system interfaces through a structured management of planning information.

D. HQDA Mobilization Planning Organization.

Conclusion: Expeditious development of an Army Mobilization Planning Systems (AMPS) cannot be successfully accomplished within any one ARSTAFF agency. It will require:

(1) Concentrated, coordinated effort.

(2) Up to two (2) years (two (2) planning cycles of MPS or PPBS).

(3) Dedicated manpower.

(4) High level management emphasis and visibility.

(5) Broad expertise spanning all ARSTAFF and MACOM activities.

Recommendation: That CSA establish an Office of the Special Assistant for Army Mobilization Planning Systems to develop and implement the AMPS. This office will:

(1) Report directly to the CSA or VCSA.

(2) Be provided approximately 18 full time personnel.

(3) Be given tasking authority over ARSTAFF agencies and MACOM.

## EXPLANATION OF TERMS

- a. ACP, VOL II. (Army Capabilities Plan, VOL II). Provides the primary administrative and operational guidance to Army agencies, Army commands and Army components of unified commands for employment and support of Army forces in the short-range period. Volume II is devoted entirely to force mobilization guidance and is the primary Army source of such guidance.
- b. DAEAP (Department of the Army Emergency Action Procedures). Identified procedures planned to cope with an increase in readiness of U.S. forces, the outbreak of hostilities, or situations in which the outbreak of hostilities, or situations is imminent, which will be executed upon notification from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The DAEAP is prepared by ODCSOPS.
- c. DMTB (Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis). A listing of all deployable/deployed TOE units on M-day and deployable TOE units to be mobilized/activated after M-day. Annex F of Volume II of the ACP. See NDMTB.
- d. Mobilization of Army Force. The ordering of units and members of the ARNGUS and USAR to active duty in preparation for war or other national emergency and the act of calling units and members of the ARNG into Federal service in preparation for war or other national emergency.

(1) Selective Mobilization. Expansion of the Active Armed Forces by mobilization of RC units and/or individual reservists, by authority of Congress or the President, to satisfy an emergency requirement for a force tailored to meet a specific requirement (such as civil disturbances or other domestic situations where the Armed Forces may be used to protect life, federal property and functions, or to prevent disruption of federal activities). A selective mobilization differs from a partial mobilization in that it normally would not be associated with requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

(2) Partial Mobilization. Expansion of the Active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization), as a result of action by Congress or the President, to mobilize Reserve Component (RC) units and/or individual reservists to meet all

or part of the requirements of a particular contingency and/or operational war plans or to meet requirements incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet the requirements of a partial mobilization are ordered to active duty at their authorized strength.

(3) Full Mobilization. Expansion of the Active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for these units.

(4) Total Mobilization. Expansion of the Active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the full mobilization of all national resources needed to include production facilities to round out and sustain such forces.

e. MTBSP (Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan). Sets forth when, in relation to M-day, RC units will be mobilized, where they will be stationed, and projected deployment periods. Published as Annex O to RCMP.

f. NDMTB (Non-Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis). Contains all units not listed in the DMTB. It includes all non-deploying units on active duty on M-day, all RC units to be mobilized/organized/activated after M-day, and all RC units not assigned a mobilization date. See Annex H of Volume II of the ACP.

g. RCMP (Reserve Component Mobilization Plan). A FORSCOM plan providing general mobilization guidance and instructions to MACOM, all FORSCOM subordinate commanders, ARNGUS commanders and related supporting commanders to accomplish required planning.

h. TPFDL/PMDL (Time Phased Force and Deployment List/ Post-M-Day Deployment List). The TPFDL is a time-phased list of the "type" units necessary to support contingency planning as required by the JSCP and ACP. The PMDL is an Army planning document that identifies actual units available to fill the "type" unit requirements. Annex G of Volume II of the ACP contains general information relating to PMDL's, however, the PMDL is published separately.

## APPENDIX B

### ARMY STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES FORCE MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND RELATED ACTIONS - CURRENT TIME FRAME

#### 1. ODCSOPS.

##### a. Develops for the ACP/JSCP:

- (1) List of major active and RC forces available for contingency planning.
  - (2) An estimate of expansion and deployment during mobilization.
  - (3) Force mobilization planning guidance.
  - (4) Priorities for mobilization of CONUS defense forces, vis-a-vis deploying units.
  - (5) Guidance for adjusting mobilization schedule as required.
  - (6) Mobilization priorities in event of no (or limited) deployments.
- b. Receives CINC's time-phased force OPLAN requirements from JCS for all plans requiring mobilization - coordinates, validates, and approves requirements.
- c. Develops estimated day of availability.
- d. Provides ODCSLOG and ODCSPER mobilization distribution priorities for personnel and equipment fills.
- e. Maintains and distributes the DMTB.
- f. Develops and displays in DMTB, a list of units not in existing force structure, required to round out approved OPLANS force requirements - these units to be considered for activation upon OPLAN implementation.
- g. Prepares and maintains in TARMOCs Post M-Day Deployments List in DEPREP format for contingency plans requiring mobilization by JSCP.
- h. Provides to ODCSPER force data for mobilization consisting of quantitative (structure authorizations) and qualitative (SACS-C tape) personnel requirements.
- i. Provides force data to ODCSLOG for computation of materiel and equipment required for mobilization.
- j. Develops plans for expansion, modification, or rehabilitation of installation telecommunications and trunking requirements. Provides

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guidance for installation telecommunications. Provides OCE guidance for RC major combat units for the development or mobilization stationing guidance.

- k. Monitors all mobilization planning.
  - l. Provides guidance and completion schedules for preparation of supporting annexes to volume II of the ACP to appropriate Staff agencies.
  - m. Monitors NDMTB.
  - n. Prepares and coordinates the Unit Training annex to volume II of the ACP.
  - o. Consolidates and updates volume II of the ACP as required, receiving and consolidating input from Army Staff agencies.
  - p. Publishes volumes I and II of the ACP and changes thereto.
  - q. Prepares, coordinates, and publishes the DA SOP for mobilization.
  - r. Chairs DA Force Mobilization Review and Evaluation Committee.
  - s. Is responsible for guidance and management of Force Mobilization Planning.
2. ODCSLOG.
- a. Develops policies and procedures for logistics in support of a force mobilization.
  - b. Prepares and coordinates Logistics annex, except the Installation appendix, and provides to ODCSOPS.
  - c. Develops DA Mobilization Transportation Requirements.
3. ODCSPER.
- a. Determines personnel procurement requirements to include Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).
  - b. Furnishes TTPPS requirements to ODCSOPS.
  - c. Determines individual training requirements.
  - d. Determines training base structure to meet individual training requirements.
  - e. Coordinates stationing of TTPS with OCE.



f. Prepares and coordinates the Personnel and Individual Training annex and provides to ODCSOPS.

g. Prepares and publishes Mobilization Designation Positions.

4. OCAR.

a. Coordinates with ODCSOPS and ODCSLOG, as appropriate, to insure pre-mobilization USAR force structure, priorities, and readiness categories, support contingency plans.

b. Is responsible for guidance and management of demobilization planning for USAR units.

5. NGB.

a. Coordinates with ODCSOPS and ODCSLOG, as appropriate, to insure pre-mobilization USNG Force Structure priorities and readiness categories, support contingency plans.

b. Is responsible for guidance and management of demobilization planning for USNG units.

6. OCE.

a. Plans for rehabilitation of existing facilities and construction of new facilities based on the maximum economic expansion capability of currently designated long-range and mobilization installations.

b. Provides FORSCOM assumptions and guidance for mobilization stationing of RC units.

c. Insures in conjunction with FORSCOM that mobilization stationing plans conform to the current DMTB.

d. Prepares and coordinates the Installation appendix to volume II of the ACP, and provides to ODCSOPS.

e. Plans for acquisition of additional real estate required to establish new installations, or to expand or modify existing installations.

7. OTSG.

a. Provides ODCSLOG requirements for additional hospital beds to support mobilization personnel strengths.

b. Provides ODCSLOG projected patient loads for station planning.

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8. OTHER STAFF AGENCIES.

a. Provide recommendations, as required, for units for which responsible.

b. Insure AR's and other pertinent directives contain appropriate wartime/emergency instructions (incident to a mobilization, but not within scope of Force Mobilization Planning and contained in FMPC documentation).

c. Assist the DA Force Mobilization Review and Evaluation Committee as required.

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## INTRODUCTION

**SUBJECT: Mobilization Planning System**

1. Purpose. This publication establishes the system to be used in the development, review, and distribution of the Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP) and subordinate unit or installation mobilization plans. Special emphasis is provided in the development of the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP).

2. Scope. The Mobilization Planning System (MPS) consolidates procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of military plans for the mobilization and stationing of Reserve forces ordered to active duty in preparation for war or other national emergency. Guidance pertinent to mobilization planning which is subject to periodic revision is contained in the Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP) and the Army Capability Plan (ACP) or in separate communications. Other publications provide detailed guidance and information which directly facilitate mobilization planning and are found in appropriate sections of this publication. A listing of references pertaining to mobilization planning is provided in the table of references.

3. Objective. The objective of the MPS is to integrate the diverse tasks of mobilization planning into an event sequenced series of coordinated actions which lead to the timely development of mobilization plans. The MPS is designed to interface with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), Force Accounting System (FAS), Total Army Analysis (TAA), Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), and the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS).

## PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

### 4. General.

a. The MPS defines a cyclic review of significant data used in the development of the RCMP and subordinate unit/installation mobilization plans. The plans will be reviewed annually and updated as significant changes occur. The MPS is designed to enhance coordination among HQDA; CINCUSAREUR; Commanding Generals, USACIDC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, USAHSC, INSCOM, USACC, USAEIGHT, and USARJ; and Commander, MTMC and DARCOM. The MPS identifies significant events in the mobilization planning cycle and highlights coordination requirements among Army elements responsible for mobilization planning. HQDA has designated CG, FORSCOM as the DA Executive and coordinating authority for the preparation and execution of plans for the mobilization of Army RC units.

b. The mobilization decision matrix at Figure 1 shows the conflict environment, condition and type of mobilization, mobilization functions, and the associated mobilization tasks. The decision matrix graphically displays the spectrum of mobilization planning required to effectively cover specific contingencies. The accomplishment of the mobilization mission includes the expansion of forces and their movement. The force expansion function encompasses the mobilization of reserve component forces and the activation of new units. The force movement function considers the total movement tasks from home station to mobilization station, utilizing air and surface modes of transportation. Movement from mobilization station to port of debarkation is part of deployment planning which is an extension of the MPS.

c. The force expansion tasks categorize the considerations involved in the development of requirements and in the definition of capabilities. The force expansion tasks are Force Structure, Personnel, Logistics, Training and Stationing. Each of the tasks include the following considerations.

(1) Force Structure - The force structure tasks define the current and projected force structure capabilities through the use of the Joint Reporting Structure (JRS), TAA, external MACOM/Agency identification of General Support Force (GSF) requirements, installation mobilization TDAs, and other FORSCOM identified GSF forces needed to support early deploying units. The JRS provides data via the Force Status and Identity System (FORSTAT) that pertains to readiness, equipment status, and organizational structure. Programmed force structure changes as identified in the TAA process are elements of the force capabilities equation. Current capabilities plus programmed changes define the total force capabilities used to determine shortfalls in force structure. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is the basic document from which mobilization requirements are determined. The Army Capabilities Plan (ACP), published as a unilateral document biennially in conjunction with the JSCP, provides further guidance on the Army forces allocated in support of the overseas commanders' mission. Volume II of the ACP is the source document for Army forces mobilization planning. Unified commands develop contingency plans in response to the guidance contained in JSCP. Each contingency plan contains a Time Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL) developed by the supported commander and coordinated by HQDA. The TPFDL specifies the forces required and their time phased deployment to support each contingency plan. The GSF requirements are generated by the organization of the deploying force and the sustaining base needed to support deployments and mobilizing forces. GSF requirements of TRADOC, DARCOM, NTMC, HSC, ACC, and other agencies are included in the development of total GSF requirement. Installation mobilization expansion plans are supported by mobilization TDAs. Late deploying units will be identified for early mobilization and interim installation support augmentation. The force structure task includes comparing requirements versus capabilities and making appropriate force structure adjustments to balance requirements and capabilities.

# MOBILIZATION DECISION MATRIX




FIGURE 1

(2) Personnel - The personnel planning task encompasses the rollup of the total unit personnel required to fill the MTOE, TDA or Mobilization (Mob) TDA specified in the force structure task. The personnel requirements are identified by number, grade, and MOS by using TPFDL and TAADS information. Input from TRADOC, DARCOM, MTMC, HSC, ACC and other agencies identifying FORSCOM CSF requirements are incorporated into the MTBSP. The unit personnel status and capability are provided by the Unit Status Report (USR) and FORSTAT systems. A comparison of unit personnel requirements and capabilities is made to determine what adjustments in personnel distribution or planning are required. The volume of automated personnel transactions during mobilization may saturate existing ADP system capabilities and constrain the personnel and logistics systems' responsiveness. The evaluation of the effect of ADP systems support for the mobilization process is an integral part of the MPS.

(3) Logistics - The logistics tasks are divided into five distinct sub-tasks: Equipment, Transportation, ADP Support Systems, Services, and Maintenance.

(a) Equipment. Equipment requirements are derived from the MTOE/TDA of the mobilized forces. This data is contained within the TAADS and TPFDL data bases. The equipment status/capability is maintained in the FORSTAT system and the USR. DARCOM prepares the Asset Control Report (ACR) quarterly that shows the distribution of major equipment end items in FORSCOM. The Total Army Equipment Distribution Plan (TAEDP) published by HQDA depicts the current and projected distribution of equipment in the force. The disposition of POMCUS residual equipment must be pre-planned by DA/DARCOM and executed by FORSCOM. The plan will require installation commanders to distribute residual equipment to deploying/mobilizing units on the training base in accordance with pre-planned priorities or to ship equipment to active theaters. The total equipment requirements and capabilities must be compared to determine what adjustments in equipment distribution or planning must be accomplished to balance logistics capabilities and requirements.

(b) Transportation. Movement planning guidance and assistance for RC units pertaining to mobilization is a FORSCOM responsibility in accordance with FORSCOM Regulation 55-1. Although a logistics task, the magnitude of the task justifies defining force movement as a separate mobilization function. This function is discussed in detail in para 4d below.

(c) Automated Data Processing (ADP) Support Systems. The logistics system is constrained by ADP systems support available at the installation. The volume of supply transactions and property accountability requirements during mobilization predicate maximum utilization of ADP support systems. Improvements required in ADP Support Systems must be defined for resolution within the framework of the MPS.

(d) Services. The requirements for services (subsistence, food service, laundry/dry cleaning and bath) are defined by the projected static and dynamic personnel loading at the mobilization station. Capabilities are based on the mobilization station's ability to continue or expand existing operations, commercial contractor availability, and the initiation of interservice support agreements (ISSAs) where feasible. Shortfalls identified by comparing requirements and capabilities will cause adjustments of priorities in services or in station loading.

(e) Maintenance. Maintenance requirements are identified by existing shortfalls in maintenance status as identified in the USR and FORSTAT file. The capability of the mobilization station to meet the maintenance demand is a function of the facilities, repair parts status, and the GSF workforce available to accomplish the defined workload. A comparison of requirements and capability to accomplish the maintenance task must consider the type equipment issued mobilized forces to ensure support compatibility.

(4) Training - Specific training criteria for unit deployments have not been defined, although general guidance requires that maximum effective unit training be conducted during the premobilization training period. Training criteria is used to project dynamic station loading since the estimated time to complete training impacts directly in length of time a unit remains at the mobilization station. The training status of the force is specified in the USR and FORSTAT and additional training status information on RC units can be obtained from the 1R/2R training evaluation reports. Installations submit an annual 244R report that specifies training facility support available. TRADOC provides guidance for the operation of US Army Service Schools and US Army Training Centers during the post-mobilization period. TRADOC also, through its Post-Mobilization Individual Training and Support Plan, facilitates planning for support of mobilized RC units and the expansion of the existing training base to accommodate an increase in the trainee population. Adjustments in training doctrine, procedures, or deployment criteria are necessary if training requirements exceed the training capability (facilities or other training support) at the mobilization station or training site.

(5) Stationing - The stationing requirement is a synthesis of diverse factors concerning force structure, personnel status, logistics status and training status. The TPFDLs are the source documents for determining the time phased force requirements. Once a unit is identified on the troop list with a specified latest arrival date, every effort must be exerted to meet the requirement. Considerations of station loading (static and dynamic), geography, and installation facility support further define stationing requirements. The capability of the mobilization station to support mobilization includes an analysis of maximum station loading, training facilities, installation facilities as defined by the real property inventory report, and GSF available which includes early mobilization of late deploying units to augment installation mobilization TDAs. The capability of the installation to provide housing, services, ADP and maintenance support are factors which directly constrain mobilization stationing plans.

d. The force movement tasks include developing requirements for air and surface transportation of RC units. The mobilization tasks for transportation reflect movement requirements from home station to mobilization station. Movement from mobilization station to port of embarkation (POE) and to port of debarkation (POD) is part of execution and deployment planning which impacts on mobilization planning. MTNC defines the transportation requirements for surface movements from the incra-CONUS movement report (INCONREP). The Computerized Movement Planning and Status System (COMPASS) develops detailed movement requirements information for both Active and Reserve Component Army units. For active units, this information relates to home station to port of embarkation to include overseas deployments; while for the Reserve Components, it identifies commercial transportation requirements for movement from home station to mobilization station. COMPASS has the capability to produce, "type-unit characteristic," TUCHA files for developing movement data used in transportation feasibility studies. The capability of the transportation systems to accommodate requirements impacts on latest arrival date and the dynamic station loading which are critical in the development of the MTBSP.

#### PLANNING PHASES

##### 5. Planning Procedure Overview.

a. To facilitate the understanding of the Mobilization Planning System, the planning process has been divided into five phases. Phase VI - Execution is not part of the MPS but reflects a natural extension of the MPS in the deployment and execution planning process. Figure 2 provides a graphic overview of the phases of the planning process.

(1) Initiation Phase. The phase in which initial tasks are assigned, general guidance is reviewed, force structure requirements are developed, and general mobilization station facility capabilities are reviewed.

(2) Data File Update Phase. The phase in which known requirements and capabilities are updated for analysis.

(3) Plan Development Phase. The phase in which shortfalls in force structures, personnel, logistics, and training are identified and resolved. Conferences are held to resolve shortfalls as required. A draft RCMP is developed and distributed for review and comment. The MTBSP is developed as an annex to the RCMP, subject to shortfall constraints, and distributed separately from the RCMP for interim implementation, review, and comment.

(4) Review Phase. The phase in which the RCMP and MTBSP are analyzed for feasibility and completeness. Unresolved shortfalls are identified as potential programing issues.

(5) Supporting Plans. The phase in which the RCMP and MTBSP are revised and distributed. Required subordinate unit and installation mobilization plans are finalized, reviewed, and approved by appropriate commanders.



## MOBILIZATION PLANNING PHASES




FIGURE 2

(6) Execution Planning Phase. The phase in which the mobilization and movement plans are adjusted and refined as required to respond to specific mobilization orders. This phase is not a cyclic phase of the mobilization planning system but reflects the culmination of planning efforts. This phase can be tested during mobilization exercises to validate the completeness of existing mobilization plans.

b. Figure 3 shows the general responsibilities and input requirements of FORSCOM and other agencies participating in the MPS. Phase I through Phase III occurs over a six month period which is initiated by the publication or annual review of the JSCP and ACP. Phase IV and Phase V are characterized by an intensive review and publication of mobilization plans.

c. The Mobilization Planning System provides the framework for a continuous dialogue between FORSCOM and other headquarters throughout the plan development cycle. The system is event oriented and the time sequencing of phases are dependent upon the completion of key events in each phase. Of particular importance is the definition of force requirements, both STRAF and GSF, through the TPFDLs, mobilization TDAs, and MACOM GSF requirements. The availability of filler personnel and equipment facilitates shortfall resolution and the development of the stationing plan. Figures 4 through 8 illustrate the significant events and the coordination in each mobilization planning phase.

6. Phase I - Initiation Phase. The phase in which initial tasks are assigned, general guidance is reviewed, force structure requirements are developed, and general mobilization station facility capabilities are reviewed. The action is initiated by the publication or annual review of the JSCP by JCS and the ACP by HQDA. Supported CINC respond to guidance by developing time phased force requirements. FORSCOM reviews the guidance provided in the JSCP and ACP for significant changes. Priorities and criteria for mobilization stationing are reviewed for applicability while comments on the previous RCMP and MTBSP are analyzed for inclusion in the next mobilization plan. All MACOM must review GSF requirements to support mobilization. Feasibility studies are initiated as force requirements are defined. Significant changes in facility support at an installation will be provided FORSCOM as it occurs but will be highlighted during the initiation phase to insure valid facility data is used in plan development.

7. Phase II - Data File Update. The phase in which known requirements and capabilities are initialized for analysis. Force requirements are defined by the supported commander in a TPFDL coordinated by HQDA. The TPFDL is the requirements document against which the Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan is based. Requirements for STRAF and GSF units are generated to support the deployments specified in the TPFDL. Files reflecting the structure and status of forces and mobilization station facilities are updated during this phase. Inputs from HQDA on projected personnel fill and DARCOM on equipment distribution provide a basis for




FIGURE 3




FIGURE 3 (CONT'D)




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


FIGURE 4




FIGURE 5




FIGURE 6






FIGURE 7




FIGURE 8

analyzing and defining shortfalls. Installations and subordinate units specify GSF requirements and the status of installation facilities. Unit movement plans highlight transportation requirements which are integrated into the Computerized Movement and Planning System (COMPASS). The FORSTAT is updated to provide the current status of FORSCOM and TRADOC units. The MTBSP file is updated using facility data (to include input from other MACOMs such as TRADOC and HSC on station static loads), FORSTAT, and TPFDD information.

8. Phase III - Plan Development. The phase in which shortfalls in force structure, personnel, logistics and training are resolved. The steps in plan development include feasibility studies concerning the dynamic loading of mobilization stations, transportation capabilities, and unit deployment status in terms of personnel, logistics, and training. The identification of GSF requirements includes defining the requirement for and specifying late deploying units to be mobilized early and utilized to augment installation GSF forces. TRADOC, DARCOM, HSC, ACC, MTMC and other agencies provide FORSCOM GSF requirements. Upon completion of feasibility studies, shortfalls are identified and resolved to the extent possible. Conferences are held as required to resolve major issues. The identification and resolution of shortfalls is a major activity of Phase III. Resource requirements for mobilization must be defined for inclusion in appropriate programming or budget submission. Force structure changes are evaluated for inclusion in the annual Troop Program Guidance. Programmed MTOEs are developed to reflect personnel and equipment authorizations. Phase III is completed when draft RCMP and the MTBSP are distributed for interim implementation, review, and comment.

9. Phase IV - Review Plan. The phase in which the RCMP and MTBSP are analyzed for feasibility and completeness. Unresolved shortfalls are identified as potential programing issues. Subordinate units and installations review and draft changes to their respective mobilization and movement plans. Comments from external organizations and internal staff agencies are incorporated into the final RCMP and MTBSP.

10. Phase V - Supporting Plans. The phase in which all required subordinate unit and installation mobilization plans are finalized, reviewed, and approved by appropriate commanders. The RCMP and MTBSP are finalized and distributed. The detailed mobilization and movement plans at the unit or installation are reviewed for format, content, and feasibility. These plans must correlate to the guidance provided by FORSCOM in the RCMP and MTBSP.

#### REFERENCES

11. The following references provide the basis for the Mobilization Planning System described in this publication. The varied aspects of mobilization planning require adherence to numerous regulations and other directives. The JCS and HQDA documents listed below represent those publications which provide an overview of the major systems that interact with the MPS.

- a. JCS Pub 6            Joint Reporting Structure.
- b. JOPS                Joint Operation Planning System (VOL 1 thru IV).
- c. AR 1-1              Planning, Programing and Budgeting Within the  
Department of the Army.
- d. AR 135-1            Reserve Component Policies.
- e. AR 135-300          Mobilization of Reserve Component Units and  
Individuals.
- f. AR 310-49           The Army Authorization Document System.
- g. RCMP                FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan.
- h. ACP                 Army Capabilities Plan (ACP) (Volume II)  
Army Force Mobilization Planning Guidance.

# ARMY COMMAND & CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM


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# ACGIS CONCEPT

TIE NEW AND EXISTING MODELS INTO  
A MASTER INTEGRATED MODEL  
SYSTEM THAT WILL EFFICIENTLY  
SERVE THE TOTAL ARMY PLANNING  
SYSTEM FOR HQDA AND PROVIDE A  
LINK TO DEPLOYMENT.

# ARMY COMMAND & CONTROL INFORMATION SYSTEM



## FILLING THE MANAGEMENT VOIDS

### OPERATIONS AND PLANS

#### OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

- FUNCTIONS
- STRUCTURE
- DECISION AUTHORITY
- CRITICAL ISSUES
- INFORMATION NEEDS

- CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS
- POLICY
- PROCEDURES

- MASTER PLANS

### AUTOMATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

#### ARCHITECTURAL ALTERNATIVES

- DATA BASE STRUCTURE
- COMPUTER PROGRAMS
- COMPUTER EQUIPMENT
- COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
- PERSONNEL


- ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT

- CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT

- MANAGEMENT REVIEWS



## VOIDS IN ADP SUPPORT FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL



Distr \_\_\_\_\_ Expires \_\_\_\_\_

CSM 79-

DATE

FILE

SUBJECT: The Army Mobilization Base

ACTION OFFICER/EXT

Requirements Model - (MOBREM)

LTC Todd/71036

Study

MEMORANDUM FOR: HEADS OF ARMY STAFF AGENCIES

1. PURPOSE. This memorandum provides for the conduct of a comprehensive study to define the CONUS base required to mobilize, train, deploy and sustain the total Army during full mobilization and to design a methodology/model to determine the force structure and manpower requirements for such a mobilization base.

2. REFERENCES.

- a. AR 1-1.
- b. AR 5-5.
- c. AR 37-100.
- d. AR 570-3.
- e. AR 570-4.

3. BACKGROUND.

a. Numerous studies and exercises have identified significant shortfalls in the CONUS mobilization base. The ability to adequately define these total requirements will greatly enhance Army program development and mobilization plans in a manner similar to the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process.

Incl 5

F-6-5-1

b. A computer model needs to be developed that will not only determine the force structure and manpower requirements but will provide the basis for modeling other resource requirements of the mobilization base.

#### 4. TERMS OF REFERENCE.

a. Problem: The force structure and manpower requirement to support a full mobilization in the CONUS base is inadequately defined.

b. Objective: To provide a model or methodology through which time-phased CONUS base requirements for force structure and manpower can be derived, analyzed and utilized in mobilization planning and programming.

c. Scope and limitations: Analysis will use the NATO/Warsaw Pact scenario requiring full mobilization response as a base, and will provide the capability for analysis of both partial and total mobilizations. The study will be conducted in two phases. Phase I will postulate the Army mobilization process through a review of DA policies, regulations, procedures and automated systems which support mobilization. Based on the analysis of Phase I, Phase II will proceed with the development of the methodology/model.

#### 5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. A Study Advisor Group (SAG) chaired by the Deputy Director, Force Management Directorate, will monitor the MOBREM Study.

b. ODCSOPER, DACS-DMO, ODCSLOG, OACSAC, OSG, COE, CAR, NGB, FORSCOM, TRADOC, HSC, DARCOM will provide points of contact (POC) to the SAG as indicated at Inclosure 1.

c. ODCSOPS will--

(1) Act as the MOBREM Study Sponsor.

(2) Provide a study coordinator for the MOBREM Study.

(3) Conduct Phase I of the study with an ad hoc study group composed of full-time representation by ODCSOPS, OCAR and NGB with participation by elements of appropriate DA staff agencies and MACOMs.

(4) Task the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), by separate correspondence to participate in Phase I of the study.

(5) Following an analysis of the results of Phase I, task CAA to proceed with the modeling process.

(6) Provide additional points of contact as indicated at Inclosure 1.

(7) Task NGB and OCAR to each provide an action officer 04/05 for full-time support to the MOBREM Ad Hoc Study group.

6. DIRECTOR AND CONTROL.

a. The Study Coordinator will call meetings of the SAG when necessary.

b. The Study Coordinator will meet reporting requirements of AR 5-5, The Army Study System.

c. Army Staff agencies will provide their POC name and telephone number to ODCSOPS (LTC James P. Todd/697-1036) by 30 June 1979.

d. Study Milestone Schedule is at Inclosure 2.

7. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT.

a. Funds for travel, per diem and overtime, if required, will be provided by the parent organization of the study representatives.

b. Administrative support (space, clerical and equipment) will  
be provided by ODCSOPS

2 Incl

The Army Mobilization Base Requirements

Model - Manpower (MOBREM) Study

Points of Contact

ODCSOPS

POINT OF CONTACT

(04/05 - GS-12/13)

DAMO-FD (coordinator)	X
DAMO-FDA	X
DAMO-FDF	X
DAMO-FDP	X
DAMO-ODM	X
DAMO-TR	X
DAMO-RQ	X
CNGB	X
OCAR	X
ODCSPER	X
ODCSLOG	X
OACSAC	X
ODACS-DMO	X
OTSG	X
COA	X
COE	X
FORSCOM	X
TRADOC	X
HSC	X
DARCOM	X

NOTE: It is anticipated that Point of Contact participation will not exceed 2 hours per week

F-6-5-5

## STUDY SCHEDULE

### PHASE I

- (1) Define the scope and nature of the problems.
- (2) Describe the activities, functions and physical character of the mobilization base.
- (3) Develop assumptions to include the force to be supported and the resources available to support deployment.
- (4) Identify policy decisions needed to begin the modeling process.

### PHASE II

- (1) Develop a new requirements model or modify an existing program.
- (2) Test the model.
- (3) Modify as necessary.
- (4) Implement for the POM.
- (5) Evaluate outputs.
- (6) Integrate into other resource management systems.
- (7) Develop the final report.

ALTERNATIVES FOR PLACEMENT OF AMPS OFFICE  
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Alternatives for Organizational Placement of an Army Mobilization Planning System Office (AMPSO) - Advantages and Disadvantages.

I. Assumptions.

- a. The AMPSO would be headed by a Major General.
- b. The AMPSC will have approximately 18 personnel.
- c. The AMPSO will be chartered to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System as described in the main body of this report.
- d. The AMPSO will have tasking authority over ARSTAFF agencies, MACOM and supporting analytic agencies and will have contractor assistance as necessary.
- e. Development and implementation of the AMPS will require up to 24 months (2 cycles of MPS or the PPBS).

II. The following organizational placement alternatives were addressed.

- Alternative A. Establish an Office of the Special Assistant for Mobilization Planning Systems reporting directly to the CSA or VCSA. (SAMPS).
- Alternative B. Establish an Army Mobilization Planning Systems Directorate within OCSA under the direct supervision of the DAS. (DAMPS).
- Alternative C. Establish a new Army Mobilization Planning Systems Directorate in ODCSOPS. (DAMO-DAMPS).
- Alternative D. Place the AMPSO within DAMO-OD, reorganized and re-named Operations, Readiness and Mobilization Directorate. (DAMO-ORM).
- Alternative E. Place the AMPSO within DAMO-FD, reorganized and re-named Force Management and Mobilization Directorate (includes transfer of DAMO-ODM to DAMO-FD). (DAMO-FMM).



### III. Alternative A. SAMPS.

#### Advantages:

- Provides maximum management emphasis (clout) through more regular involvement of the CSA, VCSA and DAS.
- Provides direct tasking authority to ARSTAF/MACOM.
- Emphasizes temporary (2 yr) status of organization.
- Provides OCSA with GO expertise for representation in the Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group (MOD SG).
- Expedites development by isolating resources from day to day contingencies and staff actions.
- Satellites admin spt on Exec Services Division of OCSA.
- Provides authority for direct coordination with OSD and JCS as Army Spokesman.
- Provides basis for direct representation on senior decision making committees as appropriate (PGRC, BRC, SELCOM, SPC, etc).
- Insures commitment of dedicated manpower for duration.
- Enhances overall ARSTAF/MACOM involvement and cooperation in mobilization planning.
- Provides an "honest broker" for reaching ARSTAF compromises.

#### Disadvantages:

- Places a complex and specialized activity directly under the CSA or VCSA.
- May create potential for conflict, in authority or responsibility, with the DCSOPS as chairman of the MOD SG.
- Creates two separate "focal" points within the Army for mobilization planning coordination with OSD and JCS.

- Requires extensive interagency coordination to insure that short term resolution of MOBEX 78 problems is consistent with long term direction of AMPS.

#### IV. Alternative B: DAMPS.

##### Advantages:

- Provides significant new management emphasis through more direct involvement of the CSA/VCSA/DAS.
- Facilitates direct tasking of ARSTAF/MACOM.
- Provides OCSA with GO expertise for representation on the MOD SG.
- Expedites development by isolating resources from day to day contingencies and staff actions.
- Provides authority for direct coordination with OSD and JCS.
- Provides basis for direct representation on senior decision committees as appropriate (PGRC, BRC, SELCOM, SPC, etc.).
- Insures commitment of dedicated manpower for duration.
- Gives the DAS a direct influence on an activity which will have a major impact on ARSTAF planning process and systems.
- Enhances overall ARSTAF/MACOM involvement and cooperation in mobilization planning.
- Provides an "honest broker" for reaching ARSTAF compromises.

##### Disadvantages:

- Places a complex and specialized activity in OCSA.
- May create potential conflicts, in authority and responsibilities, with the DCSOPS as chairman of the MOD SG.

- Creates two separate "focal" points within the Army for mobilization planning coordination with OSD and JCS.

- Appears to be a more permanent organization.

- Requires extensive interagency coordination to insure that short term resolution of MOBEX 78 problems is consistent with long term direction of AMPS.

V. Alternative C: DAMO-DAMPS

Advantages.

- Creates a single focal point for mobilization planning coordination with OSD/JCS.

- Provides a clearer relationship with the MOD SG since the DCSOPS supervises both.

- Provides more direct access to ODCSOPS mobilization expertise.

- Expedites development by isolating resources from day to day contingencies and staff actions.

- Facilitates coordination (within ODCSOPS) to insure short term resolution of MOBEX 78 problems is consistent with long term direction of AMPS.

Disadvantages:

- Requires special tasking authority over ARSTAF.

- Limits direct representation on senior decision committees (PGRC, BRC, SELCOM, SPC, etc.).

- Diverts attention of the DCSOPS from near term/imperative actions and increases span of control of the DCSOPS.

- Does not further enhance overall ARSTAF involvement and cooperation in mobilization planning - would tend to emphasize operational/force development/training aspects and de-emphasize personnel, logistics, engineer, comm/ADP aspects.

#### IV. Alternative D: DAMO-ORM

##### Advantages:

- Creates single focal point for mobilization planning coordination with OSD/JCS.
- Provides basis for the MOD SG to be the steering group for the AMPS development.
- Provides direct access to mobilization planning expertise in ODCSOPS.
- Facilitates coordination to insure that short term resolution of MOBEX 78 problems is consistent with long term direction of AMPS.
- Facilitates coordination between mobilization planning and operational and readiness planning.

##### Disadvantages:

- Fails to isolate resource from day to day contingencies and staff actions.
- Risks diversion of assets to other activities through internal changes in priorities or reorganizations.
- Limits direct tasking authorization over ARSTAF.
- Provides no direct, independent representative on senior committees (PGRC, BRC, SELCOM, SPC, etc.).
- Does not enhance overall ARSTAF involvement and cooperation in mobilization planning.

#### VII. Alternative E: DAMO-FMM\*

##### Advantages:

- Creates single focal point for mobilization planning coordination with OSD/JCS.
- Provides basis for the MOD SG to be the steering group for the AMPS development.

\*This alternative assumes transfer of present Mobilization and Reserve Affairs Division from DAMO-OD to DAMO-FD as proposed by DAMO-FD.

- Provides direct access to mobilization planning expertise in ODCSOPS.

- Facilitates coordination to insure that short term resolution of MOBEX 78 problems is consistent with long term direction of AMPS.

Disadvantages:

- Fails to isolate resources from day to day contingencies and staff actions.

- Risks diversion of assets to other activities through internal changes in priorities or reorganizations.

- Limits direct tasking authority over ARSTAF.

- Provides no direct, independent representative on senior committees (PGRC, BRC, SELCOM, SPC, etc.).

- Does not enhance overall ARSTAF involvement and cooperation in mobilization planning.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 7

ARMY READINESS REGION

## ARMY READINESS REGIONS


1. Purpose. This study describes the structure, responsibilities and functioning of Army Readiness Regions (ARR).

2. Discussion.

a. General. There are nine ARR, which are Active Component (AC) organizations established during the STEADFAST Reorganization of 1973. The primary mission of the ARR is to assist Reserve Component (RC) units, within a specified geographic area, in establishing, achieving, and sustaining unit and individual readiness.

b. Facts.

(1) Although it is currently in vogue to describe the ARR as being merely "extensions of the Continental US Army (CONUSA) headquarters," the ARR are de facto subordinate major commands of the CONUSA. The ARR commanders are Major Generals and the ARR headquarters element is authorized approximately 50 personnel. The original organizational concept, and current TDA, authorized RC Brigadier Generals (on extended active duty tours) as ARR Deputy Commanders; however, the Deputy Commander positions have always been filled by AC Colonels. The ARR Command Group (which, in addition to the Commander and his Deputy, includes an Executive Officer, a Command Sergeant Major and ARNG and USAR Staff Advisors) controls six, or seven, sub-elements shown by the following "typical" organization.



(2) Selected ARR may be authorized Flight Detachments to provide transportation services to areas where reliance on highway travel or travel by civil aviation is not feasible. Only one ARR currently has this authorization (ARR VIII at Denver). The other ARR obtain Army Aviation support through the installations at which they are stationed.

(3) The Administrative and Program/Budget and Management Offices provide ARR-wide support to AC elements in these technical areas.

(4) The Plans, Analysis and Readiness Division, generally, provides support for the ARR AC elements. However, recent changes in responsibilities place the ARR in the review/approval chain for installation and RC unit mobilization plans: this division of the ARR headquarters handles this function.

(5) The Assistance Division contains the Readiness Coordinators (READCOORD), the mainstay of the ARR headquarters' operational capability. The READCOORD are COL/LTC who are branch (armor, infantry, medical service) or functional (maintenance, composite service support) "experts." The manner in which the READCOORD operate varies from ARR-to-ARR (see Incl 1). The Training Management Development Officers (TMDO) are also located in the Assistance Division -- the TMDO handle matters involving new training materiel (training devices), materials (films, manuals, etc.) and programs (SQT, ARTEP, etc.).


(6) Readiness Groups (RG). The 28 RG execute the plans for training and assistance for the RC units. They are the operators who carry out the STEADFAST promise, providing the day-to-day advice, counsel and support for the RC. An RG has an Operations (or Operations and Training) Section, an Administrative Section, a TMDO, a Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team (MAIT) and a number of branch-peculiar (AR, FA, IN, etc.) or functional specialists (supply, administration, etc.) teams based upon the density of type-units in the supported RC population.

(7) Advisors and Advisors/Augmentees. A Senior Army Advisor (SRAA), an AC Colonel, is assigned for each ARNG Adjutant General (TAG), Division, and Army Reserve Command (ARCOM); other Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC) (such



as General Officer Commands -- GOCOM) have AC Colonels or Lieutenant Colonels as advisors. All brigade size RC organizations have AC Lieutenant Colonels as advisors. Below the brigade level, AC advisors are provided for selected battalions (Majors) and flight facilities (Majors/Captains). An AC Senior Enlisted Advisor (Sergeant Major or Master Sergeant) is provided with each officer advisor. In addition to the Advisors, there are "Advisor/Augmentee" positions at the MUSARC level. These AC personnel, controlled by the SRAA, hold positions in the MUSARC headquarters -- they work in such areas as personnel, administration, logistics and training.

(8) The locations and geographic responsibility of the nine ARR headquarters and the locations of the 28 RG are shown below.



(9) The organization of the ARR headquarters does not contain certain staff and support elements normally provided to an Army organization: this is, however, by design. The ARR were established to provide concentrated AC resources for improving the readiness of the RC through dedicated training assistance programs. The ARR headquarters performs, basically, two broad functions:

(a) Coordination of support for the RC (this includes command of all personnel assigned to the ARR), and

(b) Evaluation of RC unit readiness (this includes post-mobilization certification of units for deployment).

(10) Early concepts for managing the ARR (26 August 1975, FORSCOM Regulation 10-2) deemed it "... essential that ARR functions and responsibilities outside primary mission area be clearly defined so resources are not dissipated in self support and command activities at the expense of primary mission." It should be noted, however, that the trend, since at least 1975, has been to increase ARR missions and functions without corresponding increases in resources. A classic example of this type action is the missions and functions described in paragraph 2t of Inclosure 1. The HQDA 5 May 1978 approval of selected recommendations made by the FORSCOM Command Relationship Study, but disapproval of the recommendation for eight additional personnel spaces per CONUSA and ARR to perform the new tasks, resulted in ARR (and CONUSA) functions being increased without corresponding increased resources.

(11) The ARR headquarters occupy unique positions in the command-assistance-supervision-time/space equation involving FORSCOM and CONUSA headquarters and RG, Advisors and RC units. The ARR headquarters clearly occupy a layer in the RC management structure. The question which ACCS-82 must resolve is, "Does the ARR headquarters create an unnecessary layer in the RC management structure?"

(12) At the risk of belaboring the obvious, one must note the interrelationship between spans-of-control and layering. The National Command Authority (NCA) cannot effectively directly command and control all military forces. As a consequence, the Department of Defense, Services and Unified Command Plan establish organizations

-- layers -- with acceptable spans-of-control. All organizations adjust their control mechanisms -- headquarters -- as technology and requirements change.

(13) In 1978 FORSCOM headquarters took the position, in the "FORSCOM RC Management Structure Study" (12 April 1978) that neither the CONUSA nor the RG could assume the ARR functions. This study concluded that "... the CONUSA HQ is organizationally and geographically too remote and the RG, by design, confines itself to an assistance role," (Page 5, para 3c(3)(b)). As a result, FORSCOM recommended that if ARR HQ were eliminated, there would be a requirement to establish other organizations to perform the ARR functions. This was, in fact, a "cosmetic exercise" and the organizations recommended for establishment were really ARR HQ with new names and TDA manpower modifications.

(14) The facts of geography, even considering modern technology that improve time-distance factors, mitigate for:

(a) Revised management styles, or

(b) Retention of an ARR-like headquarters.  
Geographical factors are increasingly important as the focus of consideration moves westward from the East Coast. Personnel from First Army Headquarters can travel to the 53d Infantry Brigade or RG Patrick in Florida -- about 1,000 miles -- in approximately four hours. (It should be noted, however, that First Army is also responsible for the 166th Support Brigade and RG Buchanan, about seven hours distant in Puerto Rico). Personnel from Fifth Army Headquarters would need to travel four and one-half hours -- about 1,400 miles -- to observe the 47th Infantry Division or RG Ft Snelling in Minnesota. Personnel from Sixth Army Headquarters would need at least five hours of travel -- about 1,800 miles -- to visit the 67th Infantry Brigade in Nebraska or the 69th Infantry Brigade at RG Ft Riley in Kansas.

(15) The ARR headquarters accomplishes its coordination function, largely, through Readiness Coordinators, RG and Advisors. The means of coordination are meetings, telephone calls, messages and letters. The basis for coordination now is the coordinating headquarters' (ARR) in-depth knowledge of RC unit requirements and capabilities:

that capability would be degraded if the coordinating function were moved away from the RC units. However, it appears that some degradation of the coordination capability could be accepted and that the coordination function could be moved to some headquarters at an appreciable distance from the current ARR headquarters' locations.

(16) The ARR headquarters' functions involving the evaluation of RC unit readiness provide the greatest dilemma for assessing the necessity of the ARR headquarters. This function makes the ARR headquarters unpopular with its RC "customers" and has the potential for causing problems for CONUSA and FORSCOM headquarters if the function were to be transferred. There is nearly universal agreement that one of the keys to the RG's success with RC units is the fact that RC do not evaluate units. Many RC commanders and RG Chiefs express concern that if RG were put into the evaluation role, the RG would be much less effective (if not somewhat ineffective). Moving the evaluation function to a headquarters more distant from the RC units than the current ARR headquarters presents other problems:

(a) Time-distance factors involving CONUSA headquarters were described above.

(b) Changes such as those recommended by the FORSCOM RC Management Structure Study are readily transparent.

(c) There is a finite limit on the periods that RC units in training are available for observation: Annual Training (AT) plus about 30 of the year's 52 weekends (certain weekends are excluded from RC units' training plan schedules: holidays, etc.).

(d) Supervision and evaluation spans above the ARR level become difficult to manage; for example, consider the following:

	<u>Approx No of RC Units</u>	<u>Approx No of RC Personnel Auth</u>
First Army	1600	320 thousand
Fifth Army	1100	225 thousand
Sixth Army	700	115 thousand

(e) The CONUSA span of supervision and evaluation, with their assigned ARR assets, present a different picture:

	<u>Portions of Total No of RC Units</u>	<u>No of ARR</u>	<u>No of RG</u>	<u>Portion of Total No of RG</u>
First Army	Half	4	14	Half
Fifth Army	One-third	3	8	One-third
Sixth Army	One-sixth	2	6	One-fifth

(f) A major, unresolved, question is: "How important is the ARR evaluation function?" If the Army must have evaluations to the degree supplied by FORSCOM Forms 1-R and 2-R, "Report of Yearly Training Evaluation of Reserve Components of the Army," it would appear that the ARR, or similar headquarters, are required. However, since there is no reporting system for AC units similar to the FORSCOM Forms 1-R and 2-R, one wonders whether the system is needed for the RC. A related issue involves supervision of the training of RC units. To what extent must the AC chain-of-command supervise RC training? When one considers the AC evaluations during AT and the various evaluations conducted during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) (such as personnel from the ARR, the CONUSA or the AC Affiliation Program sponsor), it is concluded that the AC observes more than half of the RC units' training time. No comparable system exists for AC units.

(17) Having considered all of the above, there are other factors that may be overriding considerations.

(a) The GAO has pinpointed the ARR headquarters as an unnecessary layer in the AC structure for managing the RC. (Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO). Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively? Report to the Congress of the United States. Washington. 25 April 1979, p. 48.)

(b) The OSD has criticized the Army for unnecessary AC managerial structure for RC Management -- in fact, this criticism resulted in directed resource cuts (the "500/500 cut") in 1978, "to get the Army's attention" in the words of OSD staff members. (OSD Decision Package Set 059 (DPS 059) (Reserve and Guard Operations), 19 November 1977.)

(c) ACCS-82 found many RC commanders -- i.e., "customers" of the ARR -- who believed that ARR headquarters are an unnecessary layer in the structure for RC management.

(d) ACCS-82 found that many of the RG Chiefs and Advisors believed that elimination of the ARR HQ would pose few, if any, problems for their operations -- in fact, some of these personnel suggested that elimination of the ARR HQ would improve their operations.

(18) A detailed description of the ARR responsibilities, including assessments of which element discharges the responsibility and to what degree of satisfaction, is provided at Inclosure 1.

### 3. Conclusions.

a. The ARR headquarters is a layer in the AC management structure for the RC. Although it is serving the RC well, unnecessary duplications do exist between the CONUSA HQ, ARR HQ, RG and Advisors - Advisors/Augmentees. Although it is difficult to state with certainty that the ARR headquarters represents an unnecessary layer, it appears reasonably certain that, given adequate resources at the CONUSA level, the layer represented by the ARR headquarters can be eliminated.

b. The ARR headquarters can be eliminated without measurable degradation of AC support for the RC.

c. Elimination of the ARR headquarters will respond to GAO and OSD criticisms of unnecessary layering and duplication.

d. If ARR headquarters are retained in the structure, the ARR headquarters should be formally placed in the AC chain of command for RC management (e.g., FORSCOM-CONUSA-ARR-MUSARC). Additionally, CONUSA responsibility for ARNG training and readiness should be discharged by the ARR headquarters.

e. If the ARR headquarters are eliminated, revised management styles should be adopted --

(1) Less-detailed knowledge of RC units must be accepted.

(2) Supervision of RG and Advisor activities must be accomplished less frequently, and in less detail, than is now done.

(3) HQ FORSCOM should reevaluate the requirements for assessing training readiness via FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R. Evaluations of RC readiness should be based primarily on Unit Status Reports (USR) and AT reports by AC evaluators. Other reports, such as reports of AGI and training inspections, should be used by CONUSA to verify the overall readiness evaluations.

(4) Most of the functions of the ARR headquarters should be transferred to the CONUSA (or similar) headquarters.

(5) The RG must be protected from receiving additional missions/functions without receiving corresponding resources. This must be insured to avoid situations where the RG dissipate their design capability for rendering assistance to RC units.

4. Recommendations.

a. Eliminate the ARR headquarters and transfer their missions to CONUSA.

b. Increase staffing of CONUSA to absorb the ARR missions.

c. Revise management practices --

(1) Accept less-detailed knowledge of RC units.

(2) Supervise RG and Advisors less frequently and in less detail.

(3) Reevaluate the requirements for FORSCOM Form 1-R/2-R.

(4) Protect RG from getting missions without corresponding resources.

1 Incl  
as

## Missions and Functions --

### US Army Readiness Regions

1. Introduction. Army Readiness Region missions and functions described by paragraphs "2a" through "s" below, are specified in FORSCOM Regulation 10-42; those contained in paragraph "t" were issued by CONUSA in 1978 in command letters, LOI, OPLAN and messages to support HQDA's partial approval of the FORSCOM Command Relationship Study (CRS); functions described in paragraphs "u" and "v" were obtained from DA Pamphlet 570-554. Paragraph "w" and the comments following the missions and functions were developed by LTC James E. Thomas, an ACCS-82 Analyst who served a 3-year tour as a Readiness Coordinator at ARR V, by synthesizing written data and ACCS-82 views.

#### 2. Missions and Functions.

a. "Act as the Deputy to the CONUSA commander for training and readiness of Reserve Component units within the region and assist the Army Commander in the exercise of Reserve Component responsibilities. All actions pertaining to Reserve Component training within the ARR geographical area of responsibility will be forwarded through the ARR commander unless otherwise directed by the Army commander."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at the ARR headquarters, and is handled very well.

(2) There is nearly universal agreement that an AC Major General is required to be effective in accomplishing this mission. The RC commanders with which CONUSA must interface are, largely, Major Generals and the CONUSA representation is for policy - not procedure - matters.

(3) This mission/function leads to the OSD and GAO charge that the ARR is an unnecessary layer in the AC chain of command for RC management. The GAO has proposed that if ARR were eliminated, most functions could be transferred to CONUSA - this mission would be an obvious candidate for such transfer. Transfer of the function would require transfer of the following manpower:

(a) To act as CONUSA Deputy -- One or two general officers, a corresponding number of colonels (CONUSA Assistant Deputy) and supporting personal/administrative staff (aide, secretaries). The rationale for determining manpower requirements would be governed by time-distance factors, the number of



RC MUSARC and TAG, the number of RG and the number of advisors and advisor/augmentees with which each CONUSA must deal.

(b) To handle RC training -- A number of Readiness Coordinators based upon DA Pam 570-554 guidelines, consideration of the effects of increased time-distance factors and acceptance of some degree of "management by exception" for RG and advisors.

b. "Exercise operational control of MTC within geographic area."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at the ARR headquarters and is handled very well.

(2) If the ARR were eliminated, this function should be transferred to CONUSA.

(3) One lieutenant colonel should be added to the TDA of each CONUSA to handle this responsibility.

c. "Appoint Federal recognition boards for the ARNG and act as reviewing authority for the Army Commander when so directed. If the ARR commander acts as a member of the board, proceedings will be forwarded to CONUSA headquarters for review."

(1) This responsibility is discharged, largely, by SRAA and RG chiefs and is handled very well.

(2) If the ARR were eliminated, the responsibility should be transferred to the SRAA.

(3) No manpower increases should be authorized for this transfer.

d. "Coordinate and supervise Reserve Component training in assigned region. Training related to MIS/ADP will be coordinated through appropriate CONUSA functional element."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at three levels: ARR headquarters, SRAA and RG and is handled poorly.

(2) The manner in which this responsibility is discharged varies widely, from ARR-to-ARR and CONUSA-to-CONUSA, depending upon the personal managerial styles of the various commanders. ACCS-82 field investigations revealed that some

ARR tightly-controlled this function through Readiness Coordinators, while other ARR allowed advisors and RG to discharge the responsibility. The ACCS-82 investigations, therefore, confirmed the GAO finding of duplicated effort.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this function should be transferred to CONUSA.

(4) Manpower associated with this transfer would be the same as that identified in para 2a(3)(b), above.

(5) Responsibilities in this area should be clearly delineated to avoid continued duplication of effort.

e. "Evaluate training and readiness status of Reserve Component units on a continual basis and assist them in establishing, achieving, and sustaining unit and individual readiness."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at the ARR headquarters and is handled unevenly.

(2) Although SRAA and especially RG are not, per se, in the evaluation business, most ARR require trip reports and periodic assessments by those elements -- those reports are used by Readiness Coordinators in the evaluation process. Other reports used during evaluation include those from CONUSA Training Inspections (if there were any for the unit being evaluated), AGI (if one was conducted for the unit being evaluated), ARTEP external evaluations (if a report was rendered), reported results of CPX, FTX, Map Maneuvers and SQT, USAR and FORSCOM reports of AT performance (Forms 1-R/2-R). Additionally, personal observations of the unit by personnel from the ARR headquarters, usually the Readiness Coordinator, are used in the evaluation.

(3) The charge that this responsibility is handled unevenly is based upon ACCS-82 observations and interviews with AC and RC personnel. Application of FORSCOM standards, expressed in FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 and FORSCOM Pamphlet 135-3 is uneven from ARR-to-ARR and CONUSA-to-CONUSA. This is caused, to some degree, by the management styles of the AC commanders involved, but the most dominant factor in the evaluation process is the diligence of the individual Readiness Coordinators -- this diligence varies from minimal to intense.

(4) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility must be transferred to CONUSA.

(5) Manpower associated with transferring this responsibility would be the same as that identified in para 2a(3)(b), above.

(6) If the ARR were eliminated, it must be accepted that the depth of knowledge of units will decrease and there will be a concomitant decrease in the capability to evaluate units in detail.

f. "Monitor use of [Unit Status Reports (USR)] as a tool for training and readiness management."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at the ARR headquarters. Monitorship is also accomplished, to varying degrees, at the RG and Advisor levels. This monitorship is handled unevenly, but generally poorly.

(2) The USR are forwarded through the chain of command (AR 220-1). The USAR USR are forwarded from MUSARC to CONUSA to FORSCOM to HQDA. The ARNG USR are forwarded from TAG to HQDA (NGB) to FORSCOM to CONUSA. CONUSA provides consolidated computer "printouts" of USR data to the ARR. The ARR may, or may not, provide extracts of the computer printouts to the RG. Advisor monitorship takes place as the reports are forwarded through the RC chain of command -- the drafts of many USR are, in fact, prepared by advisors. The charge that this monitorship is uneven and poor is based on the time-lag involved between report preparation and receipt at ARR, the fact that RG -- those who actually conduct training assistance -- may, or may not receive the USR data and the fact that RC USR are submitted only twice per year.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to CONUSA.

(4) Manpower associated with transferring this responsibility would be the same as that identified in para 2a (3)(b), above.

g. "Assist Reserve Component commanders in securing training facilities, training areas, transportation, and other training assistance, giving priority to commanders of nonaffiliated early deploying units. Reserve Component unit training support will be accorded priority over Active

Component support."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at CONUSA HQ, ARR HQ, RG, Advisor/Augmentee levels and at installations (DRC) -- it is generally handled well.

(2) Although there is duplication and some overlap of responsibility in this area, it can not be concluded that the duplication and overlap is unnecessary.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to CONUSA HQ, RG, Advisors/Augmentees and installations.

(4) No manpower should be transferred with this function.

h. "Effect close coordination between ARR having elements of the same Reserve Component command in respective areas of responsibility to insure readiness assistance programs are in consonance. An ARR, in which division or other major headquarters is located, is responsible for coordinating with the ARR in which divisional units are located. Matters which cannot be resolved at the ARR level will be referred to the appropriate CONUSA headquarters."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at ARR headquarters and is handled satisfactorily.

(2) This is a "minor" responsibility because RC unit locations and command relationships were taken into account when ARR boundaries were established. Cross-boundary coordination is accomplished by READCOORD and Chiefs of Operations -- at times the ARNG and USAR advisors assist in the coordination.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to the CONUSA.

(4) No manpower should be transferred with this responsibility.

i. "Provide planning advice and assistance as required to Reserve Component units involved in domestic emergency plans developed by the CONUSA."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at Advisor and RG level with some assistance from the ARR headquarters. The few actions in this area are handled well.

(2) RC units, especially those of the ARNG, tend to be very competent in domestic emergency planning; therefore, the "as required" phrase of this mission becomes operative and the RC elements seldom turn to the AC for assistance in this area.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to Advisors.

(4) No manpower should be transferred with this responsibility.

j. "Provide Maintenance Assistance and Instruction Team (MAIT) support to USAR units within geographical area of responsibility. Supplemental support may be provided ARNG units in accordance with the provisions of AR 750-51."

(1) This responsibility is discharged by the RG and is handled well, albeit, within severe limitations because of manpower limitations.

(2) Civilian manpower reductions resulting from the 1978 "500/500 cut" severely limit the RG's capability to discharge this responsibility. Although subjective assessments indicate that MAIT is useful and helpful, the confidentiality of reporting MAIT results of visits precludes objective evaluation of the value of the MAIT.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to the RG.

(4) No transfer of manpower authorization is appropriate; however, consideration should be given to reinstating the manpower lost during the "500/500 cut."

k. "Provide planning advice and assistance to State Adjutants General in preparing supporting Civil Disturbance Plans, as required." The discussion and recommendations for para "2i," above, are equally applicable to this item.

l. "Direct and supervise assigned functional specialists in providing advice, instruction, and assistance in unit personnel administration, JUMPS-RC, computer services, PAD services, and unit supply functions to include property books, maintenance, food service, and unit records. Provide guidance and assistance in ammunition forecasting." The discussion and recommendations for para "2d," above, are equally applicable to this item.

m. "Maintain liaison with and conduct Staff visits to State Adjutants General, senior ARNG, USAR commands, and general officer commands." The discussion and recommendations for para "2a," above, are equally applicable to this item.

n. "Represent the CONUSA commander in civic, veteran, patriotic, and public affairs activities when requested." The discussion and recommendations for para "2a," above, are equally applicable to this item, with one addition. The SRAA and, to a significantly less degree, the RG Chiefs also discharge this responsibility. If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should, in addition to being transferred to CONUSA, be transferred to SRAA and RG Chiefs without additional resource allocation.

o. "Command advisors and RG within region." The discussions and recommendations for para "2a," above, are equally applicable to this item.

p. "Advise and assist the USAR in maintenance of strength (i.e., recruiting, retention, relocation of personnel), as required, and ARNG upon request, within availability of resources and contingent upon priorities."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at ARR headquarters, RG and Advisor levels and is handled unevenly.

(2) There is duplication of effort in this area between USAREC -- which has recruiting responsibility for the USAR--CONUSA HQ, ARR HQ, RG and RC HQ at various levels.

(3) The charge that the responsibility is met unevenly is based upon results -- RC strength has not made significant improvement and retention seems to be a key problem. However, personnel devoting their energies exclusively to retention are few and no "fool-proof" retention techniques have been developed.

(4) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to CONUSA.

(5) No manpower should be transferred with this responsibility, since there are no ARR manpower authorizations associated with the responsibilities.

q. "Direct and supervise personnel allocated to provide branch oriented assistance and form teams as necessary to respond to specific requests or as recommended by readiness coordinators." This responsibility duplicates paras "2d and e," above, and the discussion and recommendations for para "2d," above, are equally applicable to this item.

r. "Provide coordination and assistance in establishing appropriate agreements accomplished under provisions of AR 140-1 (Civilian Sponsored Unit Program)."

(1) ACCS-82 could not verify significant ARR, RG or Advisor involvement in discharging this responsibility.

(2) If ARR are eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to the CONUSA.

(3) No manpower should be transferred with this responsibility.

s. "Coordinate and supervise the Training Management Program within ARR area."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at ARR HQ, RG and ARCOM Advisor/Augmentee levels and is handled well.

(2) There is duplication of effort in this area between CONUSA HQ, ARR HQ, RG and ARCOM Advisor/Augmentee levels.

(3) There is overlap of this responsibility with para "2d," above.

(4) If ARR are eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to the CONUSA and RG.

(5) There should be no manpower transferred to CONUSA with this function; rather, the duties of the CONUSA TMDO should be critically examined for possible elimination. The

manpower at ARCOM headquarters should be critically examined for possible transfer to RG.

t. "Provide mobilization planning advice and assistance to Reserve Component units as required to ensure understanding and compliance with appropriate plans and directives. Review and approve RC unit mobilization plans."

(1) This responsibility is discharged differently in each CONUSA. First and Sixth Armies have TAG/MUSARC HQ review subordinates' plans; the CONUSA review only the TAG/MUSARC HQ plans. Fifth Army has ARR review and approve plans down to division and separate brigade level; disapproval authority is retained at CONUSA HQ. Responsibility is discharged unevenly.

(2) Since this responsibility is relatively new, and because no manpower increases were authorized concurrently with assignment of the mission, responsibility for execution has been assigned to various elements of the ARR -- the headquarters, RG and Advisors are all involved in this process, to varying degrees. Sub-tasks to meet this responsibility include:

(a) Review and concur in installation mobilization and deployment support plans. Non-concurrences will be forwarded to CONUSA for appropriate action.

(b) Prepare plans to establish teams at each mobilization station within the ARR area to assist installation commanders in certifying units as ready for deployment.

(c) Coordinate the allocation of office space, billeting, and required administrative and logistical support for the assistance/certification teams with commanders of appropriate mobilization stations.

(d) Represent CONUSA at mobilization coordination meetings between mobilization units and installations.

(e) During Phase II (ALERT) of the mobilization process:

1 Maintain a current assessment of the readiness condition of each alerted RC unit.



2 Prepare recommendations for RC units' post-mobilization training programs to ensure attainment of operational readiness by the scheduled deployment dates.

a Establish an Operations/Readiness Center.

b Prepare to operate on a 24-hour per day basis.

(f) During Phases III through V -- post-mobilization (Mobilization at Home Station, Movement to Mobilization Station, Operational Readiness Determination):

1 Assume duties as Deputy Army Commander for Mobilization and Readiness on M-Day and assume operational control of ARCOM within geographical areas.

2 Deploy certification teams to mobilization stations.

3 Supervise and assist in the training programs of RC units and AC units other than division or corps units.

4 Provide recommendations to CONUSA for the intrainstallation reallocation or redistribution of assets as necessary. (Note: First Army does not require this.)

5 Certify the readiness of RC units and AC units, other than division or corps elements, for deployment.

6 Recommend changes to deployment dates as required.

7 Continue assistance to non-mobilized units.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility (overall) should be transferred to the CONUSA. The CONUSA, with specific FORSCOM guidance, should analyze the mission to determine what portions thereof should be properly assigned to RG and SRAA. Not only this mission must be accomplished, but the foregoing peacetime tasks, for which RG were established, must be accomplished.

(4) Manpower should be transferred to CONUSA, RG, or SRAA, as appropriate, based upon the guidelines contained in DA Pam 570-554.

u. "Provide administrative support for ARR personnel (provide personnel management support; maintain travel order files; process incoming and outgoing personnel; make internal and external distribution of documents; arrange and maintain accountability for supply activities; provide reproduction service; provide files and forms management; supervise the awards and decoration, safety and security programs; maintain the unit fund)."

(1) This responsibility is discharged at the ARR HQ and is handled well.

(2) This support is provided, from the ARR headquarters, for all ARR elements.

(3) If the ARR were eliminated, this responsibility should be transferred to the CONUSA.

(4) Manpower transfers should be based upon the guidelines contained in DA Pam 570-554 and any intra-service host-tenant agreements made with installations that service RG and advisors.

v. "Manage manpower, logistics and funding resources for ARR and subordinate elements within related areas. Prepare the Command Operating Budget for submission to supporting installation. Coordinate Class I installation area support problems affecting the major reserve commands within the ARR area of responsibility. Coordinate financial management and advise subordinate elements in matters pertaining to financial management. Responsible for authorization documentation, contract of rental office machinery, analysis of travel and administrative use of vehicles, POL allocations, Command Operating Budget, maintenance of real property assets and annual work plans. Analyze current expenditures for TDY and transportation requirements, and provide all travel orders (blanket/repeated TDY) for all ARR personnel." The discussion and recommendations for para "2u," above, are equally applicable to this item.

w. Obtain, and fund, AC Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to provide required assistance that exceeds the capabilities of

the ARR. This includes Active Component Support - Annual Training (ACSAT) and, throughout the year, MTT that may range from one-man missions through unit-level task forces with organic equipment. (This function is an outgrowth of cuntion "g", but is listed separately since it is a significant task.)

(1) This responsibility is discharged at ARR headquarters, RG and advisor levels and is handled unevenly.

(2) The discussion and recommendations for para "2d," above, are equally applicable to this item.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 8

FUNCTIONALIZATION OF THE USAR

## Functionalization of the USAR

### 1. Purpose.

To functionally align the USAR force structure along branch lines. Basic purpose of this alignment is to enhance training, particularly the training of all units in each functional branch.

### 2. Facts.

Medical Command. A MEDCOM would be established under TOE 08-111 (ALO-3; 195 spaces) at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Medical command would assume direct command of four (4) medical General Officer Commands (GOCOM) in the Fifth Army area. MEDCOM would exercise operational control (OPCON) for training and medical doctrinal matters, of four medical GOCOM in First Army and one medical GOCOM in Sixth Army. The medical GOCOM would command all other USAR medical units on an area basis.

The 90th ARCOM currently located at Fort Sam Houston, TX would be disestablished. Its spaces and facilities would be used to create and house the MEDCOM. Non-medical units now reporting to the 90th ARCOM would be transferred to the 122d ARCOM at Little Rock, AK.

Military Police Command (MPCOM). The 300th Military Police Prisoner of War Command at Livonia, Michigan, currently a MUSARC, becomes the MPCOM and assumes command of all military police units in Fifth Army. MPCOM exercises operational control for training and military police doctrinal matters of two (2) MP brigades in First Army and one (1) MP brigade in Sixth Army. The brigades in First and Sixth Armies would be removed from the command of ARCOM and would become MUSARC. The brigades would command all other USAR military police units on an area basis.

Organization of USAR military police units, as outlined above, does not involve disestablishment or conversion of any existing ARCOM. Certain ARCOM would lose MP units currently assigned or attached.

Engineer Command. Currently there are two (2) engineer commands in the USAR; the 412th Engineer Command at Chicago, IL.

Both these commands would be retained. The 412th would command all engineer units in First Army through the 411th Engineer Brigade (a GOCOM) and/or the four groups and 16 battalion headquarters in that Army area. The 416th would command all engineer units in Fifth Army through the 420th Engineer Brigade (currently a MUSARC) and/or the five group and/or 12 battalion headquarters in the Army area. In addition, the 416th would exercise operational control, for training and engineer doctrinal matters, of the engineer units in Sixth Army which has no major engineer headquarters.

The 411th Engineer Brigade would be removed from the command of the 77th ARCOM and function as a GOCOM under the 412th Engineer Command. The 420th Engineer Brigade would cease to be a MUSARC and would function as a GOCOM under the 416th Engineer Command. These brigades would in turn command the engineer units which would be removed from the ARCOM to which they are now assigned. Non-engineer units not organic to engineer battalions, groups and brigades currently assigned or attached to engineer headquarters for administrative or geographic reasons would remain under the ARCOM. The Sixth Army, the engineer command and control structure consists of only three (3) battalion headquarters. Because a battalion headquarters does not have the resources and expertise to function as a GOCOM or MUSARC, the battalion headquarters in Sixth Army would remain under the command (less the operational control (described above) of the ARCOM.

It is understood that FORSCOM is studying the feasibility of converting the 416th Engineer Command to a Facilities Engineering Command to oversee real property management in the USAR. In the event that the conversion takes place, the arrangement outlined above would be modified as follows:

The 412th Engineer Command commands engineer units in First Army and exercises operational control, for training and engineer doctrinal matters, of engineer units in Fifth and Sixth Armies. The 420th Engineer Brigade would remain a MUSARC commanding engineer unit in Fifth Army. Because of the absence of engineer headquarters higher than battalion in Sixth Army, the Engineer Command's operational control of the three battalion headquarters in Sixth Army would most logically be exercised through the 420th Engineer Brigade.

Personnel Command. PERSCOM would be created by conversion of the 123d ARCOM at Ft Benjamin Harrison. PERSCOM would

command all personnel, finance, and administration units in Fifth Army and exercise operational control for training, doctrinal matters and functional operations of these types units in First and Sixth Armies. Command in Fifth Army and operational control in First and Sixth Armies would be exercised through the Personnel and Administration (P&A) Battalion headquarters in the Army areas. P&A battalions command units on an area basis. P&A battalion headquarters in First and Sixth Army remain under the command (less operational control) of the ARCOM to which currently assigned or attached since a battalion headquarters cannot function as a MUSARC or GOCOM.

This organization would provide not only functional training and doctrine but would also supervise actual utilization of the personnel, finance, and administration units in providing their services to other USAR units on an area basis. This would reduce the administrative burdens of USAR units, improve administrative efficiency, and encourage standardization. The fact that PERSCOM would be located at Ft Benjamin Harrison would allow it to interface directly with the Active Army administration and finance center. This would be of great value in efforts to achieve greater compatibility between Active and Reserve finance and personnel systems that is essential to transition from peacetime to wartime.

This organization involves the conversion of the 123d ARCOM whose spaces and facilities would be used to man and house PERSCOM. Units, other than personnel, administration, and finance, now assigned to the 123d ARCOM would be transferred to the command of the 102d ARCOM. The remaining 17 ARCOM are assigned a post mobilization mission of commanding the installations as indicated below:

#### PROPOSED MOBILIZATION STATIONING FOR ARCOM

##### STATE OWNED/OPERATED

##### REMARKS

Camp Atterbury	5004th USARG	
Camp Grayling, MI	83d ARCOM OH &	
	5064th USAR	
Camp Ripley, MN	88th ARCOM MN	
Camp Shelby, MS	121st ARCOM AL	
	3397th USAR	

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
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ACTIVE/SEMI-ACTIVE

Ft Bragg, NC	120th ARCOM SC	Notes 2 and 3
Ft Campbell, KY	99th ARCOM PA	Notes 1 and 2
Ft Carson, CO	96th ARCOM UT	Notes 2 and 5
Ft Chaffee, AR	4003d USARG OK	Notes 2 and 5
Ft Devens/Edwards, MA	94th ARCOM MA	Notes 1 and 2
Ft Drum, NY	77th ARCOM NY & 1209th USARG NY	Notes 1, 2 and 5
Ft Hood, TX	122d ARCOM AR & 4013th USARG LA	Notes 1, 2 and 3
Ft I-Gap, PA	79th ARCOM PA & 2122d USARG MD	Notes 1, 2 and 5
Ft Lewis/Gowen Field, ID	124th ARCOM WA	Notes 2 and 3
Ft McCoy, WI	86th ARCOM IL	Notes 2
Ft Meade, MD	97th ARCOM MD	Note 2
Ft Ord, CA	91st Tng Div	Notes 2 and 3
Ft Polk, LA	102d ARCOM MO	Notes 2 and 3
Ft Riley, KS	89th ARCOM KS	Note 2
Ft Stewart/ Hunter, GA	81st ARCOM GA	Note 2

OTHER INSTAL w/USARGREMARKS

Camp Roberts, CA	6211th USARG CA	Notes 1 and 2
Ft Hill, VA	3220th USARG FL	Note 2
Ft Irwin, CA	63rd ARCOM CA	Notes 1 and 5
Ft Pickett, VA	2174th USARG VA	Note 2

Note 1: RC Cbt Division mobilization stations.

Note 2: Mobilization stations for non-divisional combat, combat support, and combat service support units to include brigades and armored cavalry regiments.

Note 3: These mobilization stations will host USAR training divisions and support operation of Army Training Centers.

Note 4: Atterbury is currently a TRADOC owned, state-operated installation which becomes a subpost of Ft Harrison upon mobilization.

Note 5: ARCOM will be prepared after M+4 months to form base for new combat division.

Upon receipt of its mobilization alert order, the ARCOM headquarters would move to assigned installations and be in position to command the installation as soon as possible.

### 3. Discussion.

#### a. General.

The USAR Force structure consists of 1917 parent units which contain all of the 3250 USAR units. All Army branches are represented in this force.

The chain of command for this force consists of 44 Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), 17 General Officer Commands (GOCOM), 82 group headquarters and 727 battalion headquarters. A MUSARC is an ARCOM or GOCOM directly subordinate to a CONUSA. Table F-8-1 displays CONUSA distribution by MUSARC type. GOCOM MUSARCs consist of Training Divisions, Maneuver Area Commands (MAC), composite and functional headquarters.

Table F-8-1

#### MUSARC

Type	First Army	Fifth Army	Sixth Army	Type Total
ARCOM	8	7	4	19
Training Div	5	5	2	12
MAC	1	1		2
Composite HQ	2	2		4
Functional HQ	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
CONUSA				
TOTALS	17	20	7	44

Non-MUSARC GOCOM distributed by type are displayed in Table F-8-2. This category consists of separate combat brigade headquarters and functional headquarters.

Table F-8-2

Non-MUSARC GOCOM

Type	First Army	Fifth Army	Sixth Army	Type Total
Combat Bde	2	1		3
Functional HQ	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>14</u>
TOTALS	12	3	2	17

MUSARC analysis reveals that the 12 Training Divisions, 2 MACs and 4 composite headquarters are organized to perform specialized functions. The seven (7) functional headquarters are organized accordingly. Remaining MUSARCs - the 19 ARCOMs are neither doctrinally for functionally organized. They are command and control headquarters commanding large numbers of dissimilar units on an area basis.

Further study of functionalization of Army security and military intelligence units is held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Communication-Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) study.

Analysis also indicated that medical, military police, engineer, personnel, administration and finance units could possible be functionalized. Although these types of units could be functionalized, there is no identified shortfall of theater Army type commands (MEDCOM, MPCOM, PERSCOM and ENCOM). The balance of the USAR structure is not conducive to branch functionalization due to a lack of properly located command and control structure, unit location and CONUSA boundaries. To functionalize medical, military police, engineer, personnel, administration and finance units, the following USAR commands would be established: Medical Command (MEDCOM), Military Police Command (MPCOM), Engineer Command (ENCOM), and Personnel Command (PERSCOM). In each case, overall command and control is vested in a TOE headquarters, augmented as necessary, for administrative and resource management. These headquarters would exercise direct command of all units

of the same particular function in their numbered Army area and operational control for training and doctrinal matters of applicable units in the other Army areas.

The current USAR structure contains suitable military police and engineer headquarters to establish MPCOM and ENCOM without the activation of new organizations or the conversion of existing ones.

In the cases of MEDCOM and PERSCOM, suitable headquarters are not in the current USAR structure. MEDCOM could be formed by conversion of the 90th ARCOM at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, PERSCOM could be formed by conversion of the 123d ARCOM at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Thus, these commands would be collocated with their counterpart Active Army doctrine and educational centers. USAR units other than medical, personnel, administration, and finance now assigned to the 90th and 123d ARCOMs would be reassigned to other ARCOM on a geographic basis.

FORSCOM is currently conducting the Support Unit Improvement Program (SUIP)/Wartime Mission Utilization Program (WARMUP) Study. Objective of this study is to assign every CONUS unit a wartime mission and to group the CONUS force into doctrinally composite type organizations such as corps, COSCOMs, TAACOMs and TRANSCOMs.

b. Advantages.

(1) Formation of functional commands will provide technical training and evaluation. This highly specialized and concentrated effort will improve training and operation.

(2) As units are extracted from ARCOMs to form the functional commands, there will be a resultant reduction in the number of units ARCOMs command. Also, there will be a reduction in the number of branches requiring ARCOM attention. This will allow the ARCOMs to focus more time on fewer units thus creating the potential to improve their training.

(3) Only two new units are formed; no units are relocated. The AC command structure doesn't change; the USAR structure changes only to the extent of functionalization. Hence, there is minimum cost and turbulence.

(4) Functionalization will create TOE commands which are potential deployable assets.

(5) Assigns to remaining ARCOM the post mobilization missions of commanding installations. Considering the M-Day of the active units and the large numbers of units and training loads, this is a valid mission.

(6) As training improves through functionalization, morale and training will improve. This will enhance retention and eventually recruiting.

c. Disadvantages.

(1) Current Army doctrine is not oriented along technical lines. Orientation is the composite type organizations wherein combat and combat support units are assigned to CORPS and combat service support units are assigned to COSCOM, TAACOM and TRANSCOMS.

(2) The perception exists that there is unnecessary layering in the AC management of the RC. This alternative does not change the current AC management structure.

(3) Functionalization creates stovepipe commands which as such are not deployable. Further there is no current identified shortfall in Theater Army type commands.

(4) Functionalization will cross CONUSA, ARR, RG and ARCOM boundaries. This will create problems and complicate training management.

(5) Reorganization and functionalization will cause turbulence. Operational turbulence may be continuous.

4. Conclusions.

a. Functionalization of the USAR would be a return to the technical services; a concept which is contrary to our current doctrine of composite type organizations.

b. While functionalization may improve some technical training, it cannot be justifiably applied to all USAR Troop Program Units.

c. Functionalization doesn't lend itself to Gaining Command or wartime chain of command and may complicate SUIP/WARMUP.

d. Functionalization would complicate boundaries, overextend CONUSA span of control and creates complicated, confusing command lines.

e. Benefits which functionalization could provide can partially be realized under the current command configuration by getting the Army schools/centers more involved, with the RC, particularly in the medical and administrative areas.

f. Creates turbulence in the force structure for a minimal gain.

#### 5. Recommendations.

a. The USAR force structure not be functionalized.

b. Army schools/centers become more actively involved with USAR branch oriented training.

#### 6. References.

a. Fact Sheet, US Army Reserve Data, HQ FORSCOM, Fort McPherson, GA, 14 Nov 1978.

b. AR 140-1, Army Reserve Mission, Organization and Training HQDA, Wash, DC, 1 September 1978.

c. AR 10-42, Organization and Functions, United States Army Forces Command, HQDA, Wash, DC, 15 April 1975.

d. FORSCOM Reg. 10-42, Organization and Functions, Mission Assignments, HQ FORSCOM, Fort McPherson, GA, 27 July 1977.

e. FM 101-10-2, Staff Officers Field Manual, Organization, Technical and Logistic Data Extracts of Non Divisional Tables of Organization and Equipment, HQDA, Wash, DC, July 1975.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 9

GARRISONS, TRAINING DIVISIONS AND USAR SCHOOLS

DURING MOBILIZATION

## Garrisons, Training Divisions, USAR Schools During Mobilization

1. Purpose. To determine the status of active and USAR garrisons, training divisions and schools and their relationship to active, semi-active, and state operated mobilization stations.

### 2. Facts.

a. All active installations have a garrison unit which varies in size depending upon the installation mission.

b. All active installations have the requirement to prepare mobilization TDAs (MTDA) which should provide adequate support for expansion of the installation upon mobilization.

c. Active installations, primarily those of FORSCOM and TRADOC, rely upon borrowed manpower in addition to garrison support to operate installations.

d. There are six semi-active and eight state operated mobilization stations.

e. There are nine USAR garrisons in the force structure which mobilize at either a semi-active or state operated mobilization station.

f. There are 12 USAR Training Divisions.

g. There are 88 USAR schools in CONUS.

### 3. Discussion.

a. Active Installations. Active installations are those installations which are fully operational on a continuous basis. Each has a type of garrison unit to provide installation support.

(1) At TRADOC installations the garrison may be called the "Center" such as the Infantry Center at Fort Benning. At Fort Bliss it is called the Air Defense Center.



These range in strength from 3800 at Fort Benning to 1726 at Fort Benjamin Harrison. As stated previously strength varies because of mission requirements.

(2) At FORSCOM installations, installation support is provided by garrison units which vary in size according to installation mission.

(3) The preponderance of the garrison strength is civilian manpower. For example, at Ft. Hood the garrison consists of 415 military and 2247 civilians. At Ft. Riley 1435 civilians and 319 military are assigned to the garrison.

(4) At 19 FORSCOM installations, a total of 6270 military and 24,726 civilian spaces are in garrison units.

(5) At 18 TRADOC installations a total of 11,826 military and 25,943 civilian spaces are in garrison (Center) units.

(6) All active installations which are mobilization stations (MS) have been directed by FORSCOM to prepare MTDAs which will provide an expansion capability upon mobilization. Guidance for the preparation of MTDAs is contained in the FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP). Guidance includes the following:

(a) Computation of expansion requirements based on increased workloads during mobilization.

(b) Utilization of mobilization augmentees (civilian and military).

(c) Use of mobilization designation positions.

(d) Use of non-deploying units.

(7) Anticipated problem areas at active installations during and after mobilization are:

(a) Since installations use borrowed manpower from TOE units in peacetime, their deployment will create a reduction in support resources. FORSCOM, in an effort to counter this, has assigned 335 low priority and uncommitted units to mobilize early at MS. The next edition of the

Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan (MTBSP) will show an additional 300 units for installation support.

(b) Filling positions authorized in MTDAs will be a continuing problem with no readily apparent solution. Even though requirements have been identified, filling the requirements with qualified personnel will be extremely difficult.

b. Semi-Active Installations. Semi-active installations are those posts that are not operating to full capacity and have a primary mission of supporting the Reserve Components (RC). These installations have a garrison unit of Active Component personnel. The semi-active installations are:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>GARRISON STRENGTH</u>	
	MIL	CIV
Fort AP Hill, VA	38	143
Fort Chaffee, AR	9	134
Fort Drum, NY	92	413
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA	93	864
Fort McCoy, WI	41	611
Fort Pickett, VA	29	181

(1) Each of the above installations has been directed to prepare a MTDA to support mobilization expansion and all except Ft. McCoy are scheduled to receive a USAR garrison upon mobilization. Personnel in the existing AC garrison will fold into the USAR garrison. The MTDA for the installation will take into consideration the current assets and the USAR garrison assets to insure that duplicative requirements are minimized.

(2) Problem Areas are:

(a) Insufficient USAR garrisons to support Fort McCoy, WI.

(b) The RCMP states that upon mobilization the "senior non-deploying officer will assume command of the installation." All deploying unit commanders will be considered as tenants. The RCMP is not explicit in the role of the commander of the USAR garrison and his position if the active garrison commander outranks him. Neither is it specified where there is a senior non-deploying officer, that the USAR garrison commander becomes the deputy post commander as

occurs on active installations. In summary, command of the garrison is an unclear area.

c. State Operated Installations. State operated installations/MS are those that are generally inactive except during the summer or winter training period. At all times they are manned by a National Guard TDA unit consisting of 7-15 full time personnel (technicians) with all other members performing 48 drills annually. These installations and ARNG TDA strength are as follows:

<u>INSTALLATIONS</u>	<u>TDA STRENGTH</u>
Camp Atterbury, IN	56
Camp Edwards, MA	56
Camp Grayling, MI	84
Fort Irwin, CA	84
Camp Ripley, MN	112
Camp Roberts, CA	112
Camp Shelby, MS	64
Gowen Field, ID	56

(1) Camps Grayling, Roberts, Shelby and Ft. Irwin are scheduled to receive a USAR garrison and become separate FORSCOM installations upon mobilization. Camp Ripley, while not scheduled to receive a USAR garrison will become a separate FORSCOM installation. Camps Atterbury, Edwards and Gowen Field become sub-installations of Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ft. Devens and Ft. Lewis respectively upon mobilization.

(2) Problem areas:

(a) Insufficient USAR garrisons to support Camps Atterbury, Edwards, Ripley and Gowen Field.

(b) No planned (written) disposition of the assets in ARNG TDA unit upon mobilization.

(c) No clearly defined relationship between the TDA unit and the USAR garrison during mobilization.

d. USAR Garrisons. USAR garrisons have been placed in the force structure to provide installation support to semi-active and state operated installations which are MS and have insufficient resources to accomplish their mission.

(1) There are nine USAR garrisons as indicated below. Pertinent data for each is depicted.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>MSTA</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE MAX MOB POPULATION</u>
3220	FL	Ft. AP Hill, VA	6.6
4003	OK	Ft. Chaffee, AR	17.3
1209	NY	Ft. Drum, NY	25.3
2122	MD	Ft. IGAP, PA	22.8
2174	VA	Ft. Pickett, VA	14.9
5064	MI	Camp Grayling, MI	22.0
4013	LA	Ft. Irwin, CA	11.7
6211	CA	Camp Roberts, CA	7.9
3397	TN	Camp Shelby, MS	18.5

(2) Each USAR garrison has the capability of supporting an installation population of 25,000. All are organized the same and are commanded by an O6 and have an authorized strength of 94 officers, 5 warrant officers and 269 enlisted men. The mission statement and organization chart are as shown at inclosures 1 and 2 respectively.

(3) Problem Areas:

(a) The primary problem is that USAR garrisons are not tailored to the MS they support. As indicated above, each can support an installation population of 25,000; MS population varies from 6.6K with six posts receiving less than 20.0K. Obviously a MS that reaches maximum mobilization population of 6.6K does not require a garrison which will support 25K.

(b) An additional problem is that of resource requirements by ACC when preparing the MTDA for semi-active MS that will receive a USAR garrison. Each garrison has a communication capability and mission, yet ACC, in two instances (Ft. IGAP and Drum) has an expansion TDA to provide mobilization support.

e. Training Divisions. USAR Training Divisions have been placed in the force structure to provide for expansion of the training base upon mobilization. Training divisions are organized to accomplish the following functions:

- Command, control, and supervise operations of organic units.

- Operate a US Army Training Center at which Basic Training, Basic MOS Training (One Station/Unit Training (OSUT)), and General Skill Training are conducted. Seven training divisions are infantry oriented; three are Armor and two are engineer oriented. Additional information is at inclosure 3.

(1) Training divisions are commanded by a MG with a BG as assistant division commander. Peacetime strength of a division is between 2400 and 3200 personnel. At full strength a division can train 8,000 personnel in basic and basic MOS training and 11,000 in general skill training.

(2) Problem Areas:

(a) Upon mobilization and arrival at the MS, mobilization plans (TRADOC and FORSCOM) indicate that the senior non-deploying officer should command the installation. At FORSCOM installations, this procedure is no major problem since FORSCOM units deploy. However, the time and procedure for the change of command is not specified.

(b) At TRADOC installations a major problem exists. The commander of the installation is not a member of a deploying unit. In effect, with the arrival of the training division, the installation has then two similar organizations with command of the installation undefined since neither commander is deployable.

f. USAR Schools. There are 7,000+ personnel authorized in the 88 USAR schools. Mobilization plans require that FORSCOM retain control of the schools until arrival at the MS. At that time personnel will be used as individual augmentees to TRADOC service schools, colleges and/or Army Training Centers.

(1) USAR schools vary in size depending upon training requirements in their local area.

(2) All USAR schools have generally the same organization and provide instruction in Officer Basic, Officer Advanced and CGSC; NCO Academy Courses, and selected MOS courses.

(3) Problem Areas:

(a) Assignment of mobilization stations for

USAR schools is based primarily (90%) upon locale rather than expertise. Currently schools mobilize at the nearest TRADOC installation unless specifically requested by another TRADOC post. The Study Group documented two instances wherein a school worked with a command (HSC and INSCOM) training at an installation and had developed expertise in subjects related to the command. Each school mobilized at another installation where there was no requirement for their expertise.

(b) Another consideration concerning school personnel is that of individual vs unit MS assignment. Assignment of an individual to a MS which could make use of individual expertise may be advantageous but may be administratively unmanageable (individual management and MOB assignments for 7000 personnel).

g. Additional Considerations:

(1) FORSCOM indicates that ideally all semi-active and state operated installations should have an assigned USAR garrison.

(2) Ft. McCoy, while not having an assigned USAR garrison, and considering the size of its AC garrison and its expansion TDA, may be able to handle its mobilization population. (Source-FORSCOM).

(3) FORSCOM indicates that Camp Ripley may not require a USAR garrison since numerous ARNG assets are currently stationed there. These assets, such as the ARNG TDA consisting of 112 personnel, the USPFO and the state maintenance shop, may be sufficient to support the mobilization population which peaks at 15.1K.

(4) Gowen Field, Camps Atterbury and Edwards are to become sub-installations upon mobilization and if the parent installations plan MTDA's properly, they may be able to accomplish their mobilization missions without a garrison.

(5) FORSCOM indicates that it is studying the possibility of using USAR augmentation units for active installations. Under this concept, a USAR TDA unit would be formed near each installation with individuals assigned to the unit for the express purpose of augmenting the active garrison upon mobilization. This approach would provide

military personnel familiar with the installation immediately upon mobilization. Filling civilian requirements would still be dependent upon availability of qualified personnel in the local community.

(6) ODCSPER is undertaking a program of identifying recent retirees for potential use in MTDAs at installations, staff agencies and MACOMs. This program, when fully implemented, should as in (5) above, provide relief for the military personnel shortfall at installations.

#### 4. Conclusions.

a. Active installations have not given adequate attention to mobilization expansion TDAs to include filling additional civilian requirements (MOBEX 78 finding).

b. There are insufficient USAR garrisons to meet requirements.

c. The command of a semi-active or state operated installations is confusing and unclear when a USAR garrison assumes its mission upon mobilization.

d. No plans exist for the use of ARNG TDA personnel at state operated MS.

e. There is inadequate guidance concerning the assumption of command of FORSCOM and TRADOC installations by training division commanders.

f. USAR schools have a potential for more effective use than current mobilization plans dictate.

#### 5. Recommendations.

a. That continuing pressure be exerted by FORSCOM on Active MS to insure that each expansion TDA is properly planned, including an annual update, and will in fact provide the necessary support to the mobilization population.

b. That an additional 5 USAR garrisons be placed in the structure to support Fort McCoy, and Camps Atterbury, Edwards, Ripley, and Gowen Field.

c. That each USAR garrison be tailored specifically for the installation and troop density it will be required to support.

d. That the RCMP provide explicit guidance on the role of the training division and the USAR garrison at active, semi-active and state operated installations, that, as a minimum, includes the following provisions:

(1) That the training division commander, at FORSCOM installations, assume command 15-30 days after his division closes on the installation. Immediate integration of the installation staff and the division staff should be directed by the training division commander except when additional C<sup>2</sup> capabilities are required and can be fully justified.

(2) That the training division commander, at TRADOC training center installations (non-service school), assume command 30 days after his division closes on the installation. Intergration of the division staff into the existing staff will be accomplished by the training division commander.

(3) That a training division mobilizing at an installation with a service school (Ft Benning and Ft Knox) become a tenant unit.

(4) That the USAR garrison commander assume command 10 days after his garrison closes on the installation. The existing staff at the installation will merge with the USAR garrison staff. The AC commander of the installation will be reported as overstrength available for reassignment.

(5) That ARNG TDA at state operated installations where USAR garrisons mobilize, be federalized and merge with the garrison staff.

e. That MACOMs supporting semi-active installations which receive USAR garrisons be made aware of the garrison's support capabilities so as to minimize duplicative requirements in MTDAs. Coordination of MOB TDAs must occur among MACOMs USAR garrison, and semi-active installation staffs.

f. That FORSCOM direct MS civilian personnel offices to determine the potential availability of local civilian personnel to fill MTDAs.

g. That TRADOC, in coordination with FORSCOM, determine the best use of USAR school assets upon mobilization and



implement the plan accordingly. USAR expertise should be fully utilized when practical.

h. That FORSCOM study the feasibility/desirability of activating USAR TDA units to augment each active MS.

3 Incl  
as

F-9-10

2. LOCATION: Salem, VA

3. ASSIGNMENT: First US Army further assigned to 80th Division.

4. DATE OF LAST SURVEY:

a. Manpower - NA

b. Equipment - NA

5. MISSION: Performs administrative, intelligence, operational, managerial, legal and logistics functions necessary to operate an Army installation and support the units assigned thereto, to include on-post and off-post units and activities and USAR units assigned for annual unit training. Supervises training and discipline of troops. Provides facilities for conduct of technical projects, field exercises, and maneuvers including necessary communications, engineering and other service facilities. Provides administrative and logistical support for units engaged in personnel processing, training, research and development, storage, procurement and distribution of supplies and related functions. Maintains facilities and provides services necessary for religious, health, welfare, and entertainment activities. Arranges for security, supply, transportation, housing, and construction on the installation. Executes assigned missions in connection with emergency plans and performs special functions as assigned by the Army Commander.

6. CAPABILITIES:


a. Workload: Population supported: 25,000

b. Use of other than assigned personnel: NA

c. Geographical area serviced: NA.

7. TENANCY: None.

2174TH USAR GARRISON  
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Incl 2

F-9-2-1

# USAR TRAINING DIVISIONS

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MSTA</u>
70	MI	INF	Benning
76	CT	INF	Gordon
78	NJ	INF	Dix
80	VA	INF	Bragg
84	WI	INF	Hood
85	IL	AR	Bliss
91	CA	EN	Ord
95	OK	AR	Polk
98	NY	EN	Wood
100	KY	AR	Knox
104	WA	INF	Lewis
108	NC	INF	Jackson

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 10

INSTALLATION AREA SUPPORT

## INSTALLATION AREA SUPPORT FOR RC

1. Problem. To determine the feasibility/desirability of organizing "one-stop" support installations for RC support.

2. Assumption. Current Army policy of providing USAR funds direct to Coordinating Installations (CI) and bypassing USAR chain of command above the MUSARC will not change.

3. Facts.

a. This study will be restricted to support financed by O&M funds. Reserve pay funds and their disbursement, accounting and management will be covered in a separate study.

b. Except for Civilian Personnel Administration and Services, AR 5-9 prescribes DA policies and establishes installation area responsibilities for coordinating and providing intraservice support, by functional type, to Active Army and Reserve Component units, activities and individuals located outside the real property boundaries of installations.

c. Civilian Personnel Administration and Services are provided in accordance with servicing agreement established by MACOM as set forth in DA Civilian Personnel Regulation 200.

d. There are 24 separate area support functions and geographical areas prescribed by AR 5-9 (see Inclosure 1).

e. AR 5-9 is further refined by a joint FORSCOM/TRADOC supplement. The majority of the CI designated in AR 5-9 are either FORSCOM or TRADOC installations.

f. AR 5-9 does not bar MACOM from making exceptions to the prescribed geographical functions and boundaries within the MACOM area of responsibility.

g. Only two maps/functions in AR 5-9 apply to O&M of the ARNG pre-mobilization (Maps 10 & 11, see Inclosure 1). These maps merely prescribe the installation which will provide F&A services for a given state USP&FO. Otherwise, the USP&FO acts as a CI/SI for ARNG O&M. Therefore, no further consideration of ARNG O&M will be made in this study.

h. Training assistance/support of the RC is not prescribed by AR 5-9, but is a function of the RC management structure and is handled on a case-by-case basis by close coordination among the RC, the CONUSA, the ARR, the RG and the installations/AC units having the capability to support. Therefore, training

assistance will receive no further consideration in this study.

#### 4. Discussion.

##### a. Current Situation:

(1) The contention has been made, primarily by the CONUSA, that the geographical support coordination areas prescribed by AR 5-9 are cumbersome and inefficient due to the diversity and dispersion of Coordinating/Supporting Installations (CI/SI).

a. For example, under the AR 5-9 concept the twenty MUSARC within the Fifth Army area look to nine coordinating installations (CI) (four TRADOC, five FORSCOM) and eleven supporting installations (SI) for mission and BASOPS support. The 90th ARCOM which has units located in Texas and Louisiana has Fort Sam Houston as a CI for logistical and administrative support, and units may and do go to Forts Polk, Hood and Bliss (SI) for actual support. Similar situations exist in all CONUSA areas.

b. Given such a situation, the CONUSA charge that although the system is working the coordination required is administratively too burdensome for the MUSARC staffs.

(2) This charge has not been substantiated by MUSARC comments collected on ACCS-82 field trips. The MUSARC state in general that the concept does cause some minor coordination problems, but overall it works well and relationships with the CI/SI are good (see summary of MUSARC comments at Inclosure 2).

##### b. Description/Analysis of Current System:

(1) Study of AR 5-9 and the FORSCOM/TRADOC supplement thereto will reveal that the current system is far too complex to base decisions on the simple descriptions provided in the CONUSA charges. That the system is complex, should not be taken initially as a negative comment. The US Army CONUS Base is a complex one and the RC management and command and control structure is even more complex in terms of diverse units, geographical dispersion and crossing of traditional political boundaries. It cannot be expected unnecessarily that a support structure for the USAR can be any less complex, and it must be remembered that the support structure is not designed solely for the USAR.

(2) The following description/analysis of the current system attempts to place it in perspective in the most detail possible using general terms and notional units. Description of the system in exact detail using actual installations, locations and units is not possible within the time constraints of this study.

(3) Fund Distribution for Support of the USAR:

(a) O&M funds of the USAR are provided by the OMAR Appropriation Director. O&M funds for the type support addressed in this study are all allotted to FORSCOM by OCAR. FORSCOM further allots the funds to CI.

(b) Distribution of FORSCOM OMAR funds by functional budget account is as follows:

<u>BUDGET ACCOUNT</u>	<u>\$000</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Tech Pay	138941.7	37.5	
BASOPS	118138.9	31.8	
MUSARC Ops/Tng	51908.1	14.0	
(Equip)	14506.2		27.9
(POL/Trans)	3743.4		7.2
(Aviation)	7283.9		14.0
(Org Maint)	7841.5		15.2
(Other)	18533.1		35.7
ARR Ops	22401.5	6.0	
CONUSA Ops	17129.7	4.6	
Inst Tng Spt	<u>22483.0</u>	<u>6.1</u>	<u>        </u>
	371002.9	100.0	100.0

(c) The funds indicated under MUSARC Ops/Tng are the only OMAR funds (except Tech Pay in some cases) that are managed by the MUSARC Cdrs. This will be explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs. The amount indicated for



equip is all for Stock Fund purchases of TOE, TDA and CTA initial issue and replacement equipment. A large portion of the other subaccounts is also expended on Stock Fund purchases of supplies. Therefore, it can be seen that purchases of supplies and equipment constitutes the largest portion of the MUSARC Cdrs obligation authority.

(d) The CONUSA/ARR Ops funds are self-explanatory. The Instl Tng Spt funds are expended directly by SI and defray instl costs for recurring type training support such as affiliation travel costs. Tech pay and BASOPS will be covered in subsequent paragraphs.

(4) Description of Area Support Responsibilities/Interface.

(a) As stated earlier, there are 24 functions for which AR 5-9 prescribes geographical coordination/support responsibilities.

1 A support installation is simply one that provides intraservice support. It is normally the nearest installation to the supported unit for economy purpose.

2 All installations have responsibilities to some extent for providing off-post intraservice support. A smaller number of installations are selected for some functions to act as CI with the responsibility to serve as focal point for request for off-post support assistance. The CI then coordinates with the most convenient or capable SI to provide the actual support.

3 Although most of the maps/functions are applicable to the USAR, Map 2 & 8 have the principal impact on USAR O&M. These two provide for logistical, facilities engineering and administrative support coordination-USAR (#2) and disbursing and accounting for USAR technician pay (#8). Another principal impact on USAR O&M is the provision of CPO services. These services are governed by FORSCOM directive and are concentrated at a few FORSCOM installations (see Inclosure 3 for distribution of CPO services by MUSARC).

4 None of the maps have any particular correlation with the USAR structure boundaries except that they do not overlap CONUSA boundaries. The boundaries of Map 8 are the same as ARR boundaries since the function also includes pay of ARR and RG military and civilian salaries and benefits.

Except for Maps 2 & 8 (and the Maps for USAR military pay not discussed), the consideration of support for the AC must also be taken into account. These other maps/functions are also highly dependent on installation capabilities and are performed on a nonreimbursable basis.

(b) It remains, therefore, that there are only four resource intensive functions that impact on MUSARC day to day operations:

- 1 Provision of CPO services for technicians.
- 2 Provision of BASOPS (facilities engineering).
- 3 Payment of technicians' salaries.
- 4 Provision of other mission related support.

(c) A typical geographical region of CONUS is further subdivided into at least three more areas each containing a CI/SI designated by Map 2 AR 5-9. The area will normally enclose two or more MUSARC.

1 Provision of CPO services for technicians is not designated by Map 2, but one installation designated by FORSCOM will service the entire region. CPO support is provided on authority from FORSCOM direct from the SI to the unit concerned irrespective of MUSARC chain of command.

2 Payment of technician salaries is accomplished by the SI designated on Map 8, AR 5-9. This is generally not the same SI that provides CPO services or the CI that provides other mission support funds to the MUSARC. Salaries are paid direct from the SI to unit technicians based on time cards submitted by units by mail to the SI.

3 BASOPS support is completely decentralized and provided by each of the three Map 2 CI/SI to the USAR centers in their region. The BASOPS dollars flowing from FORSCOM are not solely for the facilities support of the USAR; some are for payment of salaries of CI/SI garrison personnel wholly dedicated to other USAR support.

4 Provision of other mission support. As an exception to AR 5-9, FORSCOM provides funds for this type support under a Single Installation Coordinating Concept (SICC). All such funds for a given MUSARC and its subordinate units go

to a single CI nearest the MUSARC headquarters. The MUSARC commander is then given an obligation target and manages the funds. As stated previously, the majority of these funds are for stock fund requisitions/purchases.

a Although the MUSARC commander may retain authority to certify obligation of all his funds and submit requisitions only to the CI, it is typical for some authority to submit requisitions to nearest SI and to make credit card purchases of POL and self service supplies to be delegated to subordinate units. This fact only reflects the realities of the geographical dispersion of the MUSARC units. It makes little sense for a unit in west Texas 40 miles from Ft. Bliss to submit a requisition for an off-the-shelf item to a MUSARC commander in San Antonio for further submission to Ft. Sam Houston. Credit card type purchases must be decentralized because of their nature, particularly POL. On the other hand, it makes little difference to the unit whether a requisition for a long lead-time item that must be obtained from the NICP is submitted through the MUSARC and CI. Dictated centralization of the system might improve status visibility at the CI, but would totally remove the flexibility intended for the MUSARC.

b Although the MUSARC commander may coordinate support primarily with the CI, he may and does coordinate support direct with various SI especially for annual training. The CI remains as a single - source of expertise and manpower for coordinating mission support if required. To insure positive fund control, FORSCOM requires that the MUSARC commander centralize his obligations through the CI during the last month of the fiscal year (Paragraph B-5f, Appendix B, FORSCOM Reg 37-7).

c The fact that technician salaries are not given as an obligation target to the MUSARC commander through the CI prevents reprogramming within a given budget account except by FORSCOM. However, FORSCOM is currently testing such a system with a few MUSARC.

d The SICC was initiated by FORSCOM on a test basis in FY 75. The concept originally included BASOPS funds as well as other mission funds, however, difficulties with management and control of BASOPS funds caused these funds to be withdrawn from the concept. The concept proved successful with other mission support and has been institutionalized in the FORSCOM-TRADOC Supplement to AR 5-9 and FORSCOM Reg 37-7, Financial Administration. The concept has resulted in high annual

expenditure rates for USAR mission funds and has experienced few RS 3679 violations.

c. Alternatives to the Current System:

(1) Single Installation for all Support for Each MUSARC:

This would be an ideal solution; however, given the geographic dispersion of USAR units and installation capabilities it is not possible. There is no one installation in CONUS that is capable of performing all the support required.

(2) Provision of maximum services from one installation for each MUSARC:

(a) This is really an expansion of the FORSCOM SICC. Given the proved success of SICC, it would appear reasonable to provide as much fund control and admin services as possible through one CI and pass management responsibilities to the MUSARC commander.

(b) As stated previously, FORSCOM is testing management of Tech Pay by the MUSARC commander. This test involves fund control through the same CI that controls other mission funds. There is no indication that the test will not be successful. This change would facilitate reprogramming within budget accounts.

(c) There seems little rationale to the current assignment of CPO responsibilities for techs except that FORSCOM has management difficulties in dealing with TRADOC CPO. Financial services could be improved if CPO services were provided by the MUSARC's SI for tech pay even if that SI is a TRADOC installation. However, this is only a mild problem. There may be some realities of Civilian Personnel Administration that preclude this fix.

(d) BASOPS Facilities Engineering Support:

1 As stated previously, this system was tested originally as a part of SICC but did not work.

2 In addition to management difficulties installations experience difficulties in providing such support over too wide an area. Even if CI responsibilities were consolidated, the new CI would probably have to negotiate ISSA for

Facilities Engineering support with other SI on the extremities of their regions.

(e) Changes (a) through (d) could be affected by FORSCOM decision.

(f) Other Functions:

1 Further consolidation of other AR 5-9 functions approaches the point of impossibility mentioned in subparagraph c(1) above.

2 While it is logical that functions should be consolidated, it is difficult to justify separate support areas just for the USAR when the same functions must be performed for the AC by another SI. Establishment of duplicate systems would require additional resources. Better alignment may result from any USAR C&C structure and boundary changes. Changes of these other functional areas would require coordination and approval by HQDA.

(3) Centralization of all MUSARC Expenditures through one SI:

(a) There is no question that such a system can work for this is in fact the system for all MUSARCS during the last month of each FY.

(b) Management control is definitely improved by this; however, the MUSARC commander's flexibility is reduced and timely provision of support to units might be degraded. The significance of such a degradation can not be measured without a test.

(c) It is completely within a MUSARC commander's authority to institute such a system. The 102d ARCOM does operate this way. However, its units are confined to relatively small area (Missouri and Southern Illinois) and there is only one CI/SI (Ft. Leonard Wood) in the region.

(4) Reduction of Number of SICC CI:

(a) There are 25 CI for 44 MUSARC under the current FORSCOM SICC (11-1A, 9-5A, 5-6A). Assignment of the CI is based primarily on the nearest FORSCOM/TRADOC installation to the MUSARC Hq. In most cases this results in one CI for one MUSARC; however, some CI's manage funds for two or more MUSARC

in areas of high MUSARC density and low installation density.

(b) There appears no valid reason why reduction of the number of CI to 2 or 3 per CONUSA would not work. Status visibility and management control would be increased naturally due to centralization. Redistribution of funds among MUSARC would be facilitated. Degradation of support to units might not occur if MUSARC retain flexibility to submit requisitions on a decentralized basis. However, coupling such a reduction with a requirement for centralized submission of requisitions could definitely degrade support due to increased time-distance factors.

(c) Any C&C scheme that reduces the number of MUSARC's could force such a system and the system seems natural to handle such a situation. However, care must be taken in placing restrictions on MUSARC flexibility.

(5) Assignment of Coordinating Responsibilities to the MUSARC Hq:

(a) Such a change appears to be a change in name only. Under the SICC, MUSARC now do the majority of their coordinating in the mission support area. Coordination is a function of Command.

(b) Actual coordination of logistical and admin support (except for AT) is an infrequent process. Once ISSA's for support are established, they are long-term in nature and seldom change.

(c) Staffing MUSARC with additional personnel specifically for a stated function of Coordination of Area Support could lead to charges of duplication by OSD. Installations are charged with the area support coordination for the Total Army and are staffed accordingly. DRC would still be required at SI for interface with the USAR as well as ARNG.

5. Conclusions.

a. Organization of total "one-stop" support installations for RC support is neither feasible or desirable.

b. Area Support Coordination has little impact on the ARNG prior to mobilization.

c. Despite charges of AR 5-9 complexity, FORSCOM implementation of the SICC provides the best possible support to the USAR in a flexible manner that is advantageous to the geographic realities of MUSARC situations.

d. Directed centralization of support to the USAR should be avoided unless forced by C&C structure changes.

e. AR 5-9 does portray a confusing picture to the inexperienced and probably should be rewritten to reflect realities of changes introduced by FORSCOM.

f. FORSCOM is continually making improvements to the system as USAR expertise is developed.

6. Recommendations.

a. That a major, radical change to Area Support Coordination not be directed by the ACCS-82 Study.

b. That consideration be given to discrete fixes to the SICC in each alternative to accommodate the given C&C structure.

c. That Tech pay and CPO services for the USAR be consolidated at each SICC CI.

## APPENDIX A

### AREA SUPPORT FUNCTIONS

<i>Map No.</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>*DA Staff/ Proponent</i>	<i>Reference</i>
(1)	Logistical, Facilities Engineering, and Administrative Support Coordination		
	Logistical	DCSLOG	AR 11-22 140 series 710-2 710-3
	Facilities Engineering	COE	AR 200-1 405 series 420 series 415-35 735-72
	Safety Services	TIG	AR 385 series 15-22 55-29 55-203
	DA Publications, Forms, and Printing	TAG	AR 310-1 310-2 310-3
	General Education Development (GED)	TAG	DA Pam 310-2 AR 621-1 621-5
	Army Recreation Services/Army Community Services	TAG	AR 28-1 608-1
	EO/RR—Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program for Active Duty Personnel and Alcohol Drug Abuse Education and Training Support for Active Duty Personnel (USAR/ARNG Upon Request)	DCSPER	AR 600-18 600-21 600-22 600-23 600-85
	Combat Readiness Flying	DCSOPS	NGR 600-21 AR 95-1 95-63
	Mobilization Support	DCSOPS	AR 135-300
(2)	USAR Logistical, Facilities Engineering, & Administrative Support Coordination		
	Financial Administration	COA	AR 37-27 37-49 37-100-XX
(3)	Aircraft Maintenance & Repair Parts	DCSLOG	DOD 4000.19M AR 95-34 140-15

\*The DA Staff proponent is responsible for the listed function and is not necessarily the proponent for the references.



<i>Map No.</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>*DA Staff Proponent</i>	<i>Reference</i>
			710-2
			750-1
			750-7
(4)	Nuclear Weapons	DCSLOG	AR 710-2
			750-1
			750-7
(5)	Air Delivery Support (Services and Maintenance)	DCSLOG	AR 140-15
			710-2
			750-1
			750-7
(6)	Pay, Disbursing, and Accounting on Area Support Basis	COA	AR 37-6
			37-103
			37-104-3
			37-105
			37-108
(7)	Pay, Disbursing, and Accounting, and Other Support for ROTC Instructor Groups Less Locally Funded Area Support	COA	AR 37-6
			37-103
			37-104-3
			37-108
(8)	Pay, Disbursing, and Accounting for Reserve Component Advisors and USAR Units	COA	AR 37-104-3
			37-108
(9)	Civilian and Active Army Pay and Disbursing, USAREC Regional Recruiting Commands and Sectors of the USMEPCOM	COA	AR DOD PM
			37-6
			37-103
			37-104-3
			37-105
			37-108
(10)	US Army Reserve and National Guard Drill Pay	DCSOPS	AR 11-22
			130-5
			37-104-3
		NGR	37-104-2
(11)	Pay, Disbursing, and Accounting for National Guard	NGB	AR 11-22
			130-5
		NGR	37-100
			37-104-3
			37-108
		NG	Pam 37-104-2
(12)	Casualty Administration, Funeral Escorts/Burial Honors	TAG	AR 600-10
		TAG	600-25
(13)	Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)	DCSLOG	AR 1-4
			75-14
			75-15
(14)	Nuclear Accident Incident Control (NAIC) Chemical Accident Incident Control (CAIC)	DCSOPS	AR 50-5
			50-6
			50-21
(15)	Training and Audio-Visual Support Centers (TASC)	DCSOPS	AR 71-7
			108-2

\*The DA Staff proponent is responsible for the listed function and is not necessarily the proponent for the references.

1 June 1978

C 1, AR 5-9

Map No.	Function	*DA Staff Proponent	Reference
(16)	Personnel Reporting	DCSPER AR	680 series
(17)	Confinement	DCSPER AR	190-47
(18)	Absentee Apprehension, Physical Security and Other Provost Marshal Activities	DCSPER AR	190-5 190-9 190-11 190-13 190-30 190-40 190-41 600-40
(19)	Public Affairs Activities	OCPA AR	360-5 360-61
(20)	Army Weather Warning	ACSI AR	115-1
(21)	US Army National Crime Information Center Terminal Operation	DCSPER AR	190-9 190-11 190-27
		FBI	NCIC Operating Manual
(22)	Claims and Chaplain Activities	TJAG AR	27-20 27-40 27-50
		CCH AR	165-20
(23)	Health Services	TSG AR	40-3 40-5
★(24)	Mobilization Personnel Reporting Installations	MILPERCEN AR	680-29

\* The DA Staff proponent is responsible for the listed function and is not necessarily the proponent for the references.

A-3

SUMMARY OF MUSARC COMMENTS  
ON  
FUNDING AND SUPPORT

63d ARCOM:

- Multiple control sites for funds have not been a problem.
- Funds should follow command lines, but there are exceptions.
- Manages civilian technician pay on a test basis.

124th ARCOM:

- Functional command overlaps complicate the CI/SI support roles.

102d ARCOM:

- All unit requisitions processed through ARCOM.
- An ARCOM should get all funding through one installation. 102d get almost all from Ft Leonard Wood.

123d ARCOM:

- Receives support from both Ft Benjamin Harrison and Ft Sheridan.
- All billing through Ft Benjamin Harrison.
- System works well.

94th ARCOM:

- No major budgeting problems.

77th ARCOM:

- ARCOM would prefer to have support relationships with FORSCOM installations only rather than TRADOC.
- ARCOM would like more input to BASOPS and facilities improvements.

- The current PPBS functions satisfactorily.
- ARCOM is understaffed (FT) for Resource Management.
- ARCOM has good relationships with CI and DRC.
- The only involvement needed by CONUSA/ARR in Resource Management would be input involving training priorities.
- Resource Management does not need to follow command lines.
- ARCOM involvement with more than one CI/SI only causes minor coordination problems.
- Cross-leveling of funds among CI must be processed by FORSCOM.
- AR 5-9 needs to be rewritten; it is too fragmented.

90th ARCOM:

- Dealing with several CI/SI causes only minor coordination problems.

79th ARCOM:

- ARCOM has no problem with support provided by CI/SI.

# CPO SERVICES

<u>CPO</u>		<u>CI/SI</u>
Ft Devens:	94th ARCOM	Ft Devens/Devens
	76th TD	Ft Devens/Devens
	98th TD	Ft Drum/Devens
Ft Indiantown Gap:	77th ARCOM	Ft Dix/Devens
	79th ARCOM	FIG/Dix
	99th ARCOM	FIG/ Dix
	78th TD	Ft Dix/Dix
Ft Meade:	97th ARCOM	Ft Meade/Meade
	80th TD	Ft Lee/Meade
	310th TAACOM	Ft Belvoir/Meade
Ft McPherson:	81st ARCOM	Ft Stweart/McPherson
	120th	Ft Bragg/McPherson
	121st ARCOM	Ft McClellan
	108th TD	Ft Bragg/McPherson
	87th MAC	Ft McClellan/McPherson
	166th SPT GP	Ft McClellan/McPherson
	412th EN CMD	Ft McClellan/McPherson
Ft McCoy:	83d ARCOM	Ft Knox/Knox
	86th ARCOM	Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
	88th ARCOM	Ft McCoy/Sheridan
	70th TD	Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
	84th TD	Ft McCoy/Sheridan
	85th TD	Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
	102d ARCOM	Ft Wood/Sheridan
	123d ARCOM	Ft Harrison/ Knox
	100th TD	Ft Knox/Knox
	103d COSCOM	Ft McCoy/Sheridan
	425th TRANSCOM	Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
	300th MP CMD	Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
	416th EN CMD	Ft Sheridan/ Sheridan
Ft Hood:	90th ARCOM	FSH/FSH
	122d ARCOM	Ft Sill/Sill
	95th TD	Ft Sill/Sill
	75th MAC	FSH/FSH
	377th SPT BDE	Ft Polk/FSH
	420th EN BDE	FSH/FSH
	807th MED BDE	Ft Hood/FSH

CPO SERVICES cont'd

<u>CPO</u>		<u>CI/SI</u>
PSF:	91d ARCOM 351st CA	Ft Knox/Knox Ft Sheridan/Sheridan
Ft Lewis:	124th ARCOM 104th TD	Ft Lewis/PSF Ft Lewis/PSF
Ft Ord:	63d ARCOM	Ft Ord/Carson
Ft Carson:	96th ARCOM	Ft Carson/Carson
Ft Riley:	89th ARCOM	Ft Riley/Carson

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 11

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR TOTAL MOBILIZATION

## TOTAL MOBILIZATION

1. Purpose. This paper describes the Army's role in total mobilization: it includes a brief historical perspective of mobilization (Inclosure 1), an outline of requirements for planning, and a description of the current status of mobilization planning.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Army is responsible to: "Prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war, and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war." This responsibility establishes clear-cut requirements for the Army to be capable of:

(1) Full Mobilization - "Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for these units," and,

(2) Total Mobilization - "Expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the full mobilization of all national resources needed to round out and sustain such forces."

b. The Army's most recent total mobilization experience occurred during World War II. That mobilization was, in fact, conducted within a continuum that began in 1939, when the Army's strength was less than 200,000, and ended in May 1945, when the strength peaked at more than eight million (see para 2b, Inclosure 1).

c. Peacetime responsibility for coordinating, planning and administering Federal plans for mobilizing the nation's resources is assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was established on 1 April 1979. Under existing draft Executive Orders, the cabinet-level Office of Defense Resources (ODR) would manage the mobilization effort upon declaration of a national emergency and FEMA would be dis-established. (Logically, however ODR would be established from FEMA assets.) See this Volume, Annex F, Appendix 12, "Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)" for a more complete discussion of FEMA.

d. The Army is also responsible for "Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the territories, the commonwealths, and possessions, and any other areas



occupied by the United States." (10 U.S.C., Sec 3062a.) To meet these responsibilities, the Army has developed concepts for employment of Land Special Security Forces (LSSF) and to provide Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD). There are obvious, major, interfaces between LSSF/MSCD and FEMA/ODR responsibilities.

e. On 1 May 1979 the National Security Council (NSC) initiated, at Presidential direction, an interagency study of national mobilization planning. The Steering Group, chaired by the NSC staff, will include the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) (which will be subsumed by FEMA not later than 1 Oct 79), and the Departments of State, Defense (to include the JCS), Interior, Commerce, and Energy. The Working Group, chaired by FPA, will have representatives from the agencies on the Steering Group plus representatives from 12 other major Federal agencies.

f. The Army is conducting a study of "Requirements for Total Mobilization (RETMOB):" This study should be completed during 1980 (see para 6d, Inclosure 1).

### 3. Discussion.

a. Army planning for mobilization beyond the program force levels has, for at least 20 years, been inadequate. The planning which has been done has ranged from none to sketchy. This has occurred for a variety of reasons, including lack of definitive guidance from the OSD/JCS levels, ever-decreasing staff manpower, and, undoubtedly, because there has been no pressing requirement to produce plans for total mobilization since WW II (see Inclosure 1).

b. The fundamentals of a mobilization study involve the assessment of requirements versus capabilities. For a total mobilization study the following factors must be considered throughout the analysis: deployment of the program force in accordance with current plans and strategy, combat engagement of in-theater forces and consequent attrition of assets, and requirements to sustain the deployed forces. In conjunction with the foregoing, an assessment must be made of requirements for additional forces, to include shortfalls for current plans, that must be activated to support national strategy. The RETMOB study should accomplish the foregoing and, thus, provide the basis for further analysis and planning by the Army Staff. As the capability to progress into full-scale planning is developed, the MACOM must be included in the planning process.

c. The availability of equipment has historically been the key pacing factor in mobilization: all available evidence indicates that this would be the case now and in the future. Therefore, assessments of

total mobilization capabilities must involve consideration of "trade-offs:" for example--

(1) If mechanized and armored equipment is not available, should personnel be used as replacements, or should non-mechanized units be formed, or should the personnel not be brought into the Service until equipment is available (and thus retained in the labor pool of the civil sector)?

(2) Should HQDA set a policy of filling units to 100% of required levels, or should they be filled to a lesser level in order to distribute the available personnel to more units?

(3) At what stage of mobilization should assets be diverted from the process of deploying/sustaining/forming units to establish the qualified instructional capability for the training base? For instance, what priority will be given to the early-mobilizing, under-equipped, USAR Training Divisions?

e. Circumstances involving a national emergency in which the Army is required to conduct total mobilization will cause the military and civilian sectors to compete for the same resources--FEMA planning/ODR management provides the technique for resolving those conflicts. It is important, then, that HQDA be attuned to national planning (and FEMA allocation) for stockpiling, acquisition, and distribution of national resources (i.e., capabilities). After FEMA determines DOD's share of the output of the industrial base and natural resources, on a time-phased basis, DOD must allocate these assets to the services. Only at this stage can the Army make detailed plans for total mobilization. Army planning must reflect not only requirements to support strategy, but also the realistically-constrained availability of assets (i.e., capabilities).

f. Since the full and total mobilization processes are interrelated, and would be executed as a continuum, the planning for both processes should be conducted by the same people. ACCS-82 found serious deficiencies in current planning for full mobilization and provided recommendations to redress them. (see this Volume, Annex F, Appendix 6, "Analysis of Army Force Mobilization Planning and Execution"). Planning for total mobilization should be conducted within the framework of these recommendations.

g. The Army Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for FY 81-85 contained a brief mention of total mobilization planning. It would appear that the Army should continue with presentations of its views of total mobilization requirements and capabilities in future POM. To accomplish this, the Army's mobilization planning system (AMPS) should be linked with the

POM production cycle. Additionally, and to support the aforementioned POM presentation, realistic requirements/capabilities for total mobilization should be included in the Total Army Analysis (TAA).

#### 4. Conclusions.

a. While the Army is clearly required to conduct planning and execution for total mobilization, the direction and control is a DOD responsibility and the JCS are responsible to provide military guidance for such activities (Reference 1, Sections II, IV and V).

b. FEMA is the national focal-point for planning for total mobilization. Since FEMA is still in relatively early organizational stages, there are opportunities for the Army to influence FEMA policies and procedures.

c. Army planning for total mobilization is currently poor and has been so for at least 20 years.

d. The Army cannot define the requirements for total mobilization until the RETMOB study is completed in the Spring of 1980.

e. RETMOB should be used as the basis to develop further studies that result in a comprehensive plan for total mobilization.

#### 5. Recommendations.

a. That the Army Staff encourage and assist DOD and JCS to provide the necessary direction, control and guidance for planning for total mobilization.

b. That the Army program adequate resources and produce a comprehensive plan for total mobilization not later than the end of FY 81: this plan should be updated annually.

c. That the Army monitor and, where possible, influence policies and procedures of the FEMA.

d. That the Army Staff fully support, and participate in, the RETMOB study.

e. That total mobilization considerations be included in the TAA.

f. That the Army's views concerning total mobilization requirements be included in the POM.

6. References.

a. Army Regulation 10-1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components." (NOTE: This AR is the same as DOD Directive 5100.1, as amended.)

b. "Army Command and Control: 1940-1975," a special study prepared for ACCS-82 by the Center for Military History, 2 May 1979.

c. Series of unpublished notes and memoranda concerning total mobilization and involving the CSA, VCSA, DCSOPS and the ADCSOPS between September 1975 and January 1976.

d. Discussions, 6 July 1979, between LTC Thomas, ACCS-82, and MAJ Steele, DAMO-SSW, subject: Total Mobilization Planning.

e. Information Paper, DAMO-SSW (MAJ Steele), subject: Increases in Force Structure, Exercise Nifty Nugget/MOBEX 78, 27 Oct 78. (Classified SECRET).

f. Memorandum for Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, ODSOPS, from DAMO-ODM (LTC Moore) subject: Planning for Expanded Force Levels, 5 Jan 78 (Classified SECRET).

g. Memorandum for Director, Operations and Readiness, ODCSOPS, from DAMO-SSW (MAJ Steele), subject: Force Structure Under Total Mobilization Planning, 30 Oct 78 (Classified SECRET).

h. Chief of Staff, Army, Memorandum (CSAM) 33-76, "Total Mobilization Planning," 7 July 76. (Classified SECRET).

i. Memorandum for (Multiple Addresses), from the White House (signed by Zbigniew Brzezinski), subject: Study of Mobilization Planning, May 1, 1979 (Classified SECRET).

j. Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82), Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 6, "Analysis of Army Force Mobilization Planning and Execution."

k. Army Command and Control Study (ACCS-82), Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 12, "Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)."

l. Annex D, "Mobilization," to The Army Program Objective Memorandum, FY 81-85, 18 May 79 (with errata sheets transmitted 14 June 79).

1 Incl  
as

Total Mobilization  
Historical Perspective\*

1. Pre-World War II.

a. The National Defense Act of 1920 established the framework for the Army's organization between 1920 and 1940; indeed, it remained the statutory basis of Army organization until 1950. The Act reflected the views that the country must depend on an organized reserve of citizen-soldiers in wartime rather than an expansible regular Army: the Act provided for only a small active duty regular force (not to exceed 280,000 enlisted men) to be reinforced by the citizen-soldiers of the National Guard and Organized Reserve.

b. General Malin Craig foresaw that industrial mobilization could not keep pace with the mobilization of personnel and, consequently, equipment would be short in the initial stages. Thus, the Protective Mobilization Plan (concentrating initially on the defense of the CONUS) was refined and extended in 1940-41 to provide much of the framework for the limited mobilization that took place prior to Pearl Harbor.

2. World War II.

a. On 9 March 1942 the War Department was reorganized under the War Powers Act to provide a better command and control organization for the mobilization.

b. There were two distinct phases of mobilization for World War II. The first covered the period from the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 to Pearl Harbor and had as its ostensible purpose creation of a force for hemisphere defense. The second involved the all-out mobilization required for fighting an overseas war on two fronts. During the first period the Army expanded from less than 200,000 to 1,643,000 men; in the second it reached a peak strength of 8,291,336. The mobilization plans of the interwar years provided only a general guide for this mass mobilization which was gradual and not based on the M-Day concept; both plans and actions were frequently simply responses to specific events.

\* Extracted from "Army Command and Control: 1940-1975," prepared by the Center of Military History, 2 May 1979, and unpublished staff memoranda from the files of ODCSOPS, HQDA.

c. The first phase of mobilization involved a small increase in the size of the volunteer Regular Army. It was followed after the fall of France by mobilization of all of the National Guard, most of the Organized Reserve officers, and the institution of Selective Service to provide the needed manpower. Expansion after the original call-up of the Guard was almost entirely a matter of selective service.

d. In any case, mobilization planning was highly concentrated in the War Department General Staff for both phases. The actual execution of the pre-war phases was carried out by nine corps areas and four Continental Armies, but the War Department selected the units and individuals to be called and set up the schedules for activation of new units. This strict centralized control continued after the nation was at war, although the three commands (Army Ground Forces (AGF), Army Air Forces (AAF) and Army Service Forces (ASF)) succeeded the armies and corps areas in the execution of the plans.

e. The shape and size of the Army were determined by the General Staff (G-3 with advice from the Operations Division (OPD) on theater needs). The number of units to be mobilized was set forth in a document known as the Troop Basis, which gave the authorized strength of the entire Army as of a specified date in the future. The Troop Basis was a blueprint of the Army, indicating how many bomber groups, infantry divisions, ordnance companies, etc., should be mobilized, as well as a plan of mobilization showing, by successive projections of several months or a year into the future, what the size and composition of the Army should be at successive future dates. The Activation Schedule was derived from the Troop Basis, showing exactly what units should be activated each month. Whether a unit called for in the Troop Basis was actually activated on a given date depended on a variety of practical and often transitory circumstances that were difficult to foresee. The Activation Schedule had to be closely watched and frequently modified. In principle the Troop Basis was revised only for reasons of general strategy or fundamental necessity; the Activation Schedule was revised to conform to the circumstances of the moment.

f. Broad decisions of mobilization policy that determined the total strength of the Armed Forces and the distribution between War and Navy Departments were made by the highest executive authority, acting with the advice of the JCS.

Within the strategic requirements as transmitted by the Joint Chiefs, the War Department determined the relative strengths of the AAF, AGF, and ASF. To AAF, until the end of 1943, the War Department made a bulk allotment of manpower. The Troop Basis showed only a lump total for the AAF until October of 1943, when mobilization was virtually complete.

g. Over the ground Army, both ground and service forces, the War Department exercised a more immediate jurisdiction. Without explicit War Department approval, neither AGF or ASF could alter Tables of Organization, modify the list of units in the Troop Basis, nor, until September, 1942, change the Activation Schedule on its own authority. The AGF and ASF had extensive powers of recommendation on matters of mobilization, but the decisions were made by the War Department General Staff.

h. AGF and ASF shared responsibility for carrying out these decisions. ASF operated the induction and reception centers where the four basic procedures of medical examination, formal induction, classification, and initial assignment were carried out. AGF activated the ground combat units designated in the Troop Basis and received the inductees in the training camps. Thus, under the overall schedules prepared in the War Department, the three commands activated and trained the units and prepared them for overseas deployment.

### 3. 1946-1950.

a. When the war was over, the Army reverted to an organization not greatly dissimilar to that existing before it began. War Department Circular 138, 13 May 1946, established the new organization effective 11 June 1946. ASF was abolished, OPD lost its preeminence among general staff sections, and the Technical and Administrative Services were restored to their former position of relative independence. AGF and AAF were continued, the former in something more and something less than its wartime role, and the latter with increased autonomy in almost every area in anticipation of the creation of a separate Air Force.

b. The passage of the Army Reorganization Act of 1950 marked the end of five years of continual organizational change within the Department of the Army made with the aim of improving the command and control structure. With little alteration, the structure established by the Act of 1950 obtained for the next five years. A principal prescription

of the Act confirmed the power of the Secretary of the Army to administer departmental affairs, including the right, within limits and with some exceptions, to prescribe the composition, duties, and the functions of the Army Staff and commands without reliance on either Congressional legislation or Presidential war powers. By lack of any mention in the Act, the "command" role of the Chief of Staff was dropped, except insofar as he exercised it as agent of the Secretary. But in this capacity of agent, and within the current command and control structure, the Chief of Staff was directly in charge of the Army's part in the defense of the United States. His direct line of authority to the CONUS Army commanders reached five combat divisions and certain smaller units in the Continental United States and a regimental combat team in Hawaii constituting the General Reserve, which was the force designated to carry out the Army's emergency assignments.

#### 4. The Korean War.

a. Though regulations assigned responsibility for developing plans for mobilizing against any attack on the United States to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, mobilization planning, of course, involved all levels of the Army Staff. The post-World War II plans, developed as the Army underwent a marked strength reduction and came under severe budgetary limitations, were based upon the outbreak of a general war and assumed no immediate deployment of forces at the opening of hostilities. For the Army's sudden and unexpected involvement in the limited operations of the Korean War, therefore, a partial, and "creeping," mobilization had to be improvised. In the main, nevertheless, its execution followed established lines of command and control. These lines at the time of the Korean War provided overall direction at the DA level, and implementation largely by the Armies. The Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) at the time had only a mission of coordinating and supervising Army mobilization training plans, not the organization of new units nor the induction of selectees and reservists.

b. To take care of the task in Korea and at the same time meet American commitments elsewhere, incremental increases in authorized strength almost tripled the size of the Army during the first year of the war. Transmuting the periodic authorizations into actual strength largely concerned the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, in the matter of individual procurement, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in the case of units. Voluntary recruitment; Selective Service;



recall of individual Reservists, enlisted and commissioned; federalizing National Guard units; and ordering units of the Organized Reserve Corps to active service were the means employed to meet manpower needs. Also involved in the selection of individuals and units of the Reserve Components for active duty were the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, on the Army Special Staff; the Chiefs of the Technical and Administrative Services; and the Chief of Army Field Forces. By a 1950 DA directive, OCAFF was responsible for keeping the Chief of Staff informed of the state of training and operational readiness of all units used by the Army in the field, including the Reserve Components. His recommendations were sought in particular on the choice of National Guard divisions to be federalized. For this, he, in turn, relied heavily on the advice of the Army commanders as to which divisions within their respective areas were best prepared.

#### 5. The Vietnam War.

a. The general system of mobilization planning and execution that existed in the fifties continued into the sixties: that is the basic mobilization plans were drawn at the DA level in consonance with JCS plans and US Continental Army Command (USCONARC) was responsible for execution. USCONARC was specifically charged with the duties of recruiting, inducting, assigning, and equipping enlisted personnel in the active Army, and with executing plans for mobilization of Reserve Components.

b. The general direction of mobilization planning in both the fifties and sixties was for war in Europe, but in the event it was involvement in Vietnam that produced the only mobilization of the period, and this a limited one, that by the decision of the President did not involve any call-up of reserves until 1968. Thus the major mobilization of the period of the Vietnam War involved an expansion of the Active Army from 970,000 to 1,570,000. While the Army Staff prepared the plans and directives relating to this expansion, the whole process was closely controlled by the Secretary of Defense, this control even extending to the choice of units to be activated. USCONARC carried out its assigned functions of actually forming, filling, and training the units.

c. In the specific instance of mobilization of a limited number of reserves in April 1968 following the TET offensive and the Pueblo Incident, the President and the Secretary of Defense determined the scope of the mobilization. Within the

Army Staff, ODCSPER reviewed and updated personnel procedures and participated with USCONARC in planning for personnel processing. OACSFOR, after consultation with ODCSLOG and the Office of Reserve Components, developed a series of alternate force structure packages (75 different ones during an 11 week period). Each of the force structure packages developed by OACSFOR was forwarded to the Chief of Reserve Components (CORC), who designated certain units for mobilization in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of Army Reserve.

d. Little of this planning was coordinated with USCONARC and, for security reasons, direct communication by CORC with CONUS Armies, the State Adjutants General, and the Army Reserve commanders was forbidden.

e. When two force packages had been selected by the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USCONARC was asked to recommend mobilization stations for all units listed in the two packages. USCONARC also identified problem areas likely to arise in event of mobilization.

f. The final selection of units to be called up was done entirely at HQDA level and the final troop list was submitted to the JCS for approval. Announcement of the partial mobilization was made by the Secretary of Defense to the news media at 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1968, hours before the receipt of the relevant message at USCONARC, the CONUS Armies, and the State Adjutants General, thus precipitating much confusion.

#### 6. 1972-1979.

a. In 1972-73 the Army underwent another reorganization (Operation STEADFAST) in an effort to modernize, streamline, an reorient the command and control structure to a new set of circumstances--the end of the war in Vietnam, the shift to a Volunteer Army, reductions in strength, and the increasing impact of inflation on personnel and materiel costs.

b. Overall mobilization plans remained a responsibility of the JCS. Within the Army Staff, with the absorption of OACSFOR functions, ODCSOPS became once again the principal General Staff element involved in mobilization planning. ODCSOPS was specifically charged with "developing policy and plans for mobilization and demobilization, and procedures and priorities for ordering Reserve Component units to active duty." Detailed planning for mobilization of the National

Guard and Army Reserve, however, rested with US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Continental Armies, and these were the agencies responsible for execution. Thus FORSCOM was explicitly charged with preparing and executing plans for mobilization of Army Reserve Component units within CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. Planning for mobilization beyond the call-up of Reserve Components appears to have become moribund in view of the demise of Selective Service and current concepts of a "short war."

c. In September 1975 the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), raised the question of planning for mobilization after the program forces had been committed. In January 1976 the DCSOPS's response to the CSA's question was that, basically there was no planning for Total Mobilization. The DCSOPS tasked the Army's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) to define the dimensions of the problem and to outline a route to follow. Although the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) for FY 80-87 included some planning for Total Mobilization, little (if any) detailed planning resulted from the interchange described above.

d. In January 1978 the Director of Operations and Readiness, ODCSOPS, again raised the issue of formulating "an Army concept plan for total mobilization," since little, or nothing, was being done in this area. As a result the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, ODCSOPS, directed initiation of a study entitled "Requirements for Total Mobilization" (RETMOB). RETMOB is being conducted in three phases:

(1) In Phase I the SSI developed a plausible scenario, in consonance with OSD Consolidated Guidance, upon which RETMOB is to be based.

(2) During Phase II ODCSOPS will use the SSI Scenario to refine requirements for conducting the final phase of the study. Phase II should be completed in August 1979.

(3) In Phase III the Army Concepts Analysis Agency will apply the FY 85/86 Program Force to the SSI Scenario and use wargaming techniques to develop requirements for expansion from Full to Total Mobilization. Phase III should be completed during 1980.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 12

MISSIONS/FUNCTIONS OF FEMA, FPA AND CDA

## Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA)

1. Purpose. To summarize the functions, organization and role of FEMA and its interface with Army domestic missions.

2. Discussion.

a. Background. FEMA resulted from the President's Reorganization Project Number 3. This new agency will combine nine existing offices and agencies, each of which will lose its identity in the new FEMA organizational merger of responsibilities, functions and relationships. FEMA was organized on 1 April, but at that time actually included only the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration and the Federal Insurance Administration. Other agencies and offices scheduled to be part of FEMA will be transferred prior to 1 October 1979.

b. Missions and Functions. The reorganization to create FEMA combines Federal emergency preparedness, mitigation and response activities under a single agency accountable to the President and Congress. The missions and functions of FEMA are:

- Advise and assist the President in developing, coordinating, planning and administering Federal plans and programs to mitigate and provide relief and recovery in the event of major emergencies to protect the civil population and the Nation's resources, and provide for continuity of Government.

- Coordinate Federal Emergency Assistance Relief and long term Recovery activities to support State and local governments in response to declared major disasters or emergencies.

- Develop and implement plans and programs between Federal and State/local government to prepare for, mitigate and provide relief from the effects of major emergencies.

- Plan and administer supporting, training and education programs for Federal, State and local public officials.

- Coordinate, plan and direct R&D, testing, public information, data gathering analysis and dissemination programs relating to joint efforts to share existing knowledge and set hazard reduction standards with Federal, State, local and civil sectors.

- Undertake selected operations responsibilities related to the coordination and administration of the agency.

- Coordinate emergency contingency plans and programs of other Federal departments and agencies affecting long term recovery of impacted communities and systems suffering from effects of major emergencies.

- Coordinate, plan and direct emergency resource management activities of the Federal government.

- Perform industrial mobilization planning as assigned or delegated.

- Determine which materials are strategic or critical and the quality and quantity to be stocked.

- Perform policy review over central resource and essential service interruptions.

- Provide central point of inquiry for providing advice and information regarding programs to:

- Prepare for disasters.

- Mitigate impact of disasters/emergencies.

- Assist those stricken by major emergencies.


- Prepare annual report to the President and Congress.

- Delegate, with reallocation of funds, specific authorities to other departments or agencies.


- Assume other authorities vested in the President at his direction.

c. Proposed Organization. The following figures show the FEMA proposed organization and the way that major responsibilities will be distributed.

Source Dated: 29 May 1979



d. FEMA Regions. The FEMA regional offices and their geographic areas are shown.



e. Organizations to be merged in FEMA.

- Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD).
- Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA).
- National Weather Service (Commerce).
- National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (Commerce).
- Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (EOP).
- Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (HUD).
- Dam Safety Coordination Program (EOP).
- Federal Insurance Administration (HUD).
- Emergency Broadcast System (EOP).

f. Army Links to FEMA. The Army, as well as other DOD elements, has historically been involved to some degree in many of the functions being assumed by FEMA. DOD has been involved since mid-1978 in the working sessions on the transfer of DCPA to FEMA. However, little has been done by the FEMA and DOD to establish the policy and procedural guidelines for the FEMA/DOD interface. FEMA/DOD interface will be necessary in the following areas:

- Civil Defense Policy
- Exercise Policy and Planning
- Mobilization
- Industrial Preparedness
- Disaster Preparedness
- Military Support to Civil Sector

The Army has interest in most of the above areas with special interest in civil defense, manpower/industrial mobilization and other domestic missions.



g. Army Domestic Missions. The Army's domestic contingency planning and execution can be categorized as Land Special Security Forces (LSSF) missions, Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD) missions and other military support missions.

(1) The LSSF mission is prescribed by the Land Defense Annex to the FORSCOM General War Plan. The US Readiness Command (REDCOM) is the unified command responsible for the defense of CONUS; FORSCOM, as the Army Component of REDCOM (ARRED) is responsible for land defense of CONUS. FORSCOM has further delegated this responsibility to CONUSA commanders within their respective geographic sections. After mobilization of the STARC, the CONUSA will control operating forces (LSSF) through STARC. Primary reliance for LSSF units is on combat or combat support units, that are low-priority deploying or non-deploying; units may be AC or RC units. Units assigned LSSF roles may be replaced by other units. LSSF are selected to provide security for selected military bases and civilian industrial facilities. The LSSF is but one part of the Army's mission in support of domestic contingency planning and execution.

(2) The MSCD mission is prescribed by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, Executive Order 10952, 20 July 1961 and DOD Directive 5160.50, 31 March 1964. The Army will provide feasible support to local and State authorities during a war-created emergency. Civil resources will be the first to be used to support civil requirements. MSCD will complement, and not be a substitute for, civil participation in civil defense operations. FORSCOM, operating as ARRED, designates CONUSA commanders as coordinating authorities for their respective areas; they, in turn, coordinate and control forces and resources for all departments of the federal government and all DOD agencies in accomplishing the MSCD mission. State Adjutants General (TAG) are responsible for pre-attack planning; and STARC, when mobilized, coordinate and control forces and resources within their respective states.

(3) Other military support includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(a) Domestic Civil Disturbances. (Title 10 U.S.C., Sections 331, 332, and 334; DOD Directive 3025.12 and AR 500-50). Planning is accomplished by HQDA (DAMO-Director of Military Support (DOMS)); execution is accomplished by FORSCOM, usually through CONUSA.

(b) Domestic Emergencies and Disasters:

1 (Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288; Executive Order 11795, DOD Directive 3025.1; AR 500-60). FORSCOM has been designated to conduct DOD disaster support activities; responsibility is discharged through CONUSA and Chief of Engineers (Civil Works Program, PL 84-99). Requests for assistance flow from the local governmental authorities, through the State Government, to one of the ten Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) Regions to the FDAA to the President. If approved, directions pass to FDAA: FDAA passes direction to DOMS, who acts for the DOD executive agent, and to the appropriate FDAA Region. DOMS (through FORSCOM) and the FDAA Region pass directions to the appropriate CONUSA. The CONUSA then tasks the appropriate Army installations/units, Naval District or USAF Reserve Region to support the requestor. Support for the American National Red Cross (ANRC) is, generally, handled in the same fashion; however, the Red Cross Area Office is substituted for the FDAA Regional headquarters. For all except major disasters, the Red Cross Area Office coordinates directly with the Army officer charged with disaster relief at local levels. For major disasters, requests are forwarded through the Regional Director or Federal Coordinating Officer. There is no formal directive authority for DOD support of the ANRC. As an allied action, the FORSCOM Military Assistance Plan contains provisions to reinforce the ANRC's capability for mass feeding during disasters. (The Commodities Food Program ended on 30 June 1974, thus ending the government's capability to distribute food to disaster victims through a network of regional warehouses. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) has no capability, beyond the "biscuits" in the Civil Defense stocks, for mass feeding; it is that agency's position that ANRC is primarily responsible for handling this problem).

2 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NOHSPCP). (PL 92-500; Executive Order 11548; DOD Directive 5030.41; AR 200-1; AR 500-60). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) chairs the National Response Teams, Regional Response Teams and provides on-scene coordinators. FORSCOM is responsible for furnishing and coordinating Army support to regional plans. The Chief of Engineers has primary Army staff responsibility for coordinating this support.

3 Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program. (10 U.S.C. 2635; DOD Directive 3000.2). This program authorizes use of DOD assets to assist civilian communities in providing medical emergency helicopter transportation. MAST support sites are established IAW community-installation operating plans approved by the Secretary of the Army. MAST support sites can be at any installation (AC or RC) that has appropriate resources. Based upon the distribution of the Army's helicopters, FORSCOM is the MACOM primarily involved with MAST.

4 US Postal Services Support. (DOD Directive 5030.50; AR 65-1; US Postal Service (USPS) Contingency Plan Number 159A; HQDA Postal Augmentation Plan "GRAPHIC HAND"). Secretary of the Army is DOD executive agent for direction, through CSA, of military forces to support USPS. FORSCOM designates task force (TF) commanders; upon approval of HQDA, operational control of all designated military forces passes to the TF commanders.

5 Support to District of Columbia (DC) Government (DOD Directive 5036.46, as amended; AR 37-27), Secretary of the Army is DOD executive agent for all matters pertaining to the planning for, and employment of military resources to assist the DC government in combating crime. Support is generally limited to: military and civilian technicians to perform non-law enforcement functions, use of training facilities and use of military equipment and supplies. Other assistance is provided as required by the personal direction of the President.

6 Support to the FBI. (SecDef Memo, "Assistance to Federal Agencies in Combating Terrorism," 8 December 1972; DOD Directive 3025.12) Secretary of the Army is DOD executive agent for all matters pertaining to the employment of military resources in support of the FBI in combating terrorism.

7 Emergency Support to Federal and Civil Agencies. (31 U.S.C. 686; DOD Directive 4000.19, as amended; AR 500-60) DA assists other federal and civil agencies in CONUS emergencies. All Army MACOM and installations provide support as available.

8 Support for US Secret Service. (18 U.S.C. 3056; PL 90-331; PL 94-524; DOD Directive 3025.13; AR 1-4). DA supports the US Secret Service in the performance

of its statutory protective duties. Approval authority for such support is vested at the DOD level; in an emergency, any military commander may make the decision, take necessary action and report through channels to HQDA. Any element of the Army may be tasked to render this support.

9 Other routine support services are provided IAW DOD directives and memoranda; they include, but are not limited to, special support for the President, support for the US Customs Service and Drug Enforcement Administration, support for Federal, State and local governments under the DA Domestic Action Program, search and rescue activities and support during aircraft piracy emergencies.

### 3. Conclusions.

a. FEMA is a new agency which is assuming a wide array of functions performed by DOD and other Federal Agencies. This reorganization will require considerable time to complete. Preliminary planning is underway for the transition, but most details remain to be worked out. Therefore, there is no way to determine, at this time, the precise interaction of FEMA with the Army's command and control structure and its domestic missions.

b. Currently, domestic missions which require Army manpower are coordinated through FORSCOM and/or CONUSA. This will likely remain the same after FEMA is organized.

c. The alternative command and control structures developed by ACCS-82 each have geographically-oriented elements (CONUSA, REDMOB or corps area-oriented element) which can interface with the FEMA regions. No specific FEMA impacts on current or planned Army command and control structures can be identified at this time.

d. ACCS-82 should continue to remain acquainted with the development of current DOD/Army and FEMA planning and reorganization.

4. Recommendation. ACCS-82 continue through 15 August 1979 to monitor the FEMA organizational planning and incorporate any changes to the final ACCS-82 report that are necessitated by newly-defined DOD/Army and FEMA interrelationships.

References.

1. Information Papers, DAMO-ODS, as follows:

- Subject: Domestic Civil Disturbances, 25 Jan 79.
- Subject: Disaster Assistance through the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), 7 Nov 78.
- Subject: Communications Support to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), 8 Nov 78.
- Subject: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 8 Nov 78.
- Subject: Assistance Provided to the American National Red Cross During Natural Disasters, 9 Nov 78.
- Subject: Employment of Military Resources for Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST), 16 Nov 78.
- Subject: Support to United States Postal Service (USPS), 20 Nov 78.
- Subject: Assistance to the D.C. Government in Combating Crime, 20 Sep 78.
- Subject: Army Representation on Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration (FPA/GSA) Regional Field Boards (RFB in Crisis Management Operations, 5 Dec 78.
- Subject: Emergency Support to Federal and Civil Agencies, 5 Dec 78.
- Subject: Assistance to the Secret Service, 6 Dec 78.
- Subject: Presidential Support, 6 Dec 78.
- Subject: Support to the US Customs Services (USCS) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 26 Sep 78.

References. (Cont'd)

Subject: Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD),  
11 Oct 78.

Subject: Background and Mission of the Federal Emergency  
Management Agency (FEMA), 28 Aug 78.

Subject: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 13 Jun 79.

2. Draft Memorandum, ASD-MRA&L, Subject: DOD/FEMA Interface,  
11 Jun 79.

3. AR 10-42 Organization and Functions United States  
Army Forces Command (15 Apr 75).

4. AR 500-50 Emergency Employment of Army and Other  
Resources, Civil Disturbances (21 Apr 72).

5. AR 500-60 Emergency Employment of Army and Other  
Resources, Disaster Relief (20 Aug 73).

6. AR 500-70 Emergency Employment of Army and Other  
Resources, Organization for Civil Defense  
(1 Sep 74).

7. US REDCOM CONPLAN 7040 (28 Aug 78) w/C1 (16 Apr 79).

8. USCINCRD CONPLAN 7045 (23 Aug 78).

9. CDR FORSCOM/USCINCRD CONPLAN 7040 (22 Mar 79).

10. US FORSCOM General War Plan (GWP) (22 Dec 75).

11. US FORSCOM Reserve Components Mobilization Plan  
(Feb 78).

12. FORSCOM Reg 10-42, Organization and Functions, Mission  
Assignments (27 Jul 78).

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 13

ADEQUACY OF RC PERSONNEL PAY SYSTEMS

## Reserve Component Personnel Pay Systems

**Purpose.** To examine the adequacy of RC pay systems.

**Discussion.**

1. JUMPS-RC, a centralized system operated at USAFAC, pays USAR and ARNGUS drill pay (IDT).

a. AT and ADT was not included under the initial JUMPS-RC, due to equipment and systems capability at USAFAC.

b. AT/ADT payment is decentralized to Active Army Installation Finance and Accounting Offices. Payments are reported to USAFAC for consolidation on a tax master file, facilitating W-2 production.

2. Administrative and Supply Technicians (AST) spend considerable time preparing pay documents. (A function of technical specialists at AC installations). It is costly and inefficient to establish and maintain such proficiency in ASTs; this is compounded by their high turnover, and by other competing requirements for their attention.

3. Improved pay systems management is being field tested at Fort McCoy, while Sixth Army has received DA approval to proceed with development of a computer based RC pay administration system. Advantages of these proto-type systems include:

- ° Reduced pay workload at RC unit level by the AST.
- ° Prevention/detection of duplicate payments (one station responsible for all types of RC pay).
- ° Functionally trained full time pay specialists managing pay administration and records.
- ° Improved utilization of RPA funds.
- ° Potential for cost and manpower savings by centralizing RC pay administration.



4. As USAFAC increases its equipment and systems capability, full centralization of RC pay (IDT, AT and ADT) will be feasible.
5. Upon mobilization, individual pay accounts are automatically established from JUMPS-RC data for mobilized RC personnel on the JUMPS Active Army (JUMPS-AA) Master Pay File.
6. At mobilization stations, RC personnel update financial records regarding:
  - a. Eligibility for quarters allowance. Current instructions require that eligibility for basic allowance for quarters be in the Personal Finance Record (PFR), but not on the JUMPS-RC record.
  - b. Eligibility for subsistence allowance. Basic allowance for subsistence (BAS) is not addressed in current instructions, nor is eligibility filed in the PFR or on JUMPS-RC.
  - c. Allotments. Allotments are not addressed in current instructions, nor filed in the PFR, or on JUMPS-RC.
  - d. Number of dependents for tax purposes.
7. USAFAC has the (ADP) capacity to accept the influx to JUMPS-AA of all mobilizing reservists and all draftees up to a ceiling expected to cover anticipated strength levels. First priority at USAFAC is for payment of the troops.
8. Because JUMPS-AA and JUMPS-RC are different systems, USAR financial personnel do not gain maximum or relevant experience for operating in JUMPS-AA when mobilized by operating under JUMPS-RC during peace.
9. COA is considering establishment of entitlement for allowances (quarters and subsistence) and allotment designations in individual JUMPS-RC accounts. This would greatly facilitate the transition from RC to AC status. Allowance eligibility and allotments could be verified during annual training.
10. A major advance under consideration by COA is the establishment of a single standard Army pay system, with the capability of paying for either RC or AC status. One standard system would:

- ° Eliminate conversion from one system in peace (JUMPS-RC) for a part of the Total Army (USAR and NGUS) to the Active Army system after mobilization.

- ° Simplify administrative processing and reduce time spent in processing during mobilization.

- ° Simplify RC financial training and improve relevancy of experience of RC financial personnel.

11. MOBEX 78 revealed differences in treatment of some data elements (e.g., taxes and years of service) by JUMPS-AA and JUMPS-RC programs. These differences created minor problems which can be corrected with (ADP) program changes. A single standard pay system (para 6 above) would eliminate such problems in the future.

#### Conclusions.

1. Current peacetime systems and procedures are adequate to provide correct and timely pay for RC personnel. Several field projects are in development or test stages which should improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of paying RC personnel. Enhancement of systems capability at USAFAC will facilitate centralizing all RC pay under JUMPS-RC.

2. USAFAC has the capability to accommodate all mobilized personnel on JUMPS-Army. Upon mobilization, RC personnel are transferred from the JUMPS-RC to the JUMPS-Active Army pay system. Current enhancement of systems capability at USAFAC should permit further improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of effecting the transition from peacetime (RC) to mobilized (AC) pay systems. (e.g., addition of allotment and allowance data elements on JUMPS-RC files).

3. JUMPS-RC and JUMPS-Active Army are compatible, i.e., they are capable of performing in combination, and are capable of orderly integration and operation.

4. Continued improvements of centralized pay systems and procedures should result in reduced administrative burden at RC unit level during peace and in more efficient RC transition to the Active Army payroll upon mobilization.

5. A single Army master pay system is the optimum solution, and should be considered a high priority improvement to Army financial management. Advantages are:

- No different pay systems in peace and war, or for soldier's who are members of the active as compared to reserve components. (One pay system for one Army).

- Reduction of administrative processing during mobilization, thus expediting the transition from peace to deployable status.

- Simplify and reduce the pay related administrative work within RC units.

- Possibly reduce the cost, both dollars and manpower, from that currently involved in paying RC AT and ADT in a decentralized manner.

6. Full development of JUMPS-RC, or development of a single Army pay system will require considerable effort in terms of systems development, design, testing and approval, and also appropriate equipment capacity. The Army is increasing it's equipment capacity at USAFAC, however all current systems must first be converted to the new hardware. Conversion is clearly the top priority, since financial systems must provide accurate and timely pay and accounting support for the Army. Conversion will require full application of systems personnel. Furthermore, during conversion, systems in being are normally frozen in their current status, to facilitate conversion, thus even changes to improve current systems are deferred until conversion is completed. Due to the need to concentrate systems resources to accomplish conversion, it may be more than a year before effort could be applied to developing a complete JUMPS-RC or a single Army pay system.

#### Recommendations.

HQDA and FORSCOM should establish priority plans and milestones to implement an orderly sequence of improvements in RC pay administration as follows:

1. FORSCOM should continue development, testing and implementation of consolidation of all types of RC pay administration at single installations.

2. Army and FORSCOM instructions should be modified to require not only BAQ, but BAS, allotment and dependency/tax status be included in individual PFRs, and updated not less than annually. To enhance mobilization, this effort should be directed with priority to all RC units up to LAD 60.

3. As a high priority project, upon completion of conversion at USAFAC, DA should develop JUMPS-RC capability to:

a. Absorb AT and ADT.

b. Add data regarding allowances and allotments to the individual pay files at USAFAC.

4. Upon completion of systems conversion at USAFAC, begin development of a single integrated Army pay system, which will pay according to the current status of an individual.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 14

RESERVE COMPONENT PROMOTION SYSTEMS

## Reserve Component Promotion Systems

1. Purpose. To describe the Reserve Component (RC) promotion systems and determine where improvements could be made.

2. Facts/Discussion.

a. There are two systems for promotion of RC officers in the Reserve of the Army. The mandatory promotion and unit vacancy (UV) promotion systems were established by the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954. All RC promotions are permanent with no temporary promotion as in the Active Component (AC). Promotion policies and patterns are designed where possible, after AC promotions. The Secretary of the Army is the approval authority for promotions through Major, but this authority has been delegated to the CONUS Army (CONUSA) commanders for unit vacancy promotions only. The Senate must confirm all LTC and higher promotions. State ARNG promotions require Federal recognition before Reserve of the Army status is granted.

b. The policy for mandatory promotions promulgated in AR 135-155 applies evenly to USAR and ARNG officers in an active status (Selective Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and Standby-Active) as well as on active duty. HQDA is the convening authority and provides a letter of instruction (LOI) patterned after AC LOI. A promotion board, with membership from both AC and RC, is convened and the membership is approved by HQDA. A cross-section of specialties, minority and female representation, if available, is required. Boards are held annually at RCPAC for grades CW3 and CW4 and CPT through COL. CW2 and 1LT promotions are administrative and are made without board proceedings. Selection for promotion is based on the "fully qualified" method for CPT through LTC and on the "best qualified" method for CW3, CW4, and COL. Separate boards are held for AMEDD officers.

c. The UV promotion policy of AR 135-155 applies only to USAR officers. UV promotions are made to fill vacancies in USAR troop units which cannot be filled by unit officers or from the IRR. The unit commander is responsible for identifying all vacancies in his command and recommending officers to fill those positions. He is required to identify all other available officers. Promotion packets are prepared for all available officers, even though it is known

some of them are not qualified for either promotion or the vacancy. All UV promotion packets must be signed by the Commanding General, or in his absence, the Deputy Commander or Chief of Staff. HQDA provides an LOI patterned after AC promotion LOI. Boards are convened quarterly to consider all grades (CPT-COL) and branches. CONUSA commanders are the convening authority and approve promotions through Major. The UV boards promote on the "best qualified" basis, or if only one officer is being considered, the officer must be fully qualified. If none are qualified, none will be promoted. Time-in-grade and time-in-service requirements are less than for mandatory promotion and UV promotions are often equated to a below-the-zone promotion.

d. ARNG unit promotion policies and procedures for officers are the prerogative and function of each state, Washington, DC, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, a total of 53 separate entities. However, all state promotions require Federal recognition for which policies are promulgated in NGR 600-100. Promotions will be based on efficiency, time-in-grade, demonstrated command and staff ability at the appropriate level, potential for service in the next higher grade and with few exceptions will be made only when an appropriate TOE or TDA vacancy exists. HQDA provides a standing LOI for Federal recognition purposes. Federal recognition boards (FRB), held in each state, are the responsibility of the Army commanders acting for the Secretary of the Army. The FRB consist of three members, of which at least one will be Active Army and preferably Regular Army. He will usually be the Senior Army Advisor. Each of the three CONUSA have delegated FRB procedures to the Army Readiness Regions. The Chief, NGB, acting for the Secretary of the Army, extends Federal recognition to NG officers based on FRB recommendations. Once federally recognized, the officer is then promoted to that grade in the Reserve of the Army with assignment to the Army National Guard of the United States.

e. Reserve Component Promotion Criteria:

<u>TO</u>	<u>Mandatory</u>		<u>Unit Vacancy</u>		<u>Military EDUCATION</u>
	<u>IN GR</u>	<u>IN SER</u>	<u>IN GR</u>	<u>IN SER</u>	
1 LT	3 yrs	N/A	3 yrs	None	Basic Course
CPT	4 yrs	6 yrs	2 yrs	None	Basic Course
MAJ	7 yrs	12 yrs	4 yrs	None	Adv. Course

<u>TO</u>	<u>Mandatory</u>		<u>Unit Vacancy</u>		<u>Military EDUCATION</u>
	<u>IN GR</u>	<u>IN SER</u>	<u>IN GR</u>	<u>IN SER</u>	
LTC	7 yrs	17 yrs	4 yrs	None	50% CGSC
COL	5 yrs	21 yrs	3 yrs	None	CGSC

NOTE: 2LT or 1LT is eligible for promotion after serving 12 months in a CPT position.

\* Waived for AMEDD except SC 67.

f. The Officer Personnel Management System - US Army Reserve (OPMS-USAR) will provide a centralized personnel management system on individual career guidance, professional development, and assistance to officers in both the IRR and Troop Program Units (TPU). The final phase of OPMS-USAR began on 1 Oct 78 at the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC) and upon completion by the end of FY 79 all USAR IRR and TPU officers will be under OPMS-USAR.

g. Each CONUSA is the promotion authority in its area. In both 1977 and 1978, attempts were made at Department of the Army level to implement centralized promotion procedures at RCPAC. There were sufficient objections from national level to USAR unit level that the program has been tentatively "shelved."

h. CONUSA hold several boards each year. For example, First Army convenes the following boards:

(1). Unit Vacancy Selection Board (1 AC GO, 1 AC 06, 3 RC 06). Convenes quarterly, recommends officers for promotion to fill unit vacancies.

(2) General Officer Assignment Advisory Board (2 ARR Cdrs, 1 RC GO). Convenes as needed and recommends officers to fill general officer positions.

(3) O-6 Assignment Advisory Board (1 RC GO, 2 AC 06). Convenes monthly or as required and recommends officers to fill positions of Commander, Deputy Commander of Chief of Staff.

(4) Selective Retention Board (1 RC and 1 AC GO). Convenes annually and recommends for retention in TPU or



transfer to control group, 06's and MUSARC staff officers who have 20 or more qualifying years of service.

i. Promotion to the grade of 07 is the responsibility of a HQDA selection board, which reviews promotion recommendations. Promotions are retained at DA to insure that congressional limitations on the number of active status general officers are not exceeded and insure that uniformity in selection is maintained. Promotion to general officer requires presidential approval and senate confirmation. Nominees may not be submitted to the HQDA General Officer Promotion Selection Board without favorable recommendations from FORSCOM and the CONUSA. Therefore, the role of the two commanders is an appropriate one in the promotion process.

j. Enlisted Promotion Systems.

(1) An individual in the USAR will be administratively advanced to pay grade E-2 upon completion of six months service following entry on initial active duty for training (IADT). TAGs may authorize advancement for Non-Prior Service enlistees prior to IADT to E-2 for referring up to three individuals who join the Army or NG and to E-3 for referring four individuals who join. Promotion authority for other enlisted grades in troop units is:

		<u>Commanders of-</u>	
<u>To Pay</u>	<u>CO, Btry, Unit</u>	<u>Org auth Cdr of</u>	<u>Org auth Cdr of</u>
<u>Grad(s)</u>	<u>Trp and sep Unit</u>	<u>LTC or higher</u>	<u>COL or Higher</u>
	<u>or higher</u>	<u>based on recom</u>	<u>based on recom</u>
		<u>of Sel Board</u>	<u>of Sel Bd</u>
E-3 and E-4	X		
E-5 and E-6		X	
E-7, E-8, E-9			X

Promotion authority for members of the IRR, attached to RTU or assigned to MOBDES positions, is retained by CG, RDPAC. Promotion of enlisted members of the IRR or attached to RTU is limited to grades E-3 through E-7. Promotion of members assigned to MOBDES positions is limited to grades E-6 through E-9.

(2) The following time in grade and time in service apply to promotions:

<u>Time in Grade and Time in Service</u>		
<u>TO</u>	<u>TIG</u>	<u>TIS</u>
E-9	28 months in E-8	18 Years <sup>1</sup>
E-8	24 months in E-7	15 Years <sup>2</sup>
E-7	21 months in E-6	N/A
E-6	15 months in E-5	N/A
E-5	12 months in E-4	N/A
E-4	9 months in E-3	N/A
E-3	6 months in E-2 <sup>3</sup>	N/A
E-2	4 months in E-1 (ARNG only)	

- 1 Ten years must be cumulative enlisted service.
- 2 Eight years must be cumulative enlisted service.
- 3 Four months for ARNG.

(3) Under provisions of recent changes to enlisted promotion policy, a qualified member may be promoted to E-3 or E-4 in any MTOE/TDA unit without regard to unit vacancies. E-5's with five years of service and E-6's with 12 years of service may also be promoted, provided all other eligibility requirements for promotion have been met. These promotion policies will be in effect for the next two years unless extended. Promotions to E-5 and E-6 previously could be made only as a result of promotion boards, or an E-4 or below entering Officer Candidate School at which time he could be promoted to E-5.

(4) Except for provisions in the preceeding paragraph, enlisted promotion selection boards are required for individuals promoted to pay grades E-5 through E-9. Promotions will be based solely on the individuals qualifications and appropriate unit vacancies. To be eligible for consideration for promotion, the individual as a minimum, must:

- (a) Be active in the Ready Reserve or the ARNG.
- (b) Be recommended by the unit commander.
- (c) Achieve minimum established SQT score on the latest DMOS evaluation in the MOS for which he is being promoted (MOS score of 110 for USAR).

(d) Have completed required time in grade and time in service (unless waived).

(e) Meet the minimum established educational requirements.

(5) Unit commanders may recommend waivers for:

(a) USAR

1 MOS test score between 70 and 109.

2 Not more than one-half of the prescribed TIG for promotion to E-5 through E-7.

3 Up to four years of TIS for promotion to E-8.

4 Up to five years of TIS for promotion to E-9.

(b) ARNG: Up to one-half the TIG for promotion through E-8.

k. Enlisted members who have been selected for promotion to E-7 through E-9 by a selection board may be promoted and concurrently assigned to MOBDES positions upon acceptance by CG, RCPAC, or by the overseas commander for ARNG personnel.

1. Problems with the systems:

(1) Promotion boards convened by each CONUSA do not insure same standards apply to all Reservists.

(2) Promotion packets must be prepared by unit commanders for all available officers, even though it is known some are not qualified for the unit vacancy(ies).

(3) All packets must be signed by the Commanding General, or in his absence, the Deputy Commander or the Chief of Staff.

(4) State recognition: Though national guidelines are established, the states are entities into themselves and each of the 53 may establish their own internal

officer management practices, e.g., preferentially assign selected individuals.

(5) Unit commanders may forward better promotion packets on officers desired for promotion.

(6) Unit commanders may not have knowledge of all available RC officers in his area.

(7) Unit members have much greater promotion prospects than non-unit members because of unit vacancy promotion system.

(8) Field records are often more complete than "official" records.

(9) F&B procedures may give NG officers up to 3 months earlier date of rank than USAR counterpart.

### 3. Conclusions.

a. The Reserve Component promotion systems are quite similar to active systems, except for State appointments.

b. The systems work and have survived legal challenges.

c. Improvements of significance, e.g., centralization of officer promotions at RCPAC, will continue to meet stiff resistance from the field (with valid reasons to not implement it). To implement them may require DA direct implementation instructions.

### 4. Recommendations and Rationale.

a. The preferred recommendation is to centralize officer promotion boards at RCPAC.

(1) Assures all officers have the same opportunity for promotion and to serve in TPU.

(2) Eliminates favoritism or preferred nominee that exists in present system.

(3) Would:

(a) Require additional staffing of an estimated eight full-time personnel.

(b) Insure same promotion standards are applied to all USAR officers.

(c) Require transfer of documents and period of adjustment to new system.

(d) Possibly cause increase in workload because of checks which would have to be implemented. There would probably be many cases where inactive reservists may not be able to assume Active Reserve status. Non-unit personnel would have to be contacted concerning assignment to a unit.

(e) Eliminate discrepancies between field and official files and dual records keeping.

b. In conjunction with a, above, remove CONUSA from unit vacancy promotion responsibility with specific prohibition on maintaining USAR unit officer records, but retain the CONUSA in the administrative chain of command between USAR units and RCPAC.

(1) Would:

(a) Reduce CONUSA workload.

(b) Incorporate positive features of centralization at RCPAC.

(c) Leave CONUSA commander responsible for insuring subordinate RC units adhere to all regulations and procedures.

(d) Result in probable space savings of 3-5, or more, spaces per CONUSA (manpower survey would determine actual reduction).

(e) Result in fewer personnel being required to serve on boards due to consolidation, thus saving man-hours not directly job related.

(f) Be met with relatively strong objections from CONUSA and senior RC commanders who would perceive a loss of one of their command prerogatives, as well as their recollection of former less efficient/responsive UV promotion management by RCPAC.

c. If CONUSA retain UV promotion authority, eliminate requirement for unit commanders to forward promotion packets for all officers.

(1) Time consuming and serves no valid purpose. If individuals are unqualified, records should not be forwarded. An annotation could be entered at the lowest level personnel office as to why records were not forwarded.

(2) Administrative time could be better utilized.

d. Eliminate requirement that a general officer sign all promotion packets. Internal controls could be established which would still allow for approval, e.g., a cover letter when records are forwarded to the promotion convening authority.

e. Limited centralization of USAR senior enlisted promotions should be expanded.

(1) Boards should be established at General Officer Command (GOCOM) level headquarters (level to be established by MUSARC commander).

(a) Provides greater latitude for selection.

(b) Same standards applied to larger number of individuals.

(c) Lesser partially for certain individuals if boards are held at GOCOM level headquarters.

(2) Not officially recognized by Department of the Army.

(3) Two First Army ARCOM and one Fifth Army GOCOM have initiated Senior NCO promotion boards at their headquarters.

(a) Boards comprised of officers and E-9's.

(b) Results generally well received by NCOs concerned.

(4) Subordinate unit commanders learn who in other units are qualified to fill their vacancies.

(5) Unit changes are prerogative of individual and unit commanders concerned. Moves are not mandatory.

5. References.

a. AR 135-155, Promotion of Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers Other than General Officers, 30 Aug 74, w/C5.

b. AR 140-158, Enlisted Personnel Classification, Promotion, and Reduction, 22 Jun 73, w/C3.

c. NGR 600-100, Commissioned Officers - Federal Recognition and Related Activities, 31 Jan 78.

d. NGR 600-200, Enlisted Personnel Management, 1 Sep 78.

e. HQDA, ODCSPER, Information Paper, Reserve Component (RC) Officer Promotions Less General Officers, 30 Jan 78.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 15

REQUIREMENTS FOR BATTALION AND

FLIGHT FACILITY ADVISORS



REQUIREMENTS FOR BATTALION

AND

FLIGHT FACILITY ADVISORS

1. Purpose. To determine the requirements for battalion and flight facility advisors.

2. Facts.

a. There are 81 officers and 80 enlisted men currently authorized to advise battalions (Incl 1).

b. There are 36 officers and 54 enlisted men currently authorized to advise flight facilities (Incl 1).

c. There is no Department of the Army regulation prescribing the duties and functions of an advisor to the Reserve Components.

d. DA Pamphlet 570-554 provides the guidelines or basis for allocation of battalion and flight facility advisors and a brief description of their duties (same for advisors at all levels).

e. The CARR Study (conducted in 1976) found, through the use of a questionnaire, that the CONUSAs supported a reduction in battalion advisors.

f. A recent (Nov 78) GAO report found numerous examples of duplicative functions being performed by the ARR Coordinators, Readiness Groups, and Advisors.

g. FORSCOM currently plans no increase or reduction in the advisory effort.

h. Authorizations for battalion level advisors vary among the CONUSAs and is based primarily on the CONUSA commander's method of operation (and possible pre-Steadfast considerations).

i. The ARNG is opposed to any reduction of advisors.

3. Assumptions.

a. All USAR commanders will not support a reduction of advisors.

b. A reduction of advisors at any level will be viewed by the RC as a lessening of the AC commitment to the Total Army Concept.

c. Increased full time manning will lessen the requirements for battalion advisors.

4. Discussion.

a. Battalion Advisors. Authorization for battalion level advisors is found in DA Pamphlet 570-554 dated 15 July 1978 which states:

Dedicated advisors below division, group, brigade and comparable size units will not be recognized unless it is determined by local onsite appraisal that a battalion is effected (sic) by one or a combination of the following factors.

(1) Critical "Round-out" unit. If distances are not prohibited (sic) where dedicated advisors for battalions are recognized, consideration should be given to reducing some of the above indicated allowances due to reduced workload associated with assisting and supporting subject battalions. Additionally, dedicated battalion advisors should assist and support other RC units in their area of responsibility. If only one advisor is required, category of position will be determined by local appraisal. Affiliated units should, whenever possible, be supported by the unit to which they are affiliated.

(2) Highly specialized and complex in nature.

(3) Newly activated or converted.

(4) Extremely isolated and sub-units highly dispersed.

A battalion may be authorized a LTC or MAJ and/or a MSG or SFC.

(1) There are no specific missions or functions assigned to advisors by DA regulations. The GAO Report previously referenced had the following comments concerning advisor functions and responsibilities.

-- Is essentially one of assistance, not advice. Some of the advisors' major functions and responsibilities are:

- Serve as principal point of contact to Reserve Component Commanders and the Army Readiness Region headquarters.

- Assist units in establishing, achieving and sustaining unit readiness.

- Monitor and evaluate readiness reports.

- Assist the appropriate ARR headquarters readiness coordinator in determining the readiness posture of units.

- Coordinate assistance from Readiness Group branch and functional teams.

- Assist units in securing training facilities, transportation, and other training assistance.

(2) All of the above functions duplicate those being accomplished by Readiness Groups. GAO found that:

"--advisors duplicate the coordinators functions approximately 80% of the time."

In other words, the functions' being performed by advisors could be performed by Readiness Region Coordinators or the Branch Assistance Teams (BAT) of the Readiness Group (RG).

(3) Since all Roundout Battalions are participants in the Affiliation Program, their assistance/advice should be provided by the AC sponsor unit. A Roundout Battalion with an advisor has three sources of assistance; advisor, AC sponsor unit or the RG BAT.

(4) The CARR Study states that the CONUSAs supported a decrease of 123 battalion advisors. First Army had not requirements for battalion advisors. Sixth Army requested additional 17 personnel while Fifth Army proposed a reduction of 110 spaces. This information alone is sufficient evidence to challenge the requirements and authorizations for battalion advisors. It also suggests that the CONUSA commander is the sole determinant of their employment and utilization. Functional analysis and manpower surveys would appear to be more appropriate justification.

b. Aviation Support Facility (ASF) Advisors.

(1) An Aviation Support Facility provides the following:

- Exercises centralized control and assures the proper use and operation of aviation assets.

- Provides aviation training and logistical support beyond the unit capability.

Each ASF was established to support an aviation company of 20 or more aircraft with 30 or more aviators assigned or attached for training. Each ASF is authorized a GS-13 and a GS-12 as full time technicians. Both are officer positions and are entitled "Supervisory Aircraft pilot" and "flight instructor" respectively. Their duties include supervision of operations and training, aviation safety, flight training and that of providing advice to the MUSARC commands or ARNG commands on aviation matters. Other technician positions may be authorized but are not supervisory positions.

(2) ASF advisors are authorized by DA PAM 570-554 which states the following:

One officer and one enlisted advisor per USAR or ARNG Aviation Support Facility. One additional Enlisted Advisor may be required for ARCOM for ARCOMs with two or more aviation flight activities. In

states having aviation units of 5 or more aircraft, one officer aviation advisor may be recognized and designated as the State Aviation Advisor. States having 25 or more aircraft will require one Enlisted Advisor.

(a) Functions and responsibilities for ASF advisors are the same as those for all advisors (para 4.a.1.).

(b) Allocation and authorizations are based on facilities, units and aircraft rather than functions to be accomplished.

(3) In view of the findings in the GAO report and the lack of definitive function guidelines, the requirement for ASF Advisors is questionable. A significant manpower space savings could be achieved if ASF Advisors' assets were consolidated at RG's where several ASF's could be supported by the same advisory team.

c. Dedicated Advisors. Dedicated advisors are viewed with mixed emotions by the USAR and ARNG. They are in agreement on the perception that advisors are an indication of the AC commitment to the RC. Even though the ARNG would like to retain dedicated advisors, there is little evidence to support their contribution to unit readiness.

5. Conclusions. Battalion and ASF advisors are marginal contributors to improved unit readiness and in the case of the battalion advisor, duplicate functions that can be (or are being) performed by the ARR, RG, and/or AC sponsor unit.

6. Recommendations.

a. That all battalion level advisors be withdrawn.

b. That FORSCOM evaluate current authorizations and requirements for ASF advisors.

7. References.

a. CONUSA/ARR/RG (CARR) Study 21 Sept 76.

b. GAO Report, The Army and Air Force Selected Reserve Components--Better Readiness and Deployability through Organizational Changes, Nov 78.

c. DA PAM 570-554, 15 Jul 78.

1 Incl  
as

BATTALION ADVISORS FY 79

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT</u>
1A	2	2	4
5A	66	66	132
6A	$\frac{13}{81}$	$\frac{12}{80}$	$\frac{25}{161}$

FLIGHT FACILITY ADVISORS - FY 79

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT</u>
1A	6	15	21
5A	21	30	51
6A	$\frac{9}{36}$	$\frac{9}{54}$	$\frac{18}{90}$

NOTE: HQDA has no programmed changes planned in either category thru FY 81.

Incl 1

F-15-1-1

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 16

ADEQUACY OF RG STAFFING IN  
RELATION TO AFFILIATION PROGRAM



Adequacy of Readiness Group Staffing in  
Relation to Affiliation Program

1. Problem. To determine if RG staffing is duplicated by the Affiliation Program.

2. Background.

a. In its recent report on the RC, the GAO concluded that the Affiliation Program duplicated the assistance provided to affiliated RC units and that RC staffing should be reduced accordingly.

b. The GAO conclusion was based on an examination of RG Lewis and the duplication is admitted in statements and documents from RC, USASIX and ARR IX personnel (see extract of GAO Report at Inclosure 1).

c. While admitting an amount of duplication, Army personnel stated in some cases it was still more cost-effective for RG personnel to provide assistance rather than the host AC unit incurring travel costs to do so.

3. Discussion.

a. Since the inception of the GAO study effort, a Staffing Guide for US Army Readiness Regions (includes RG) has been developed by FORSCOM and published by HQDA. Pertinent staffing tables for the RG are attached at Inclosure 2.

b. A comparison of actual authorizations for RG Lewis and Redstone versus staffing guide requirements is attached at Inclosure 3. Staffing requirements are based primarily on number of branch or branch related company size units supported as indicated at the top of the spread sheet. ARR/RG have not been subjected to manpower surveys since the development of the staffing guide; therefore, no manpower reductions have been levied based on the staffing guide. The staffing guide does not make any explicit allowance for the impact of affiliation; although, it does recognize that units with dedicated advisors require less assistance than those without. Affiliation is not exactly the same as having a dedicated advisor, but the same type impact should be realized.

c. The top part of the spread sheet at Inclosure 1, which does not consider affiliation, indicates that both RG's are overstrength according to the staffing guide (only 1 space for Lewis, 19 spaces for Redstone). Actual RG organization does not compare directly to staffing guide organization; therefore, the comparison is valid at the total level only.

d. The bottom of the spread sheet makes the same type comparison with the RG's affiliated units deducted from their support responsibilities. Naturally, in view of the previous results, the RG are overstaffed to a greater degree (Lewis +24, Redstone +37).

e. Although the staffing guide cannot be taken as an absolute (leeway is given for establishing additional requirements based on local appraisal), there is sufficient proof that some reduction of staffing is warranted due to the Affiliation Program. The differences in staffing guide strengths alone for the two RC are 34% and 14% respectively. Assuming that 15% is a conservative estimate of the average RG overstaffing, 355 spaces ( $2368 \times .15$ ) could possibly be saved.

f. Time-distance factors should be considered in judging how cost effective it is for support to be provided by AC host units, but the following analysis indicates that the trade-off is reasonable. In the example cited in the GAO report, RG Lewis contends that it is better for the RG to provide support than for the 7th Div to pay \$154 air fare (approximately 700 miles) to do the same. However, taking the number of spaces that could be cut from RG Lewis (23) times an average salary of \$16,672 gives a dollar saving of \$383,456. This equates to approximately 2490 trips at the \$154 rate or a two-man team to all the MUTA-4 of each company sized unit affiliated (87). Per diem and accommodation costs would be incurred equally whether support is provided by the RG or the AC unit.

#### 4. Conclusions.

a. RG Staffing can and should be offset by the Affiliation Program possibly as much as 15% with savings of 300-400 spaces.

b. Such an offset is cost-effective.

5. Recommendations.

a. FORSCOM should develop adjustment factors to staffing guide yardsticks to allow for the impact of affiliation.

b. FORSCOM should develop a high priority for and perform in the near future a manpower/management survey of all RG.

6. References.

a. Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO). Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively? Report to the Congress of the United States. Washington: 25 April 1979.

b. U.S. Department of the Army. Pamphlet 570-554: Staffing Guide for U.S. Army Readiness Regions. Washington: 15 July 1978.

3 Incl  
as

in 1978 the command proposed reducing readiness region headquarters' staffing from 413 to 261 personnel while modifying the headquarters' structure. One reason for retaining the headquarters echelon was the importance the command places on the Active Army major generals who command the headquarters. In transmitting his proposal to the Army Chief of Staff, the Forces Command commander noted:

"\* \* \* the catalyst of the whole program is the major general ARR (Army readiness region) commander. His ability to deal with State Adjutant Generals, ARCOM commanders and the whole hierarchy of Reserve Component command as an equal, as one who shares a common mission, as the visible contact point for matching Reserve Component needs with the Active Component assets, and representing the Total Army concept, and who is in fact the executive in charge of the operation effort cannot be overemphasized."

We were unable to verify this statement. However, we believe there are alternatives for accomplishing these functions without retaining what is, in our opinion, an unnecessary management layer. One alternative would be to retain one of the major generals in each CONUSA area as a deputy CONUSA commander. At the present time, one readiness region commander in each CONUSA area has this responsibility as an additional duty.

#### IMPACT OF AFFILIATION ON READINESS GROUP STAFFING

In its proposal to alter the Reserve component management structure in response to directed personnel reductions, the Forces Command did not consider eliminating the readiness regions' readiness group. The proposal noted:

"\* \* \* The Readiness Groups are almost universally recognized as the best aspect of STEADFAST, irreplaceable in their role and stretched now to the limits of practicality in their geographic distribution."

We agree that readiness groups, as focal points for technical and functional assistance to Reserve component units, are an important aspect of the STEADFAST reorganization. However, we believe the Army's Affiliation Program offers both an alternative to the readiness group assistance concept and an opportunity to reduce readiness group staffing.

Current readiness group staffing is based on the number of Reserve component units assigned to the groups. Although some Active units provide their affiliated units the same types of assistance as that provided by the readiness groups, the readiness group assets have not been reduced accordingly. Consequently, the capabilities of the Active units are duplicated by those of the readiness groups.

For instance, the Fort Lewis, Washington, Readiness Group of Readiness Region IX, has a 10-person infantry branch assistance team whose principal <sup>1/</sup> responsibilities are to provide support to the Oregon National Guard's 41st Infantry Brigade and the Washington Guard's 81st Infantry Brigade. However, the Active Army's 7th and 9th Divisions are affiliated with and provide support to the 41st and 81st Brigades, respectively. In addition, the Fort Lewis Readiness Group's 4-person field artillery branch assistance team provides assistance almost exclusively to Reserve component units affiliated with the 7th and 9th Divisions.

The support the 7th and 9th Divisions have provided to their affiliated Guard units has been outstanding, according to Active Army and Guard officials. For example, the Sixth Army Commanding General wrote the following assessment of the support provided by Active units during the 1977 annual training period:

"Although the four divisions (1st, 4th, 7th, and 9th) respond to the training support mission for the Reserve Components in different ways, each did a simply outstanding job \* \* \*. If I were to single out one effort as the most outstanding, I would mention the program implemented by the 1st Brigade of the 7th Division for its roundout brigade, the 41st Infantry Brigade of the Oregon National Guard. This program focused on improvements of the skills of the individual soldiers \* \* \*. The 41st Brigade Commander stated emphatically this was the best annual training year ever experienced by his brigade and will provide impetus to his recruiting efforts while serving to retain the better soldiers."

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<sup>1/</sup>The Fort Lewis Readiness Group also supports an Army Reserve training division and a special forces battalion.

An Army readiness region coordinator, noting the 7th Division's outstanding support of the 41st Brigade's 1978 annual training, said he considered the division's training program to be as good as any he had seen conducted by either an Active or a Reserve unit.

The Active units are also capable of supporting their Reserve units during weekend training. For example, the Deputy Commander of Army Readiness Region IX noted that at times the 9th Infantry Division appears to have almost as many personnel at the 81st Brigade's weekend training assemblies as the brigade. Weekend support becomes more difficult when Active and Reserve units are not located close by. But even this does not prevent the Active units from providing effective support. For example, the 7th Division Commander told us his division is capable of providing the 41st Brigade with all the assistance it needs. Likewise, the training officer of the 41st Brigade told us that the 7th Division gave his brigade all of the assistance it asked for, and sometimes more.

For economic reasons, however, the brigade continues to receive some assistance from the readiness group's branch assistance teams. As one 7th Infantry Division officer noted, "It's much cheaper for the Readiness Group to send a sedan down from Fort Lewis (approximately 150 miles) than it is for us to fly someone up from Fort Ord (approximately \$154 round-trip air fare)."

As noted earlier, we believe the readiness groups are an important echelon of the Army's Reserve component management structure. But readiness group support to affiliated units duplicates the capabilities of sponsoring Active Army units. We believe the Fort Lewis Readiness Group's infantry branch assistance team can be reduced from 10 to 4 persons because of the assistance provided to its assigned units by the 7th and 9th Divisions. (The group would continue to support the training division and special forces battalion noted earlier.) Also, the readiness group's four-person field artillery assistance team can be eliminated, for the same reason.

The Deputy Commander of Readiness Region IX, headquarters of the Fort Lewis Readiness Group, informed us that paperwork had already been initiated to reduce the number of advisors to the 81st Brigade, due to the brigade's affiliation with the 9th Division, and that the same probably should have been done for the readiness

group. But the paperwork was withdrawn when the region learned of the Forces Command's study of the Reserve component management structure in response to directed personnel reductions.

We believe the Army should reevaluate criteria and levels of staffing of the readiness groups, in light of the assistance provided to affiliated Reserve component units by their Active unit sponsors. We also believe expansion of the Army's Affiliation Program would further reduce the need for readiness group assets. (Opportunities to expand the Affiliation Program are discussed in chapter 4.)

#### INEFFICIENT INTERMEDIATE ARMY RESERVE COMMANDS

As described on page 35, the major intermediate command and control headquarters for Army Reserve units, below the CONUSA level, are the MUSARCs and the ARCOMs. The MUSARCs, in our opinion, possess the technical orientation to provide effective command over and assistance to similar subordinate units. The ARCOMs, on the other hand, are neither staffed for nor capable of providing meaningful technical guidance to their units. Much of the functional assistance provided to Army Reserve units comes from other echelons of the Reserve component management structure.

The primary mission of Army Reserve units in peacetime is training to prepare for mobilization and deployment. The ARCOMs are responsible for providing training assistance to their subordinate units, including:

- Developing unit training plans.
- Supervising unit training.
- Coordinating training facilities.

Other ARCOM responsibilities toward their units include:

- Financial management (programming, budgeting, and funds management).

Table 554-61: Office of the Commander, Readiness Group

**Work Performed.** Commands and supervises all personnel assigned to the Readiness Group. Plans, directs, and coordinates readiness assistance to Reserve Component units within assigned area of responsibility and assists in the evaluation of unit readiness status. Develops and implements Readiness Group operational and administrative policies and procedures. Arranges for and provides internal administrative, personal management, logistical, and budgetary support for the Group assistance teams. Coordinates assistance effort with Readiness Region Headquarters, Senior Army Advisors, and other agencies as required. Maintains liaison with Senior Reserve Component commanders within assigned area and adjacent Readiness Groups. Performs other missions as directed by the Region Commander.

Yardstick		Manpower requirement (range)				3		4	
Line	Military positions				Position designation	Number of positions		Civilian positions	
	Title	BR	Code	Grade				Title	Code
1	COMMANDER	NC	( )	COL	M	1		SECY STENO-GRAPHER CLERK-TYPIST	GS-0318
2	EXECUTIVE OFFICER*		( )	LTC	M	—	—		
3	ADMIN SUPV		71L30	E-6	M	1	1		
4	STENOGRAPHER		71C10	E-4	C	1	1		
5	CLERK-TYPIST*	71L10	E-3	C	—	1	GS-0322		

\* A1. Executive Officer may be authorized if total manpower requirement allowed under staffing tables 554-62 through 554-67 exceeds 75 or if the commander is absent from the group on official business at least 50% of the time.

\* Position warranted if authorized strength of the RG exceeds 70.

\* Officer code and SSI will be determined by the commander in accordance with provisions of AR 611-101.

Table 554-62: Administrative Support Section

**Work Performed.** Responsible for expendable and nonexpendable supplies, classified documents, mail, regulations and publications, personnel reports and actions, preparation of correspondence, typing, filing, compiling data and other related duties required by the Readiness Group Commander.

Yardstick*	Advisors supported				50	90	135	185			
	Manpower requirement				4	6	8	10			
	Interval rate				.050	.044	.040				
Line	Military positions				Position designation	Number of positions				Civilian positions	
	Title	BR	Code	Grade						Title	Code
1	CLERK-TYPIST		71L10	E-4	C	4	6	8	10	CLERK-TYPIST	GS-0322

\* Personnel justified by this yardstick represent a consolidation of all clerical workload requirements throughout the Readiness Group excluding the Office of the Readiness Group Commander. Coordination and supervision required by the indicated staffing will be provided by the Administrative Supervisor assigned to the Office of the Group Commander.

Note. Additional allowances determined by local appraisal may be required when physical facilities or separation of Assistance Teams do not permit total consolidation.



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
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Table 554-63: Operations and Training Section

**Work Performed.** Coordinates and performs staff supervision of the overall Readiness Assistance Program within the Readiness Group. Prepares budget estimates and administers the expenditure of travel and other funds. Maintains data on assistance effort and status of Reserve Component unit readiness. Develops and conducts training management programs and special training projects including workshops and seminars. Plans and schedules training for Group personnel as required. Assists teams in developing specialized training packages. Coordinates TASC support within Readiness Group area and maintains liaison with ARR, USAR Schools, TRADOC and other active component agencies. Coordinates ARCOM/RG efforts in identifying AT sites for RC units. Conducts mobilization readiness assistance visits and instruction to RC units and ARR elements, and provides advice and assistance to RC units involved in CONUSA Domestic Emergency Plans. Administers quality control in training management to include maintenance of training, schedules, records and reports.

Yardstick	Number of units subject to assistance*				100	150	210	290			
	Manpower requirement				5	7	9	11			
	Interval rate				.040	.033	.025				
Line	Military positions				Position designation	Number of positions				Civilian positions	
	Title	BR	Code	Grade						Title	Code
1	OPERATIONS OFF		54A*	LTC	M	1	1	1	1	PLANS & TNG SP	GS-0301
2	PLANS & TNG OFF		54A*	MAJ/CPT	C	1	1	1	1		
3	TRAINING MGT OFF		(*)	MAJ/CPT	M	—	—	1	1		
4	OPERATIONS/ TRAINING OFF		54A*	CPT	M	—	1	1	1		
5	OPERATIONS SGT	NC	(*)	E-9	M	1	1	1	1	ACCOUNTS MAINT CLK CLERK-TYPIST	GS-0520
6	TRAINING MGT NCO	NC	(*)	E-7	M	1	1	1	1		
7	ASST TRAINING MGT NCO	NC	(*)	E-6	M	—	1	1	2		
8	ADMIN SP		71L10*	E-4	C	1	1	1	1		
9	OPERATIONS CLERK		71L10*	E-4	C	—	—	1	2		GS-0322

\*Unit count consists of one company size unit or headquarters or combination of detachments having an authorized strength of 100, or total authorized strength of all units/headquarters/detachments divided by 100, whichever is larger.

\* Appropriate secondary specialty desired may be added; e.g., 54A11, or 12, or 13, or 14.

\* Officer and Enlisted codes, ASI and SSI should be appropriate to the type units supported and will be determined by the RG Commander in accordance with provisions of AR 611-101 and AR 611-201.

Note. Except for peak workloads, administrative support can be accomplished by the Operations Clerk.

Table 554-64: Branch Assistance Team

**Work Performed.** Assists and advises RC Commander in all aspects of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, and Engineer doctrine, techniques, plans, training, readiness and management. Effects coordination with higher headquarters, service schools, AC units and other RG Teams to ensure proper preparation and execution of mission requirements by RC Commanders. Designs and supervises instructional programs. Reviews and comments on doctrinal and instructional material. Prepares reports, studies and briefings. Receives and processes requirements for assistance to include travel arrangements, preparation of orders and vouchers and review of unit data.

Yardstick	Number of units subject to assistance*				24	48	72	96
	Manpower requirement**				4	6	8	10
	Interval rate				.083	.083	.083	
Line	Military positions*					Position designation	Number of positions	
	Title	BR	Code	Grade				
1	BRANCH TM CHIEF		(*)	LTC/MAJ	M			
2	ADVISOR		(*)	MAJ/CPT	M			
3	SR ENL ADVISOR		(*)	E-8/E-7	M			
4	ADVISOR		(*)	E-7/E-6	M			

\*Unit count consists of one company size unit or headquarters or combination of detachments having an authorized strength of 100, or total authorized strength of all units/headquarters/detachments divided by 100, whichever is larger. Work units supported will be determined by local appraisal.

\*\*Staffing indicated provides sufficient personnel to assist each company sized unit within the Group's area of responsibility. Allowances include average preparation time, travel time, on-site time and followup time for each unit. The workload in support of Annual Training (AT) is within the capability of the staffing provided by the yardstick and indicated allowance allows for accomplishment of all tasks listed under Work Performed. The table should be used to separately determine the staffing required to support each of the following types of units: Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer and Infantry. Units belonging to battalions with dedicated advisors require less assistance than those belonging to battalions without dedicated advisors.

\* Positions shown here indicate the type of personnel which may be required. The mix between officer and enlisted positions should be equal at the lowest range progressing to a ratio of 35% Officer and 65% Enlisted at the higher ranges, except for Armor and Field Artillery Assistance Teams which should be staffed at 25% Officer and 75% Enlisted.

\* Officer, WO, and Enlisted codes, grades, ASI and SSI should be appropriate to the type units supported and will be determined by the RG Commander in accordance with provisions of AR 611-101, AR 611-112, and AR 611-201.

Note 1. Due to FDC/FADAC functions, above indicated allowances should be increased by a factor of .33 for Artillery Assistance Team requirements.

Note 2. Additional manpower requirement may be recognized based on local appraisal for support of approved RG functions and tasks not directly related to supported units (i.e., MOS qualification, conferences, schools, vehicle maintenance, staff studies, etc.) supported by quantifiable workload data.

Note 3. When there are four or more assistance teams or a total requirements strength of 25 or more advisors for combat Arms, one Officer and one Chief, Enlisted Advisor may be recognized for supervision of the Combat Arms Teams.

Note 4. Administrative support will be provided by the RG Administrative Support Section.

Note 5. Armor Assistance Teams supporting an Armor Division size force or larger require seven persons to effectively assist in gunnery skills testing and gunnery training.

Note 6. If manpower requirements for an assistance team are 12 or more, one additional space may be recognized for supervision based on local appraisal.

Note 7. An additional manpower requirement may be recognized for Infantry Assistance Team to assist in MOI, Leadership, NCO School, USAR School, etc., instruction.

Note 8. Additional manpower requirements may be recognized based on local appraisal when requests for assistance exceeds normal expectancy and can be supported by formal requests.

Table 554-65: Combat Support Assistance Team

**Work Performed.** Assists and advises RC Commander in all aspects of ordnance, quartermaster, medical, signal, chemical, military police, transportation, PSYOP, military intelligence, civil affairs, aviation doctrine, and techniques, plans, training, readiness and management. Effects coordination with higher headquarters, service schools, AC units and other RG teams to ensure proper preparation and execution of mission requirements by RC Commanders. Designs and supervises instructional programs. Reviews and comments on doctrinal and instructional material. Specific assistance is furnished Class I, II, III, IV, VI, VIII, laundry, maintenance, ship operations, storage procedures, and ammunition operations. Provides CBR and C&E assistance to all units within the RG area of responsibility. Receives and processes requirements for assistance to include travel arrangements, preparation of orders and vouchers and review of unit data.

Yardstick	Number of units subject to assistance*				24	48	72	96
	Manpower requirement**				5	7	9	11
	Interval rate				.083	.083	.083	
Line	Military positions*				Position delineate	Number of positions		
	Title	BR	Code	Grade				
1	BRANCH TM CHIEF		(*)	LTC/MAJ	M			
2	ADVISOR		(*)	MAJ/CPT	M			
3	SR ENL ADVISOR	NC	(*)	E-8/E-7	M			
4	ENL ADVISOR	NC	(*)	E-7/E-6	M			

\*Unit count consists of one company size unit or headquarters or combination of detachments having an authorized strength of 100, or total authorized strength of all units/headquarters/detachments divided by 100, whichever is larger. Branch work units less than 15 units will be determined by local appraisal.

\*\*Combat Support Assistance Team consists of personnel required to assist branch oriented activities such as Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, Transportation, Military Police, Medical, SF/CA/PSYOP, and AG. The surveyor must determine if the group has such units within its area of responsibility. Staffing indicated provides sufficient personnel to assist each company sized unit within the Group's area of responsibility. Allowances include average preparation time, travel time, on-site time and followup time for each unit. The workload in support of Annual Training (AT) is within the capability of the staffing provided by the yardstick and indicated allowance allows for accomplishment of all tasks listed under Work Performed. Units belonging to battalions with dedicated advisors require less assistance than those belonging to battalions without dedicated advisors.

\* Officer, WO, and Enlisted codes, grades, ASI and SSI should be appropriate to the type units supported and will be determined by the RG Commander in accordance with provisions of AR 611-101, AR 611-112, and AR 611-201.

Note 1. Administrative support will be provided by the RG Administrative Support Section.

Note 2. Over and above indicated staffing, consideration must be given through local appraisal to provide CBR, C-E, physical security, medical, and transportation assistance to all units within the Group's AAR's area of responsibility, as appropriate. Also, aviation assistance provided to Aviation Detachments organic to nonaviation units must be considered.

Note 3. Food Service Advisor(s) will be recognized in the Admin/Supply Assistance Team.

Note 4. If manpower requirements for any of the above functional areas equates to six or more, a separate Combat Support Assistance Team should be established.

Note 5. If there are no requirements for MICA/PSYOP Advisors, those requirements for Special Forces functions should be recognized in the Infantry Branch Assistance Team.

Note 6. Normally only one Adjutant General, WO space is required for higher level Adjutant General Advisory support since AG assistance can be obtained, as required, from the Admin/Supply Team.

Note 7. Due to the diversity of skills within a CS Team, if manpower requirements exceed 15, two additional spaces can be recognized for supervisor based on local appraisal.

Note 8. Manpower requirement for support of approved RG functions and tasks not related directly to supported units will be determined by local appraisal supported by quantifiable workload data.

Note 9. If total requirements exceed 25, consideration should be given to establishing a Special Purpose Assistance Team composed of the following sample skills: SF, MI, CA/PSYOP, Medical, Chemical, and MP.

Note 10. When workload at one or more RG's is insufficient to support a full-time advisor in specific technical areas, subject advisors (i.e., Aviation, Marine Technicians, Marine Engineers, MI, CA, PSYOP, SF, Chemical, etc.) should be centralized at the RG which is collocated with the ARR.

Note 11. Additional manpower requirements may be recognized based on local appraisal, when requests for assistance exceeds normal expectancy and can be supported by formal requests.

Table 554-66: Administrative and Supply Assistance Team

**Work Performed.** Assists and advises RC commanders in the preparation, training and maintenance of personnel records, personnel management, personnel affairs, unit administration, postal operation, supply records, property reports, property accountability and functions, food service activities, JUMPS, functional filing system and routine records and reports.

Yardstick	Number of units subject to assistance*					150	250	350	500
	Manpower requirement**					9	13	17	23
	Interval rate					.840	.840	.833	
Line	Military positions				Position designator	Number of positions			
	Title	BR	Code	Grade					
1	BRANCH ADVISOR		42A41	LTC	M	1	1	1	1
2	PERSONNEL TECH		711A	WO	M	1	1	1	1
3	SUPPLY TECH		716A	WO	M	1	1	1	1
4	CH ENL ADV		(*)	E-8	M	—	1	1	1
5	CH ENL ADV		(*)	E-7	M	1	—	—	—
6	FINANCE SGT		73C40	E-7	M	—	1	1	1
7	SUPPLY SGT		76Y40	E-7	M	—	1	1	1
8	FOOD SVC SGT		94B40	E-7	M	—	—	1	1
9	PERSONNEL SGT		75Z40	E-7	M	—	1	1	1
10	ADMIN NCO		71L40	E-7	M	—	1	1	1
11	FINANCE SGT		73C30	E-6	M	1	1	2	3
12	SUPPLY SGT		76Y30	E-6	M	1	1	2	3
13	FOOD SVC SGT	NC	94B30	E-6	M	1	1	1	1
14	PERSONNEL SGT	NC	75Z30	E-6	M	1	1	2	3
15	ADMIN NCO	NC	71L30	E-6	M	1	1	1	3

\*Unit count will consist of one company size unit or headquarters or combination of detachments having an authorized strength of 100, or total authorized strength of all units/headquarters/detachments divided by 100, whichever is larger.

\*\*Staffing indicated provides sufficient personnel to assist each company sized unit within the Group's area of responsibility. Allowances include average preparation time, travel time, onsite time and followup time for each unit. The workload in support of Annual Training (AT) is within the capability of the staffing provided by the yardstick and indicated allowance allows for accomplishment of all tasks listed under Work Performed.

\* Enlisted codes, grades, ASI and SSI must be appropriate to the type units supported and will be determined by the RG Commander in accordance with provisions of AR 611-101, AR 611-112, and AR 611-201.

Note 1. Administrative support will be provided by the RG Administrative Support Section.

Note 2. Manpower requirement for support of approved RG functions and tasks not related to direct Admin/Supply support to units will be determined by local appraisal supported by quantifiable workload data.

Note 3. Teams that exceed a requirement of 18 may require an additional officer position based on local appraisal.

BRANCH RELATED UNITS REQUIRING ASSISTANCE												
	161	25	15	12	44	18	11	7	29	161		
	OAT	BAT AR	BAT EN	BAT FA	BAT IN	BAT MD	BAT AV	BAT TC	BAT COMP	A/S AT		
RG LEWIS												
Actual	68	13	4	4	10	4	5	4	5	15		
Staffing	67	3	4	4	6	5	4	4	6	10		
guide												
Difference	+1	+10	-9	-	+4	-1	+1	-	-1	+5		
	578	77	94	69	47	56			235	578		
RG REDSTONE												
Actual	148	16	22	14	10	8	-	-	37	20		
Staffing	129	5	10	8	6	8	-	-	25	28		
guide												
Difference	+19	+11	-13	+6	+4	-	-	-	+12	-8		
MINUS AFFILIATED UNITS												
	74	6	11	1	2	17	11	7	19	74		
RG LEWIS												
Actual	68	13	4	4	10	4	5	4	5	15		
Staffing	44	3	3	2	2	4	4	3	5	6		
guide												
Difference	+24	+10	-6	+2	+8	-	+1	+1	-	+9		
	504	68	64	54	35	56			227	504		
RG REDSTONE												
Actual	148	16	22	14	10	8	-	-	37	20		
Staffing	111	5	7	6	5	7	-	-	25	22		
guide												
Difference	+37	+11	-10	+8	+5	+1	-	-	+12	-2		

Incl 3

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ANNEX F

APPENDIX 17

MOBILIZATION MISSIONS FOR ARR AND  
THEIR SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS

## MOBILIZATION MISSIONS FOR ARR

1. Subject. Mobilization Missions for ARR and their Subordinate Elements (RG, Advisors/Augmentees).

2. Purpose. To propose logical and suitable mobilization missions for ARR and their subordinate elements.

3. Facts.

a. At present the mobilization missions/functions for ARR, RG and Advisors/Augmentees are not clearly defined. Those that are defined are at Inclosure 1. Of note is that as the months after M-Day pass the ARR will have less and less to accomplish. Immediately after M-Day the ARR will have several important functions to accomplish. These are:

- (1) Certification of unit readiness to deploy.
- (2) Continued assistance to non-mobilized units.
- (3) Assumption of OPCON of ARCOM in geographical area.
- (4) Training assistance to mobilized units.

As units depart their mobilization stations for deployment, ARR personnel (ARR staff and RG) will have fewer units requiring assistance or certification. Additionally, the Advisor/Augmentee role or disposition upon mobilization is totally undefined. In most instances, these personnel have become key members of the commander's staff; either in providing advice or as actual staff members. The loss of the Advisor/Augmentee would certainly detract from the unit's ability to reach the required readiness posture during the critical period following mobilization.

b. Currently, the three CONUSAs are not uniform in their unit certification roles. All deploying RC units should be certified.

4. Discussion.

a. ARR commander, Staff, and Readiness Group personnel. It is estimated that during the period M+90-120 days, training assistance and certification requirements will lessen to the point that the ARR and RG will no longer be required. During this period, two courses of action appear feasible. There are:



(1) The CONUSA commander could phase out the ARR and RG depending upon requirements, reporting excess individuals available for reassignment. This alternative would allow a gradual phasing out of the ARR and RG, providing personnel for reassignment as available.

(2) The CONUSA commander, as directed by DA and FORSCOM, could use the ARR and RG as the cadre for division headquarters required for total mobilization. The staff of the ARR and RG are ideally suited for this purpose. In addition to having the necessary rank and branch orientation, they are thoroughly familiar with all aspects of training.

b. Advisors/Augmentees. Since these personnel are often key personnel in the unit with which they work, they should mobilize and/or deploy with their supported unit. Upon arrival in the theater and if in excess of unit requirements, they should be reassigned as normal overstrength personnel.

#### 5. Conclusions.

a. ARR personnel including RG personnel, will not be required after M+120 days.

b. Advisors will be of assistance to the unit commander during the mobilization and deployment process.

c. All units should be certified prior to deployment.

#### 6. Recommendations.

a. That ARR and RG personnel (less advisor/augmentees) be phased out not later than M+120 days and be reassigned IAW DA requirements.

b. That Advisors/Augmentees be assigned to the supported unit upon mobilization of that unit.

c. That the current mission and function statements for ARR's include provisions for certification of all deploying RC units.

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MOBILIZATION FUNCTIONS  
FOR THE  
COMMANDER AND STAFF  
OF AN ARR  
(INCLUDES RG, ADVISORS/AUGMENTEES)

1. Assume duties as Deputy Army Commander for Mobilization and Readiness on M-Day and assume operational control of ARCOM within geographical areas. (Note: Although Sixth Army does not specifically state the ARR-ARCOM OPCON relationship, it would exist de facto based upon geography.)
2. Deploy certification teams to mobilization stations. (Note: First Army does not plan to have teams closing at mobilization stations until M+30 (based on the assumption that units deploying through LAD so will not have time, nor be required, to go through a deployment certification process).)
3. Supervise and assist in the training programs of RC units and AC units other than division or corps units. (Accomplished by RG, SRAA and Readiness Coordinators. It is questionable how effectively assistance can be rendered after RG, or RG plus SRAA, form the certification teams (lack of assets may preclude assistance).)
4. Provide recommendations to CONUSA for the intra-installation reallocation or redistribution of assets as necessary. (Note: First Army does not require this.)
5. Certify the readiness of RC units and AC units, other than division or corps elements, for deployment. (Note: Units through LAD 30 are excluded from this process in First Army.)
6. Recommend changes to deployment dates as required. (Note: Sixth Army also tasks ARR/RG to recommend changes in mobilization dates as required.)
7. Continue assistance to non-mobilized units.

REFERENCES: FORSCOM Reg 10-42, RCMP, and CONUSA MOB Plans.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 18

RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES OF  
SELECTED FOREIGN NATIONS

RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES OF SELECTED  
FOREIGN COUNTRIES

1. Purpose. To provide information on the Reserve Component (RC) forces of Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom, identify differences in management and determine some practices which might be applicable to management of RC forces in the United States.

2. Facts/Discussion.

a. Missions.

(1) Canada. To provide:

(a) A pool from which company-size units and individuals may be drawn to augment regular units.

(b) A framework for a training base if full mobilization is followed by total mobilization.

(2) Germany. To provide:

(a) Predesignated fillers to bring all active service units to wartime authorized strength.

(b) Reserve units to furnish logistical support and rear area security.

(c) A pool of unassigned reservists for use as loss replacements.

(3) Israel. The primary mission of the reserves is to provide the force necessary to successfully prosecute a war.

(4) United Kingdom.

(a) Units: To provide the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) logistical support and rear area security, augment the UK Mobile Force, assist in maintaining a secure base, and provide a framework for expansion of the Army.

(b) Individuals: To provide prior service individuals to bring the active and reserve units to wartime authorized strength upon mobilization.

b. Procurement of reserves.

(1) Canada. No draft; RC service is voluntary, and

individuals may leave at will. There are local recruiting drives similar to those in the United States.

(2) Germany. Individuals are drafted as needed for 15 months of active service, though they may volunteer.

(3) Israel. Universal military service. Over 90% of the males and 50% of the females are inducted at age 18 for three years of active duty.

(4) United Kingdom. Service is voluntary, but once in the active force a total 12-year military obligation is incurred.

#### c. Training.

(1) Canada. Enlisted personnel are trained by their unit during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT). They may volunteer for a two-week basic training period and attend service schools if they desire. Participation in IDT and AT depend on the number of man-days allotted to the unit, normally about 60 days. Training standards are similar to the Regular Army, though equipment shortages and time limitations are considered.

(2) Germany. Individuals serve three months of basic and advanced individual training and then spend 12 months with a TOE unit, prior to obtaining "Reserve status." IDT is on an unpaid, voluntary basis only. Units perform AT with Active units. Active army is responsible for Reserve training.

(3) Israel. Initial three year active duty tours are designed to prepare a well trained base of RC personnel. There are no individual reserve pools as all personnel are assigned to units within three months of release from active duty. Training is rigorous, with meaningful hands-on training being emphasized. AT may be scheduled according to security needs. Reservists are obligated for one day of duty per month. Active army is responsible for the planning and conduct of AT; active equipment is used.

(4) United Kingdom. Initial training is conducted in the unit. The first 15-day AT is spent in basic training. Proficiency is measured against active standards. Up to 30 percent of trained enlisted men do not have to meet IDT and AT training obligations, if approved by the battalion commander.

The Ministry of Defense issues generalized training instructions which are similar to active training. Up to 70 percent of available training time in most reserve units is devoted to individual training. No training is provided in peacetime for individual reservists in the General Army Reserve.

d. RC management structure.

(1) Canada.

(a) Reserves are organized into 21 districts, commanded by reserve colonels, under five area headquarters, commanded by reserve brigadier generals. Full time AC manned; RC on drill status only.

(b) Approximately 100 combat units plus administration and service units; none larger than a battalion.

(c) Understructured and understrength.

(d) Reserve strength of 16,000 vs 24,000 in Active ground force units.

(e) Full-time Active Component Manning.

1 One officer and two enlisted at battalion.

2 One NCO at company.

3 Are rated by appropriate reserve commander.

(f) Short about one-half major equipment; Active force provides it for training.

(2) Germany.

(a) Two major components.

1 Field Army of three corps with divisions, separate brigades, and supporting units to support NATO.

2 Territorial Army which consists of brigades battalions, and smaller units for rear area security, logistical support of the Field Army and NATO forces.

3 Both brought to full strength with reservists on mobilization.

(b) Reserve units are subordinate to the next higher active service headquarters to which they are assigned on mobilization.

(c) Predesignated active army personnel to fill key positions on mobilization.

(d) Personnel processing accomplished in peacetime.

(e) Peacetime and wartime chain of command is the same.

(3) Israel.

(a) Units are of all arms and services and range in size up to division.

(b) 100 percent TOE equipped; equipment maintained in ready status.

(c) Reserve units are subordinate to the active area commander where their equipment is stored.

(d) No reserve chain of command.

(e) Active army cadre in units; 5-7% depending on type unit.

(f) Brigades and divisions commanded by active army or former high ranking active personnel.

(g) Administration centralized at battalion and higher levels.

(4) United Kingdom.

(a) Divided into ten military districts.

(b) Ground force reserve units are known as the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve (TAVR), consisting of Independent Units (IU) and Sponsored Units (SU).

(c) IU comprise bulk of TAVR.

1 Each IU has a Regular Army and civilian permanent staff.

2 Except for a small parachute brigade, the largest unit is a battalion.

3 Not uniformly organized or equipped; tailored to mobilization assignment.

4 Subordinate to the active service military district headquarters.

(d) SU.

1 Technical and specialist units based on civilian skills needed by the military.

2 No Armory or reserve center or permanent staff.

(e) Reserve Associations (including civilians) directly involved in reserve unit management.

e. Major differences from US Reserves.

(1) Use of active duty cadre and predesignated active duty personnel for reserve leadership positions.

(2) Reserve units are seldom larger than battalion.

(3) Few reserve positions higher than rank of Major, or command above battalion.

(4) Flexible training requirements.

(5) Longer reserve obligation after completion of active duty.

(6) Active retirees fill reserve command positions.

(7) In general, much closer active supervision of reserve training.

(8) Civilian equipment and services are prerequisite for reserve mobilization purposes in Germany and Israel.

(9) The US is the only country which does not assign Active Army personnel into reserve units in peacetime, nor predesignate Active Army fillers for Reserve units. Also:



(a) Active Army does not control peacetime training as in Germany and Israel.

(b) The only country maintaining Federal forces (National Guard) in peacetime for national defense, yet controlled by provincial authorities (governors).

(c) Except for Canada, is the only country which permits reserve officers to attain general officer rank without active duty experience.

f. A summary of the major features of Army reserve systems, extracted from the Heymont report is attached (Incl 1).

### 3. Conclusions.

a. The two countries with the greatest perceived threat, Germany and Israel, use retired personnel as active reservists, which keeps reserve strength and training at a higher level.

b. Only Israel has practiced mobilization of its reserve forces. Germany has frequent practice alerts, which are essential in that reservists do not regularly perform IDT.

c. Utilizing Active or former high ranking active personnel in reserve command positions would enhance unit performance.

d. Where reserves would be deployed in combat (Canada has no plans to deploy reserve units), all administrative and logistical functions should be accomplished in peacetime. The same policy should apply in the US, where hundreds of man-years would be devoted to post-mobilization non-combat functions.

e. Flexible training standards and requirements should be incentives to recruitment or retention of US reserves.

f. The practice of reserves training on active installations with active equipment would enhance the US RC readiness.

### 4. Recommendations.

a. Utilization of active or recently retired personnel in full-time, TOE or TDA positions in lieu of reserve personnel

b. Increase the period of reserve obligation for discharged active personnel.

c. Consider modifying rigid RC training requirements. Allow commanders more flexibility in determining training needs of their units.

d. Consolidate administration at battalion level to allow units to use more available time for training.

e. Utilization of active equipment, where practical, should be implemented. Units with computers or specialized intelligence or signal equipment should be further considered for such a program.

f. Be realistic concerning the One-Army concept. For training evaluation, accept the fact that many RC units are underequipped and have too little time to actually attain active standards.

g. Tax benefits (United Kingdom) and AT pay based on civilian salaries (Israel and Germany) should be considered as retention incentives for the US RC.

#### 5. References.

Goldrich, Robert L., The Applicability of Selected Foreign Military Reserve Practices to the Reserve Practices of the U.S. Reserves: Proposals Based on the Reserve Forces of the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel and the U.S.S.R., The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Jan 78.

Heymont, Irving, Report CR-180, Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of Israel, Canada, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands, General Research Corporation, McLean, VA, May 1977.

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# MAJOR FEATURES OF ARMY RESERVE SYSTEMS

Factor	Israel	Canada	United Kingdom	Federal Republic of Germany
GENERAL ORGANIZATION				
Units				
Mission	Front-line combat and logistical	Non-deploying combat and logistical	Rear Area security and logistical	Rear area security and logistical
Largest size	Division	Battalion	Battalion	Battalion
Service	Compulsory of age 41 for first line units	Voluntary	Voluntary, upper age varies with rank and arm/service	Compulsory for about six years or less
Active army cadre	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not applicable <sup>a</sup>
Prodigiously active army personnel	Yes	No	No	Yes
Individual Reservists				
Mission	None	Fillers for active units	Fillers for all units	Fillers for active units replacements
Service		Voluntary	Voluntary and compulsory for on-active service PM for total service of 12 years	Compulsory to age 32 for PM, 45 for RCOs, 60 for officers
Total reserves as operational reserve in full mobilization				
TRAINING OF RESERVE UNITS				
Active duty (days)	31-36 per year, officers and RCOs 7 days more	80-85 percent	40 percent	Over 30 percent
Inactive duty (days)	Average 1 day per month, not unit training	7-14 per year	15 per year (overseas once every 3 years)	6-12 every 10 months
Inactive duty (days)				
Active army control	Yes	No	No	None except voluntary
Mobilization exercises	Yes	No	No	Yes
INITIAL TRAINING OF RESERVISTS				
Enlisted men	3 years active duty	2 weeks and then with reserve unit	2 weeks and then with reserve unit	15 months active
Officers	Includes one year of active duty	No active duty requirement	No active duty requirement	Includes 3 months of active duty
UNIT EQUIPMENT				
	Maintained by unit not for war use. Not used in training.	Divided between unit and depots. Used in training	Divided between unit and depots; some in deployment area. Used in training.	Maintained by unit act. Not used in training. Issue to be replaced by those from civilian sources

<sup>a</sup> Units not named in parenthesis except during active duty for training

Both units are described in App E

<sup>c</sup> Applies only to independent units (see App C)

**ANNEX F**

**APPENDIX 19**

**COMMAND AND CONTROL: RC**

**UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS**

## COMMAND AND CONTROL OF RC UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS

1. Purpose. This study describes the current command and control arrangements for mobilizing RC units and for the installations at which they mobilize. The study also describes alternative, improved, command and control arrangements.
2. References. See Inclosure 1.
3. Glossary of Terms. See Volume III, "Glossary."
4. The Problem. The General Accounting Office (GAO), in its April 25, 1979 report (reference 5) succinctly described the problem by stating that the HQ FORSCOM "...span of control is so great during peacetime [with 53 subordinate commands, including 17 CONUS installations], that it must rely on management by exception. The scope of its responsibilities becomes even greater during the transition from peacetime to wartime operations, as it assumes command of [3,300] Army National Guard units, executes deployment plans for Active component units and supervises the mobilization and deployment of the Reserves. As a result, the need to rely on subordinate commanders to accomplish the day-to-day supervision of operations will continue and probably increase following mobilization."
5. Defining Command and Control. There is no accepted definition of command and control that satisfactorily describes the framework within which CONUS commanders operate. For this study, therefore, command and control is defined as the authority and capability to accomplish the following:
  - a. Control and supervision of forces
  - b. Training
  - c. Personnel management
  - d. Logistics management
  - e. Resource management (manpower and funding).

If any of the above features cannot be accomplished in a particular circumstance, then the commander or headquarters exercises "command and control minus (the missing feature)." It is important to understand and to accept this definition because, as this study will show, unfettered command and control can only be exercised at a few key nodes in the Army's structure: all other commanders are capable only of exercising "command and control minus."

6. Current Relationships. Current CONUS mobilization command and control relationships focus basically on two categories of RC units (employing and deploying units), the two AC corps, and 50 mobilization station installations (the term mobilization station and installation are used interchangeably in this study).

a. Employing units are those RC units that remain in the CONUS following mobilization and which are employed by CONUS MACOM. These units are commanded in peacetime by CONUSA and MUSARC (USAR units) or by Governors, through State military headquarters (ARNG units). Upon being ordered to active duty the ARNG units are assigned to CONUSA, but STARC have OPCON of the ARNG units for movement to mobilization stations. The STARC are also assigned to CONUSA. CONUSA transfer the ARNG units to the gaining MACOM concurrently with ordering them to active duty, however the CONUSA retain OPCON of the units, for purposes of movement, until the units close at the mobilization stations. For USAR units (which are commanded by CONUSA in peacetime), the CONUSA also transfer the units to the gaining MACOM concurrently with ordering them to active duty; as with the ARNG units, however, CONUSA retain OPCON of the units, for purpose of movement, until the units close at the mobilization stations. These relationships are prescribed by reference 1. The ARR commanders are, on M-Day, designated as CONUSA Deputy Commanders for Mobilization and Readiness (references 12-14). As such, they have the authority to exercise the OPCON for movement, described above, through the MUSARC and STARC. Upon closure at the mobilization stations the CONUSA/ARR/STARC OPCON relationships end and units are subject to unfettered command and control by the MACOM's installation commanders (see references 2, 7 and 10).

b. Deploying units are those RC units that have a post-mobilization mission outside the CONUS. Pre-M-Day command and control of deploying units is the same as was described above for employing units. For post-mobilization

command and control, the only differences from the procedures described for the employed units are that--

(1) Units are attached to mobilization station commanders rather than MACOM.

(2) CONUSA transfer to ARCOM the non-organic USAR units which mobilize later than their non-ARCOM MUSARC headquarters (e.g., units attached to Training Divisions in peacetime are transferred to ARCOM on M-Day).

c. Command relationships for AC corps and divisions are relatively straightforward. III Corps directly commands two divisions, its corps troops (less Corps Artillery) and Ft. Hood. Corps Artillery, at Ft. Sill, is handled through Ft. Sill--a TRADOC installation. XVIII Airborne Corps directly commands the 82d Airborne Division, its corps troops and Ft. Bragg; the corps has an OPCON relationship for training and contingency planning for the 101st Air Assault Division, which directly commands Ft. Campbell. The Corps have authority commensurate with responsibility for their units that are collocated on the installations commanded by the Corps. Relationships with elements located at Forts Sill and Campbell, however, are not so clear-cut. The commanders of those installations report directly to their parent MACOM (TRADOC and FORSCOM, respectively) in the installation management chain (reference 7) and to MILPERCEN and DARCOM elements in the personnel and equipment areas.

d. The mobilization stations, which are commanded by their parent MACOM, command all deployable units that have closed at those installations (reference 1).

(1) Installations control cross-leveling of personnel through their Military Personnel Office (MILPO) and the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).

(2) Control of logistic assets is more complicated, however, than personnel. Uncovered POMCUS is a term used to describe equipment left behind by units that deploy to Europe to POMCUS stocks. Uncovered RICC-1 selected POMCUS items are DARCOM assets; all other uncovered POMCUS items are installation assets. Installations may allocate their equipment to deploying or non-deploying units in accordance with HQDA priority lists (DAMPL or PMDL) and they report excess equipment to DARCOM agencies. HQ DARCOM provides shipping or cross-leveling instructions to installations for the selected RICC-1 items (see reference 4) and items reported as excess.

(3) Funds, and fund control, are handled directly between MACOM and installations (see references 7, 15, 16 and 17).

e. On M-Day the CONUSA Commanders are designated as FORSCOM Deputy Commanders for Mobilization and Readiness and as FORSCOM "executive agent for the training of mobilized RC units." (Reference 1, pp 13-14). This appointment makes the CONUSA commanders, inter alia, responsible to:

(1) Exercise FORSCOM supervision of post-mobilization training of RC units at mobilization stations.

(2) Certify the readiness for deployment of mobilized RC units and non-divisional AC units.

(3) Implement materiel redistribution actions at FORSCOM installations (for other than uncovered POMCUS selected RICC-1 items) as directed by FORSCOM and in coordination with DARCOM. (Neither reference 1 nor any other reference provides authority for CONUSA commanders to redistribute materiel on non-FORSCOM installations. Additionally, reference 1 does not provide definitive instructions for redistribution of personnel.)

f. Although the three CONUSA have mobilization plans, or other instructions, which designate ARR Commanders as CONUSA Deputy Commanders for Mobilization and Readiness in their respective geographic areas, the details of the CONUSA instructions vary based upon interpretation of reference 1 and the approach of each CONUSA commander to meet his responsibilities. The result is, however, that ARR have the authority to control all RC units, to include MUSARC and STARC, between units' M-Day and closure at the mobilization stations. The ARR Commanders, in their CONUSA Deputy Commander role, have also been tasked to conduct training supervision of mobilized RC units at the mobilization stations and to certify units as ready for deployment.

7. Problems Caused by Current Relationships. There have been long-standing problems involving command and control procedures for mobilization. The fundamentals of centralized planning and decentralized execution have not been easy to apply to the thousands of units which operate in peacetime in the AC and both elements of the RC, yet converge as AC elements at 50, or so mobilization stations.



a. The term "command through installations" has been used to accommodate the relationship of CONUSA and mobilization stations. Under this concept (references 1 and 5), the CONUSA commander executed authority over installations in matters relating to the Reserve's mobilization and deployment, but had no responsibility, nor complete authority for installation management or the deployment of AC units--the chain of command continued to be from the appropriate MACOM directly to the installation. This has proved to be an awkward and ill-defined relationship. As a result of a HQDA decision (reference 6), HQ FORSCOM conducted a test, during MOBEX 78, of a new CONUSA-Installation relationship--

"Upon closure at mobilization stations, Reserve Component units will be attached or assigned to the installation. CONUSA will act as Deputy Commanding General, Forces Command, for post-mobilization training and deployment readiness." (Reference 5-reference 1 also applies).

b. Results of this test show that it did little to clarify the situation. The CONUSA relationship with installations was still ill-defined. Further, the CONUSA compounded the confusion by designating the ARR as CONUSA Deputies (references 12-14)--the ARR, at least in theory, had some authoritative relationship with the installations (e.g., review and concurrence authority for mobilization plans, review of deployment support plans, supervision of post-mobilization training of mobilized deploying units and certification of units for deployment).

c. The wording of the authority and responsibility assigned by reference 4, and thus authority and responsibility expressed in reference 1, is relatively broad and general in nature. As a result, FORSCOM's subordinate, and lateral, commands have ample opportunity for interpretation--or misinterpretations. Other key regulations and instructions affected by reference 6 have, in general, not been updated to reflect the May 1978 HQDA decisions (e.g., references 2 and 10). Both the GAO (reference 5) and HQDA (reference 8) concluded, based upon MOBEX 78, that there is confusion concerning command and control responsibilities at CONUSA and installation level.

d. The HQDA May 1978 approval of selected FORSCOM recommendations (reference 6) placed significant new responsibilities on the CONUSA. At the same time, HQDA disapproved

recommendations for additional manpower authorizations for the CONUSA and ARR and for development of Management Information Systems (MIS) for CONUSA to effectively discharge their newly-assigned duties (reference 6).

(1) The CONUSA attempted to compensate for the HQDA disapproval of the recommendation for additional manpower by planning for increased employment of ARR, RG and ARCOM assets in performing the new post-M-Day tasks (references 12-14). However, there has been no action taken by HQDA to formally protect the ARR, RG or ARCOM assets from drawdown during mobilization.

(2) Peacetime management of personnel and materiel resources is accomplished in "vertical" channels between installations and HQDA "operators"--MILPERCEN and DARCOM agencies such as Materiel Readiness Commands/National Inventory Control Points, respectively. The MIS that support these vertical arrangements (basically the SIDPERS and SAILS systems) have been designed for the current vertical (installation to HQDA operators) management systems. Financial management follows the HQDA-MACOM-Installation chain of command and is supported by the STANFINS MIS. As this description shows, CONUSA are not directly involved in the normal flow of information or decision-making for personnel, materiel or financial management--it should be noted, however, that CONUSA participate "off-line" with FORSCOM HQ in an advisory capacity for USAR financial management. Neither CONUSA nor FORSCOM HQ are in the decision-making path for personnel or materiel management. FORSCOM HQ makes its priorities and preferences for personnel and logistics known to the HQDA operating agencies, but decisions and operating directives in these areas are handled in the HQDA-to-Installation vertical systems. After-the-fact status reports in the personnel and logistics fields are provided to HQ FORSCOM (and other MACOM)--these reports are, generally, provided on a monthly (personnel) or quarterly (logistics) basis.

(3) Current DA MIS supporting installation "BASOPS" functions, and planned MIS for RC management (e.g., CONUS Army MIS--CAMIS), do not provide the CONUSA or ARR information concerning personnel or logistics status of units at mobilization stations. The WWMCCS Entry System (WES) has not yet been extended to all mobilization stations. When WES is extended, the FORSCOM WWMCCS computer systems probably will not have the capacity to support CONUSA demands for information, nor

will there be terminals for the ARR. (These conclusions are based on ACCS-82 interviews at FORSCOM, CONUSA and ARR).

(a) No intermediate headquarters between HQDA (and its agencies--MILPERCEN and DARCOM elements) and installations can exercise effective redistribution of personnel or materiel for mobilization without additional MIS development or expansion and unless changes to centralized HQDA control of such assets are made. Later explanations in this study support the conclusion that such changes should not be made.

(b) Unless CONUSA are actively involved with installation MIS and their associated data bases in peacetime, it is unreasonable to expect that the CONUSA could successfully begin their involvement--from a "cold start"--during the confusion of mobilization. Further, there is no compelling reason to involve the CONUSA with installations MIS in peacetime. In fact, Operation STEADFAST took the CONUSA out of the installation management chain to create improved over-all Army operating efficiencies through the vertical management systems.

(4) Although FORSCOM has assigned to CONUSA the responsibility for training the mobilized RC units and redistributing their logistic assets to meet deployment schedules, the CONUSA do not have the authority of direct command over either the units (after they arrive at mobilization stations) or all mobilization stations (see reference 1). As was seen earlier, redistribution of personnel and materiel is controlled by HQDA and, thus, FORSCOM's tasking to the CONUSA appears to be inappropriate.

(a) FORSCOM attempted to provide CONUSA with requisite authority by designating the CONUSA Commanders as FORSCOM Deputy Commanders (reference 1). While this provides the CONUSA with authority to command the 25 FORSCOM installations (17 FORSCOM active installations and eight installations that are State-operated in peacetime but transferred to FORSCOM after M-Day), it does nothing for the relationship of the CONUSA with the 25 mobilization stations assigned to other MACOM. Further, the CONUSA have delegated authority to the ARR by designating ARR Commanders as CONUSA Deputy Commanders for Mobilization and Readiness (references 12-14). This expedient has further confused command and control relationships between CONUSA, mobilization stations and units.

(b) Installations are commanded by MACOM (reference 7). Installation commanders have authority over, and responsibility for, mobilized RC units assigned or attached to the installation (reference 2). However, in the area of training the installation commanders' responsibilities are not clear-cut.

Reference 1--

(1) Directs the mobilization station commander to provide "...required training and other facilities support to mobilized units..." (page 8).

(2) Provides "each mobilizing RC unit will be 'assigned' to a MACOM and normally 'attached' to an installation/activity without qualification or for specified purposes. The installation/activity to which a unit is 'attached' will normally be the mobilizing units mobilization station." (page L-3), and,

(3) States that "During the post-mobilization period, CONUSA will command all mobilized Reserve Component units within geographical area of responsibility except those transferred to other MACOM or assigned to installations. Upon closure at mobilization stations Reserve Component units will be attached or assigned to the installation. CONUSA will act as DCG FORSCOM for post-mobilization training and deployment readiness." (page R-1).

(4) Directs the CONUSA Commanders to act as the "...FORSCOM executive agent for training of mobilized Reserve Component units on Mobilization Stations within geographic area of responsibility..." (page 13).

However, reference 10 (page 2-1) directs the installation commanders to, "organize, train and equip all assigned and attached units and individuals to perform assigned missions." Intra-installation redistribution of equipment also provides a potential for conflict: Reference 1 (page 14) tells the CONUSA Commander to "...implement necessary redistribution actions..." but it also describes (Annex Q) installation commander responsibilities that are consistent with the vertical system described earlier. The potential for conflicts in training and redistribution of assets exist because authority for these activities is "given" to CONUSA, ARR and installation commanders.

c. Mobilization stations commanded by MACOM other than FORSCOM must respond to FORSCOM in matters pertaining to readying units for deployment (references 1 and 4). These mobilization stations are also responsible for missions and functions assigned by their parent MACOM (reference 7 and a variety of directives from MACOM). A current lack of clear-cut guidance from HQDA concerning priorities for allocating resources between deploying units and elements of the training and mobilization base of the Army creates a serious potential for conflicts for these non-FORSCOM commanders.

d. Inclosure 2 describes current authority and relationships for command and control as defined by this study.

#### 8. Recommendations

a. Having identified the foregoing problems, it is obvious that some changes to the current system are in order. However, the recommendations that follow are evolutionary, not revolutionary, because it appears that the current system provides an excellent basis for operations.

b. The primary objective of the Army's command and control system during mobilization is to bring the mobilized RC deploying units, and deploying AC units, to levels of manning, equipment, POR/POM, and training necessary to satisfy deployment criteria outlined in references 2-4. ACCS-82 concluded that, in general, procedures for deploying AC units are satisfactory. Therefore, the recommendations for changing the current systems and procedures that follow address primarily the activities involving mobilized RC units.

c. Two fundamental changes must be made at the HQDA level:

(1) HQDA, not FORSCOM, should control the planning for mobilization. Included in this control is a requirement for a comprehensive Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS).

(2) HQDA must provide unequivocal guidance to installation commanders concerning priorities for redistribution and cross-leveling of assets.

d. Command and control responsibility for, and authority over units--AC, RC and mobilized RC--must be clear-cut. Conditions for defining command relationships must be clearly articulated with regard to responsibilities and authority, time and geography. Terms such as "Executive Agent for..." and "Deputy Commander for..." should be avoided or explicitly

defined to ensure that relationships avoid conflicts, overlaps or shortcomings. Additionally, care must be exercised with regard to terminology--the specific responsibility and authority associated with the terms "assign," or "operational control" (reference 18) must be clearly understood and adhered to--non-standard and vague terminology must be avoided.

(1) Installation commanders should, generally, exercise command and control over units located on their installations. For certain units, such as those of "stove-pipe" agencies (HSC, ACC, CIDC), the technique of "host-supported" agreements (reference 11) is appropriate.

(2) Command and control of RC units prior to M-Day should continue as now specified:

(a) ARNG units are commanded by State Governors.

(b) USAR units are command by CONUSA.

(3) Upon, and following mobilization, command and control of RC units should be as follows:

(a) Non-mobilized units continue the relationships specified in the preceding paragraph.

(b) Mobilized ARNG units are assigned to CONUSA on M-Day, less OPCON for movement from home stations to mobilization stations.

(c) CONUSA command of USAR units is modified to reflect "less OPCON for movement from home stations to mobilization stations."

(d) STARC, which are assigned to CONUSA upon their mobilization, are charged with exercising OPCON of mobilized ARNG units (from their States) for movement from home stations to mobilization stations. The OPCON is terminated when each unit, or element thereof, arrives at the mobilization station and the unit is attached to the installation with the modification, "plus authority for transfer and promotion of personnel."

(e) MUSARC, which are assigned to CONUSA, are charged with exercising OPCON of mobilized USAR units (from their command) for movement from home stations to

mobilization stations. The OPCON is terminated when each unit, or element thereof, arrives at the mobilization station and the unit is attached to the installation with the modification, "plus authority for transfer and promotion of personnel.

(4) The procedures outlined above place installation commanders clearly in command of units on their installations. However, the role of the CONUSA, ARR and RG should also be clearly specified.

(a) CONUSA provide FORSCOM the means for decentralization of responsibility during mobilization--a step that is definitely required. The relationship between CONUSA and installations must be clearly articulated to eliminate the current confusion in the system. As was indicated above, personnel and logistical transactions are "two-player" operations--they involve installations and HQDA "operators." Funding matters are also "two-player" operations--they involve installations and MACOM; however, CONUSA are involved in an advisory capacity. To provide the minimum command and control redundancy considered prudent to assure the Army's capability to conduct successful mobilization and deployment, certain modifications to the current system are required. CONUSA need to have the capability to perform an integrating and coordinating function for mobilization stations within their areas. It is possible, based on the experience of MOBEX 76 and 78, that the vertical management systems--and the communications systems--will be overwhelmed by the volume of transactions during the early phases of mobilization. The CONUSA provide an "escape valve" for these systems. However, the CONUSA must have more information than is now available to them if they are to be successful as escape valves. The technique which would provide the CONUSA a full-scale capability in this area is to include the CONUSA in the SAILS, SIDPERS and STANFINS MIS in peacetime and wartime. Not only must ADPE and "software" be provided, but also peacetime manpower resources to build and maintain the data bases involved with the various MIS. An alternate solution--which is recommended at this time because it can be done quickly and with few resources--involves two steps.

-- HQDA "operators" provide "rollup" displays of installation asset status to HQ FORSCOM in peacetime. FORSCOM uses the rollup data to provide recommendations to HQDA (and its operators) for shifting of priorities and and assets between installations. The rollups are also

provided to CONUSA to hold for use as a "starting point" in the event of mobilization.

-- Upon mobilization, installations provide simple daily SITREPs to the CONUSA -- the SITREP would include data concerning on-hand, "over/short" status for major equipment, personnel and funds and projected training shortfalls for units. After the initial report, installations report changes only. The SITREP should be designed by HQ FORSCOM (in conjunction with other MACOM, installations and CONUSA) and sufficient peacetime training exercises should be conducted to familiarize personnel with the SITREP procedures. IF, and only when, the vertical management systems (SIDPERS, SAILS and STANFINS) are overwhelmed, the CONUSA can use the SITREP information to make decisions and recommendations. Until the vertical systems fail, however, the CONUSA relationship with installations in the resource management field is purely monitorship of readiness and SITREP data -- this is done only to prepare the CONUSA to exercise OPCON over installations for management of resources for deployment in the event that the centralized management systems fail. When HQDA determines that centralized management of resources can no longer be accomplished, HQDA will notify the MACOM that CONUSA will temporarily assume OPCON of installations for redistribution of personnel, logistic and financial resources for purposes of meeting readiness for deployment of units. In the interests of simplicity and timeliness, CONUSA will inform HQ FORSCOM (with information copies provided to the affected installations and HQDA "operators") that "Unless otherwise directed, the following redistribution actions will be taken at (date-time-group) . . ." To assist in this redistribution action, the CONUSA should position on-site representatives (liaison teams) at each mobilization station.

-- The CONUSA should have limited OPCON, as specified below, of all mobilization stations for RC unit mobilization planning and for coordination of the execution of RC unit mobilization.

-- CONUSA should be the single point of contact for RC unit mobilization planning within their geographic areas of responsibility.

-- This includes CONUSA authority to:

-- Provide RC unit planning guidance as directed by HQ FORSCOM and in coordination with the States' Adjutants General/State Area Commands (TAG/STARC).



-- In coordination with mobilization stations, establish schedules and milestones for RC unit inputs to mobilization stations.

-- Review of installation mobilization plans as they pertain to RC units.

-- Plans from FORSCOM installations are forwarded by the installation directly to the appropriate CONUSA for review, concurrence and forwarding to FORSCOM for approval.

-- Plans prepared by other MACOM installations (less Health Services Command (HSC) are forwarded by the installation to the appropriate CONUSA for review and concurrence. Plans are then forwarded to the installations' MACOM for approval. If nonconcurrence cannot be resolved between the mobilization station and the CONUSA, or between the MACOM and FORSCOM, the nonconcurrence will be forwarded to HQDA (DAMO) for resolution.

-- This includes CONUSA responsibility to:

-- Assist mobilization stations in coordinating with RC units and major RC headquarters.

-- Provide timely planning guidance to the RC.

-- Provide appropriate RC unit data (including movement data) and support requirements to the mobilization stations.

-- Ensure coordination of mobilization planning between installations and RC units.

-- Assist and instruct RC units in home-station mobilization procedures.

-- CONUSA should be the single point of control and coordination for mobilization execution for RC units within their geographic area of responsibility.

-- This includes CONUSA authority to:

-- Modify stationing guidance, as required, based on directives from HQ FORSCOM.

-- Order execution of RC unit mobilization plans as directed by HQ FORSCOM.

-- In coordination with HQ FORSCOM, insure that CI/SI (AR 5-9) accomplish tasks that support mobilized units. This does not include authority to task non-FORSCOM installations for assets or resources without prior coordination with the appropriate MACOM.

-- Modify movement schedules for mobilized units between home stations and mobilization stations in coordination with the appropriate MACOM

-- Modify RC unit mobilization plans and unit mobilization support requirements data sheets, as required, based on HQ FORSCOM guidance.

-- This includes CONUSA responsibility to:

-- Modify and execute plans for domestic contingencies and military support for civil defense based on HQ FORSCOM guidance.

-- Assist mobilizing units through subordinate commands in the execution of home-station procedures.

-- Assist RC units with identification of support requirements for mobilizing units.

-- Assist mobilization stations in providing support to mobilizing units.

In addition to the relationships described above for CONUSA and Installations, the CONUSA must clearly describe relationships with--and between--STARC and for the CONUSA Deputy Commanders (i.e., the ARR Commanders).

-- Peacetime analysis of a particular CONUSA's span of control for STARC should result in regional grouping of STARC under designated STARC--a "STARC-Group" concept. CONUSA could then decentralize the STARC activities of moving mobilized units to mobilization stations, controlling mobilized units that have not begun movement and conducting MSCD and LSSF missions.

-- The aforementioned peacetime analysis of the CONUSA span of control should also result in a determination of the specific roles that Deputy Commanders (if any) should have. There are fundamentally two options for the CONUSA: (1) The Deputy may be assigned to take all CONUSA actions within a specified geographic region, or (2) The Deputy may be assigned the mission of acting for the CONUSA on an "as required" basis (i.e., use the Deputy as a "troubleshooter" to handle problems on a case-by-case basis).

(b) The ARR headquarters should continue assistance for non-mobilized RC units to the extent possible. Further, they provide a source for CONUSA to use to man their installation liaison teams.

(c) The RG should form teams (similar to CAMI/MART) to assist the installation commanders in preparing units for deployment. These teams should be attached to the installations.

e. While at mobilization stations RC units must:

- (1) Complete required unit training.
- (2) Fill required equipment shortages.
- (3) Fill required personnel shortages.
- (4) Complete POR/POM.

f. Completion of required unit training.

(1) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment training readiness for units. Also shown are the headquarters and/or organizations in the current structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

(a) Determine training status--units, CAMI/MART and Installation (DPT).

(b) Determine training program--units, CAMI/MART and Installation (DPT).

(c) Determine, and coordinate, assistance required beyond capability of unit or installation--CAMI/MART, Installation (DPT), ARR HQ.

(d) Conduct training--units, assisted by CAMI/MART and Installation (DPT).

(e) Report status and progress for purposes of training management and deployment planning--units, assisted by CAMI/MART and Installation (DPT).

(f) Certify training readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARR HQ, CAMI/MART and Installation (PPT)).

(2) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment equipment readiness for units. Also shown are headquarters and/or organizations in the current structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

(a) Determine status of on-hand equipment--units, assisted by CAMI/MART and Installation (DIO).

(b) Verify equipment requirements--units and Installation (DIO).

(c) Repair and/or turn-in (job order) equipment--units and Installations (DIO).

(d) Determine equipment shortages--units and Installation (DIO).

(e) Issue available equipment--Installation (DIO).

(f) Requisition equipment shortages--units and Installations (DIO).

(g) Report status and progress for purposes of deployment planning--units and Installation (DIO/DPT).

(h) Certify equipment readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARR HQ and Installation (DIO)).

(3) The following basic steps are involved in achieving predeployment personnel readiness for units. Also shown are headquarters and/or organizations in the current structure that appear best qualified to accomplish each step.

(a) Update personnel inventory--units.

(b) Verify requirements--units and Installation (MILPO).

(c) Reassign non-deployable personnel--Installation (MILPO).

(d) Make grade/MOS substitutions--units and Installation (MILPO).

(e) Determine personnel shortages--units and Installation (MILPO).

(f) Make intra-installation reassignments (cross-level)--Installation (MILPO).

(g) Requisition personnel shortages--Installation (MILPO).

(h) Report status and progress for deployment planning--units and Installation (MILPO/DPCA/DPT).

(i) Certify personnel readiness for deployment--CONUSA (assisted by ARR HQ, CAMI/MART and Installation (DPCA)).

(4) Preparation of replacements for overseas movement (POR) and unit preparation for overseas movement (POM) are generally "two-player" activities involving units and installations. The CONUSA representatives should monitor accomplishment of POR/POM processing in order to assess overall progress toward readiness for deployment.

9. Command and Control Arrangements for ACCS-82 Alternatives.

a. Alternative 1. Apply the recommendations contained in paragraph 8, above.

b. Alternative 2B. Apply the recommendations contained in paragraph 8, above, with the following exception/addition:

(1) Corps Commanders have responsibility and authority to control and supervise forces and to plan, direct and evaluate training for all units assigned or attached to the corps.

(2) When mobilization begins, command of designated installations is assumed by ARCOM commanders upon deployment

of the AC commander or ten days after the ARCOM HQ closes at the installation (whichever occurs first), or as may be designated by the FORSCOM commander.

c. Alternative 3A. Apply the recommendations contained in paragraph 8, above, with the following modifications:

(1) Corps commanders have responsibility and authority to control and supervise forces and to plan, direct and evaluate training for all units assigned or attached to the corps.

(2) ARR HQ and selected MUSARC (ARCOM) are eliminated and REDMOB are activated in their place.

(3) Peacetime command of USAR units is accomplished in a chain of command from CONUSA-to-REDMOB-to USAR units.

(4) Control of mobilized RC units is accomplished by--

(a) Assigning mobilized ARNG units and STARC to REDMOB rather than CONUSA, and

(b) Having REDMOB, rather than CONUSA, command USAR units.

(5) REDMOB are substituted for CONUSA in the role of "escape valves" in the event the Army's vertical management systems fail to function. The CONUSA serve as integrating and coordinating elements for their subordinate REDMOB.

(6) During completion of required unit training, the REDMOB are substituted for ARR.

(7) The REDMOB serve as CONUSA representatives to monitor accomplishment of POR/POM.

(8) During mobilization, the REDMOB (except REDMOB X at PSF) assume command of the installation on which they are located. Command of Ft. Devens and FIG are assumed immediately on M-Day; command of the remaining installations is effective upon deployment of the major AC unit or earlier if approved by the FORSCOM commander.

d. Alternative 4. Apply the recommendations contained in paragraph 8, above, with the following modifications:

(1) CONUSA and ARR HQ are eliminated--three additional Corps HQ are formed--each of the five corps have a non-deployable element--the corps perform all functions previously performed by CONUSA and ARR HQ.

(2) Corps, rather than CONUSA, command the USAR units and supervise the training of ARNG units. Corps also command the RG.

(3) Upon mobilization ARNG units and the STARC are assigned to corps--STARC have OPCON of mobilized ARNG units and MUSARC have OPCON of mobilized USAR units--OPCON terminates when units arrive at mobilization stations and--

(a) Employing units are assigned to the gaining MACOM or (if they remain FORSCOM units) to a headquarters designated by the Corps Commander.

(b) Deploying units either continue the assignment to their corps or, if they cross corps boundaries, they are assigned to the mobilization station upon their arrival.

(4) Major AC units are commanded by corps. Where appropriate, an OPCON relationship for specific, narrowly defined purposes is established between corps units and the installations upon which they are located. For example, "OPCON for the assignment of school training support missions, to the extent that unit readiness is not degraded," is given to the following installation commanders for the units shown:

- (a) Ft. Sill - III Corps Artillery
- (b) Ft. Bliss - 11 ADA Brigade
- (c) Ft. Benning - 197 Infantry Brigade
- (d) Ft. Knox - 194 Arm Brigade

(5) MACOM continue their command of installations:

(a) Installations control cross-leveling of personnel through the installation MILPO interacting with MILPERCEN.

(b) The corps assumes responsibility and authority for cross-leveling of equipment. The corps interacts with DARCOM regarding uncovered RICC-1 assets, and with installations for redistribution of other uncovered POMCUS equipment.

(c) Resources (funds) management is an installation responsibility. Corps monitor funds management and provide information and guidance as required for funds related to unit training and readiness.

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
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RC Units and Installations

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ANNEX F

APPENDIX 20

STATE AREA COMMAND (STARC)

MISSIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CAPABILITIES

State Area Command (STARC): Missions, Responsibilities  
and Capabilities

1. Purpose. The purpose of this analysis is to describe the missions, responsibilities and capabilities of the STARC during transition and wartime and to analyze peacetime training requirements.

2. Facts/Discussion.

a. As defined in AR 135-300, a State Area Command (STARC) is a mobilization entity within the ARNG State headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD) that is ordered to active duty when ARNG units in that State are alerted for mobilization. The organization provides for command and control of mobilized ARNGUS units from home station (HS) until arrival at mobilization station (MS). The STARC is also responsible for planning and executing military support for civil defense and land defense plans under the respective area commander.

b. A brief examination of the alert, mobilization and movement process involving ARNG will put the STARC into perspective.

(1) HQDA prepares the alert order to active duty utilizing the appropriate message format and issues it to the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB).

(a) The CNGB transmits the alert notice by the most expeditious means available to the State governors through the State adjutants general who in turn alerts the appropriate ARNGUS units.

(b) Area Commanders (CONUSA) order the STARC to active duty in States in which ARNG units are being alerted for active duty. This order to active duty is on the same day that ARNGUS units in the State are alerted for order to active duty. The Commander, STARC will report directly to the CONUSA.

(c) Upon official announcement by the Secretary of the Army, the Commander, STARC will order the Selective Service Section, State HHD to active duty for assignment to the State Headquarters of Selective Service in their respective States.

(d) STARC will issue advance orders to active duty to ARNGUS personnel required to assist with the alerted units' administrative processing, payment of troops, and personnel

designated to attend schools.

(2) Upon receipt of an alert, unit commanders will update movement plans in accordance with specific instructions and will coordinate with the STARC for movement of their units.

(a) Supporting Installations (SI) will assist STARC in planning and executing movements.

1 The National Guard Bureau (NGB) All-States letter of 17 May 1978, subject: Revision of State HHD--State Area Command (STARC) states:

"Responsible for movement of mobilized units from home station to mobilization station, or from home station to port of embarkation."

2 AR 135-300, paragraph 2-9c, states:

"Supporting installations will assist USAR units and STARC in planning and executing movements,..."

3 AR 135-300, paragraph 3-6b(7), states:

"...The STARC will exercise command and control over mobilized ARNGUS units in the State and will provide, within its capabilities, the required administrative, movements, and logistic support for those units from home station until arrival at mobilization station (includes dealing directly with MTMC area command and submitting required expedited movement report..."

4 The above citations indicate that the STARC is responsible for planning and executing movements of mobilizing ARNGUS units. Should assistance be required, the STARC would request that assistance from the appropriate supporting installation.

(b) STARC deal directly with the MTMC area command.

(3) CONUSA transmit the order to active duty for ARNGUS units to the respective State adjutants general.

(a) Upon receipt of the order from the State adjutants general, unit commanders prepare and issue orders to active duty for all unit members.

(b) The units' order to active duty will serve as official travel orders to move the units from home station to their mobilization or duty station or ports of embarkation as directed by the CONUSA.

c. Organization of the STARC.

(1) The official directive establishing the STARC is the NGB letter to all States, subject: Revision of State HHD TDA -- State Area Command (STARC), dated 17 May 1978.

(a) The letter provided guidance for the development of the STARC mobilization TDA.

1 The STARC mobilization TDA will not be a part of the State HHD TDA, and it will have its own UIC for mobilization purposes.

2 Organization will be under the G-staff configuration.

3 As a planning figure, 60-70 percent of the personnel in the HHD should be designated for assignment to STARC.

4 The TDA should be structured so that key personnel and specialists are selected in sufficient numbers and for functional area expertise to properly plan for and execute mobilization responsibilities.

5 States were encouraged to utilize Air National Guard (ANG) Hqs resources in the STARC and fully involve its personnel in planning and exercises. The principal reason for including this item in the NGB All States letter was to involve the ANG in State, Land Special Security Force (LSSF) and Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD) missions.

6 A sample paragraph 5, Section I, HHD TDA was provided.

7 The Adjutant General should not be designated commander of STARC. The commander of STARC should be a federally recognized ARNG officer of a rank appropriate to that of the major unit commander within the State.

(b) The above guidance to the States permitted each State to develop its STARC to adequately manage its unique State missions. The broad functional areas are defined, but the exact numbers and types of personnel are determined by State requirements and troop density.

d. Pre-mobilization responsibilities.

(1) The commander, STARC serves as the executive agent for the State Adjutant General on all matters pertaining to mobilization.

(2) To organize, train and prepare for activation of the STARC to accomplish its mobilization missions.

(3) Each State has a Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer (technician position) in the technician manning document. This position is compatible with the requirement for mobilization planning for the STARC.

(4) AR 135-300 requires the STARC to prepare a mobilization plan following the standard format of the basic FORSCOM mobilization plan.

(5) Mobilization planning by the STARC includes the mobilization plans of the State's ARNG units to insure that the plans are complete, updated and exercised.

(6) Pre-attack planning for LSSF and MSCD must be conducted.

(7) Prepares and publishes training and coordination instructions for planning LSSF, MSCD, war or other mobilization missions.

(8) Conducts tests of unit alert and mobilization plans.



(a) AR 135-300, paragraph 2-13, states:

"Mobilization plans testing. a. Area commanders and State Adjutants General will insure that each mobilization entity periodically conducts tests of its mobilization and alert plans for completeness and accuracy..."

(b) An assembly or report is not required unless specifically directed by higher headquarters. First US Army Mobilization Plan, paragraph 11(3) states:

"Each RC unit will exercise its unit alert notification plans annually."

(c) The above citations describe the current situation in which a unit is required by AR 135-300 to test its mobilization and alert plans and CONUSA ((b) above is representative) requires an annual alert test. This requirement is included in each State's mobilization plan.

(9) For State responsibilities, the STARC commands, controls, and supervises units employed in support of civil authorities in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety under competent orders of State authorities.

(a) The intent is to recommend utilization of the STARC organization to provide command and control and supervise units called up for State duty.

(b) Therefore, the operation of the STARC would occur either upon State call-up or upon federal mobilization.

e. Post-mobilization responsibilities.

(1) Exercises OPCON over mobilized ARNG units. Continues to coordinate with and be responsive to The Adjutant General on all aspects related to mobilization.

(2) Reports directly to respective CONUSA Commander.

(3) Provides required support and implementing instructions to mobilized ARNG units to accomplish required

administrative, logistical and personnel processing from time of alert to arrival at mobilization station.

(4) Responsible for movement of mobilized units from home station to mobilization stations, or from home station to ports of embarkation.

(5) Coordinates the submission of reports to mobilization stations and other headquarters as required for all mobilized units.

(6) Coordinates with US Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) and State Maintenance Officer the logistical support requirements for mobilized units.

(7) Assists units with dependent processing.

(8) Exercises operational employment over units of all services in joint operations supporting LSSF and MSCD missions.

(9) Responsible for cross leveling personnel and equipment in accordance with existing directives.

(10) Provides for 24-hour operations during periods of emergency and until situation no longer requires it.

(11) Is the channel of communications between mobilized units and CONUSA, mobilization stations, support installations, and coordinating installations.

(12) Integrates and assigns personnel activated from the inactive ARNG.

(13) Responsible for post attack damage assessment.

(14) Supports post mobilization training being conducted at home station as appropriate.

(15) The financial procedures of mobilization are described in Chapter 7 of AR 135-300. The following summarizes the provisions of Chapter 7:

(a) When RC units are ordered to active duty, the funding authority will remain within formal channels and

will be accounted for under normal reporting channels unless otherwise directed.

(b) RC will fund for all actions between the time of alert and the time the units enter on active duty -- this includes increased communications charges.

(c) Following entry on active duty, Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) or Military Pay Army (MPA) funds will be provided through comptroller channels to support activated units until they reach the mobilization station.

(d) The USPFO will reimburse the State for base operation costs in support of mobilized ARNGUS units use of State-owned facilities.

(e) The appropriate supporting installation will provide OMA funding from the effective date of the order until the date the units report to their mobilization stations. The mobilization station thereafter will provide funding.

(f) ARNGUS units will be provided necessary funding data through the STARC.

(g) All expenses incurred after a unit enters on active duty are chargeable to the applicable project within MPA or OMA appropriations.

(h) As soon as possible after alert, unit commanders will appoint Class A agent officers. The appointment becomes effective on the date the unit is being ordered to active duty.

(i) The Class A agent officer will receive funds direct from the designated Finance and Accounting Officer (FAO) at the Supporting Installation.

(j) When unit travel is by organic transportation, and bulk purchase of Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL) is feasible, STARC/USPFO will provide for refueling of ARNGUS units in route to mobilization stations.

(k) The STARC upon mobilization would follow the same funding channels as other mobilizing ARNGUS units.

f. The following observations pertaining to the STARC are extracts from the trip reports prepared by ACCS-82:

(1) Ft. Riley -- MOBEX 78 Player Participation.

STARC could assist mobilizing USAR units within the State.

(2) HQ 26th Inf Div (ARNG).

STARC mob mission is ill-defined.

(3) TAG PA.

(a) STARC is organized and in process of being trained.

(b) PA will conduct own MOBEX of 2 Bns in March 1979.

(c) STARC will conduct one week AT prior to the March MOBEX.

(4) TAG DE.

(a) STARC will not function as an entity during IDT.

(b) STARC can do its job.

(5) 50th Armd Div (ARNG).

G3 likes STARC for logistics purposes -- the access to USPFO computer saves much time and effort.

(6) TAG MN.

(a) STARC is useful in peace and war -- has solid missions.

(b) Has assigned LnO from USAR, USAFR, and USNR.

(c) Doubtful that State has the assets to accomplish State missions after STARC is mobilized.

(d) AC has not provided any guidance to State concerning STARC -- only directive out is the NGB letter.

(e) Conclusion from MOBEX 78 summary was that the use of STARC section/unit could provide adequate command and control during mobilizations.

(7) HQ Sixth Army.

Sixth Army staff is not certain of STARC mission.

(8) HQ CANG.

(a) STARC is actually several years old.

(b) NGB guidance was inadequate.

(c) STARC is essential for mobilization.

(d) STARC is capable of Command and Control (C<sup>2</sup>) of mobilizing USAR units.

(e) About 70 percent of SHHD personnel slotted against STARC.

(f) USPFO role is doubtful -- as he would have both State and Federal jobs at same time after mobilization.

(9) Assistant TAG WN.

(a) STARC TDA is developed -- guidance for STARC is considered adequate.

(b) WN will utilize STARC in Feb 79 in area of military support to Civil Defense.

(c) Current TDA of STARC uses 90 percent of SHHD -- includes Air Guard.

(d) STARC mission includes assisting mobilizing units and the dependents of mobilizing ARNG personnel.

(10) TAG NC.

(a) STARC could not pick up the C<sup>2</sup> function

because of the presently envisioned STARC mission using HHD personnel. Three major commands were needed in NC for C<sup>2</sup> of ARNG units. The need for three C<sup>2</sup> Hqs was reinforced by stating that the STARC could not function in a C<sup>2</sup> role because of its composition and mission.

(b) STARC is important to the Bdes, because if they mobilize, a HQ will be required to assume C<sup>2</sup> of presently attached subordinate units.

(11) TAG MS.

(a) Assumed that MS STARC on mobilization would move to Cp Shelby and be subordinate to RG.

(b) STARC TDA not yet approved by NGB.

(c) Plans being made to exercise STARC this year and during next MOBEX -- will be restructured if necessary.

(12) TAG AZ.

(a) STARC was exercised during MOBEX 78.

(b) During AT 79, STARC will go as entity.

(c) Approximately one-half of IDT time will be devoted to STARC functions.

(d) An undertermined number of Unit Training Assemblies will be used solely for STARC planning.

(e) The automated capability available to STARC is a plus.

(f) Because STARC will be subordinate to CONUSA, an Army Liaison Officer should be assigned to each State Headquarters.

(g) 40 percent of HHD and personnel assigned to Command and Control (CAC) are utilized to form the STARC.

(h) USPFO not placed in STARC.

(13) TAG IN.

(a) STARC is the focal point for mobilization planning.

(b) STARC element in HHD has nine personnel dedicated to mobilization and the STARC TDA has a total of 160.

(c) No problems in mobilization and moving units to mob stations.

(d) STARC could also handle mobilizing USAR units if given the mission.

(14) TAG GA.

(a) STARC organization is too small.

(b) Function is not funded -- therefore, it cannot properly train.

(15) TAG KS and HQ 69th Inf Bde.

(a) STARC and CAC are at least misunderstood and at best, not necessary.

(b) STARC could be used for installation management upon total mobilization.

(c) STARC could also become a Brigade Headquarters upon total mobilization.

(16) TAG FL.

(a) STARC is organized, but little attention is given to it by the State Staff.

(b) Does not clearly understand the STARC mission.

(c) Prefers a smaller STARC.

(17) TAG AL and 167th COSCOM.

(a) State should be provided capability of secure voice/data system to be utilized on a daily basis.

(b) AR 135-300 should be amended to require Supporting and Coordinating Installations to route all mobilization traffic through STARC/USPFO and not direct to units.

(c) STARC should conduct mobilization type CPX with selected units in conjunction with AT periods.

g. A summary of the comments on STARC contained within the NGB MOBEX 78 Final Report follows:

(1) STARC should be tasked with the responsibility of dependents assistance. Written procedures should be provided in AR 135-300.

(2) A consideration should be given for additional full time personnel for mobilization planning and the placement of more emphasis on training for mobilization.

(3) Standardized format for MS/SI requirements must be developed to eliminate the confusion which exists when STARC deal with the variations that exist between CONUSA and MS.

(4) The STARC is a good, workable concept needing exercise and refinement.

(a) More emphasis needs to be placed upon training and use of STARC in their assigned mission.

(b) MS/SI and CONUSA need to be made more aware of the capabilities of the STARC.

(c) STARC need to refine lessons learned and enhance their capabilities.

(d) Some of the problems which surfaced during MOBEX 78 were:

1 Some States had limited STARC play or none at all due to the recency of organizing each STARC.



2 The magnitude of requirements placed on STARC exceeded the pre-mobilization capability of the limited military support element.

3 Many of the mobilization directives bypassed the STARC and went directly to player units.

4 More training of STARC in its complete TDA configuration is needed.

5 A traffic management representative should be a member of STARC TDA.

6 More responsibilities were placed on technicians than on STARC.

7 Each STARC needs to have a UIC assigned for mobilization.

8 STARC will have to assist in rear area responsibilities of mobilized units.

9 Additional personnel must be identified to augment STARC upon mobilization.

10 STARC should be required to provide liaison personnel at MS and participate in coordination conferences on a regular basis.

(5) AR 135-300 should contain more definitive guidance for STARC responsibility for movement of units between HS and MS.

(6) The requirement for STARC to furnish accession cards to MS under SIDPERS should be eliminated because the new MOBPERS system provides this information.

(7) The FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP) is not consistent with AR 135-300 and is not responsive to the needs of ARNG units, STARC, and MS/SI.

(8) STARC/USPFO have the capability of providing the required assistance to ARNG units which is currently assigned to a variety of CI/SI. STARC could maintain direct coordination with MS for this purpose.

(9) MS are not totally aware of STARC and its capabilities.

h. Subsequent to the ACCS-82 visit, TAG Florida developed a paper which contained some valuable insight into the STARC. A summary of the key points follows:

(1) The STARC has a potential that has not been fully explored. It has the data and first-hand information on the status of ARNG units. It can directly influence all actions and requirements of the State's units.

(2) The USPFO recommended that mobilization resource management should follow command lines through the STARC.

(a) This would require changing existing regulations into one document which eliminates layering of requirements and defines responsibilities through one chain of command.

(b) Realign mob plans to facilitate utilization of personnel and assets at the highest level that is cost effective.

(c) Establish a work group to determine what personnel and funding assets are required at what level to assure maximum efficiency upon transition from peacetime to wartime.

(d) All concerned should get serious about planning for mobilization of RC units.

(3) An analysis by the STARC indicated:

(a) The STARC is staffed by a nucleus of full-time technicians whose daily duties encompass many of the actions to be performed by the STARC.

(b) The requirement for compatibility of technician assignment with TDA assignment coupled with the strength limitation does not provide the overall expertise or depth in certain areas.

1 Personnel spaces are not available to include all required MOS and/or additional personnel to

provide adequate number of AUDODIN operators, communications, liaison, JAG, dependents assistance, transportation, operations/intelligence, and departure airfield personnel.

2 The dual assignment of personnel to a peacetime and a mobilization TDA does not allow the personnel to train as a unit for the mobilization mission.

(c) The STARC TDA should be a separate peacetime increment with definite requirements for planning, coordination, and training.

(d) The peacetime relationship of NGB with TAG and ARNG units is effective.

(e) The peacetime command and control relationship does not include CONUSA in the chain of command for ARNG units. Upon mobilization, this change is abrupt and there is no apparent benefit from the change. The results cause delays in actions and unnecessary layers of reporting.

(f) The STARC should be provided additional personnel spaces and secure communications equipment and authorized to conduct training assemblies the same as other RC units.

(g) Command echelons above STARC should be held to the absolute minimum and gear to the capability to receive data that can be submitted direct from the STARC and respond directly to such data in promptly making decisions and providing support.

1. NGB has developed an exercise designed to evaluate the ability of STARC and selected ARNG units to perform alert and mobilization functions at home stations and deploy direct to POMCUS during rapid reinforcement of 3-6 days.

(1) The title of the exercise is Rapid Mobilization for Direct Deployment to POMCUS (RAMDEP).

(2) The evaluation will extend over a two-year period and will involve a total of eighteen units. FY79 will be used to collect data on methods, procedures, responsibilities, and time requirements. FY80 will assess the feasibility of actual direct deployment in a 3-6 day time frame to fall in on actual POMCUS in Europe.

(3) The directive contains detailed requirements for effecting direct deployment.

3. Conclusions.

a. The STARC is a viable concept with a vast potential to carry out both State and Federal missions and is the focal point for mobilization of ARNG units.

b. Requirements of the STARC are not clearly defined. In addition to those responsibilities specified in the pertinent directives, the STARC has the potential to:

(1) Operate an installation.

(2) Provide the nucleus for the headquarters of a major combat unit (Corps, Division, or Brigade).

(3) Provide area command and control of mobilized ARNG and USAR units.

(4) Provide command and control for rear area security.

c. The AC is not fully aware of the responsibilities and capabilities of the STARC.

d. AR 135-300 does not contain a definitive description of the duties and responsibilities of the STARC.

e. The STARC has the potential of assisting mobilizing USAR units within the State.

f. There is limited opportunity for the STARC to train as an entity.

g. There is no dedicated funding for the peacetime role of the STARC.

h. The STARC in some States may require additional personnel to fully realize their potential.

i. There is a lack of secure communication equipment at State-level.

#### 4. Recommendations.

a. That the STARC have a separate peacetime TDA increment with definite requirements for planning, coordination, and training. The NGB (Mobilization and Readiness Division) is recommending that each State have at least one full-time technician or military assigned to the STARC function on a daily basis. Experience is showing that the Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer (Technician position) is nearly fully employed in areas other than STARC related activities. To insure mobilization planning and STARC operations to include training, at least one full-time person is required in each State.

b. That appropriate funding be allocated to accomplish the requirements stated in "a" above.

c. That States assess their personnel requirements for their STARC and if the need exists, additional personnel spaces should be authorized.

d. That resource management for mobilization should follow command lines through the STARC.

(1) USPFO have the expertise in most areas to support mobilization of ARNGUS units from time of alert to the mobilization stations.

(2) It is recognized that some requirements must be satisfied through joint efforts between USPFO, support installations, and mobilization stations.

(3) As pointed out by the Florida USPFO, management of funding through the STARC/USPFO would provide for the most efficient controls.

e. That AR 135-300 be changed to include more specific description of the duties and responsibilities of the STARC.

f. That efforts should be taken by HQDA to insure that appropriate AC headquarters are fully informed on the duties, capabilities and responsibilities of STARC.

g. That consideration be given to the acquisition of secure communication at State-level.

h. That post mobilization missions of the STARC be prioritized as:

(1) The STARC could remain as a State Command and Control entity for the purposes of processing subsequent mobilizing ARNG and USAR units; direct rear area security; conduct LSSF and/or MSCD missions.

(2) The STARC could be assigned to an installation and form the nucleus for a newly-forming AC combat headquarters (brigade, division, or corps).

(3) The STARC could be assigned the task of managing an installation.

(4) The STARC could be broken-up and individuals used as fillers.

(5) The STARC could be de-activated and perform State HHD functions.

5. References. The principal references establishing the STARC, its mission and responsibilities are:

a. AR 135-300, Mobilization of Reserve Component Units and Individuals, 15 May 1978.

b. FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan, 6 Feb 78.

c. NGB letter to all State Adjutants General, subject: Revision of State HHD TDA -- State Area Command (STARC), 17 May 1978.

d. NGR 10-2, State Headquarters and Headquarters detachment, Army National Guard, 5 April 1976.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 21

ADPE, MIS AND COMMUNICATIONS

ADP/MIS Support of Reserve  
Component Administration and Management

1. PURPOSE. To identify major problems in ADP/MIS support of Reserve Component administration and management and recommend actions to remedy these problems.

2. DISCUSSION.

a. General. Reserve ADP systems do not adequately support peacetime administration and management below the CONUSA level and do not facilitate the transition to wartime AC operations.

b. Facts.

(1) There is virtually no direct ADP support available to USAR headquarters below the CONUSA. Some management reports from CONUSA or DA MIS are provided to MUSARC and units but these reports are not properly or fully utilized.

(2) Peacetime ADP/MIS support of the ARNG is centralized within each state on the USPFO computer system. The current USPFO ADPE is obsolete and cannot provide either the capacity or the capabilities required for modern ADP support. Some management reports from the USPFO or NGB MIS are provided or are available to ARNG units but these are not properly or fully utilized at unit level.

(3) The U.S. Army Audit Agency (AAA) found that both USAR and ARNG technicians are not using available MIS reports even though many of the MIS reports were designed for unit use in reducing administrative workload (Reference 5a). Unit technicians (ASTs) gave various reasons for this. These included:

- ° Data bases were inaccurate or out of date,
- ° Reports were not in needed formats, and
- ° Reports could not be obtained in a timely manner or when needed.



(4) Reserve units generally maintain and depend on manual records and files even where automated reports are available. AST are required to manually update and return many of the automated reports received in order to update the central data bases.

(5) Current MIS, mostly used in the military pay and personnel administration areas, have been designed for efficient peacetime support of centralized management activities. These current systems do not support RC unit administration adequately, are not compatible with active Army systems performing similar functions and cannot support a rapid accession of RC personnel and units into active systems during mobilization.

(6) Implementation of SIDPERS - Wartime for use by the AC during mobilization, and SIDPERS-USAR, SIDPERS-ARNG will provide compatible personnel systems which will support the rapid accession of RC personnel and units in the AC. However, SIDPERS WT will operate in a decentralized mode at mobilization stations (MS), divisions, and corps, while SIDPERS-USAR and SIDPERS-ARNG will be centralized at RCPAC and NGB, respectively. This will require prepositioning of data at MS and complex communications interfaces and procedures to insure that the data are accurate and up to date. Additionally, all three versions of SIDPERS are separately designed and maintained, thus requiring continual coordination and testing to insure compatibility as the systems are modified and improved. It is uncertain that any of these systems will improve the support provided to RC units and AST during peacetime.

(7) JUMPS-RC, being developed by USAFAC, will be a major step toward providing improved and compatible RC military pay support. It has the advantage that both JUMPS-Army and JUMPS-RC will be developed, operated and maintained centrally by USAFAC. However, it is also uncertain that the user interface at unit or installation level will be sufficiently compatible to insure that RC personnel will be able to transition easily to JUMPS-Army. Input pay transactions to JUMPS-Army will be provided by installation F&AO through the JUMPS Automated Coding System (JACS). ARNG input to JUMPS-RC will be provided from the Personnel Reporting System (PRS) operating on the USPF0 computers. USAR pay transactions will be submitted manually to JUMPS-RC input stations but may in the future be generated by the Reserve Army Pay Processing System (RAPPS) being tested by Sixth Army/FORSCOM.

(8) All of the systems discussed, above, continue to depend on manually prepared transactions, source documents, or reports from RC units. HQ FORSCOM submitted to HQDA a General Functional System Requirement which directly addresses this unit level requirement within the USAR. The Continental Army Management Information System (CAMIS) will provide "smart terminals" at USAR Centers, connected to mini computers at MUSARCs which are connected to a CONUSA computer. This system will generally automate management, administrative, and readiness data from the USAR unit level up. FORSCOM has proposed that systems interfaces to JUMPS-RC and SIDPERS-USAR be tested in the prototype testing. The prototype evaluation plan states that, as a minimum, the following forms will be automated:

- ° DA Form 1379 (US Army Reserve Components Unit Record of Reserve Training).
- ° IAA Form 143 (Unit Manning Chart).
- ° IAA Form 127-2-R (Status of Operating Resources).
- ° DA Form 4244 (JUMPS-RC Drill Attendance/ Unit Assembly Data).
- ° DA Form 4245 (JUMPS-RC Accessions and Pay Change Data).
- ° IAA Form 100-R (Accessions and Losses Worksheet)

(9) The FORSCOM comments on CAMIS (Reference 5b) indicate that the unit AST will maintain a unit data file of personnel, logistic, training and organizational data in computer readable form. Presumably this data will support automated input of all or nearly all of the unit transactions, or reports to higher automated systems. Specific interfaces to systems other than JUMPS and SIDPERS-USAR are not identified. CAMIS is also intended to provide USAR units the capability to provide accurate, up-to-date, automated data to mobilization stations upon mobilization.

(10) While the NGB is acquiring 53 mini computers for the USPFO to replace existing obsolete computers, it has proposed no system or concept for the ARNG which is similar to CAMIS.

(11) There is no existing automation planning document which addresses the RC management environment and the impact or relationship which these systems will have on each other and on RC units. The Army Automation Planning, Programming and Evaluation System (AAPPEs) provides a master planning structure for automated systems. Functional Systems Plans (FSP) and Individual System Automation Plans (ISAP) are prepared by ARSTAF functional proponents. These FSP and ISAP are provided annually to MACOM in the form of MACOM Planning Guidance and serve as a basis for development of MACOM Army Automation Master Plans. A review of AAPPEs plans indicates the following problems concerning the RC environment.

(a) ARSTAF FSP and ISAP address only Standard Army systems and emphasize the DA management functions. Systems such as SIDPERS-RC and JUMPS-RC are covered but only in the context of the functional system and the interfaces between the AC and RC systems. They do not address the employment of systems in the RC unit environment.

(b) OCAR has not been an ARSTAF proponent of any automated system and has not directly contributed to AAPPEs (OCAR will be the proponent for CAMIS).

(c) Many of the FSP and ISAP are not current. For example, in its October, 1978 annual update for personnel systems, ODCSPER did not address SIDPERS-RC and the current master plans do not reflect the separate development of SIDPERS-USAR and SIDPERS-ARNG.

(d) The MACOM master plan are structured primarily to identify and justify resource requirements and are not very useful for managing ADP system development or extension. The FORSCOM plan identifies RAPPs and CAMIS but provides only a brief description of each system and the funds required to support implementation.

(e) The prescribed format and level of detail of the FSP and ISAP are not useful in providing information for managing system integration.

(12) A review of the Battlefield Automation Management Program (BAMP) developed by TRADOC (CACDA) indicates that the BAMP may be a model for the type of planning and management methodology needed for the RC homestation environment. The BAMP designates an agency (CACDA), and provides a methodology,

for reviewing and influencing all automated systems proposed for use on the battlefield, from the viewpoint of the battlefield user and the environment. It is oriented towards integration of systems in the environment where they are used. (Reference 3). BAMP is not currently considered to be part of AAPPES.

### 3. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Current ADP systems supporting RC management are not compatible with AC systems, do not facilitate the transition to war and accession of RC units and personnel into AC systems, and do not adequately support RC unit management or administration.

b. Army standard systems currently being developed for the RC (i.e., SIDPERS-USAR, SIDPERS-ARNG, JUMPS-RC) are expected to be compatible with AC systems at the data interface and will facilitate accession of RC personnel and unit data into AC systems. They do not, however, solve the problem of training RC personnel in the use of AC systems and there is no assurance that they will improve support of RC unit functions.

c. CAMIS is potentially a system which can provide direct support to RC unit functions including the inputting of information into all or most other standard systems. However, its specific functions and interfaces are still almost completely undefined.

d. The lack of master planning for the RC unit user environment and the continued development of separate systems for the USAR and the ARNG will cause integration of AC and RC systems to become increasingly complex and costly.

e. The structure of the AAPPES Automation Master Planning does not provide a basis for a single MACOM or ARSTAF agency to be responsible for master planning in a multifunctional, multi-command environment such as the reserve unit home station environment. Nevertheless, OCAR, as the ARSTAF proponent for CAMIS, should be in a position to raise and resolve system interface and USAR user environment issues with the assistance of OACSAC and FORSCOM.

f. The definition of the terms "compatible" and "integrated," when applied to AC and RC ADP/MIS systems, must be extended to include the unit user environment.

#### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That HQDA (OACSAC lead) establish a policy that will require all new automated systems, and any redesign of existing automated systems, to be planned with the objective of single system support to the AC, USAR and ARNG.

(1) This objective should be defined as an Army Automation Objective in the AAPPES and the AAPPES structure should be modified as necessary to provide a basis for enforcing this policy.

(2) That AR 18-1 be changed to include this policy and the Automation management procedures prescribed in AR 18-1 and the TB 18-100 series be modified as necessary to implement this policy.

b. That OACSAC, as the principle ARSTAF agency responsible for Automation Management, task OCAR and FORSCOM (OCAR lead) to jointly develop a USAR Automation Management Plan.

(1) This plan must be developed with the following objectives:

- Full support of USAR unit management and administrative information requirements and elimination of redundant or duplicative requirements for unit input of either manual or automated information.
- Development of single or common application systems supporting AC units at installations and USAR units at home station (coordinated and integrated with ARNG systems).
- Development of fully automated interfaces for accessing RC personnel and units into AC data bases upon mobilization.

(2) This plan should include, for the USAR home station environment, management functions similar to those of the Battlefield Automation Management Plan (BAMP) for the battlefield environment.

c. That NGB be tasked to develop a similar ARNG Automation Management Plan for the ARNG home station environment based on common (for USAR and ARNG) guidelines provided by OACSAC.

5. REFERENCES.

a. Audit Report: SO 79-708, Administrative Workload in the Reserve Components, US Army Audity Agency, 16 April 1979.

b. Letter, AFDS-ISM; Subject: Continental Army Management Information System (CAMIS), dated 30 May 1979. With 5 Inclosures.

c. Battlefield Automation Management Plan (BAMP), USATRADO-CACDA, 1 July 1978.

SUBJECT. Installation Level ADP Support During Mobilization

PURPOSE. To identify deficiencies in CONUS installation ADP support of mobilization and recommend actions to remedy these problems.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. General. The rapid expansion of the active Army during mobilization will result in a large surge in ADP workload for essential logistic, personnel and financial support at Army installations. If installation ADPE is fully utilized or saturated by peacetime workloads (as it is currently), mobilization can be supported only by termination of non-essential workload, increased processing capacity, or both. Current functional processes and their supporting MIS are not well structured to facilitate termination of non-essential ADP requirements and current ADPE is both saturated and approaching obsolescence.

2. There are 50 CONUS installations designated as mobilization stations. Of these:

- 33 (31 active and 2 semi-active) are BASOPS computer sites.
- 4 are active DARCOM installations.
- 8 are state operated and have no ADP capability.
- 4 are semi-active and have no ADP capability.
- 1 is an active subpost (Ft. Story).

3. The BASOPS computer sites are equipped with IBM 360/40 or 360/50 computers which are all running three shifts per day, five or more days per week in peacetime. Many of these computers will be fully saturated by peacetime workload before the end of 1979.

4. FORSCOM has been provided FY 80 funds for nine ADP terminals which will be used for peacetime training and to provide mobilization ADP support to semi-active/state operated mob station. The terminals must be homed on the processing capacity of a designated host BASOPS computer.

5. The OACSAC program (PDIP Number 5S04) to upgrade the IBM 360 computers to provide interim mobilization capacity has not been given sufficient priority to ensure funding in FY 81. This program includes upgrades of the designated host computers which will support terminals at semi-active/state operated mobilization stations. The current host computers cannot support these terminals under mobilization processing loads.

6. IBM no longer supports the operating system (software) used by BASOPS applications. Additionally, the IBM 360/40 and 50 as configured in BASOPS cannot support new interactive terminal applications. New applications designed to give installation managers more timely access to data cannot be implemented on the current computers.

7. Project VIABLE is the HQDA program to replace the current BASOPS ADPE and provide reserve mobilization capacity. VIABLE ADPE will support peacetime workloads on a 2 shift, 5 day/week basis, leaving the third shift and weekends as a mobilization reserve. Additionally, VIABLE will provide support for on-line terminal applications and on-line access to communications systems. New applications designed for VIABLE hardware will provide installation managers response capabilities similar to those which have been available for years in WWMCCS and in industry. Due to the apparent reluctance in the Army to fund major interim upgrades of current ADPE and GSA prohibition of non-competitive (specified make and model) upgrades, Project VIABLE is the only available means of providing ADP capacity for mobilization at Army installations on a permanent basis. While Project VIABLE (PDIP GO3) was funded in the FY 81-85 POM, its first year procurement funds (OPA) for FY 82 were placed in PDIP GO3A and are unfunded. If this is not changed, implementation of Project VIABLE will be delayed for an additional year.

8. Recent guidance to PM VIABLE directed increased emphasis on considering alternatives for regionalizing and contracting out ADP support of installations. The CONUS installation is the focal point for execution of mobilization. The concept of decentralized execution places great emphasis on the installation commanders' control of BASOPS assets during mobilization. The impetus for regionalization of ADP lies in peacetime economy and efficiency. The impact of regionalization on wartime survivability and responsiveness of ADP during mobilization has not been determined.



9. Subsequent to MOBEX 76, a project was initiated to identify non-military computer capacity which could be contracted in peacetime for use in the event of mobilization. This project (ADPERCAP-ADPE Reserve Capability) was intended to serve mobilization stations and was tested during MOBEX 78. FORSCOM reported that the concept worked for the test site but that suitable non-DOD computer capacity could not be found to support most of the other FORSCOM posts. This is partly due to geographic dispersion of installations and distance from metropolitan areas and, partly, because most civilian computer centers use newer ADPE which is incompatible with the IBM 360.

10. HQDA and FORSCOM have prepared guidelines for processing essential Standard Army MIS during mobilization. A test of the guidelines in MOBEX 78 indicated that an overall reduction of 12% was achieved in ADP workloads. While mobilization workloads are not well defined, most DPA managers believe that the 12% reduction is not sufficient to allow processing of the increased transaction volume expected.

11. The guidelines discussed above reduce ADP operations during mobilization without reducing the functional procedures/tasks required to execute mobilization plans at installations. Such an approach will result directly in an increase in required manpower for manual processes unless functional activities streamline their wartime systems and eliminate non-essential tasks/transactions altogether. The Mobilization Personnel System (MOBPERS) and SIDPERS-WARTIME have been developed to this end and will be in place at mobilization stations in December 1979. The largest single consumer of installation ADP capacity is the SAILS system, yet no major redesign of installation intermediate supply functions is currently underway.

12. The LOGCEN is conducting a HQDA directed study of Automation of Wartime Functional Supply Requirements (AWFSR). This study is addressing ADP support requirements in a "mature Corps" wartime environment in a combat theater. Reductions in the SAILS processing functions and changes to the intermediate supply activities/doctrine are being considered which will reduce the ADP requirements in the Corps. While proposed changes to SAILS for the Corps would also affect the installation, the study is not addressing the installation wartime/mobilization requirement.

13. The current policy of maintaining peacetime PLL in RC units based on peacetime demand results in a major surge in requisitioning at installations during mobilization. Supply

policy requires unit requisitioning (pull system) to fill wartime PLL prior to deployment. From an ADP point of view either the ADPE must be capable of supporting the surge or the surge must be reduced/eliminated.

14. By reference 1, HQDA (DAMO-ODW) has proposed an Army WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (ARWIN) concept for development of an integrated C<sup>2</sup> telecommunications network. The purpose of ARWIN is to provide decision makers with an integrated, information management system designed to support essential missions with increased data accuracy, relevancy, and timeliness. ARWIN will provide connectivity to intelligence systems, personnel systems, logistic systems, and operations systems through computer interfaces with these vertical information systems. Many of these interfaces will be developed at the installation level. Figure F-21-1 illustrates the proposed ARWIN network.

15. By reference 2, HQDA (OACSAC) has proposed an Automation and Communications management concept based on goals for developing fully integrated teleprocessing networks supporting the Army's "corporate," off-the-battlefield, management processes. A companion goal is the management of information as a basic resource. Since current management systems are generally vertical structures based on installation to MACOM to HQDA processes, installations are potentially major nodes in the evolving teleprocessing network. These nodes must ultimately support many of the interfaces between "command and control" and "management" information systems.


16. The networks envisioned in both references 1 and 2 would include major nodes and interfaces at HQDA, MACOM and Army installations, however, the management of C<sup>2</sup> networks and the management of MIS teleprocessing is organizationally separated at all echelons of the Army in CONUS.

17. While the Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC<sup>2</sup>MP) is largely oriented on in-theater C<sup>2</sup> systems, it does address architectural concepts which include ARWIN and WES in CONUS. The AC<sup>2</sup>MP identifies some functional information requirements which are presently satisfied, in part, by Army MIS but interface requirements between C<sup>2</sup> systems and management MIS have not been addressed.

#### DISCUSSION.

1. Expansion of ADP capacity after M-Day through acquisition of additional ADPE or ADP commercial services is not practicable for support of a rapid mobilization. Required mobiliza-

Figure F-21-1  
PROPOSED TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK CONCEPT



tion capacity must be "on-hand" in peacetime either through reserve capacity on installation ADPE or through routinely exercised commercial contract services.

2. The Army cannot economically justify total dependence on increased ADP capacity to satisfy mobilization requirements. Many peacetime applications will continue to be non-essential or not affordable during mobilization and wartime. Peacetime applications (MIS) must be planned, structured and prioritized to facilitate the immediate termination of non-essential workload to accommodate the surge of essential mobilization processing. This will require not only modification of MIS, but the modification of supported functional processes to eliminate non-essential actions or to perform more essential actions prior to mobilization.

3. Mobilization ADP workload estimates are currently very rough estimates or, in some cases, are unknown. ADP is a supporting service which responds to derivative requirements defined by basic military processes. ADP mobilization workloads cannot be accurately estimated until functional mobilization planning is completed. Stabilization of force mobilization plans, particularly the FORSCOM RCMP and MTBSP, is necessary so that installation mobilization plans can be completed and ADP workloads estimated.

4. Conceptually, it is becoming more difficult to draw clear lines of distinction between the C<sup>2</sup> information systems supported by WES/ARWIN/WWMCCS and MIS supported by the evolving "management" teleprocessing systems. The continuing evolution of two large, integrated, but separately managed, teleprocessing/telecommunication networks, which both support vital mobilization processes at HQDA, MACOM, and installations will become increasingly impractical and inefficient. Continued separate management of the "C<sup>2</sup>" and "MIS" networks will make it difficult to effectively design, implement and maintain system interfaces and will inhibit the efficient utilization of common user or shared ADP and communication resources.

#### CONCLUSIONS.

1. Installation ADPE processing capacity must be matched to workload requirements during both peacetime and mobilization. This will require effort in three areas.

a. Modern, more powerful, installation level (BASOPS) ADPE must be provided to support increasing peacetime and mobilization workloads.

b. ADP applications (MIS) must be redesigned or modified to facilitate the rapid termination of non-essential or low priority workload.

c. Functional processes at installations must be modified and streamlined for mobilization so as to eliminate non-essential actions (and ADP transactions) or to perform more essential actions during pre-mobilization planning and preparation.

2. ADP support capability for inactive, semi-active or state-operated mobilization stations must be established in peacetime.

3. The Army must adopt organizations which will facilitate a more fully integrated management of automation and communications networks supporting C2 and management processes.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That the FORSCOM project for acquisition of ADP terminals and communications links for semi-active and inactive mobilization stations be fully funded in FY 80.

2. That the FORSCOM/TARDOC interim upgrade of BASOPS ADPE (PDIP 5S04) be funded in the FY 81 budget (OMA) process.

3. That Project VIABLE be fully supported and the FY 82 OPA funds (PDIP G03A) be restored to the base case (funded) level of the POM during development of the FY 82-87 POM preparation.

4. That DA DSCLOG, FORSCOM, and DARCOM develop interim measures to relieve early deploying units of the need to requisition PLL after mobilization, and develop an automated system which will eliminate all post mobilization unit requisitioning of PLL, ASL and authorized equipment fill.

5. That ODCSOPS (DAMO-RQ) and OACSAC jointly develop and staff an AC<sup>2</sup>MP management plan which clearly defines ODCSOPS responsibilities as the proponent for C<sup>2</sup> systems and OACSAC responsibilities for systems integration, network management and as FYDP Program 3 manager.

REFERENCES.

1. HQDA (DAMO-ODW) message, Subject: Army WWMCCS Inter-computer Network (ARWIN) Concept; DTG 040709Z Jul 79.
2. OACSAC Study of Management-Automation and Communications, Part 2-Automation and Communications Organizational Realignment Concept; June 1979.

SUBJECT. CONUS Communications During Mobilization

PURPOSE. To identify major problems in CONUS communications support during mobilization and recommend actions to remedy these problems.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. Communications equipment and facilities at active Army installations and headquarters in CONUS are generally adequate for supporting mobilization requirements, however many of the CE facilities are staffed only for one or two shifts per day to support peacetime communication volumes. Mobilization will require large numbers of communications personnel with appropriate technical skills and security clearances to expand communications services to a full 24 hour per day operation. Inactive, semi-active and state operated mobilization stations do not have adequate CE equipment, facilities, or personnel for activation of those installations and support of estimated mobilization traffic volumes.
2. Personnel shortages at active FORSCOM/TRADOC installations will be created by loss of deploying STRAF CE personnel [and potential cross leveling of installation personnel into deploying signal units]. USACC has completed a survey of expected losses and plans to request pre-assignment of MOBDES or retirees to replace these losses during mobilization.
3. Many telecommunications centers supporting DARCOM activities operate only on a part time basis in peacetime. At 29 DARCOM activities additional personnel will not be available to convert to full time services during mobilization. USACC (7th Signal Command) has projected a 1 July 1979 completion date for a survey of DARCOM CE personnel requirements and plans to request pre-assigning of MOBDES/IRR fillers to satisfy these mobilization requirements.
4. Five of the 14 semi-active/inactive or state operated mobilization stations (MS) do not have assigned USAR garrisons. For these five MS there are no CE personnel available to activate or expand communication facilities or services. While USACC has developed MOBTDA for ACC elements at these installations the sources and availability of personnel to fill MOBTDA is unknown. USACC plans to submit by Nov 79 requests for establishment of USACC Detachments (Reserve)

to satisfy these requirements.

5. MOBEX 78 experience indicated that implementation of M1ELERS (Mobilization Telecommunication Requirements) after M-Day cannot satisfy requirements for semi-active/inactive/state operated MS. The only apparent solutions to this problem are:

a. Equip late deploying signal units with sufficient organic equipment and mobilize them early at inactive MS.

b. Organize and equip non-deploying signal units which can mobilize early at these stations.

c. Stabilize the mob stationing plan and provide funds for pre-engineering and standby contracts for commercial communications equipment and services.

d. Adjust the mob stationing plan to eliminate the need to use inactive or semi-active MS prior to M+180.

6. USACC has recommended that inactive/semi-active MS not be used prior to M+180 (5d, above). Pending a FORSCOM review of the requirement for these MS, USACC has begun developing requirements for CE support of these MS based on a combination of non-deploying RC units and commercial contracts (5b and 5c, above). OACSAC PDIP A06 in the FY 81-85 POM includes \$9M in FY 81 for mobile, secure record terminals for 10 of 14 of these MS and \$2.8M in FY 81 for upgrade of telephone systems at all 14 sites. PDIP A06 is in the funded level of the POM.

#### DISCUSSION.

1. The Communications-Electronics issues defined in the MOBEX 78 Analysis Report (Reference 1) address all of the problems identified above. These issues have been tasked to USACC for resolution and HQDA (ODCSOPS) and the FMREC will monitor actions as part of the overall plan for resolution of MOBEX 78 issues.

2. In problem areas pertaining to shortages of qualified personnel, USACC has provided milestones to ODCSOPS for the identification and submission of personnel needed for mobilization expansion. Considering that CONUS requirements will not have first priority on available personnel assets it is highly likely that the individual ready and retired reserve pool will not contain sufficient assets to satisfy these requirements. Proposals which depend on these sources



for personnel to fill MOBTDA should be carefully evaluated for feasibility before they are approved as solutions to MOBEX 78 CE issues/problems. Reference 2 establishes a number of tasks pertaining to mobilization and wartime pre-trained manpower sources. These tasks will serve as the basis for satisfying USACC personnel requirements.

3. Expansion of communications capabilities after M-Day through acquisition of additional equipment or commercial services is not practicable for support of a rapid mobilization. The required mobilization capacity must be "on hand" in peacetime either through reserve capacity in installation CE facilities; equipped, early mobilizing RC units; or through routinely exercised commercial contract services.

#### CONCLUSIONS.

1. Problem areas in expansion of CONUS communications for mobilization are well defined in MOBEX 78 issues.
2. Resolution of communications problems in supporting mobilization will require investment of resources in personnel programs, equipment and facilities for semi-active and inactive mobilization stations and increased dependence on commercial services.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. That FORSCOM and HQDA (ODCSOPS) revalidate requirements for the semi-active, inactive and state operated MS and insure that USACC programs for equipment and facilities are funded for MS which must be activated before M+180.
2. That HQDA (ODCSOPS and OACSAC) monitor the resolution of MOBEX 78CE issues through the FMREC to insure satisfaction of mobilization communications requirements.
3. That USACC and HQDA (ODCSPER) insure that all USACC personnel requirements are identified and addressed in appropriate tasks under the Mobilization and Wartime Pre-trained Manpower Program (reference 2).

#### REFERENCES.

1. MOBEX 78 Analysis Report (U); HQDA, DAMO-OD, 25 April 1979 (Confidential).
2. CSM 79 - (Draft); Subject: Mobilization and Wartime Pretrained Manpower, undated.

ANNEX F

APPENDIX 22

FULL-TIME MANNING (FTM) IN  
RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS

SUBJECT: Full-Time Manning (FTM) in Reserve Component Units.

1. Purpose. The purpose of this paper is threefold:

a. To synthesize selected references regarding FTM of the Army Reserve Components.

b. To identify strengths and weaknesses in FTM, including differences between programs and current FTM directions.

c. To recommend changes or reinforce programs which will favorably impact on unit readiness and mobilization potential.

2. Assumptions.

a. Readiness improvement trends from additional FTM should be visible during FY 81, and improved RC readiness posture demonstrated by FY 83.

b. The disparity in direct pay between military and civilian (civil service) technicians will create difficulty in recruitment of FTM personnel, particularly at lower enlisted grades.

c. The "status quo" problem has created an untenable situation in the Army Reserve Technician program.

d. Combat readiness is not directly related to the ratio of full-time support personnel to the military strength in all types of Selected Reserve units.

3. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. General. FTM in the RC began with passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 which provided Federal funding to hire "caretakers and clerks" to give full-time support to the Guard - the legislative forefather of our current full-time technician support force. <sup>1/</sup> Mobilization readiness is the primary goal of the RC and training is the priority function in RC units. Nonetheless, there exists a continuing need to meet the day-to-day administrative, supply and maintenance requirements which support the training function.

<sup>1/</sup> Report of FTTA, OSD(MRA&L) June 1978, Pg I-3

b. U.S. Army Full-Time Support of the RC (Technicians).

(1) ARNG.

(a) The concept of the ARNG technician program has traditionally been to preserve the military requirements of the ARNG by having technicians work full-time in the military units to which they belong and hold concurrent ARNG membership. <sup>2/</sup> Recognizing the need to continue the emphasis on the ARNG as primarily a military organization, the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 sets forth the conditions for dual-status employment in the National Guard. The statute specifically mandated that military membership was a condition of technician employment and retention. Thus Guard technicians are considered to be unlike other Federal civil service employees because technicians are required to be a military selected reservist first and a Federal employee second. National Guard technicians are expressly authorized under the provisions of title 32 of the United States Code. As a condition of continued employment as a civil servant, they must be members of the military units for which their technician positions are authorized. These are "excepted service" appointments.

(b) Currently, direct unit support is provided by Army National Guard technicians in the fields of administration, supply, training, readiness, maintenance, flying, and military personnel. Additional maintenance echelons give technician maintenance support at unit training equipment sites, mobilization and training equipment sites, and combined support maintenance shops. Headquarters-type support is provided by technicians in the areas of logistics, property and fiscal, technician and military personnel, recruiting and retention, plans, operations, training, military support (civil authorities), officer candidate school, equal employment opportunity, and safety. <sup>3/</sup>

(2) U.S. Army Reserve Technician Program.

(a) The Army Reserve technician program <sup>4/</sup> operates under a "memorandum of understanding" between the Department of the Army and the Office of Personnel Management.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid, I-5

<sup>3/</sup> Ibid, I-6

<sup>4/</sup> Ibid, I-8

This memorandum specifies the conditions of employment for Reserve technicians and recognizes the requirement for dual-status of technicians for the purpose of providing enhanced mobilization readiness.

(b) The memorandum provides that dual-status technicians who later lose their active Reserve status for reasons outside their control will not be involuntarily reassigned or removed. Voluntary release or loss of Reserve membership because of unsatisfactory military performance or conduct by a technician who has attained dual-status will be a basis for removal from his or her position. Dual-status Reserve technicians who lose their Reserve membership for reasons beyond their control (e.g., physical reasons, mandatory removal due to age, or failure to be promoted) are classified as "status quo" in that they are no longer members of their Reserve units but still perform as civilians the necessary work to maintain the readiness of the unit. In time of activation, the status quo technicians would not mobilize.

(c) Effective 1 September 1970, the memorandum also provides that, to the maximum practicable extent, technicians will be participating Reserve members assigned to the units with which they are employed. However, Army Reserve dual-status technicians are permitted to be members of Reserve units other than the units in which they are employed. As a last resort, when qualified dual-status personnel cannot be obtained, non-dual status technicians may be obtained. Non-dual status technicians may be hired only on a temporary basis for a period not to exceed one year. The temporary appointment after one year may be reviewed only with prior approval of HQDA and the Office of Personnel Management.

(d) No technician employed prior to September 1970, who is not in a dual civilian military status on the date will be involuntarily reassigned or removed from his position for failure to comply with the dual status requirement.

(e) The administrative-supply technician (AST) at company level is the backbone of the Reserve full-time training and administration Force (FTTA) and performs a myriad of duties from requisitioning supplies to preparing the payroll. More than 35% of all Army Reserve technicians are ASTs; another 35% perform maintenance functions; and the remainder are assigned to recruiting duties, flight facilities, and staff positions. <sup>5/</sup>

<sup>5/</sup> Ibid, I-9

c. Other Services RC support programs. Each of the other Services has a RC support program but each differs somewhat from the Army program, as follows:

(1) Naval Reserve. Training and Administration of the Reserve (TAR) personnel include Naval Reservists on active duty to manage the Naval Reserve and to prepare a Naval Reserve budget separate from that of the Regular Navy. In addition to TAR personnel, there are two other categories of personnel who provide full-time support to the Naval Reserve: civilian personnel (the smallest category) provide clerical support and do not serve in mobilization billets; and Regular force personnel (the largest category). Of the 19,000-plus military full-time support force, about 50% are Regular and 50% TAR. Roughly 70% of the Regulars serve on Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships. While TAR personnel serve multiple tours within the Reserve Program, the assignment of Regulars is normally for a single tour. TAR personnel may be assigned to Regular Navy billets for refresher training, and the vacancy he creates in the Reserve program must be filled by a member of the Regular force. <sup>6/</sup>

(2) The Marine Corps Selected Reserve was reorganized during the mid 1960s to create the 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, plus supporting units, organized exactly the same as the three Active Marine Divisions and Wings. The CG, 4th MAW is a Regular Officer. Commanders of Marine Air Groups are generally Regular Officers, with their executive officers generally members of the Ready Reserve. Squadron commanders are Ready Reserve officers. The majority of the personnel who provide support to the Reserve program are Regular Marines and Navy personnel who are rotated to Reserve assignments for specified tours from Regular units. They are assigned to Selected Reserve ground units as Inspector-Instructors (I-I) and to Selected Reserve air units to man Marine Air Reserve Training Units/Detachments (MARTU/MARTDs). In addition to performing I-I duties, the MARTDs provide day-to-day support in the aircraft maintenance and operations functional areas. The I-I personnel (Regulars) do not necessarily fill unit vacancies in the organization they support, but may be used as fillers for those units upon mobilization. The Regular cadre assigned to MARTU/MARTDs supporting units for the 4th MAW do fill vacancies with the supported units and are mobilized with their units. In addition to the Regular support of the Marine Reserve there is a small cadre of Active Duty Reservists known as Category 6 officers who serve with various

<sup>6/</sup> Ibid, I-10

headquarters and staffs. They are assigned for a specific period of time, with tour extensions possible, and their promotions are governed by ROPA and, thus, are not in competition with Regular officer promotions. They are not counted against total Marine Corps end strength. I-I staffs are authorized 1614 Regular Navy enlisted personnel in 154 staffs which organize, recruit, instruct and train Ready Reserve personnel in 197 units at 154 locations. The 22 MARTU/MARTDs in 4th MAW are authorized 2407 Regular officer and enlisted personnel, 12 Category 6 officers and 9 Regular Navy enlisted personnel to service 66 Marine Air Reserve units. 7/

(3) The current Air Reserve Technician program (Air Force Reserve) began in January 1958 after an examination of the Air National Guard technician plan. The Korean war had proven that Air Reserve units were more effective and more quickly mobilized than were individuals trained for augmentation. Permanent party personnel of the Air Force Reserve Training Centers were replaced by Active Duty Reservists from the community in which the wings were based, and were absorbed into the organizations of the wings served rather than maintained separately. The Air Reserve Technician Program is based on agreement between the Department of the Air Force and the U.S. Civil Service Commission which provides for dual-status technicians (concurrently AF Reservists and competitive civil service employees). Air Reserve Technicians provide support at 38 different locations. Approximately 73% of the technicians are assigned to the aircraft maintenance function, with the remainder assigned primarily in the operations and personnel areas. The number authorized in a unit ranges from two to 495 and depends on the unit's mission and equipment and the work required to meet its training and administration needs. 8/

(4) The Coast Guard Augmentation Training Program accomplishes approximately 65% of CG Reserve training through Reservists working alongside Active counterparts performing active missions on active equipment and craft. Because each unit consists of a small number of Reservists, relatively few support forces are assigned to the operating locations. Rather, most FTTA personnel are located at headquarters and district offices. Categories of FTTA include about 65 Regular officers assigned, on a rotational basis, to the Reserve program; 90 Reserve Program Administrators (RPAs), career Reserve officers

7/ Ibid, I-13

8/ Ibid, I-16

assigned at headquarters and district levels, involved in overall administration and development of training programs for Reserve units; 173 Regular duty enlisted personnel, of whom 99 are assigned as station keepers involved in diverse activities similar to the Army ASTs; and 119 civilians who provide administration and training support. <sup>9/</sup>

d. Technicians in the Army and Air Force programs outlined above are now required to be dual-status personnel.

e. Current, on-going changes to full-time support of USAR and ARNG units.

(1) The Study of the Full-Time Personnel Requirements of the Reserve Components (Stroud Study) Dec 1977, and the Report of Full-Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve (FTTA Study), June 1978 each recognized a need for added full-time personnel in support of RC units.

(a) The Stroud Study proposed manning in units based on unit strength at one of three levels: minimal, adequate or optimal (Incl 1). The FTTA Study dealt with the broader realm of all Service RC support; it recognized the benefits of certain programs over others; and although it recommended the development of increased authorization for full-time personnel of the Army Reserve Components it did not quantify requirements at any level.

(b) In addition to recommending increased full-time support in RC units both the Stroud and FTTA Studies recognized that the USAR has the least effective full-time support (technician) force. The relative effectiveness is based upon fragmentation of its management program, union activities and, to the greatest degree, upon the "status quo" problem. As a result, both the Stroud and FTTA Studies recommended that the USAR competitive civil service program be replaced by the ARNG excepted civil service program.

(c) The Stroud Study recognized that RC personnel on AD could accomplish the work requirements of supported units but did not conclude that such status is either less expensive or more efficient than ARNG dual-status technicians. It also recognized the potential for AC full-time support in RC units but concluded that this was the least desirable form of manning. The Stroud Study recommended a uniform "military technician program" in both the ARNG and USAR requiring unit membership with the same grade and manning structure (the ARNG dual status excepted civil service technician changed in name to "military technician"). This was reiterated in the FTTA



Study and recommended for inclusion in a DOD Directive to clarify DOD policy on status and use of USAK and ARNG technicians.

(2) As a result of the House Armed Services Committee Report 95-194 a test program was initiated in 1977 in which 146 Operation Readiness Specialist (ORS) NCO were added to 28 ARNG mobilization entities in 19 states, and 97 Additional Full Time Training Readiness Manning (AFTTRM) NCO were added to USAR units. The test program began in January 1978 and was evaluated in December 1978. The subjective evaluation rendered the test a success although data collected from Unit Readiness Reports and FORSCOM 1R/2R Reports did not reveal significant improvement of test units over control units. It is anticipated that time will act in favor of readiness improvement. The program originally anticipated an expansion in AFTTRM/ORS personnel during FY 79 but that increase has been deleted by OSD. The AFTTRM/ORS NCO employed during the test program, scheduled for termination in 1979 have been recommended for extension to 1980 so that they may be integrated into the FTM program (below). The AFTTRM/ORS program is separate from other RC full-time support.

(3) The Army POM for FY 80-84 described a program of investment in the readiness of the RC force. The current budget submissions at the basic level provide 2220 AC spaces (1200 for ARNG support; 1020 for USAR support), 1108 ARNG spaces and 1060 USAR spaces for Additional Full-Time Manning (AFTM). This FTM/AFTM program emphasizes the M to M+30 units scheduled for deployment. These AFTM personnel are in addition to full-time technicians. AFTM personnel will be assigned to a TDA providing for attachment to or duty at the RC unit being supported. They will not be advisory personnel. They will be used as operational personnel in units to which they are assigned, and will be earmarked for specific duties with specific units. Active Army participants will be assigned to an Active Army major headquarters TDA with duty station at a specified RC unit. Key points:

(a) All AFTM personnel will be directly responsible to the gaining RC unit commander.

(b) AFTM assignees participate with the unit both IDT status and during Annual Training.

(c) AFTM personnel will be mobilized with their duty unit.

(d) Active Army personnel will not participate when their ARNG units are ordered to participate in State Active Duty.

(e) RC selectees will be ordered to full-time duty for an initial tour not to exceed two years, with an extension possible.

(f) Active Army personnel will be assigned for a normal tour. The significant departure from prior programs is the provision for Active Army "filler" personnel when RC members cannot be recruited for a position. Assignment of AC personnel will be accomplished when it is determined that RC recruitment, within a specified period, has been unsuccessful. Priority of fill of AFTM personnel will be: a qualified incumbent from the associated position in the unit; another qualified unit member; a qualified RC member recruited from outside the unit; an AC member. It is by making available to the RC unit Commander qualified AC and RC military personnel on a full time basis that the purpose of FTM of improving readiness and deployment/employment capability of selected RC units will be achieved. However, the present status is that the RC have indicated a potential need for less than 70 AC members. These are for MOS skills not locally available. The RC have thus indicated optimism in their capability to fill the FTM/AFTM spaces. This will not be conclusive until actual fill begins after 1 October 1979.

(4) During FY 1979 approval was granted to convert RC technician program vacancies to "military technicians" by ordering Reservists to AD/ADT to fill specific program vacancies for a two year tour of duty. This conversion to full-time manning (CFTM) resulted, in part, from the one for two civilian hiring restriction imposed by the President and is considered to be temporary and not a part of the FTM force ((c) above). The House Appropriations Committee, in its report of July 27, 1978 (95-1398) recommended a test program to determine if the Reserves have the ability to attract and hire personnel in an AD status by actions including:

(a) Filling all vacancies which occur in positions currently held by status quo technicians with full-time Reservists on AD.

(b) Fill all positions not manned at end FY 78 and all new positions added to the structure in FY 79 with full-time AD military support.

The conversion program began in Jan-February 1979 and the ARNG had successfully filled 597 of their available 1032 spaces as of 31 May 1979. The USAR had filled 277 of their 736 available spaces (310 vacant, 426 projected attrition) by 25 June 1979. FY 80 spaces for conversion are ARNG - 2119 and USAR 540. The success of these conversions should provide a measure of the potential of the ARNG and USAR to recruit and fill AFTM spaces.

(5) It must be reiterated that the Army full-time RC support programs include technicians, FTM/AFTM, AF1TRM/ORS and CFTM. Technician spaces are reduced (temporarily) by CFTM; AFTTRM/ORS is recommended for integration into FTM/AFTM; otherwise the programs are separate and managed independently. It must also be recognized that "military technicians" refers to both the CFTM personnel and to those dual-status technicians who serve as military members in the units they serve as technicians.

f. Impact of Unionization. Over half of Guard and Reserve technicians are represented by national labor unions. In the Guard, bargaining units are all granted recognition to represent Guard technicians only, thus all union activity is directed toward technician administration and management activities. Conversely, bargaining units for Army Reserve technicians include all other eligible Federal employees assigned to a specific facility. In the latter (USAR) case, day to day activities seldom involve subjects which impact upon technicians only. The Defense Manpower Commission (May 1976) recognized "an inherent potential for undue union influence in the strictly military functions of the technicians, resulting in a dilution of military command authority and adversely affecting the responsiveness and discipline of Guard and Reserve units." 10/ More recently the House Appropriations Committee (21 June 1977) recorded "Membership in a military Reserve component means that an individual accepts the responsibilities inherent in military discipline and the other facets of military life should he be called to active duty. This is a matter of grave concern to the Committee and is one of the reasons for the recommendation to phase out the technician program." 11/

g. Manpower and Cost Considerations. The intent of Congress is that DOD shall use the least costly form of manpower that is consistent with military requirements and needs of the DOD. Civil Service manpower is less costly than military (AC), primarily because less Federal structure has to be established in support of civilians. Further, once assigned, technicians are not rotated as frequently as Active force personnel. However, the Defense Manpower Commission (May 1976) found that "the objectives of the

technician program can be accomplished at substantial savings by ultimately replacing the technicians with full-time active duty guardsmen and reservists. ...Implementation of this change would eliminate dual pay and retirement for what in essence is the same job." 12/ Also, a significant factor developed in analyzing the difference in total costs was that an increase in the ratio of enlisted personnel to officer personnel tended to increase the technician costs over the military costs. 13/ Present ratios are approximately 3 to 1. Finally, although there may be a cost avoidance generated by retaining technicians in their dual status role amounting to as much as \$200 million, if wage grade salaries continue to increase at the relatively higher rate of the past several years the technician program could cost approximately \$370 million per year more than an active military program in ten years. 14/

h. Full-time support - Unit Needs. The functional areas of administration and supply (in that order) consume the greatest portion of the Army technician's time. These are followed, at a significant distance, by training, personnel management and recruiting and retention, not necessarily in that order. According to a technician survey, training is the functional area most requiring increased attention under ideal conditions, but does not exceed the requirement in administration and supply even under the ideal. 15/ Unit commanders identified "training" as the greatest void in the present manning criteria and their first choice for assistance. 16/

i. Affiliation programs increase full-time requirements at unit level. 17/ Increased workload is caused by:

- (1) The need to coordinate with additional headquarters.
- (2) Requesting, scheduling and coordinating MTT visits.
- (3) Coordination of visits by unit personnel to sponsor units (administrative workload/orders etc.).
- (4) Compliance with additional circulars and directives requiring reports.
- (5) Increased frequency of comprehensive evaluations.
- (6) Increased action involving the exchange and accountability of equipment.

12/ Ibid, III-6

13/ Ibid, IV-4

14/ Ibid, Cover Memo, pg 1

15/ STROUD Study, Dec 1977, Pg III-6, Table IX; III-7; Table X; III-8, Table XI

16/ Ibid, III-24

17/ Ibid, III-11, III-32

j. RC unit commanders are generally opposed to assignment of full-time AC personnel to their units for the following reasons: 18/

(1) Lack of dedication of AC personnel to the unit and the community.

(2) Turnover due to PCS.

(3) Impact on unit promotions.

(4) Possibility of negating state control and "home town boy" local identity and relationships.

(5) Exceptions were:

(a) Full-time AC personnel should be from the parent unit (roundout unit).

(b) AC support is acceptable if the present quality of augmentee personnel can be maintained.

(c) Each exception was stated only once in the survey responses.

k. Mobilization assets for RC units will be increased, and unit readiness may be increased, through any of the following:

(1) Reducing the number of "status quo" technicians.

(2) Changing technicians from competitive to excepted civil service.

(3) Conversion of selected technician spaces to full-time military status (preferably active duty Reservists/Guardsmen).

l. Problems in the present technician programs. The Army Audit Agency found that the impact of administrative workload in RC units is overstated, and that any present backlog of administrative workload is not adversely affecting unit readiness or capability of the units to train effectively. The administrative workload could be managed more effectively and reductions in workload could be achieved through elimination of unnecessary work and through more efficient methods, including use of available automated systems for personnel management and use of AFES by ARNG for processing enlistments. The

existing supervisory system is weak and allows too much functioning by unit technicians independent of day-to-day supervision, resulting in the development of inefficient work habits over the years. Staff technicians (6,000) are not effectively utilized to supervise ASTs (8,300) and the current supervisory problems will be magnified when additional FTM personnel (8,000) are added at the unit level. Supervisory requirements must be refined and precisely stated; job descriptions must be specific; and work duplication between technicians and added FTM personnel must be eliminated. Since administrative positions offer little potential for improving training and readiness they should not be among the first added (contrary to the findings of the "STROUD" Study).

#### 4. Discussion.

a. The intent of Congress, as demonstrated in the National Guard Technician's Act of 1968 is that the military characteristics of the technician program are paramount and that promotion of unit readiness is the sole purpose for having technicians. Excepted Civil Service is the DOD preferred alternative to competitive Civil Service for dual-status technicians. Union activities are an adverse factor within the technician programs. Union members are opposed to the proposition of an active duty military status for technicians. <sup>19/</sup> In addition to the "status quo" problem in the USAR technician program about 26% of Army Reserve Technicians are currently assigned to Reserve units other than the units in which they are employed as technicians (referred to as misassigned technicians). DOD has, since the early 1970s, submitted several legislative proposals to OMB to change Army Reserve technicians from the competitive to the excepted service. The Civil Service Commission opposed the proposals because of unresolved questions concerning the status of civilian technicians presently on the rolls and the impact on status-quo technicians who either never had or who lose military reserve unit membership without fault. The requirement for legislative action to obtain the same degree of military consideration and mobilization readiness for the Army Reserve technician program as is in the ARNG technician program is recognized in a recent GAO memo to SECDEF dated 26 February 1979. Such legislation was not proposed, however, pending results of the CFTM program outlined above.

b. In addition to the mobilization and readiness considerations of the excepted versus competitive civil service technician programs, there are certain direct-cost benefits which accrue to the Army under the former. Overtime must be paid to competitive civil service technicians but under the excepted civil service

<sup>19/</sup> FTTA, III-6

technician program overtime is repaid as compensatory time. Although either system may be abused and costly, the potential for unnecessary overtime appears greater when the reward is a cash increase to pay.

c. Recruitment and retention of a RC military AFTM force for many ARNG and USAR units may be difficult because of lack of proximity to active posts, reducing the availability of benefits such as commissaries, medical facilities etc. Another factor reducing the potential for recruiting RC AFTM personnel is the military wage, particularly at the lower enlisted levels. Whether or not RC units can actually compete with the local civilian economy for the quality of personnel needed may well be revealed by the success of the FY 79 CFTM effort. A third factor with potential detrimental impact on the AFTM recruitment effort is the tour length of two to three years without an inducement of some permanency. Well qualified personnel can hardly be expected to leave civilian employment on any short-term basis.

d. The full-time support force will be some combination of technicians, Reservists/Guardsmen on active duty, and Active Component manpower because of the inability to change the current structure under civil service laws, and the inability to recruit sufficient lower grade technicians and enlisted Reservists/Guardsmen to meet FTM requirements to improve unit readiness.

e. Advantages of Existing Support Programs.

(1) USAR technicians (competitive civil service).

(a) Provide reasonable on-the-job stability (continuity).

(b) Provide expertise based on average of three years active duty in the specialty related to the technician function (maintenance technicians).

(c) Lower life span costs than Active Component military personnel.

(d) Dual-status required.

(e) Provide compatibility with the community because of local hiring practices.

(f) Are generally available to meet unprogrammed requirements, although overtime pay is required when pay period work hours are exceeded.

(2) ARNG technicians (excepted civil service). In addition to advantages (1)(a)-(e) above found in the USAR technician program, the following accrue to the ARNG program:

(a) Over 95% of excepted technicians are considered mobilization assets, thereby improving readiness.

(b) Personnel proficiency and personnel administration are enhanced through state management systems and the job retention based on unit membership.

(3) Active Duty Reservists/Guardsmen.

(a) Initially more attuned to the problems of training and administering the Reserves.

(b) Provide stability similar to the technicians.

(c) Generally comes from the community in which the unit he serves is located, thus has a rapport with that community.

(d) The lowest cost alternative, by virtue of the difference in pay (direct costs) between military and civilian salaries and absence of requirement to pay overtime, and because the support costs (BASOPS etc.) are not as substantial as for the active duty Regular Army personnel.

(4) Active Duty Regular Army Personnel.

(a) Potentially possess the widest breadth of experience as a result of the worldwide rotation system.

(b) Potentially the most available source of AFTM personnel, if current assets are considered for assignment to AFTM positions.

(c) Enhance unit readiness when designated a mobilization asset to the unit served.

(d) Provide a work force available for unprogrammed activities.



(5) Other Services Programs.

(a) The Navy system is particularly effective in providing full-time support personnel who are experts in the training and administration of the Reserves.

(b) The USMC program enhances a total force concept through assignment of Regular Marine members to specific billets in RC units.

(c) The most significant advantages of the Air Force Reserve technician program are:

1 The equipment-intensive nature of the Air Force which allows Air Force Reserve personnel to use active equipment.

2 The capability of the Air Force Reserve to perform actual missions, rather than to accomplish repetitive training for potential commitments.

3 The limited number of Air Reserve Centers operated.

(d) The Coast Guard Reserve trains on active ships with active Coast Guardsmen. Size of the Reserve is in its favor and actually obviates any comparison with the Army Reserve programs.

i. Disadvantages of Existing Support Programs.

(1) USAR technicians (competitive civil service).

(a) Approximately 20% are "status quo" and cannot be considered as mobilization assets.

(b) Dual (military) status is not always performed in the units which the technicians serve as civilians, indicating turbulence upon mobilization. (Misassignment approaches 26%.)

(c) Supervisory responsibility, particularly in units, rests with the unit commander. The limited contact between the IDT commander and his full-time technician staff is generally unfavorable.

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OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C F/O 15/7  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82 (ACCS-82). VOLUME III. ANNEXE--ETC(U)  
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(d) Union activities impact adversely on work-time, military requirements and employee-supervisor relations. Union activities are generalized for all types of competitive civil service personnel, and are not directed at USAR technicians as a group.

(2) ARNG Technicians (excepted civil service).

(a) Supervisory responsibility is through the technician program, but is not adequately exercised by supervisory level technicians.

(b) Union activities are directly related to technicians since each union represents a specific group of excepted technicians. Supervisors are required to deal with several unions, each representing a different element/facet of the technician program. The potential for work stoppage may be the major disadvantage to the ARNG system.

(c) Has the lowest breadth of experience of FTM programs because of the inability to periodically reassign personnel on a worldwide or nationwide basis.

(d) Some nonavailability of force members for unprogrammed tasks, caused by the requirement for compensatory time for time worked beyond 80 hours in a two-week pay period.

(3) Active Duty Reservists/Guardsmen.

(a) Most difficult to recruit, particularly at the lower enlisted levels required.

(b) Breadth of experience is limited and bears a direct relationship to time spent as a Regular Army member or to time spent on active duty for training in MOS-related schools.

(4) Active Duty Regular Army Personnel.

(a) Accessibility for assignment may deprive AC units of required personnel.

(b) Least desirable to the RC because:

- 1 Frequency of rotation (reduced continuity).
- 2 Not actually assigned to units served.

3 Perceived placement of loyalty is not to RC or unit served.

4 Perceived potential for impeding promotions of RC unit members.

5 Not considered as mobilization assets.

(5) Other Services Programs.

(a) In the Navy system the management functions of policy and budget are not controlled by the Chief, Naval Reserve, who is responsible for overall management of the system.

(b) The USMC does not develop a force experienced in the unique aspects of training and administering Reserve forces since it does not habitually reassign individuals to Reserve duty. Neither does it guarantee, in the case of the I-I staff, that the FTM member will be a mobilization asset of the unit served.

(c) The Air Force Reserve holds the potential for the same "status quo" problems as the Army Reserve technician program, although this in no way approaches the magnitude of the Army problem at present.

(d) The Coast Guard Reserve program, due to its limited size and method of training holds no significant disadvantages.

5. Conclusions.

a. The USAR technician program rates lowest among the full-time support forces of all of the services. Accounting for the lower Army ratings are the following differences:

(1) The USAR has a substantial number of small, widely dispersed units.

(2) The USAR has a less centralized management system.

(3) Inadequate emphasis is placed on the military aspects of the technician program.

b. The excepted civil service program eliminates many of the problems which occur in attempting to meet military requirements with a non-military force. This makes the ARNG system highly desirable among members of the RC. Desirability

has been reduced, recently because of unionization and collective bargaining. This major disadvantage could be eliminated by barring unions from the technician force or by not allowing commanders to bargain or consult with unions on technician matters. Conversion of all technicians to excepted service and restriction of union activities to strictly non-military elements of the technician program would also add to the recognition of the primacy of the military aspects of the technician programs.

c. The temporary freeze on hiring new civilian technicians and the program of conversion of vacant civilian technician spaces to full-time active duty positions for Reservists/Guardsmen is a positive step toward improving the overall FTM program. CFTM restores the primacy of the military requirements of the support program.

d. Recruitment of Active Duty Reservists could achieve the same effectiveness levels in performance as the present excepted service technicians. This would improve the excepted civil service program by removing the members from the union sphere of influence, and is a recommended alternative of the FTTA study. The limitation to this course of action, however, is the potential for recruitment and retention of lower enlisted members. Recruiting is a product of the local job market and of the potential for continued service once recruited. Few will enlist if the job potential is limited to slightly more than two years. Retention appears to be the greater problem because those recruited may opt for the wider range of benefits available to Regular personnel and may transfer to the Regular Army.

e. Active duty Regular Army personnel provide the most accessible source of FTM personnel because they are available for assignment. They also have the broadest experience base. However, conversion to a Regular Army FTM force is the least desirable type of support for the RC members. Such action would be perceived as an AC takeover of the RC. Loyalties are questioned and potential damage to the upward mobility of RC unit members is forecast. Neither of the latter are mitigated by a promise of readiness improvement resultant from the AC FTM personnel becoming mobilization assets of the supported unit. Some objections (or reservations) to the use of AC AFTM may be obviated by the use of AC volunteers insofar as possible. The assignment of AC volunteers to RC

units in their home town or region would lead to an earlier rapport between the community and the AC AFTM member. Further, the use of AC volunteers to the maximum extent practicable would minimize the impact of the perception among the AC of AFTM assignments in RC units as hardship and career-killing tours of duty.

f. Problems in the management and supervision of the technician programs identified in the Army Audit Agency report (April 1979) must be resolved before AFTM is fully implemented. Improvements possible include, but are not limited to:

(1) Refinement of technician job descriptions to eliminate general duties in favor of specific duties by functional area.

(2) Development of specific goals and objectives in each functional area which, under FTM, will support measurement of readiness improvement. This includes statement of specific measures to be used and the development of a definite timetable for RC unit readiness improvements.

(3) Standardization of functional areas to be filled by FTM in all RC units, similar to the recommendations of the STROUD study.

(4) Addition of a FTM training specialist/NCO in every deployable company and battalion sized unit and in selected early-mobilizing, non-deploying units. This will relieve the technician of training functions essential to the unit but not part of his job description.

(5) Requirement for RC units to establish flexible drill periods for unit members in administrative, supply, clerical, maintenance and personnel specialties. This would encourage them to perform in their MOS duties in support of their unit throughout the month rather than only during one monthly training assembly. This will better support the efforts of technicians and other FTM personnel by allowing scheduling of work to be accomplished.

(6) Allowing unit commanders to establish their own priority for fill of FTM after the FTM training specialist/NCO and after flexible scheduling of assemblies for specialists in (5) above is attempted. This should preclude arbitrary

addition of FTM administrative and/or supervisory personnel before other sources of relief are exhausted.

(7) Standardization of day-to-day supervision and rating of competitive service technicians, excepted service technicians and AFTM personnel. This should be accomplished by full-time personnel in the units served. Members of the unit chain of command provide written comments, as appropriate, to be attached to ratings rendered by full-time supervisors.

g. The present status of the technician force, competitive and excepted civil service, is such that neither will be eliminated for over 20 more years because of civil service employment and retention standards and practices. Some Active Duty Reservists/Guardsmen are present and more are programmed for both AFTM and as Military Technicians. AC support has been approved and the test program of assignment of AFTM to selected units was a success. The conclusion is that, while excepted civil service is the preferred technician program, active duty military programs for Reservists/Guardsmen are potentially less expensive and are more desirable because of their position beyond the sphere of labor unions; but a mixed force is, for the foreseeable future, here to stay. It is imperative that we learn to effectively manage the mixed force to achieve maximum efficiency in support of the RC to produce the readiness capability which the RC is expected to fulfill.

#### 6. References.

a. Report of Full Time Training and Administration of the Selected Reserve, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics, June 1978.

b. Study of the Full-Time Personnel Requirements of the Reserve Components, (STROUD Study), DOD, Dec 1977.

c. The Army Reserve Technician Study, Operations Research Institute, Inc., (ORI) Silver Spring, MD. (OCAR Contract), June 1978.

d. Army Audit Agency Report (Southern District) 16 April 1979, Administrative Workload in the Reserve Components.

## COMPANY FULL-TIME MANNING REQUIREMENTS (RECOMMENDED LEVELS)

UNIT SIZE	SUPV	ADMIN/ SUPPLY	SUPPLY	TRAINING	CLERK	LEVEL
230 +	1	1	1	1	1	OPTIMAL
	1	1		1	1	ADEQUATE
		1		1	1	MINIMAL
150-229	1	1		1	1	OPTIMAL
		1	1	1	1	ADEQUATE
			1	1	1	MINIMAL
80-149	1	1		1	1	OPTIMAL
			1	1	1	ADEQUATE
			1	1		MINIMAL
60-79			1		1	OPTIMAL
			1		1	ADEQUATE
			1		1	MINIMAL
26-59			1		1	OPTIMAL
			1			ADEQUATE
			1			MINIMAL
LESS THAN 26-GROUP TO 35 OR MORE						

## RECOMMENDATION

### FULL-TIME MANNING AT BATTALION

	<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>MINIMAL</u>	<u>ADEQUATE</u>	<u>OPTIMAL</u>
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL	4	5	6	9
FUNCTIONS OF PERSONNEL	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">           ADMIN TRAINING  PERSONNEL TRAINING         </div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">           ADMIN TRAINING  PERSONNEL TRAINING *CLERK         </div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">           ADMIN TRAINING  PERSONNEL TRAINING *SUPPLY *CLERK         </div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;">           *STAFF SUPV. ADMIN TRAINING PERSONNEL *EN SUPV *ADMIN *SUPPLY TRAINING *CLERK         </div>

\* ADMIN PERSONNEL  
\* ADDED TO USAR, ALREADY IN MOST ARMO UNITS

NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE CURRENT  
STRUCTURE AT THE RECOMMENDED LEVELS

<u>CURRENT</u>	<u>OPTIMAL</u>	<u>ADEQUATE</u>	<u>MINIMAL</u>
ARMO	18,731	6,149	2,842
USAR	5,964	3,034	1,705
TOTAL	18,695	9,183	4,547

BC BATTALIONS AND COMPANIES NUMBERS DERIVED FROM ARMO/USAR UNIT STRUCTURE/  
STATISTICS JUNE 77

LEVELS OF OPTIMAL, ADEQUATE, AND MINIMAL MANNING FROM "STROUD STUDY"

Incl 1

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**ANNEX G**  
**REPORTS**

**ANNEX G**

**APPENDIX 1**

**STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING MINUTES.**

**8 JAN 79 MEETING**

1 FEB 1979

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING MINUTES,  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82  
(ACCS-82)

1. The SAG meeting was convened on 8 Jan 79 at 0900 hours, in Room 2C731, the Pentagon. The purpose of the meeting was to obtain SAG comments on the ACCS-82 study plan, and the constraints and assumptions shown at inclosure 3. The meeting adjourned at 1225 hours. A list of attendees and the agenda is at inclosures 1 and 2, respectively.

2. Opening remarks by the Acting SAG Chairperson (COL Vail) emphasized the importance of the ACCS-82 study effort. He expressed the need for all study advisory group members to become involved in the study and commented on the problems of previous studies in which SAG members were not so dedicated. A commitment of all members is required to support the study group. Contact with SAG members will be made by ACCS-82 members after this meeting. However, SAG members should not wait to be contacted if they have information or questions. Following this brief background and introduction by the Acting SAG Chairperson, each of the members of the SAG introduced himself and identified the agency or command which he represented.

3. In the discussion phase of the meeting, some SAG members expressed their concerns and expectations of the study effort.

a. Mr. Clark-ASA(M&RA) expressed the need for active involvement of the Reserve Component. He stressed the need for effective planning as a means of resolving issues. His contribution could be to help the Study Group understand some of the political implications which they may encounter.

b. COL Wing (TRADOC) was concerned with: the Army's ability to sustain its training so it can be expanded during mobilization, and the consequences of postmobilization activities.

c. COL McLain (ACC) expressed concern regarding RC communications in CONUS, communications for Reserve Components in overseas areas after mobilization and what RC elements require support at CONUS bases.

d. Mr. Lowe gave guidance from General Peixotto that previous studies involving reorganization required additional resources. General Peixotto will not agree with any increase in resources, particularly increases in manpower.

e. COL Lumpkins (OCAR) expressed concern in three areas. STEADFAST was a good reorganization but does require some improvement in command and control below the CONUS Army. There is concern about the gaining command concept. Funding below the CONUSA level should be streamlined.

f. COL Timlin (INSCOM) expressed concern about echelons above corps (EAC) and the combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) for RC at Corps and below.

g. COL Willner (ACSAC) stated that the study group should review the Army Command and Control master plan for communications concurrent with ADP analysis. He indicated that the crisis in post-strike command and control communications requirements has already been identified by the Army Command and Control master planning group in a study completed by IBM. There will be heavy dependence on commercial communication facilities which requires premobilization contracting. He expressed an understanding of the Army budget problems identified earlier by Mr. Lowe; however, any improvements may require more resources.

h. COL Mitchell (DCSLOG) stated that several attempts have been made to improve combat service support in the Army. Under today's restrictions of CSS, battlefield forces would be limited to 50 percent effectiveness despite recent additions of full-time manning personnel and dollar resources. Eighty percent of the non-divisional combat service support is in the Reserve Components and 65 percent of that would go to the theater of operations by D + 30. POMCUS is required. There is no neat organization or central geographic line which can be established. DCSLOG is now looking at the requirement for six COSCOM's and two TASCOS required to support theater operations. The association program being developed in conjunction with FORSCOM would cause additions to the budget to provide support to NATO. COL Mitchell also expressed his concern regarding the need for ADP for logistics.

i. COL Cass (HSC) indicated that MOBEX 78 showed HSC had no control over its units until mobilization. HSC initiated a study in this area in August 1978. The ACCS-82 study group should consider this effort.

j. COL Feilke (DARCOM) reiterated the problems which came to light in MOBEX. These problems included the utilization of reserve units in depots followed by deployment of the same units overseas. Movement of supplies (ammo) in CONUS and to Europe must be addressed. Problems exist between the wholesaler and the combat forces concerning who should operate the system. Some problems with procedures need to be resolved and streamlined between HQDA and MACOM's.

k. COL Miller (FORSCOM) explained that his commander feels the study should not address only full mobilization but should look at the total mobilization situation. Study needs to consider factors involved in going from unit readiness to total readiness. CG, FORSCOM is interested in the study because mobilization is FORSCOM'S business.

l. Mr. Brinkerhoff (OSD) introduced COL Dave O'Rear. He expressed the need for command and control to act in peace and transition to war at reasonable cost. MOBEX has proven that we need a stronger command and control structure. The Army's problems are long standing. There are too many echelons in the RC management structure to do the job efficiently. He indicated that Mr. Resor is now the overall manager for mobilization efforts and has policy authority. Mr. Resor is now studying mobilization. Mr. Brinkerhoff mentioned that since the Army lacks the command and control to mobilize effectively the most important outcome of the study should be a command and control structure which will accomplish that mobilization. The study should not be resource-constrained but should develop the best system. We need an improved system.

m. COL Larsen (TAG) expressed a concern of his agency that we not detract from the quality of life aspects of the soldier. Administrative systems must be considered in command and control. The Adjutant General is concerned about RCPAC, the use and considerations of the RCPAC functions of the RC management and an improvement of the mobilization capability of individual ready reserve (IRR).

n. COL Higman (OCE) questioned what effect the study would have on the installation planning effort and how the study translated into requirements particularly related to troop mobilization and stationing plans. OCE will assist with the engineer role of RC engineer units, and mobilization expansion including an engineer study done on the housekeeping command and an internal reorganization revolving around mobilization.

o. LTC(P) Sperandio (TSG) expressed interest in recruiting to man the RC under the Surgeon General's Office and recruiting of physicians on the whole.

p. COL Sheard (PA&E) reiterated the deficiencies already noted by the SAG members including the need for requirements supporting an optimum way for transition from peace to war but he reiterated Mr. Lowe's comments regarding realistic solutions within budget plans. The optimum solutions must be reduced to a realistic solution. He

recommended decremented solutions which consider the best case and reduced cases based on the cost and resources.

5 The Acting SAG Chairperson (COL Vail) reviewed the charter of the SAG. He emphasized the need of the SAG to provide advice and technical guidance throughout the period of the study, not only at the Study Advisory Group meetings. The SAG members become adhoc study group members in their own agencies and should assist the study progress. The SAG members should keep the study group informed of problems influencing the study. The constraints and assumptions must be representative of the Army Staff. Additions are expected and there are minor alterations to the constraints and assumptions presented. Continuity of members on the SAG is essential. Members should be available to the Study Group. Finally, he advised the Study Advisory Group of the role of the Army Management Division of the Director of Management Office.

6. The ACCS-82 Study Group Chairperson (BG Wilson) next introduced the ACCS-82 study group members present at the SAG meeting. He commented on two particular items: First, the focus seemed to be revolving around the RC and he made it clear that the study is to encompass both AC and RC and is not completely RC oriented; and second, he noted the budget and resource concern. He stated that if a best case becomes evident, that best case must be represented as the preferred alternative; however, this does not preclude the consideration and presentation of other cases which recognize realistic constraints. The study group will accept any recommendations on constraints. He then presented a briefing on the evolution of the ACCS-82 study, the summary of criticisms of command and control in the Army, and the Study Group action to date (see inclosure 4).

7. Next, LTC Shope presented the study plan overview to the SAG members, including the purpose, objective, scope, and constraints and assumptions (see inclosure 4). During the discussion on constraints and assumptions, concern was expressed on the role of affiliation program and how it impacted on command and control. The essence of the question was: Would ACCS-82 review affiliation and the gaining command concept? It would seem that the first constraint indicates that the group will not review those programs. The question was expanded to ask whether or not the Study Group would consider the timing of assumption of command and control of the overseas command over mobilizing units. The answer to that was no.

a. There was concern with the study constraint regarding provisions of AR 570-8 Army Management Headquarters Activity. Any constraints

based on AR 570-8 would seriously limit the quality of the final product of the Study Group. The Study Chairperson indicated that the constraint as stated was not intended to place a limit on what the Study Group could do, but rather expressed the need to address changes in compliance with the regulations as appropriate. All management headquarters can be changed with appropriate approval.

b. The Study Chairperson noted the time constraint. There is a limit on the period when the results of the study must be implemented to meet an agreement between GEN Kroesen and Dr. White. It was also noted however, that, there is concern in the Director of Management Office that the time allowed to complete the study could be too restrictive and that the 1 Jun 79 and 1 Aug 79 suspenses could be extended.

c. It was recommended that constraint No. 2 concerning the minimization of turbulence in the implementation of the study recommendations be eliminated as a constraint and incorporated into guidance for the Study Group. The reason is that turbulence is subjective based on viewpoint. The Study Chairperson, in his discussions with the VCSA, indicated the final recommendations could be evolutionary or revolutionary. The VCSA indicated that the implementation period may have to be expanded to reduce the turbulence and to be evolutionary.

d. Discussion next revolved around which scenario should be the driving force of the study effort: Case 4/1 or Case 1. Mr. Brinkerhoff said that Case 1 is the most demanding situation and everything would be covered within considerations for Case 1. There was concern about the use of Case 1 because of the RC/POMCUS situation. The basic difference between the two and the reason for selection for Case 1 is that we do not know for which type of war we must mobilize and as we do mobilize, changes will occur. Case 4/1 presumes knowledge in advance and allows specific preparations. It was noted by Mr. Brinkerhoff that the critical element is the time for mobilization up to 180 days.

e. It was recommended that an addition be made to assumption No. 1. A comment that this does not preclude the transfer of functions between major commands should be added. The Study Chairperson indicated that there is no need to review reorganization of major commands. The major commands will be retained and this study is not a study of whether or not to retain them.

f. Discussion revolved around assumption No. 3 regarding Reserve Component ADP systems. The discussion noted the lack of availability of

ADP systems in addition to the compatibility problem. The question of only addressing the ADP compatibility in the assumptions was raised. It was suggested that other shortfall areas be included if ADP is to be specifically mentioned. It was noted that some of the shortages will be improved before the study recommendations are implemented.

g. It was recommended that an assumption be added to the effect that the Army is in a period of declining civilian manpower. The question arose as to what baseline manpower must be considered by the Study Group. Should it be the most recent PBG or the January 1979 PBG? The question concerns itself with civilian manpower because the military manpower through FY 80 is essentially the same as 79. It was decided that the January PBG should be used as the baseline. It is essential that the Study Group know the FY 80 baseline since that will become the basis for changes for FY 81. We should assume a continuing decline in manpower. The Study Group should outline the functions necessary to meet the requirements and then be prepared to defend the resources required to support those functions. Tradeoffs, to compensate for manpower cuts, will be identified.

h. Comments next concerned recruiting. The Chairperson noted that the study will not concern itself with ways and means to recruit. The major concern is that the command and control study cannot hinder recruiting. It was noted at this point that there is a 3 percent real growth in the defense budget, but that there is no evidence of a 3 percent growth in the Army's budget. The Army should request its representative share of this real growth, notwithstanding other budget cuts. The Army has as much claim to this real growth as does any service but it is not apparent that the Army is achieving a 3 percent real growth.

i. Comments in other areas included: a current study is being conducted by ACE on stationing; studies conducted by OCAR regarding RC manning at major command headquarters are available; MACOM's need to develop communications and ADP requirements so ACSAC can procure the necessary equipment. The subject of a possible integration of National Guard and Reserve was mentioned. DCSOPS representative indicated that that was probably beyond the realm of reality. His particular emphasis was that this study should not address the consolidation of RC. The Study Group members indicated that it was not the intent of ACCS-82 to eliminate one element of the RC, but rather to find ways to improve the command and control structure for both elements.

j. The Engineer representative asked whether or not the study would address the "where" of any added organizations? The response from the study group members was yes, we will consider geographic and demographic



constraints in stationing. There is a need for an update of stationing.

k. Comments were made that the COSCOM and TACOM commanders can do the job if given the resources. One objective of the study should be to put resources into the hands of the commander who will become the commander on the battlefield in both AC and RC. This will also improve the relationship between AC and RC. Commanders must be able to control their units and must be responsible for their own readiness condition. There was concern that the study group may not consider changing the present structure. This was dispelled because the group will recommend necessary changes to the present structure if that would improve command and control in the CONUS and the ability to transition from peace to war. Increased manpower at higher levels of command was noted, along with the excess layering which occurs between the major command and the units. The placement of resource allocation at the user level (brigade/battalion) would be an improvement. In this respect, the working relationships between the National Guard and Army Reserve in Birmingham, Alabama and in the State of Iowa was noted.

8. LTC Akam of the ACCS-82 Study Group briefed the SAG members on the management scheme (work relationship and flow diagram). He also presented the control measures to be used throughout the study including SAG scheduling and in-process reviews, and membership on the Study Advisory Group and in-process reviews committee (inclosure 4). He concluded his portion of the briefing with an overview of the type of tasking for information that would be of interest to the major commands.

9. BG Wilson reminded members of the SAG to forward inputs for changes to the study plan, constraints, and assumptions by the 12th of January so they can be incorporated in the final plan. He also reiterated the request that information on all studies, impacting on ACCS-82, be made available to the Study Group. The Study Chairperson indicated that the constraints and assumptions would be a product of today's meeting, and expressed his appreciation for the participation of all concerned.

10. COL Vail concluded the meeting by emphasizing the need for continuity and commitment. SAG members should not be changed. They should take a personal interest in the study. SAG members are to be the representative of the study group in their particular agency and also be available to assist the Study Chairperson as necessary. He thanked all members for their assistance and interest.

11. The next SAG meeting is scheduled for 21 March 1979.

4 Incl  
as

*Michael D. Isacco*  
MICHAEL D. ISACCO  
LTC, GS  
Recorder

ACCS-82

SAG ATTENDEES

8 JAN 1979

REPRESENTATIVE

COL (P) Vail (Chairman)  
Mr. Brinkerhoff  
Mr. Clark  
Mr. Toulme  
COL Miller  
COL Wing  
COL Feilke  
COL Cass  
COL McLain  
COL Timlin  
COL Fancher  
COL Berge  
COL W. Mitchell  
COL Alston  
COL Willner  
COL Vierra  
COL Lumpkins  
COL Higman  
LTC (P) Sperandio  
Mr. Lowe  
COL Larsen  
COL Sheard  
\* Mr. McGrath

AGENCY/HEADQUARTERS

ODOM, OCSA  
OASD, MRA&L  
OASA, M&RA  
OASA, I, L&FM  
FORSCOM  
TRADOC  
DARCOM  
HSC  
ACC  
INSCOM  
ODCSOPS  
ODCSPER  
ODCSLOG  
OACSI  
OACSAC  
NGB  
OCAR  
OACE  
OTSG  
OCCA  
OTAG  
ODPA&E, OCSA  
AAA

ACCS-82

STUDY GROUP MEMBERS

BG Wilson  
COL Fitzgerald  
LTC Akam  
LTC Green  
LTC Shope  
LTC Thomas  
MAJ Cowan  
MAJ Walker  
Mr. Schwartzapfel

Chairman  
Executive Officer

\* Observer

Incl 1

G-1-1-1

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP

8 January 1979

Army Command and Control Study - 82 (ACCS-82)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Presented/Done By</u>
0900-0930	Introductory Remarks	COL (P) Vail
	and	
	Guidance to SAG	COL (P) Vail
0930-0945	Background of Study	BG Wilson
	and	
	Study Group Activities to Date	BG Wilson
0945-1150	Working Session: Study Plan	COL Fitzgerald
	● Purpose, Objectives & Scope	LTC Shope
	● Constraints and Assumptions	"
	● Methodology	"
	- Research and Data Collection	
	- Identify and Detail Base Case	
	- Develop, Analyze, and Compare Alternatives	
	- Define Quantitative and Qualitative MOE	
	● Study Management	LTC Akan
	- Phasing and Milestones	
	- Control	
	- Resources	
	- Visits	
	- MACOM and Agency Tasking	

Incl 2

G-1-2-1

<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Presented/Done By</u>
	• Discussion	BG Wilson
1150-1200	Concluding Remarks	COL (P) Vail
	• Re-cap of SAG Guidance	
	• Summary Guidance to Study Group	

5 JAN 1979

#### STUDY CONSTRAINTS

1. Study will address only the CONUS command and control structure.
2. Proposed improvements to the current command and control structure must be evolutionary and accomplished with a minimum of turbulence.
3. ARNG peacetime command and control is prescribed in the US Constitution and Title 32 of the US Code.
4. Changes to designated Management Headquarters are subject to the provisions of AR 570-8, Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA).
5. Time available to complete the study.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

1. The concept of MACOM as established under the STEADFAST reorganization is sound.
2. Current CONUS command and control structure for the total Army can be improved.
3. AC ADP support systems will not be compatible with AC systems by FY 82.
4. As a minimum, C2 structure must satisfy mobilization requirements of CASE 4/1 in consonance with approved warning scenarios.

16 JAN 1979

#### STUDY CONSTRAINTS

1. The Study will address only the CONUS command and control structure.
2. Proposed improvements to the current command and control structure must be evolutionary and accomplished in a manner that minimizes the adverse impact of turbulence.
3. Army National Guard peacetime command and control is prescribed in the U.S. Constitution and Title 32 of the U.S. Code.
4. Changes to designated management headquarters are subject to the provisions of AR 570-8, Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA).
5. Time available to complete the study.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

1. The current MACOM design (STEADFAST) is sound and will be retained.
2. As a minimum, the command and control structure must satisfy mobilization requirements of case 4/1 in consonance with approved warning scenarios.

ACCS - 82

BACKGROUND

- STEADFAST (1973)

- DESIGNED TO IMPROVE AC AND RC READINESS.
- ALIGN SCHOOLS AND COMBAT DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.

- OSD CONCERN WITH RC COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE (EXCESS LAYERING/DUPLICATIONS).

- MOBEX 76 & 78 CONCLUDED THAT CONUS COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS EXISTED BEFORE, DURING, AND FOLLOWING MOBILIZATION.

- ARMY FORCE INTEGRATION STUDY DISCLOSED THAT CHANGES COULD BE MADE TO IMPROVE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR.

- FORSCOM COMMAND RELATIONSHIP STUDY RECOMMENDED COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN STEADFAST FRAMEWORK.

## SUMMARY OF CRITICISM

- OSD PERCEPTION OF RC MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
- MOBEX 76 AND MOBEX 78 REPORTS ON ORGANIZATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS
  - LACK OF POST-MOB MISSION FOR ALL HQ
  - INSUFFICIENT AC AND RC INTEGRATION
  - LACK OF CORPS HQ IN STRUCTURE
  - FORSCOM WIDE SPAN OF CONTROL
  - INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES DURING MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT
  - LACK OF COMMUNICATION AND ADP EQUIPMENT
  - ORGANIZATIONAL TURBULENCE



ACCS - 82 ACTIONS TO DATE

- \* STUDY DIRECTOR VISITS
- \* GATHERED PERSONNEL
- \* ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE
- \* INITIAL BRIEFINGS TO STUDY GROUP
- \* PREPARATION OF STUDY PLAN
- \* INITIAL CONTACTS WITH AGENCIES, COMMANDS
- \* INITIAL RESEARCH/VISITS
- \* POC MEETING (19 DEC 78)
- \* SAG MEETING (8 JAN 79)

ACCS - 82

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY IS TO EXAMINE THE  
US ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION  
IN CONUS.

- DETERMINE IMPROVEMENTS TO INSURE  
WARTIME EFFECTIVENESS AND TO STRIVE FOR  
PEACETIME EFFICIENCY.
- MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE COMMAND AND  
CONTROL OF ALL AC AND RC FORCES.
- PROVIDE NECESSARY SUPPORT AND  
ASSISTANCE TO ALL RC ELEMENTS.

ACCS - 82

OBJECTIVE IS TO IMPROVE THE TOTAL ARMY CONUS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE TO PERFORM MISSIONS DURING PEACE, WAR, AND THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR.

- ASSURE PROPER COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ARMY UNITS.
- MAKE THE TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR.
- USE THE RC CHAIN OF COMMAND.
- CONTINUE TO STIMULATE AC INTEREST IN READINESS AND TRAINING OF RC UNITS.
- PROVIDE FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLANNING.
- PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL BASIS FOR EXPANSION TO TOTAL MOBILIZATION.

ACCS - 82

SCOPE FOR EXAMINATION INCLUDES THE CONUS  
TOTAL ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS  
FROM DA TO BRIGADE LEVEL.

- RECOGNIZE PEACETIME MISSIONS OF  
THE STATES.
- CONCENTRATE ON COMMAND STRUCTURES  
AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.
- PROVIDE AN ORDERLY IMPLEMENTATION  
PLAN.
- CONSIDER EFFECTS ON RC TRAINING AND  
READINESS.
- CONSIDER IMPACT OF ON-GOING AND  
PROGRAMED ACTIONS TO ENHANCE RC READINESS.
- PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS  
BY FY 82.
- CONSIDER REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF  
PEACETIME ONLY STRUCTURE.

### CONSTRAINTS

- CONUS C2 ONLY
- EVOLUTIONARY IMPROVEMENTS - MINIMUM TURBULENCE
- ARNG PEACETIME C2 - CONSTITUTION/US CODE
- AR 570-8 - ARMY HQ MGMT ACTIVITIES
- TIME

### ASSUMPTIONS

- STEADFAST MACOM STRUCTURE IS SOUND
- CONUS C2 CAN BE IMPROVED
- AC/RC ADP SYSTEMS NOT COMPATIBLE
- CASE 4/1 - WARNING SCENARIOS

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERSHIP  
AND  
IN-PROCESS REVIEW PARTICIPANTS

	<u>I P R</u>	<u>S A G</u>
DAS OR VCSA	X	
MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE	X	
ODCSOPS	X	X
ODCSPER	X	X
ODCSLOG	X	X
OACCSAC	X	X
NGB	X	X
OCAR	X	X
OCE	X	X
OTSG	X	X
OTAG	X	X
OCA	X	X
FORSCOM	X	X
TRADOC	X	X
DARCOM	X	X

# STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERSHIP

AND

## IN-PROCESS REVIEW PARTICIPANTS

	<u>IPR</u>	<u>SAG</u>
ACC	X	X
HSC	X	X
OSD (MRA&L)	*	X
ASA (M&RA)	X	X
ASA (IL&M)	X	X
PAED	X	X
AAA	(OBSERVER)	(OBSERVER)

\* AS REQUIRED

# BRIEFINGS AND REPORTS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>IO</u>	<u>DATE</u>
SUBMIT STUDY PLAN		
STUDY REPORT OUTLINE		
AND MILESTONE SCHEDULE	DIR OF MGMT	8 DEC 1978
STUDY PLAN, CONSTRAINTS	SAG	8 JAN 1979
AND ASSUMPTIONS		
ALTERNATIVES		
	SAG	21 MAR 1979
	IPR	28 MAR 1979
EMERGING RESULTS REPORT		
	SAG	21 MAY 1979
	IPR	25 MAY 1979
STAFF DRAFT REPORT	DA STAFF & MACOM	1 JUN 1979
SELCOM PREPARATION	SAG	24 JUL 1979
DECISION BRIEFING		
FINAL REPORT	SELCOM	1 AUG 1979



## MACOM TASKING

- MOBILIZATION PLANNING
- COMMENTS ON MOBEX 76 AND MOBEX 78
- COMMENTS ON CENTRALIZED INSTALLATION  
MANAGEMENT-HOUSEKEEPING COMMAND
- SUPPORT FROM RC UPON MOBILIZATION
- INTERFACE PROBLEMS BETWEEN MACOM
- SPAN OF CONTROL
- RC MANNING IN MACOM HQS

FORSCOM

- CORPS VS CONUSA
- INTEGRATION OF USAR AND ARNG
- INSTALLATION C2 ANALYSIS
- ASSESS ADVISOR PROGRAM
  - FULL TIME MANNING
  - CIVILIAN TECHNICIAN
- EVALUATE READINESS REPORTING PROCEDURES
  - CERTIFICATION
- AFFILIATION PROGRAM
- USAR FUNCTIONAL COMMANDS

DARCOM

- CONTROL OF EQUIPMENT
  - POMCUS RESIDUAL
  - RICC
  - CROSS LEVELING
- PLL/ASL
  - SUFFICIENCY
  - 70/50 IMPACT
  - DELIVERY TO UNITS
- LOGISTICS ADP/MANUAL SYSTEMS
- EQUIPMENT INTENSIVE FUNCTIONS

IRADOC

- RELATIONSHIPS WITH USAR SCHOOLS & TNG DIVS
- SUPPORT OF TRAINING BASE DURING MOBILIZATION
- TRAINING MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

INSCOM

- RC ALIGNMENT

HSC

- PATIENT LOADS
- POST MOBILIZATION MEDICAL SUPPORT IN CONUS
- RC ALIGNMENT

MIMC

- MOBILIZATION PROBLEMS
- RELATIONSHIP TO ITO(S)

CIDC

- RC ALIGNMENT

MILPERCEN

- CENTRALIZED AC/RC MGMT

USACC

- RC ALIGNMENT
- EQUIPMENT INTENSIVE FUNCTIONS
- USACC/DCA RELATIONSHIPS

ANNEX G

APPENDIX 2

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING MINUTES,

21 MAR 79 MEETING

Study Advisory Group Meeting Minutes  
Army Command and Control Study - 82  
(ACCS-82)

2 APR 1979

1. The second SAG meeting was convened on 21 Mar 79 at 1300 hours in Room 1A1079. The purpose of the meeting was to have members of the SAG review the principal issues, alternatives, and evaluation plan. The meeting adjourned at 1700 hours. A list of attendees and the agenda is at inclosures 1 and 2 respectively.

2. Opening remarks by the Study Director (MG Greer) emphasized the need to maintain continuity among the SAG membership throughout the course of the study. He solicited input from represented agencies and asked that appropriate members within each agency be kept informed of study progress. He outlined the objectives of the meeting which were: to review principal issues, to review proposed alternatives, and to analyze the plan for evaluation. It was emphasized that nine alternatives are a lot to examine in detail and that hopefully the SAG could eliminate some of less promising ones from further consideration. The option remained to add alternatives, if necessary, and to modify the proposed alternatives as appropriate. The Study Director asked for a response from SAG members by 1200 hours, 23 March on their recommendations concerning the alternatives.

3. Col Fitzgerald provided the status of study progress. He reviewed the critical dates and asked that SAG members provide comments on time to enable the study group to meet its suspenses. All members were provided a copy of the approved study plan with changes. Assumption number 2 was clarified to reflect the most demanding requirement. The following items were also reviewed:

- a. Travel schedule - Incl 3
- b. MACOM taskings - Incl 4
- c. Comments and Responses - Incl 5

ACSAC representative (COL Wilner) questioned the ACCS-82 finding that NG state structure was sound: he believes that since there is no command and control structure above the States, it is misleading to talk about the soundness of ARNG command structures. After discussion, it was agreed that any discussion of the soundness of ARNG C<sup>2</sup> structure should emphasize the limitation of being within each state.

4. Col Ernst briefed the base case and significant issues which have been raised in the course of the study. Mr. Brinkerhoff asked about the

specifics of the ROTC program. A question was raised on how dedicated mobilization planners would be obtained, i.e., would there be an increase in Army end strength? Gen Wilson explained that he hoped resources could be redistributed to provide these spaces if they are ultimately approved. Gen Greer emphasized the importance of resources but did not rule out a request for end strength increase at this stage. Col Miller asked if the issues were raised by the ACCS-82 study group or if they derived from other sources. The issues principally come from those in the field who are working under the present C<sup>2</sup> structure. Gen Greer asked if the SAG members had any other issues to raise. None were raised.

5. LTC Shope and LTC Akam briefed each of the nine proposed alternatives in detail. It was asked if ACCS-82 favored any particular alternative. None are favored at this time since they are only alternatives and have not been fully evaluated.

a. The slide that shows "Common Elements Throughout" is misleading. A more descriptive title might be "Elements that may be applied to most alternatives." (MG Greer commented that, for instance, the Functional Command Concept lends itself to adoption to the Gaining Command Concept).

b. The OCAR representative (COL Watson) suggested that as alternatives and issues are addressed, ACCS-82 should take full cognizance of the impact of new programs: for example, would a 15% level of FTM mitigate for reductions of RG's?

c. Mr. Brinkerhoff pointed out the possible adverse political connotations of the term "Divisions" for converted ARCOM HQs. After discussion, it was generally agreed that deliberate considerations would be required before replacing "ARCOM" with "Division."

d. The ACC representative (COL Wilner) said that it appears that organizations and C<sup>2</sup> of ARNG were not being addressed. BG Wilson stated that internal state aspects had been examined and found sound. Arrangements for training OPCON, gaining commands, etc. will continue to be addressed by ACCS-82.

e. The ACSI representative (LTC Quinn) asked if ACCS-82 knew what specific considerations led to elimination of the pre-STEADFAST corps structure for the RC. Answer: No, we will look into the history.

f. It was also mentioned that a separate study is being conducted on the feasibility of an installation command. The OCAR representative stated that although the perception today is that the RG is essential, this could change as proposed changes are implemented. It was clarified that the USAR division was in fact a division HHC capable of future deployment. It was also mentioned that the proposed RC Corps would



be deployable corps HHC and were applied against known requirements.

g. Alternative 1.- Col Miller questioned the validity of accepting the criticism of unnecessary layering. He hoped that ACCS-82 did not blindly accept this criticism as a fact and recommended that the layering be referred to as "perceived layering."

h. Alternative 2. TRADOC representative (COL Wing) asked for confirmation that installations for which RC "Divisions" are proposed as command elements, are only FORSCOM installations; the answer was yes. NGB representative (COL Vierra) pointed out that STARC could also operate installations, probably after or about M+180. Mr. Brinkerhoff noted that with STARC the Army has a built-in basis for area commands (in a Federalized status). The ACSAC representative (COL Wilner) again objected to the failure of ACCS-82 to fully explore C2 of ARNG. It was agreed that the sequence of passing federalized ARNG units through C2 channels from the home station to the mobilization station should be explained. BG Vail suggested that the "Advantages" slide should describe potential for enhancing mobilization and deployment planning. Gen Greer stated the comment about USAR GO spaces should be deleted.

i. Alternative 3. OCAR representative (COL Watson) questioned why state USAR commands couldn't be "subordinated" to HQDA in the fashion of NGB TAGs. COL O'Rear (OSD representative) asked if there would be MG USAR Commanders in each state: BG Wilson said not necessarily - it would depend upon the size of the command.

j. Alternative 4. FORSCOM representative (COL Miller) suggested that an extremely persuasive disadvantage should be added: increased/extra responsibility for deploying Division Commanders.

k. Alternative 5. OCAR representative asked if problems of increased spans of control had been analyzed: the answer was no.

l. Alternative 6. NGB representative (COL Vierra) stated that there should be a NG GO in the Corps HQ, since the Corps would be involved in training/supervision of NG units. TAG representative (COL Larson) cautioned ACCS-82 that ceilings on GO spaces could pose problems for this alternative (MAJ Tom Nettling, ODCSPER GO Branch, OX7-7994, was identified as the expert on USAR/ARNG GO authorizations). TRADOC representative, (COL Wing) suggested that MACOM OPCON of RC units should be considered in this option. COL O'Rear (OSD) questioned why RC units were not more visible in an OPCON relationship with AC divisions under this option. FORSCOM representative (COL Miller) had a major objection to this option: it increases the corps "Span of Interest"; BG Wilson will be briefed on this via the FORSCOM SUIP and WARMUP studies next Monday.

m. Alternative 7. MG Greer suggested adding the disadvantage of no enhancement of AC/RC integration.

n. Alternative 8. OCAR representative (COL Waston) objected to the term "USAR Command": the command is an AC command. COL O'Rear (OSD) sees little difference between this alternative and the pre-STEADFAST RC management structure.

o. Alternative 9. ODCSOPS representative (COL Fancher) believes that there is no improvement in mobilization and deployment (M&D) planning: the M&D Executive Agent must deal with all MACOMs not just a few. FORSCOM representative (COL Miller) pointed out the apparent lack of non-deploying C<sup>2</sup> capability and the requirement for management of non-deploying units. COL Fancher expressed concern that all of the foregoing alternatives had failed to adequately focus on installations: MOBEX 78 showed that the greatest M&D problems were at the installation. He believes that RC commands could command installations in peacetime. There was general agreement that the IMCOM (Installation Management) concept of host-tenant would affect all alternatives since the IMCOM host would provide a de facto non-deploying HQ.

6. Gen Greer questioned how the installation study meshed with the proposed alternatives. He was concerned that the alternatives not be addressed in a vacuum and that alternatives are now structured for stay behind forces that would be unnecessary with an installation command. He next asked if there were any alternatives which would not require further consideration.

a. OCAR representative (COL Watson) suggested that Alternative 3 be eliminated from consideration: SAG agreed.

b. FORSCOM representative (COL Miller) said that FORSCOM would not support Alternative 4 or 7. OCAR representative wants at least one (1) of them analyzed. MG Greer pointed out current Congressional consideration of a separate USAR command. BG Wilson may eliminate either #4 or #7 (COL Fancher suggested that #7 be retained for analysis).

c. FORSCOM representative (COL Miller) said that FORSCOM will not support Alternative 5 because of assignment of RG's (Readiness Group) to installations (RC Commander must go to too many places for support). MG Greer over-ruled the objection and told ACCS-82 to analyze Alternative 5.

d. BG Vail suggested that Alternative #6 and 9 could be combined: MG Greer agreed and directed ACCS-82 to do so.


e. MG Greer directed the following:

(1) Insure that IPR presentation includes definition of the parameters of the gaining command concept.

(2) ACCS-82 is to conduct a sensitivity-type analysis to determine relative values of criteria to be used for evaluation.

7. The evaluation plan and IPR overview were presented. MG Greer stated that the evaluation procedure required an in-depth analysis from all SAG members. He asked that each member solicit comments from his agency on what was presented at the SAG and return those comments to ACCS-82 by 1200 hours 23 March. He asked that particular attention be given to a thorough analysis of all alternatives and careful consideration be given to the validity of the evaluation plan. He emphasized the opportunity to help and to get agency views under consideration early in the study.

8. The next SAG is scheduled for late May. The meeting was adjourned at 1700 hours.

  
M.D. Isacco  
LTC, GS  
Infantry Recorder

ACCS-82

SAG ATTENDEES

21 MAR 1979

REPRESENTATIVE

MG Greer (Chairman)  
BG Vail  
Mr. Brinkerhoff  
LTC(P) Buff  
Mr. Toulme  
COL Miller  
COL Wing  
Mr. Blackmore  
COL Cass  
COL McLain  
COL Timlin  
COL Fancher  
COL Berge  
LTC Wakefield  
LTC Quinn  
COL Wilner  
COL Viera  
COL Watson  
Mr. Gordon  
COL Otterstedt  
Mr. Lowe  
COL Larsen  
COL Sheard  
\* Mr. Arnholts  
LTC Isacco

AGENCY/HEADQUARTERS

DOM, OCSA  
ODOM, OCSA  
OASD, MRA&L  
OASA, M&RA  
OASA, I, L&FM  
FORSCOM  
TRADOC  
DARCOM  
HSC  
ACC  
INSCOM  
ODCS ~~PER~~ OPS  
ODCS PER  
ODCSLOG  
OACSI  
OACSAC  
NGB  
OCAR  
OACE  
OTSG  
OCSA  
OTAG  
ODPA&E, OCSA  
AAA  
Recorder

ACCS-82  
STUDY GROUP MEMBERS

BG Wilson  
COL Fitzgerald  
LTC Akam  
LTC Shope  
LTC Cowan  
MAJ Walker  
Mr. Schwartzapfel

COL Ernst  
COL Qualtrough  
COL Birkle  
LTC Bellinger  
LTC Hyde  
LTC Preston  
MAJ Echols

LTC Green  
LTC Thomas

\* Observer

G-2-1-1

Incl 1

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP

21 March 1979

Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Presented By</u>
1300-1305	Opening Remarks	MG Greer
1305-1315	Study Plan Update	COL Fitzgerald
1315-1415	Issue Development	
	● Summary of Study Team Visits	COL Fitzgerald
	● MACOM and ARSTAFF Inputs	
	● Base Case	COL Ernst
	(Design, Strengths, Weaknesses)	
	● Issues	
1415-1430	Break	
1430-1530	Alternatives	LTC Shope & LTC Akam
1530-1545	Evaluation Plan	MAJ Echols
1545-1550	IPR Overview	LTC Preston
1550-1615	Discussion	BG Wilson
1615	Concluding Remarks	MG Greer

Incl 3

# VISITS TO ACTIVE COMPONENTS

- 8 MACOM HQS
- 3 ARMY HQS
- 2 CORPS HQS
- 4 DIV HQS
- 6 MAJOR ACTIVITIES
- 9 ARR HQS
- 12 RG HQS
- 15 INSTALLATION HQS
- 3 MOBEX 78 SITES

G-2-3-1

# VISITS TO RESERVE COMPONENTS

## ARNG

- 15 STATE AGS
- 7 DIVISION HQS
- 5 BRIGADE HQS
- 2 GROUP HQS
- 1 COSCOM HQS
- 2 STATE INSTALLATIONS
- 2 BN HQS

G-2-3-2

## USAR

- 11 ARCOM HQS
- 5 TNG DIV HQS
- 5 BDE HQS
- 1 MAC HQS
- 2 USAR SCHOOLS
- 8 CMD HQS (0-6 TO 0-8 CDR)
- REGIONAL LOGEX

## MACOM TASKING

- MOBILIZATION PLANNING
- COMMENTS ON MOBEX 76 AND MOBEX 78
- COMMENTS ON CENTRALIZED INSTALLATION  
MANAGEMENT-HOUSEKEEPING COMMAND
- SUPPORT FROM RC UPON MOBILIZATION
- INTERFACE PROBLEMS BETWEEN MACOM
- SPAN OF CONTROL
- RC MANNING IN MACOM HQS

Incl 4

G-2-4-1



## SUMMARY OF COMMENTS/RESPONSES

### ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

- STEADFAST HELPED RC
- RG ESSENTIAL
- ARR UNNECESSARY
- FUNCTIONAL USAR COMMANDS DESIRABLE
  - GEOGRAPHY PROHIBITIVE
- STARC NOT UNIFORMLY ORGANIZED
- AC CAN COMMAND BOTH AC AND USAR
- CORPS HQS POPULAR
- ARNG C<sup>2</sup> STRUCTURE SOUND
- LACK OF POST-MOB MISSIONS FOR SOME HQS

#### INSTALLATIONS

- IM COMMAND NOT POPULAR
- ILL PREPARED FOR MOBILIZATION
- AUGMENTATION (EARLY) NEEDED

#### TRAINING AND READINESS

- INCREASE FTM, ATA
- EXPAND AC/RC INTEGRATION PROGRAMS
- SQT POPULAR WITH RC
- MAC/MTC VALUABLE
- USAR TNG DIV AND SCHOOLS USEFUL
- NOT ALIGNED FOR POST MOB MISSION

#### MOBILIZATION PLANNING

- GUIDANCE UNCLEAR  
(CROSS LEVELING, DRAWDOWN, IRR TRAINING, ROTC)
- LACK OF PLANNERS AT ALL LEVELS
- USAR SCHOOL MISSIONS UNCLEAR
- MORE MOB EXERCISES NEEDED
- HQDA MOB CHIEF NEEDED
- TOTAL MOB PLANNING INADEQUATE

#### OTHER

- WORKABLE UNCOVERED POMCUS POLICY NEEDED
- ASL/PLL SHORTFALL FOR RC
- AMMO FOR EARLY RC UNITS
- INSUFFICIENT ADP/COMM ASSETS
- TNG DIVISIONS LACK EQUIP
- STABILIZATION OF RC DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULES

ANNEX G

APPENDIX 3

STUDY ADVISORY GROUP MEETING MINUTES,

1 JUN 79 MEETING

12 JUN 1979

Study Advisory Group Meeting Minutes

Army Command and Control Study-82  
(ACCS-82)

1. The third SAG meeting was convened on 1 June 1979 at 0930 hours in Room 1A1079. The purpose of the SAG was to review the details of the proposed alternatives, the results of the alternative evaluations, and the issues which ACCS-82 will address in the final study report. The meeting adjourned at 1200 hours. A list of attendees and the agenda is at Inclosures 1 and 2 respectively.
2. Opening remarks by the Study Director (MG Greer) emphasized that the purpose of the meeting was to review the progress of the study, present proposed changes to the previously briefed alternatives and to brief the results of the evaluation process to include the ranking of the alternatives. The Study Director requested each member to comment during the briefing and to followup with written comments as soon as possible after the briefing. He emphasized that each SAG member should brief his principal in detail to prepare him for the IFR.
3. MAJ Walker briefed the major events that have occurred since the last SAG (21 Mar 79).
4. LTC Akam presented features which were common to all alternatives as well as those type changes that can be accommodated in each alternative.
5. LTC Shope briefed Alternative 1 stating that it is essentially the status quo alternative since it makes only minor modifications to the current structure. COL McLain (ACC) pointed out that since Alternative 1 does not provide the required additional corps, it is a disadvantage and should be listed as such. BG Wilson (Study Chairman) stated that creating functional commands in the USAR is not a truly worthwhile alternative because of many disadvantages (e.g., authority conflicts, incompatibility with SUIP/WARNUP). MG Greer pointed out that the activation of additional TOE headquarters was listed as both an advantage and a disadvantage. He requested ACCS-82 review both the advantages and disadvantages for clarity and consistency. COL Watson (OCAR) asked if the availability of the two headquarters had been determined from DCSOPS. GEN Wilson stated that this would occur during the staffing of the draft study report.
6. LTC Akam presented Alternatives 2, 2A, and 2B.
  - a. (Alt 2) COL McLain (ACC) pointed out that the requirements for additional signal assets may not necessarily be a cost of Alternative 2 since a separate action is underway to convert signal units to support an additional corps. BG Wilson stated that ACCS-82 has requested the status of signal assets from ODCSOPS and will adjust resource requirements accordingly.

b. (Alt 2A) COL Watson (OCAR) asked why the RGs were not reduced in strength since selected units would be getting support from MACOMs. Answer: Support will not be in the form of training assistance, rather it will be related to mobilization, planning, and coordination.

c. (Alt 2B) COL Vierra (NGB) asked how SUIP and WARMUP would be accommodated and if any changes in command relationships were expected. BG Wilson stated that SUIP and WARMUP will fit into all alternatives equally well. It will not change ARNG command lines; however, the gaining command might be given OPCON for training of NG units. He further stated that at this time FORSCOM had not completed its study of command relationships for the programs.

7. LTC Shope briefed Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B.

a. (Alt 3) LTC Quinn (OACSI) asked what the rationale was for removal of battalion advisors? Answer: Duplication of functions being performed by RGs, Senior Advisors and, in many cases, those performed by the AC sponsor unit in the affiliation program. COL Watson (OCAR) asked if demographics were considered in the stationing of the REDMOBs. Answer: Yes, a detailed analysis was conducted. BG Wilson stated that a key consideration during the analysis was that of stationing each REDMOB as close as possible to an ARCOM location. COL Watson (OCAR) further questioned if the cost of PDS positions that might not be filled as a result of the ARCOM activation/relocation to a REDMOB headquarters had been considered. Answer: It is assumed that necessary personnel will be able to accommodate REDMOBs and that remaining personnel will be backfilled into other units. It is recognized that a possible loss of PDS personnel may occur since all personnel may not be able to either occupy REDMOB positions or other troop program unit spaces. MG Greer asked for the NGB position concerning possible degradation of AC GO attention to the ARNG. NGB had no position.

b. (Alt 3A) MG Greer suggested that it is only a perception that Alt 3A may degrade USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises OPCON. This disadvantage will be changed to state that it is a perception. Mr. Brinkerhoff (ASD-MRA&L) asked for TRADOC's position on this disadvantage. Answer: It is under study.

c. (Alt 3B) MG Greer noted that the disadvantage of a reduction in the number of senior, AC general officers dedicated to RC management could possibly be viewed as an advantage. He suggested that this disadvantage be removed from the presentation. MG Greer pointed out that under the REDMOB concept, a possibility of conflicting guidance to RC units could occur. Since USAR units are under the command of a REDMOB and have an association with a corps, USAR units would receive guidance from two different headquarters. Solution: Close coordination between both headquarters on matters of common interest such as training.

8. LTC Akam briefed Alternative 4. COL Vierra (NGB) pointed out that in both Alternative 3 and 4 there was a requirement for RC general

officers. He felt that since this type of requirement in STEADFAST was never filled that the program never had a real chance to succeed. He further stated that it was of utmost importance to both Alternative 3 and 4, that these requirements be filled to provide a better chance of success. COL Mitchell (ODCSLOG) stated that Alternative 4 was the only alternative that had the potential for improved resource readiness since it would complement PPBS. Answer: Financial management was considered during the evaluation process. It was also noted that support of the PPBS should not be an overriding consideration in the design of a command and control structure. Mr. Brinkerhoff (ASD MRA&L) pointed out that the signal requirements for the Meade and Sheridan Corps HHC's could be constituted in the ARNG and USAR. An error was noted in the resource summary slide. Net change for the AC manpower should have been +1160 instead of -1160.

9. LTC Preston briefed the results of the ACCS-82 evaluation of the Alternatives. Mr. Brinkerhoff (ASD MRA&L) asked if the cost of the corps signal requirements had been isolated. Answer: \$13.3M. COL Mitchell (ODCSLOG) again pointed out the advantage of resource management in Alternative 4. MG Greer agreed that it should be considered as an advantage. COL Sheard (PA&E) pointed out that the evaluation procedure would be more easily understood if the relative weights of the measured areas were displayed. Subsequent briefings will display the weighted values of the measured areas.


10. LTC Thomas briefed the key issues which ACCS-82 will address.

11. COL Fitzgerald briefed the composition and organization of the final study report, study milestones and the proposed IPR agenda. A packet of information containing the details of each alternative, results of the evaluation, cost summary and updated issues was provided to each SAG member.

12. Following the briefing a short discussion period was conducted. Mr. Brinkerhoff (ASD MRA&L) stated that Alternatives 2, 3, and 4 appeared to be good workable solutions to the problem. He also stated that the Army (ODCSOPS) should make a concerted effort to determine the exact requirements for additional corps and associated signal assets.

13. MG Greer summarized the SAG briefings and made closing remarks. He stated that the packet of information provided each member was excellent and should be used to update the IPR principals. He requested that each SAG member provide comments to ACCS-82 ASAP. Additionally, he noted that if the IPR principals are properly briefed on the results of the study thus far, that the potential for "surprises" during the IPR should be greatly reduced. He concluded by stating that the briefing had been excellent and that it had been a good session.

14. The next SAG meeting is scheduled for early August. The meeting was adjourned at 1200 hours.

  
M.D. ISACCO  
LTC, GS  
Recorder



# ATTENDEES

<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>REPRESENTATIVE</u>
OASD (MRA&L)	Mr. Brinkerhoff
OASA (M&RA)	
OASA (IL&FM)	Mr. Toulme
OASA (DM)	MG Greer
	BG Vail
	LTC Isacco
OCSA (DPA&E)	COL Sheard
ODCSLOG	COL Mitchell
ODCSOPS	COL Fancher
ODCSPER	COL Bartlett
OCOA	Mr. Hoole
OACSI	LTC Quinn
OACSAC	COL Seeberg
OACE	LTC Higgins
OTSG	COL Otterstedt
OTAG	COL Larsen
NGB	COL Vierra
OCAR	COL Watson
AAA	Mr. Fugii
FORSCOM	COL Miller
TRADOC	LTC Hedrick
DARCOM	COL Harrison
INSCOM	LTC Hardy
ACC	COL McLain
HSC	COL Cass
ACCS-82	BG Wilson
	COL Fitzgerald

**AGENDA**

**STUDY ADVISORY GROUP**

**1 June 1979**

**Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82)**

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PRESENTED BY</u>
0930-0935	Opening Remarks	MG Greer
0935-0945	Agenda Overview Progress Since SAG Key Milestones	MAJ Walker
0945-1025	Alternative Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Organization</li><li>• Major Characteristics</li><li>• Resources</li><li>• Advantages/Disadvantages</li></ul>	LTCs Shope/Akam
1025-1045	Evaluation and Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Process</li><li>• Results-Effectiveness/ Efficiency</li><li>• Alternative Variations -Evaluation</li><li>• Ranking of Alternatives</li></ul>	LTC Preston
1045-1055	Break	-----
1055-1115	Key Issues Findings/Conclusions	LTC Thomas
1115-1130	What Remains to be Done <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Complete the Draft Report</li><li>• Staffing</li><li>• Timing-Key Dates</li><li>• Detailed Costing/Manpower</li><li>• Implementation Planning</li><li>• IPR Overview</li></ul>	COL Fitzgerald
1130-1145	Discussion	MG Greer
1145-1150	Summary of SAG Guidance	MG Greer
1150-1155	Closing Remarks	MG Greer

ANNEX G

APPENDIX 4

IN PROCESS REVIEW MEETING MINUTES,

27 MAR 79 MEETING



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DACS-DMA

2 APR 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 IPR, 27 March 1979

1. General Kroesen, VCSA, opened the meeting by explaining the genesis of the study: DPS 059 of 19 November 1977 ("500/500 cut"), the Army's appeal of the DPS 059 decisions and the 15 August 1978 agreement between OSD and DA.
2. COL Fitzgerald described the ACCS-82 purpose, objectives and management plan. He then described selected key issues identified thus far.
3. MAJ Echols described the ACCS-82 Evaluation Plan. General Kroesen directed that Effectiveness Measure #1 (Mob and Deployment Planning - Transition) be modified to include answering the question, "Does the alternative provide proper command and control for the mobilization base?" General Shoemaker, FORSCOM Commander, cautioned ACCS-82 that "reducing layering" is not necessarily a good measure of effectiveness. There was agreement that layering is not inherently bad; reduction of unnecessary layering is the objective.
  - a. Measurement of the effectiveness of alternatives must consider the structure's execution capability.
  - b. Measurement of AC/RC integration is not an absolute: proper, or appropriate, integration, rather than "increased integration", is the objective.
4. LTCs Akam and Shope described ACCS-82 Alternatives 1-7.
  - a. Alternative 1. General Shoemaker requested that detailed analysis be done to identify functions that must be transferred from the eliminated ARCOM and a determination be made whether the new/gaining commands can perform the functions.
  - b. Alternative 2. General Kroesen requested clarification of the "USAR Div/Corps" headquarters organization. The organization could be either current ARCOM TDA (with new names) or TOE HHC.

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 IPR, 27 March 1979

(1) General Kroesen asked if only USAR units were to be assigned to the USAR Corps: the reply was yes.

(2) MG Scott, ADSOPS, asked how the required number of corps headquarters would be developed. The reply was to use Total Mobilization requirements for divisions and to size the corps with 3-5 divisions each. General Kroesen, MG Scott and MG Faith, DAMO-OD, discussed the problems associated with this approach, since Total Army Analysis (TAA) does not address Total Mobilization.

c. There were no questions concerning Alternatives 3-6.

d. Alternative 7.

(1) MG Scott questioned whether USAR Divisions were under the Corps: the reply was yes.

(2) MG Faith questioned the validity of the concept of RC COSCOM backing-up V and VII Corps, considering the Gaining Command Concept.

(3) MG Scott asked what mission the Corps and COSCOM not associated with OCONUS Corps would have. It was explained that they would command all the USAR support units not destined for V or VII Corps. General Shoemaker cautioned that there were many combat support units that would have to be considered: he has doubts that this structure can handle them.

5. General Shoemaker briefed the group on a part of the FORSCOM SUIP study. He also made the following points:

a. FORSCOM is conducting SUIP and WARMUP studies in parallel with ACCS-82; there have been frequent meetings between ACCS-82 and HQ FORSCOM.

b. There are many questions, pertinent to ACCS-82, that have not been answered in detail:

(1) What is the Army's force structure requirement?

(2) What is the timing for mobilizing specific units and headquarters?

(3) What is the timing for deployment of specific units and headquarters?

c. HQ FORSCOM does not support any alternative that eliminates CONUSA or assigns RC to AC corps. Also, HQ FORSCOM supports retention of the ARR HQs.

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 IPR, 27 March 1979

- d. The USAR ARCOM should not be renamed Division/Corps.
  - e. Mobilization TDA for installation should be developed in great detail and in full consideration of requirements for the mobilization missions. Retirees and others can be considered for application to the Mob TDA: Command of the installation should be considered last.
  - f. HQDA must make a fundamental decision concerning execution of mobilization -centralized or decentralized control? For example, the DARCOM wholesale system should be sheltered from a flood of requisitions during the first 30, or so, days after mobilization.
  - g. Many of the SUIP command and control headquarters deploy early, leaving a void. What headquarters pick up the mission?
  - h. Use of the STARC and assignment of appropriate missions require further study.
  - i. General Shoemaker favors retention of only alternatives 1 and 6 for analysis by ACCS-82.
6. General Kroesen led a discussion designed to reduce alternatives and concepts for further analysis.
- a. There was no agreement on elimination or retention of ARR HQ; alternatives must continue to address the ARR.
  - b. It was generally agreed that the IMCOM concept (Alternative 4) and the USAR command concept (Alternative 5) are likely candidates to be discarded early by ACCS-82; the study group was directed to conduct sufficient analysis to confirm, or reject, and document this observation. The study group was further directed to ensure that any alternatives, which are discarded, are fully documented as to the basis for the decision to discard.
  - c. There was agreement that the preferred alternative must have a non-deployable area command capability such as the CONUSA.
  - d. It was agreed that if CONUSA are tasked with wartime command or OPCON of installations, they must have adequate assets.
  - e. The study group was directed to eliminate the designations "USAR" Division/Corps for Total Mobilization requirements. (ARCOM can be provided a mobilization mission that includes this responsibility).

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: ACCS-82 IPR, 27 March 1979

f. Mr. Hobbs was concerned that contracting could reduce flexibility at the installation level. LTG Morris believed the installation commander would still retain control of all programs and that contract services would improve efficiency.

g. The concept of adding an additional AC corps to the structure is to be retained for evaluation.


7. ACCS-82 was directed to retain the following alternatives for further study: 1, 2, combination of 3 and 6, and number 7. Examination of an expanded relationship of RC units (especially USAR) with MACOMs is necessary: special attention should be given to mobilization requirements of DARCOM, TRADOC, HSC and ACC; examination should consider the advantages that would accrue from such relationships with regard to peacetime unit training assemblies.

8. MG Greer requested that the Evaluation Model be critically examined by the staff and that comments be provided to ACCS-82. He believes that now is the time to thoroughly analyze the evaluation procedures rather than in the later stages of the study. He urged all agencies to take an active part now to ensure the evaluation procedures are valid. LTG McGiffert reinforced the importance of ensuring evaluation procedures are valid.

9. General Kroesen confirmed the following:

a. ACCS-82 is not be constrained by any discussion at the IPR; the IPR was conducted to provide guidance; however, the study group is to proceed with examinations and studies that appear to be appropriate.

b. ACCS-82 has complete flexibility to modify alternatives during the study to develop the most desirable alternative(s).

  
THOMAS U. GREER  
Major General, GS  
Director of Management

ANNEX G

APPENDIX 5

IN PROCESS REVIEW MEETING MINUTES,

12 JUN 79 MEETING





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) In  
Process Review (IPR)

1. The second IPR was convened at 1000 hours on 12 June 1979 in Room 2E687. A list of attendees and the agenda are at Inclosures 1 and 2 respectively.

2. In the absence of LTC Meyer, LTC McGiffert, DAS opened the meeting by stating that the purpose was to review the final alternatives, the evaluation of these alternatives and selected key issues relevant to improvement of the command and control structure. He requested that participants pay particular attention to the rankings assigned to alternatives by ACCS-82. Comments/guidance that would permit ACCS-82 to make modifications to the draft report prior to staffing were also solicited.

3. COL Fitzgerald provided an agenda overview, progress since the last IPR and key future milestones.

4. LTC's Akam and Shope presented the principle features, advantages/disadvantages, and resource requirements for the four alternatives and four variations.

a. During the presentation on Alternative #2, MG Faith asked why the AC signal assets required were so large if the signal support was to be provided primarily by RC units.

ANSWER: AC assets represent the minimal essential to perform CPX's, FTX's and maintain the capability for early deployment. GEN Shoemaker and MG (P) Myer supported this requirement.

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) In  
Process Review (IPR)

b. LTG McGiffert asked how many corps headquarters were required in the force structure. ANSWER: MG Scott provided current planning data used by DCSOPS.

5. LTC Preston described the ACCS-82 evaluation methodology and presented the results of the application of the methodology to the alternatives. LTG McGiffert asked if any consideration had been given to reduced resource requirements? ANSWER: BG Wilson replied that the major costs were in the signal elements and these had been reduced to the lowest level feasible. Selected other alternative features could be reduced if necessary (e.g., Mobilization Planners at Installations). Other tradeoffs within the current force structure have not been identified.

6. LTC Thomas briefed the selected key issues addressed by ACCS-82 and the resultant findings.

7. COL Fitzgerald concluded the formal presentations with an outline of the draft report composition.

8. LTG McGiffert opened the discussion period by asking what the proposed Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) would do for the Army? ANSWER: The intent is to bring coherence to the currently fragmented and basically ad hoc nature of mobilization planning in the Army. After the system is designed, it would be institutionalized in the proper Army Staff agency.

a. MG Greer asked if mobilization planning problems were ones of organization or just lack of emphasis. GEN Shoemaker replied that structuring an institutional system was the key; it should drive everything. Properly tied to the PPBS it would become the heart of Army planning. Responsibility for Army mobilization planning should be transferred from FORSCOM back to HQDA.

b. MG Scott stated that he agreed conceptually, but that DCSOPS should be responsible for mobilization planning. GEN Shoemaker asked if MG Scott agreed to the transfer of the function from FORSCOM. ANSWER: Yes.

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) In  
Process Review (IPR)

9. Discussion then moved to the alternatives:

a. MG Scott stated that he preferred Alternative 3A conceptually, but was concerned about the political sensitivities.

(1) GEN Shoemaker replied that the sensitivity issue is overplayed. If the solution is the right one, Reservists could be expected to go along.

(2) LTG McGiffert pointed out, however, that the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) and other Reserve officers had reacted strongly when briefed on Alternative three.

(3) MG Berkman agreed that Reservists should support the right solution, but is not convinced that Alternative 3 is the best alternative. The sensitivities are a reality and must be considered.

(4) MG Milby (ARFPC) stated that perhaps some Reservists did not fully understand Alternative 3.

(5) Mr. Clark (ASA MR&A) stated that he thought the sensitivities could be overcome if RC GO's were placed in command of REDMOBs.

(6) GEN Shoemaker stated that the real issue is the need to rationalize the structure for the management of the RC. Key problems are time required and complexity of the job. The recommended alternative must improve our "go-to-war" capability. Alternative #4 just doesn't do this.

(7) GEN Shoemaker continued by stating that there were a lot of individual ACCS-82 actions that he agreed with. The Army needs an additional corps headquarters. Battalion advisors need to be examined. We can probably eliminate many advisors, but not necessarily all. To sum up, Alternative #2 is a start, but the ARR's should not be eliminated without replacing them with something.

b. MG Scott questioned the ability of ARCOM's to move to and command installations post M-Day. GEN Shoemaker

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) In  
Process Review (IPR)

agreed, stating that ARCOM staffs should not be expected to run installations on M-Day. Also, Training Divisions should run Training Centers not installations. GO commanders should be addressed separately from this issue.

c. MG Weber stated that he has worked closely with ACCS-82 and appreciated their efforts. Additionally, he was satisfied with improvements in ARNG readiness brought about by the STEADFAST reorganization. He is concerned that improvements made under STEADFAST could be diminished by a reorganization. He expressed his support for the ARR organization.

d. MG Weber also mentioned that in Alternatives 3 and 4, more general officers are required than available, and it would be an excellent opportunity to seek relief from OGLA and bring some RC general officers on active duty. MG Weber did not agree with the thrust of the AAA report on excessive administrative requirements on the RC.

e. MG Weber mentioned a need for something between training assistance and OPCON, perhaps a more suitable term like "readiness management." This arrangement would be mutually beneficial to the AC and RC. He stated that the Army should not be concerned about sensitivity but rather getting the job done. BG Wilson mentioned that the National Guard can accept OPCON if the terms and arrangements are well known.

f. GEN Shoemaker said that SUIP and WARMUP are putting all units into an organizational posture which should show shortages and excesses. It should be done on a geographic basis.

g. MG Faith cautioned that in the view of OSD, the Army is layered and we need an alternative which will be accepted by OSD. GEN Shoemaker said that he is only concerned about getting the best system.

h. BG Wilson summarized the views of OSD, GAO, and an ODCSPER study which viewed the ARR's as unnecessary and duplicative. He raised the question of whether the ARR is necessary or can the mission be accomplished in another manner?

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) in  
Process Review (IPR)

i. GEN Shoemaker said that the CONUSA commanders and he viewed the ARR's as necessary.

j. LTG McGiffert asked GEN Shoemaker if the Army would be spinning its wheels to staff what has been accomplished thusfar before the results of SUIP and WARMUP are known? ANSWER: GEN Shoemaker did not know what results SUIP and WARMUP would produce but felt the ACCS-82 draft should be staffed and its efforts continued in parallel with the FORSCOM effort.

k. MG Greer asked GEN Shoemaker if his effort would cause new alternatives to be evaluated. ANSWER: There may be a variation of some of the proposed alternatives but no completely new initiatives should have to be evaluated.

l. LTG McGiffert asked about the impact on other MACOM's. ANSWER: There has been little feedback and no real problems have surfaced. MG Bergquist stated that DARCOM would provide HQDA a list of units required to support DARCOM upon mobilization.

m. MG Weber asked if Alternative 4 addressed OSD issues. GEN Shoemaker said that Alternative 4 does not relate to the package Europe said it needs to fight the war. MG Faith stated that the CONUSA and ARR concept does not support Europe's need either. He would not want to see a hard view on Alternative 4 without considering some modification of the alternative. GEN Shoemaker feels the corps are spread too thin at present to assume other missions.

n. LTG McGiffert was concerned whether the centralized administrative and logistics systems could accommodate mobilization requirements. GEN Shoemaker mentioned that FORSCOM needs to be able to determine the status of RC units monthly.

o. MG Greer questioned the need for a special mobilization task force to be formed in the Office Chief of Staff. He stated that more effort is needed throughout the staff on mobilization planning and that it is a basic ODCSOPS responsibility. MG Scott agrees with this position. BG Wilson stated that mobilization planning must be formalized, and that the task requires a full-time effort.

DACS-CC

13 June 1979

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) In  
Process Review (IPR)


p. LTG McGiffert asked about the status of uncovered POMCUS. GEN Shoemaker said he wanted HQDA to provide overall requirements to FORSCOM, and he would then specify locations from which POMCUS equipment could be shipped. MG Faith stated that current problems are being resolved by DARCOM, FORSCOM, and appropriate DA staff members.

q. MG Greer asked if anyone had any quarrel with the methodology used in the study to evaluate the alternatives. GEN Shoemaker indicated he was primarily interested in the recommendations and wasn't certain he agreed entirely with the methodology. No other comments were received on this subject.

10. Upon general agreement by the IPR members, LTG McGiffert concluded the meeting by directing BG Wilson to staff the ACCS-82 draft report and incorporate comments from the IPR as deemed appropriate.

11. The IPR adjourned at 1220 hours.

2 Incl  
as



THOMAS U. GREER  
Major General, GS  
Director of Management

ATTENDEES

12 JUNE 1979

IPR

ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS-82)

OFFICE/AGENCY

ASA(M&RA)  
ASA(IL&FM)  
FORSCOM  
TRADOC  
DARCOM  
HSC  
ACC  
INSCOM  
DAS  
DCSOPS  
DCSPER  
DCSLOG  
ACSI  
ACSAC  
NGB  
CAR  
COE  
TSG  
COA  
TAG  
DM  
DPAE  
ARFPC  
ACCS-82

ATTENDEE

Mr. Clark  
Mr. Wallace  
GEN Shoemaker/COL Miller  
MG Hixon  
MG Berquist  
COL (P) Cass  
BG Blair  
BG Freeze  
LTG McGiffert  
MG Scott/MG Faith  
MG Long  
MG Konopnicki  
MG Thompson  
MG Myer  
MG Weber  
MG Berkman  
MG Wray  
LTG Pixley  
Mr. Leonard  
MG Pennington  
MG Greer/BG Vail/LTC Isacco  
Mr. Hamilton  
MG Milby  
BG (P) Wilson  
COL Fitzgerald  
COL Ernst  
LTC Akam  
LTC Hyde  
LTC Preston  
LTC Shope  
LTC Spaulding  
LTC Thomas

G-5-1-1

Incl 1

**AGENDA**

**12 JUNE 1979**

**IPR**

**ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82 (ACCS-82)**

<u>TIME</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PRESENTED BY</u>
1000-1005	Opening Remarks	LTC Meyer
1005-1010	Agenda Overview Progress Since Last IPR Key Milestones	COL Fitzgerald
1010-1050	Alternative Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Organization</li><li>• Major Characteristics</li><li>• Resources</li><li>• Advantages/Disadvantages</li></ul>	LTC Shope/LTC Akam
1050-1115	Evaluation and Analysis <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Process</li><li>• Results - Effectiveness/ Efficiency</li><li>• Alternative Variations, - Evaluation</li><li>• Ranking of Alternatives</li></ul>	LTC Preston
1115-1135	Key Issues Findings/Conclusions	LTC Thomas
1135-1140	What Remains to be Done <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Complete the Draft Report</li><li>• Staffing</li><li>• Detailed Costing/Manpower</li><li>• Implementation Planning</li></ul>	COL Fitzgerald
1140-1155	Discussion and Summary of IPR Guidance	LTC Meyer
1155-1200	Closing Remarks	LTC Meyer



ANNEX H  
ON-GOING STUDIES AND ACTIONS

## ON-GOING STUDIES AND ACTIONS

During the 8 Jan 79 meeting of the ACCS-82 Study Advisory Group (SAG), each SAG member was asked to provide to ACCS-82 information pertaining to his agency's on-going actions which would impact on the study. A subsequent letter from ACCS-82 to each agency requested that the listing of on-going studies, programs and reorganization/transfer of responsibilities which would impact on ACCS-82 be furnished by 19 Feb 79.

The on-going studies and actions reported by the agencies were:

### 1. FORSCOM

- a. Support Unit Improvement Program (SUIP).
- b. On-going test at Ft Carson concerning the reduction of equipment for training.
- c. Study on the Army Dental Care Delivery System
- d. Engineer Gaining Command Plan.
- e. Topographic Reorganization.
- f. Vertical Installation Automation Baseline (VIABLE).
- g. First Army Management Information System (FAMIS)
- h. Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC<sup>2</sup>MP)
- i. Review of Reserve Components (RC) Aviation Advisor Positions

### 2. TRADOC

- a. Relocate Chaplain School/close Ft Wadsworth
- b. Vacate Ft Totten
- c. Realign Ft Hamilton
- d. Establish NBC Defense School at Ft McClellan

- e. Realign ATC at Ft Bliss (to OSUT Mode)
  - f. Vacate ATC at Ft Dix
  - g. Vacate ATC at Ft Jackson (alternate to vacate Ft Dix Study)
  - h. Civilian RIF (Ft Benning, Dix, Jackson)
  - i. TRADOC Civilian Manpower Analysis Baseline Study
  - j. Ft Dix ATC Addendum (Bliss OSUT)
  - k. Ft Jackson ATC Addendum (Bliss OSUT) (Alternate to Ft Dix ATC Addendum)
  - l. HQ TRADOC Relocation
  - m. 18-Company Drawdown
  - n. CST Consolidation (assumes that no ATC is disestablished)
3. DARCOM
- a. Project Aviation Depot Roundout
  - b. Reorganization Plans for Improved Armywide TMDE Calibration and Repair Operations
  - c. Armament Production Base Preparedness Studies
  - d. Army Readiness Management System (ARMS)
  - e. Design of a Corps Information Management System
  - f. Dynamic Analysis of Ammunition Production Base Under Mobilization Conditions
  - g. Failure Factors for Contingency Planning
  - h. Logistics for Instant Peacetime - Wartime Transition
  - i. Maximum Release Quantity Edits Under Mobilization
  - j. Operational Readiness Oriented Logistic Support Model

k. Planning Depot Maintenance Repair Parts Supply for Surge/Mobilization

l. Readiness of Computer Systems in Laidaway Armament Production Facilities

m. War Reserve Requirements for New Weapon Systems

4. HSC

a. HQ HSC Conceptual Study, USAR AMEDD Command and Control and Active-USAR Medical Communication

b. OTSG Conceptual Plan for Command and Control of AMEDD Reserve Component Units

5. USACC

a. Management of Resources, Commercial and Industrial Type Functions

b. Contracting of C-E Services/Facilities Presently Provided with In-House Resources

c. Feasibility studies or actual implementation of programs to correct shortfalls addressed by USACC After Action Report to NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78

d. Feasibility studies or actual implementation of USACC-RC initiatives addressed in briefing slides and information papers provided to ACCS-82.

6. INSCOM

a. Intelligence, Security and Electronics Warfare Support to Echelons Above Corps (ISE-EAC) Study

b. SIGINT Support to Military Operations (NSA/CSS)

c. FM 100-16 (Echelons Above Corps)

d. Military Intelligence Force Structure Study

7. ODCSOPS

a. Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC<sup>2</sup>MP)

b. Requirements for Total Mobilization (RETMOB)

- c. MILPERCEN CSSF on move to Ft Harrison
  - d. OPMS and EMPS-RC
  - e. MOBPERS
  - f. Oversea Replacement Centers
  - g. Reinstitution of Draft Registration
  - h. SIDPERS-ARNG
  - i. USAREC CSJF
9. ODCSLOG
- a. Restructured General Support Study
  - b. Improved TMDE Calibration and Repair Study
  - c. Logistics Data Network (LOGNET)
10. OACSI
- a. Army Intelligence Master Plan
  - b. Army Signal Intelligence (SIGNET) Architecture Plan
  - c. RC-CEWI (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence), 81-85
  - d. Intelligence, Security and EW Support to Echelons Above Corps Study
  - e. ASD (C<sup>3</sup>I) "For Coordination" Draft, DOD Plan for Intelligence Support to Tactical Forces
11. OACSAC
- a. Information Management Study being conducted by Arthur Young and Co for USAMSSA
  - b. Mini-computer study being conducted by Sterling Systems Inc for USMSSA
  - c. USAMSSA Data Base Study

d. In-house study by USAMSSA to establish policy and a program for implementing a distributive network among all HQDA DPIs in 1985-90 timeframe

e. OACSAC MOBEX 78 Final Report

f. Study of Management-Automation/Communications (SOMAC)

g. TRADOC developing a doctrinal automation and communications network for Combat Service Support (CSS) in theater of operations.

h. Communication Support Requirements-Echelons Above Corps (COMSREAC) being conducted by BDM Corporation

12. NGB

Has no on-going studies which will impact on ACCS-82

13. OCAR

a. Theater of Operations Medical Support System (TOMSS)

b. Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC<sup>2</sup>MP)

c. Affiliation Program

d. RC Employment Training with OCONUS Commands

e. Gaining Command Program

f. Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI)

g. Civil Affairs (CA) Inactivations

h. DARCOM Requirements for USAR Units

i. Mobilization Force Requirements Model (MOBFORM)

j. Full Time Manning (FTM)

k. Long ADT Tour Management

14. OACE

Has no on-going studies, programs, or reorganizations which would impact on ACCS-82 other than RPMA Studies, Phases I & II, previously provided to the study group.

15. OTSG

- a. Procurement of AMEDD Officers into the Reserves
- b. Health care responsibilities for the Canal Zone
- c. Improvement of the Combat Service Support action plan -- COSCOM/TAACOM roundout analysis by FORSCOM

16. OCOA

Has no on-going studies, programs, and reorganizations/  
transfer of responsibilities which would impact on ACCS-82

17. OTAG

- a. Army Club Management Study
- b. DOD Single-Manager for Postal Service
- c. Army Library Study
- d. Administrative Support Systems Prototype
- e. "PUSH" Publications System
- f. HQDA Admin Support Study

18. PA&E

Full-Time Manning Program

ANNEX I  
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GLOSSARY

## TERMS

**ACCELERATED MOBILIZATION.** Mobilization which is at a rate faster than programed or planned and which requires units and members to enter on active duty without regard to established schedules.

**ACTIVE DUTY.** Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. A general term applied to all active military service with the active force without regard to duration or purpose.

**ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (ADT).** A tour of duty which is used for training members of the Reserve components to provide trained units and qualified persons to fill the needs of the Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency and such other times as the national security requires. The tour of duty is under orders which provide for return to nonactive status when the period of active duty for training is completed. It includes annual training, special tours, and the initial tour performed by non-prior-service enlistees.

**ACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD.** Those units and members of the Army and Air National Guard of the several States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands (Army National Guard only) which are Federally recognized in accordance with law, and which are authorized to have equipment and to engage in regularly scheduled training activities other than Federal service.

**ACTIVE STATUS.** The status of a member of a Reserve component who is not in the inactive Army National Guard, on the Inactive Status List of the Standby Reserve, or in the Retired Reserve.

**ADMINISTRATION.** The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily in the field of logistics and personnel management, to include Internal management of units.

**ADMINISTRATIVE CHAIN OF COMMAND.** The normal chain of command as determined by the administrative organization.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters, such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations.

AFFILIATION PROGRAM. Programs which associates selected Reserve Component units with Active Component units.

ALERT. Any form of communication used by Headquarters, Department of the Army, or other competent authority, to notify ARNGUS or USAR unit commanders that orders to active duty are pending for the units. Simultaneously with the alert, or as soon as possible during the alert period, the unit is given the effective date of entry on active duty, its mobilization station, MTOE, and other basic data as determined by the orders issuing authority.

ANNUAL TRAINING (AT). The minimum period of annual active duty for training or annual field training which a member performs each year to satisfy the annual training requirements associated with his Reserve Component assignment. It may be performed during one consecutive period or in increments of one or more days depending upon mission requirements.

AREA COMMAND. A geographic area of command with Reserve Component functions and responsibilities under the jurisdiction of a CONUSA commander, an OCONUS commander, or an OCONUS unit commander.

AREA MAINTENANCE SUPPORT ACTIVITY (AMSA). A US Army Reserve activity established to provide on an area basis, instruction and organizational maintenance support which is beyond the supported unit's capability to accomplish during scheduled training assemblies.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (ARNG). The Army portion of the organized militia of the several States, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES (ARNGUS). A Reserve component of the Army, all of whose members are members of the Army National Guard.



ARMY RESERVE COMMAND (ARCOM). Established to command a grouping of attached, non-divisional units of the U.S. Army Reserve in a specific area. Reports to a Continental U.S. Army and is normally commanded by a USAR major general.

ARMY READINESS REGION. Advises RC unit commanders in the administration and training of their units. Also supervises the advisors to the RC units. The ARR is subordinate to the Continental U.S. Army. There are nine Readiness Regions.

ARMY RESERVE TECHNICIAN. An employee of the Army Reserve who provides permanent party support to an Army Reserve unit and occupies an Army Reserve unit manning document military position in the unit comparable to his or her technician position.

ASSIGNMENT. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively permanent and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel.

ATTACH. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed by the attachment order, the commander of the formation, unit, or organization receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control thereover as he does over units and persons organic to his command. However, the responsibility for transfer and promotion of personnel will normally be retained by the parent formation, unit or organization.

AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF ORGANIZATION (ALO). The authorized manpower spaces and equipment against which an organization is authorized to requisition personnel and equipment in peacetime.

AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. Is the total number of personnel prescribed in the authorized column of an approved manpower authorization document. (Table of Organization and Equipment, Organization Table, Table of Distribution and Allowances, Unit Manning Document, etc.)

C-DAY. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

CHAIN OF COMMAND. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel.

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. The development of and maintenance of a skilled and civilian workforce. It includes recruitment and placement; job evaluation and pay administration incentives; communications; employee relations-and morale; performance appraised, training, and career development.

CIVILIAN SPONSORED UNIT. An Army Reserve troop program unit or reinforcement training unit (RTU) which, by mutual agreement between the Department of the Army and civilian or governmental organization, is sponsored by a civilian or governmental organization. It is maintained in an Army Reserve status with key personnel provided, as much as possible, from members of the sponsoring organization and the Army Reserve.

COMMAND. The authority which a commander in the military service, lawfully exercises over his subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively issuing available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes the responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

COMMAND AND CONTROL. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of his mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of his mission.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM. The arrangement of personnel, communication procedures and techniques which are employed by a commander for planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of his mission.

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**COMPETITIVE SERVICE TECHNICIAN.** As a Federal employee, the Army or Air Force Reserve competitive service technician is employed under Title 5, U.S. Code. Additionally, in accordance with an agreement between the Military Departments and the Civil Service Commission, military (Reserve) membership is a condition of employment and loss of such membership for reasons within the technician's control is cause for separation. With that exception, the technician is otherwise administered the same and has the same pay and benefits as all other Federal employees in the competitive service under Title 5.

**COMPOSITE COMPENSATION.** Those items of compensation which include life insurance, health benefits, civil service retirement at 7 percent of base pay, State retirement, FICA, O&M support costs, and all items in direct compensation.

**CONTINENTAL U.S. ARMY.** Commands, supports, and supervises USAR forces in specific geographical areas. There are three CONUSA in the U.S.: The First at Fort Meade, Maryland; Fifth at San Antonio, Texas; and the Sixth at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. The CONUSA reports to Headquarters, Forces Command.

**CONTROL.** Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.

**COORDINATING INSTALLATION.** A supporting installation assigned to coordinate specified types of intraservice support within a prescribed geographical area.

**COUNTERPART TRAINING.** Specialty related training for USAR members are attached to an Active component unit to perform specific, career enhancing duty in a specialty required for mobilization.

**D-DAY.** The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

**DAMPL.** Department of the Army Master Priority List is a display by major commands, activities and units in a relative order which determines priorities among claimants for the allocation of commonly required resources and insures management of critical resources is consistent with overall missions and objectives of Department of the Army.

**DELAY.** The postponement of either the date a member is available to report for his active duty tour or the reporting date specified in orders to active duty.

**DIRECT COMPENSATION.** Items of compensation which include base pay, hazardous and environmental pay, premium and night differential pay, severance pay, cost of living allowance (COLA), and lump sum leave.

**DIRECT PAY COSTS.** Those items of compensation that are paid to an individual in a force being costed.

**EARLY RELEASE.** The release of a Ready Reservist from active duty prior to the normal scheduled release date.

**EFFECTIVE DATE OF ENTRY ON ACTIVE DUTY.** The date designated for unit or individual entry on active duty. This is the date members are required to report to the home station or other place designated on official orders.

**ENLISTED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM-USAR (EPMS-USAR).** The management of the USAR enlisted force, beyond the MOS system affecting all aspects of personnel management (training, evaluation, classification, and promotion).

**EXCEPTED SERVICE TECHNICIAN.** An excepted service technician is employed under Title 32, U.S. Code and, except as prescribed by the Secretary concerned, while so employed will be a member of the National Guard and hold the military grade for that position (32 U.S.C. 790b). Military membership is a statutory condition of employment for an "Excepted" National Guard Technician. The technician must be promptly separated upon loss of military membership; ceasing to hold the appropriate military grade for the position; or failing to meet the military security standards (32 U.S.C. 790b). Excepted technicians are employed in their units, train with units, and are mobilized with their units. Other than the exceptions indicated below, the National Guard excepted technician enjoys the same benefits of Federal Civil Service as are provided the Title 5, U.S.C. employee (competitive service). National Guard technicians are exempt from the following sections of Title 5, U.S.C.:

SECTION

SUBJECT

2108  
3502

Veterans Preference  
Order of Retention; Reduction-  
in-Force

SECTION

SUBJECT

5542	Overtime Pay - General Schedule
5543	Compensatory time-off
5544	Overtime Pay - Wage Grade
6102	Overtime Pay - (8-hours day; 40-hour week)
7511	Preference Eligibles - Definitions (Adverse Action)
7512	Cause, Precedence, Exceptions (Adverse Action)

EXEMPTION. Total relief from the requirement to report for active duty on the reporting date specified in orders to active duty.

F-HOUR. The effective time of announcement to the military departments by the Secretary of Defense of a decision to mobilize Reserve Component units.

FILLER OR REINFORCEMENT. Personnel from the Individual Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Active Army who are assigned as reinforcements to mobilized Reserve Component, Active Army, and AUS units to bring the units to full TOE or TDA (wartime) strength.

FORCE READINESS. The readiness of the Army as measured by its ability to man, equip and train its forces and to mobilize deploy and sustain them as required to accomplish assigned missions.

FULL MOBILIZATION. Expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved force structure, all individual reservists, and the materiel resources needed for these units.

**FULL-TIME TRAINING DUTY.** Full-time training or duty, with or without pay, authorized for members of the Army National Guard under 32 U.S.C. 316 and 502-505. This duty is performed in State status and includes annual training, attendance at Army service schools, Army area schools, Air defense region schools, participation in small-arms competition, attendance at military conferences, short tours of special projects, ferrying of aircraft, and participation in command post exercise maneuvers.

**FUNCTIONS.** The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, officer, or organization. (The term "function" includes functions, powers and duties as defined in the National Security Act of 1947).

**GENERAL OFFICER COMMAND.** Includes training divisions, unit maneuver area commands, and functional organization such as engineer commands, separate brigades, hospitals, or other units with an Army Reserve General Officer as Commander.

**GENERAL WAR.** Armed conflict between major powers using total resources of combatant nations. National survival of one or more belligerents is in danger.

**HOME STATION.** The assigned permanent location or assembly point of ARNGUS and USAR units or initial active duty station for individuals reporting separately.

**INACTIVE DUTY TRAINING (IDT).** Authorized training performed by a member of a Reserve Component not on active duty or inactive duty for training and consisting of regularly scheduled unit training, assemblies, additional training assemblies, periods of appropriate duty or equivalent training, and any special additional duties authorized for Reserve Component personnel by an authority designated by the Secretary of the Army, and performed by them in connection with the prescribed activities of the organization in which they are assigned.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR).** Members of the Ready Reserve who are not assigned to the Selected Reserve and who are not on active duty. These reservists may be mobilized as individuals to meet reinforcement requirements of active force units or mobilized Reserve Component units, to form new AUS units and to replace combat losses.

**INSTALLATION.** A grouping of facilities located in the same vicinity which support particular functions.

**JOINT AT-ADT-IDT TRAINING.** The performance of AT or ADT in conjunction, but not concurrently, with IDT by subsections or by individual members of a unit.

**LAYERING.** Headquarters within the same chain of command performing similar functions for the same subordinate units.

**LIMITED WAR.** Armed conflict short of general war.

**M-DAY.** The day the Secretary of Defense, based on the President's or Congress' decisions directs a mobilization. All mobilization planning (e.g., alert, movement, transportation, and deployment/employment) will be based on that date.

**MANAGEMENT.** A process of establishing and attaining objectives to carry out responsibilities. Management consists of those continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of men, money, materials, and facilities to accomplish missions and tasks. Management is inherent in command, but it does not include as extensive authority and responsibility as command.

**MAJOR ARMY COMMAND.** A command directly subordinate to, established by authority of, and specifically designated by Headquarters, department of the Army. Army Component Commands of unified and specified commands are Major Army Commands.

**MAJOR US ARMY RESERVE COMMAND (MUSARC).** A collective term used to describe an ARCOM or a GOCOM that is directly subordinate to a CONUSA.

**MEMBERS.** A commissioned officer, warrant officer, or enlisted person in the Ready Reserve, either as a unit member or as an individual member.

**MILITARY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.** The process of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the procurement, training/education, utilization, separation/retirement, development, and motivation of military personnel to assist in the successful accomplishment of the reorganizational mission. It includes all procedures related to: military job analysis and evaluation; position classification, personnel classification, assignment, and utilization, maintenance of an adequate staff of records and reports required for successful operation of the Army personnel system; HRD activities to include development of individual potential;



and the development of an organizational climate that enhances the attitude, motivation, commitment, and sense of well being of soldiers and their facilities.

**MISSION.** The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task.

**MOBILIZATION.** The ordering of units and members of the ARNGUS and USAR to active duty in preparation for war or other national emergency and the act of calling units and members of the ARNG into Federal service in preparation for war or other national emergency.

**MOBILIZATION DESIGNEE (MOBDES) DETACHMENT.** A functional non-troop program unit consisting of a minimum of five Army MOBDESs organized to provide appropriate inactive duty training (IDT) for members in a nonpay training status.

**MOBILIZATION DESIGNEE PROPONENT.** Any Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or other Federal agency whose mobilization table of distribution and allowance provides mobilization designation positions to be filled by preselected members of the USAR.

**MOBILIZATION ENTITY.** A unit which is organized under an approved authorization document (MTOE or TDA), implemented by general order, and which mobilizes as one entity. All sub-elements are organic and have a common troop program sequence number and a common mobilization station.

**MOBILIZATION STATION.** The designated military installation (active, semiactive, or inactive) or mobilization center to which a Reserve Component unit is moved for further processing, organizing, equipping, training, and employing after mobilization.

**MOVEMENT DIRECTIVE.** An order, issued by the appropriate commander, authorizing a command to move a designated unit from one location to another.

**MUTUAL SUPPORT PROGRAM.** Unstructured association between AC and RC units designed to achieve improved readiness training.

**NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU.** A Joint Bureau of the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force, which is the channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and the Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the National Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the United States.

**NONPAY TRAINING STATUS.** The status of individual members who, with their consent and when authorized by the appropriate commander (CG US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), or ARCOM-GOCOM commander, or OCONUS Commander-OCONUS unit commander) participate in training or related activity without pay for retirement credit only.

**OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM-USAR (OPMS-USAR).** A centralized personnel management system for unit and nonunit (Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)) USAR officers who are not on extended active duty.

**OPERATIONAL CONTROL.** The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

**ORDER.** The procedure by which the Reserve Components (ARNGUS and USAR) enter into the active military service of the United States, under Sections 672 and 673 of Title 10 United States Code, or other acts of Congress.

**PARTIAL MOBILIZATION.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces (short of full mobilization) as a result of action by Congress or the President to mobilize Reserve Component units and/or individual reservists to meet all or part of the requirements of a particular contingency and/or incident to hostilities. Units mobilized to meet the requirements of a partial mobilization are ordered to active duty at their authorized strength.

**PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.** Includes all aspects of civilian personnel management and military personnel management (AR 310-25).

**POMCUS (PREPOSITIONING OF MATERIEL CONFIGURED TO UNIT SETS).** A POMCUS unit is a unit designated to fall in on an existing set of prepositioned (POMCUS) equipment.

**PREASSIGNED PERSONNEL.** Members of the IRR who have been issued orders in peacetime, effective on media announcement of full mobilization. The orders direct individuals where and when to report.

**PRESIDENTIAL CALL.** Procedures by which the President brings all or a part of the Army National Guard into the active Federal service of the United States under Section 3500 and Chapter 15 of Title 10 United States Code.

**READINESS GROUP.** Subelement of an Army Readiness Region that contains branch and functional teams to provide assistance to Reserve Component units.

**READY RESERVE.** Units and members of the Reserve Components and individuals liable for involuntary active duty in time of war, national emergency as declared by Congress, national emergency declared by the President, or when otherwise authorized by law.

**REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES.** Operations and maintenance of the Army's fixed facilities, to include operations of Utilities Maintenance and repair of facilities, minor construction, and other engineering services.

**ROUNDOUT UNIT.** RC unit assigned to an AC Division to raise it to the desired configuration.

**SECTION 265 OFFICERS.** Officers of the Reserve Components authorized under 10 U.S.C. 265 to serve on active duty at the seat of government and at headquarters responsible for Reserve affairs to participate in preparing and administering the policies and regulations affecting the Reserve Components.

**SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION.** Expansion of the active Armed Forces by mobilization of Reserve Component units and/or individual reservists, by authority of Congress or the President, to satisfy an emergency requirement for a force tailored to meet a specific requirement (such as civil disturbances or other domestic situations where Federal Armed Forces may be used to protect life, Federal property and functions, or to prevent

disruption of Federal activities). A selective mobilization differs from a partial mobilization in that it normally would not be associated with requirements for contingency.

**SELECTED RESERVE.** That portion of the Ready Reserve consisting of units and, as designated by the Service Secretaries, of individual reservists required to participate in inactive duty training periods and annual training, both of which are in a pay status. The Selected Reserve also includes persons performing initial active duty training (10 U.S.C. 268(b)).

**SELECTIVE SERVICE DETACHMENT.** A troop program detachment of the US Army Element, Selective System Organization (USAR Augmentation) organized, supervised, and trained as prescribed by the Director, Selective Service.

**SPAN OF CONTROL.** The number of subordinate units that may be supervised effectively by a single commander.

**STATE AREA COMMAND.** A mobilization entity within the ARNG State headquarters and headquarters detachment that is ordered to active duty when ARNG units in that State are alerted for mobilization. It provides for command and control of mobilized ARNGUS units from home station until arrival at mobilization station. It is also responsible for planning and executing CONUS general war plans and military support of Civil Defense under the respective area commander.

**STATE CONTROL.** The controlling authority for all ARNG units not on active duty.

**STEADFAST.** Reorganization of the U.S. Army structure in CONUS which resulted in establishment of USA Forces Command, Training, and Doctrine Command, and the consolidation of several smaller commands.

**SUPPORTING INSTALLATION.** An installation or activity that provides a type of support to off-post units and activities within a specific geographic area.

**TECHNICIAN, DUAL STATUS.** A full-time employee of the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, or the Army of Air National Guard of who is required, as a condition of employment, to be a military member (Reserve/Guard) of the organization for which he or she works. Technicians provide day-to-day continuity of management, operations, training, maintenance, and other support activities required to maintain the operational and mobilization readiness of their respective military units.

TECHNICIAN, NON-DUAL STATUS. A full-time employee of the Army or Air National Guard who is not required to be a military member of the Guard. Normally not to exceed 5 percent of the dual-status technician force.

TITLE 5 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. In a restricted sense, the term "Title 5 Civilian Employees" refers to persons employed under Title 5, U.S.C., who are assigned to the National Guard Bureau or to support-type functions at bases managed by the Air National Guard. Such employees are not required to be military members of the National Guard. In a more general sense, the term includes all persons who are employed in the Federal Government under Title 5, U.S.C. (civil service).

TOTAL COST. Includes all items in composite compensation plus workman's compensation, unemployment compensation, and civil service retirement at 24.7 percent of base pay.

TOTAL FORCE POLICY. A Department of Defense policy which recognized all components as contributing to deterrence of war and protection of United States national security interests. These components--collectively called the Total Force--include both active and Reserve components of the United States, those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs. The objectives of this policy is to ensure that an appropriate balance is achieved throughout all phases of planning and programing, manning, equipping, and employment of the Total Force components, so that United States national security objectives can be achieved most effectively and efficiently.

TOTAL MOBILIZATION. Expansion of the active Armed Forces by organizing and/or activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop basis to respond to requirements in excess of the troop basis and the full mobilization of all national resources needed to round out and sustain such forces.

UNIT. Any military elements of the Selected Reserve whose structure is prescribed by an approved authorization document such as an MTOE or a TDA.

UNIT READINESS. The readiness of a unit is the degree to which it is capable of performing the mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

US ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER (RCPAC). A field operating agency of the Adjutant General, Department of the Army that commands and controls all individual nonunit Army Reserve personnel assigned to control groups, except as indicated in figure 1-1, and plans for their mobilization develops and maintains automated Reserve personnel accounting and reporting systems; administration of personnel management systems; administration of personnel management activities of the Army Reserve.

## ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Army Audit Agency
AC	Active Component
ACC	Army Communications Command
ACP	Army Capabilities Plan
ACU	Active Component Unit
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADPE	Automatic Data Processing Equipment
ADT	Active Duty for Training
AFEES	Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station
AFMPG	Army Force Mobilization Planning Guidance
AG	Adjutant General
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
AMEDD	Army Medical Department
AMIS	Army Management Information System
AMS	Army Management Structure
AMSA	Area Maintenance Support Activities
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
AR	Army Regulation
ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
ARFOR	Army Forces
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARNGUS	Army National Guard of the United States
ARR	Army Readiness Region
ARRED	U.S. Army Force, Readiness Command
ART	Army Reserve Technician
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASOP	Army Strategic Objectives Plan
AT	Annual Training
ATC	Army Training Center
ATEP	Army Training Equipment Pool
ATP	Army Training Program
ATS	Annual Training Sites
AUS	Army of the United States
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOSEVECOM	Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
BA	Budget Activity
BASOPS	Base Operations
BBM	Blocking, Bracing Packing, and Crating Material
BDE	Brigade
BOIP	Basis of Issue Plan
BOTEFRC	Balance of TOE Equipment for Reserve Components
BSI	Base Support Installation
C-DAY	Commencement of Deployment Day
C-E	Communication Electronics
CAMIS	CONUS Army Management Information System

CAP III	Centralized Assignment Processing System III
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CDR	Commander
CI	Coordinating Installation
CLRT	Command Logistics Review Team
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
COA	Comptroller of the Army
COE	Chief of Engineers
COGS	Combat Oriented General Support
COILS	CONUS Installation Logistics Support
COMPASS	Computerized Movement Planning and Status System
CONPLAN	CONcept Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CONUSA	Continental US Army
COOP	Continuity of Operations Plan
COSCOM	Corps Support
CPO	Civilian Personnel Officer or Civilian Personnel Office
CPX	Command Post Exercise
D-DAY	Commencement of Hostilities Day.
DA	Department of the Army
DAMPL	Department of the Army Master Priority List
DARCOM	U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DARNG	Director, Army National Guard
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DEFCON	Defense Condition
DFAE	Director of Facilities Engineering
DIB	Defense Intelligence Board
DIC	Document Identifier Code
DIO	Director of Industrial Operations
DLOG	Division Logistics System
DMTB	Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis
DPI	Data Processing Installation
DPPG	Defense Policy and Planning Guidance
DPT	Director of Plans and Training
DRC	Director of Reserve Components
DRL	Date Ready to Load
DS	Direct Support
EAD	Echelon Above Division
ECS	Equipment Concentration Site (USAR)
ED	Effective Date when unit enters Federal Active Duty
E-DATE	Date of Status Change of a Unit
EEA	Essential Element of Analysis
EEE	Essential Element of Evaluation
EPMS	Enlisted Personnel Management System
F-HOUR	Time specified by the SECDEF for the military departments to mobilize



FAD	Funding Authorization Document
FAO	Finance and Accounting Office
FMREC	Force Mobilization Review and Evaluation Committee
FOC	FORSCOM Operations Center
FORSCOM	U.S. Army Forces Command
FTTD	Full-Time Training Duty
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GAO	General Accounting Office
GOCOM	Army Reserve General Officer Command
GS	General Support
HSC	Health Services Command
IADT	Initial Active Duty for Training
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IPR	In-Process Review
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ISSA	Inter-Service Support Agreement
ITO	Installation Transportation Officer
JOPS	Joint Operations Planning System
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Operations Plan
LAD	Latest Arrival Date
LCSMM	Life Cycle System Management Model
M	Mobilization
M-DAY	Day Commencement of Mobilization begins
MAC	Maneuver Area Command
MATES	Mobilization and Training Equipment Site
MEDAC	Medical Activity
MEDCEN	United States Army Medical Center
MEPCOM	Military Enlistment Processing Command
MI	Mobilization Installation
MILPERCEN	Military Personnel Center
MILPO	Military Personnel Office
MISO	Management Information Systems Office
MLCH	Major Logistics Control Headquarters (Reserve Components)
MOR	Mobilization
MOBDES	Mobilization Designee
MOBEX	Mobilization Exercise
MOBPERS	Mobilization Personnel System
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPP	Mobilization Preassignment Program
M&RA	Manpower and Reserve Affairs
MS	Mobilization Station
MTBSP	Mobilization Troop Basis Stationing Plan
MTC	Maneuver Training Commands
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MUSARC	Major United States Army Reserve Command (subordinate to a CONUSA)
MUTA	Multiple Unit Training Assembly
NDMTB	Non-Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis

NDMTB	Non-Deployment Mobilization Troop Basis
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NICP	National Inventory Control Point
OCAR	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
OCE	Office of the Chief of Engineers
ODCSPER	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
OE	Organizational Effectiveness
OMA/OMAR/	Operations and Maintenance, Army/Army Reserve/Army
OMARNG	National Guard
OMNIBUS	The Army Operational Readiness Analysis
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPMS	Officer Personnel Management System
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPCCN	Operational Control
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General
PAPPGM	Preliminary Army Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PDS	Paid Drill Strength
PIRC	Program to Improve Reserve Components
PL	Prescribed Load
PLL	Prescribed Load List
PMDL	Post Mobilization Deployment List
PMITSP	Post Mobilization Individual Training & Support Plan
PMOS	Primary Military Occupational Specialty
POC	Point of Contact
POM	Program Objective Memo/Preparation for Overseas Movement
POMCUS	Pre-positioned Material Configured to Unit Sets
POR	Preparation for Overseas Replacement
RAPS	Reserve Automated Pay System
RC	Reserve Components
RCMP	Reserve Component Mobilization Plan
RCPAC	US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center
RCU	Reserve Component Unit
REDCON	Readiness Condition
REFORGER	Redeployment of Forces to Germany
RG	Readiness Group
RICC	Reportable Item Control Code
RIG	Report Identification Group
RIN	Record Identification Number
RPA	Reserve Personnel, Army
SA	Secretary of the Army
SAIS	Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System
SAMIS	Standard Army Management Information System
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense

SI	Supporting Installation
SICC	Single Installation Coordination Concept
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRAA	Senior Army Advisor
SRC	Standard Requirements Code
SSS	Selective Service System
STARC	State Area Command
STRAF	Strategic Army Forces
TAG	The Adjutant General
TCMD	Transportation Control and Movement Document
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOA	Transportation Operating Agencies (includes MAC, MTMC, and MSC)
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPFDD	Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSG	The Surgeon General
TUCHA	Type Unit Characteristics
UIC	Unit Identification Code
UMC	Unit Move Category
URR	Unit Readiness Report
USACC	U.S. Army Communications Command
USAFAC	U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center
USAINTA	U.S. Army Intelligence Agency
USAR	U.S. Army Reserve
USAREC	U.S. Army Recruiting Command
USAREUR	U.S. Army Europe
USARRED	U.S. Army Forces, Readiness Command
USREDCOM	U.S. Readiness Command
USPFO	U.S. Property and Fiscal Office (NG)
UTA	Unit Training Assemblies
UTC	Unit Type Code
UTES	Unit Training Equipment Sites
VCSA	Vice Chief of Staff, Army
VMP	Volunteer Mobilization Program
VTAADS	The Vertical Army Authorization Document System
WES	WWMCCS Entry System
WIN	WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System

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